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Abstract 
 
In many developing countries, those people who work the land as food producers are 
also the ones who most suffer from food insecurity. While many studies look at the 
power dynamics within the food system at the global level and the role played by 
transnational companies in particular, this investigation starts at the local level to 
look into the reasons behind the high levels of food insecurity among farmers. 
Specifically, it analyses how the relationship between the domestic food producers 
and the state in Tanzania has affected food security in rural areas, in particular in 
farmers’ households. The question it asks is: How has the relationship between the 
state and farmers shaped food security in rural Tanzania since its independence? 
A qualitative approach has been employed: farmer interviews were conducted in 8 
villages located in two regions of Tanzania - Coast and Kilimanjaro - and 
supplemented by interviews with state officials and civil society representatives. The 
villages surveyed in the Coast region suffer from arid conditions and are isolated 
from the main road that connects Dar es Salaam to Morogoro, while the villages 
studied in the Kilimanjaro region are on the slopes of the mountains around the town 
of Usangi, far from the touristic and commercial centres of Moshi and Arusha. 
Through interviews with farmers in these villages, the qualitative approach of this 
research offers a contextualised insight into food insecurity, the problems of the 
agricultural sector and farmers’ attitude towards the state and its policies. The 
interviews with state officials and representatives of civil society were employed to 
investigate both current agricultural policies and officials’ attitude towards small 
scale farmers.  
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This thesis makes an empirical contribution to the literature on food security and 
state-farmer relationships.  I argue that the mixture of agricultural policies 
implemented by the state over the years have done little to improve the livelihoods of 
small scale farmers that live in isolated rural areas.  One of the reasons why this is so 
is that the policies are not framed around the needs of small scale farmers (despite 
them being the great majority of the farmers in the country), and hence are not 
welcomed positively by the communities. The results of this study identify a 
reciprocal distrust between the state and farmers as one of the main causes of policy 
failure and unsatisfactory improvements in food security in rural areas. On one side, 
state officials see small scale farmers as inefficient and wish for the agricultural 
sector to be driven by medium and large scale farmers. On the other side, most 
farmers tend to dismiss state officials’ advice as inadequate to the reality of farming. 
In general, farmers see the state as a distant entity, with which they have little 
contact and which they do not trust. 
I argue that the controversial relationship between the Tanzanian state and farmers is 
historically grounded and has a direct link with food insecurity amongst farmers for 
two main reasons. First, it affects the framing, objectives and implementation of 
agricultural policies, which thus fail to support small scale farmers. Second, it 
hinders the ability of farmers to successfully cooperate and/or create a coherent 
farmers’ movement to improve food security and address their challenges at state 
level. Farmers’ discontent is perceived in their alienation to politics, and in their 
distrust towards a state that has historically not been able to address their challenges 
nor improve their condition.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1.1. The world’s quest to achieve global food security 
The relationship between people and food has been explored for centuries. 
Throughout history, food and different diets have characterised the distinction 
between classes, and determined social and political power. The rich banquets 
consumed in the courts of the feudal Europe in the late Middle Age period were 
produced and cooked by poor peasants, who consumed much more modest meals. 
The wealthy ate, while the poor suffered. And after many centuries not much has 
changed.  
Under-nutrition is still widespread, and most importantly, it is still strictly connected 
to a condition of poverty.
1
 Curiously, the producers of food are often the ones that 
most stay hungry. The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) estimates that 
small scale farmers produce nearly 70% of the total world food supply (FAO, 2013, 
p.22). However, most of them are unable to produce enough food or earn enough 
income to meet their own household’s needs, as explained by the UK Food Group 
(2010, p.1). A study by the World Food Programme (2013) also underlines how 
agricultural households are more vulnerable to food insecurity than urban ones, and 
are also the ones in which diversification of food is lowest and where the share of 
income spent on food is the highest (more than 75%). It is indeed curious to see that 
those most active with the production of food are often also those that have the least 
food in their hands at the end of the day.  
                                                          
1 The connection between poverty and food insecurity has notably been analysed by Amartya 
Sen in the book Poverty and Famine (1998). 
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This apparent contradiction is what struck me most during my year and a half in 
Tanzania in the years 2010 and 2011, and inspired me to investigate this issue further 
through this study. It was difficult to understand why and how, in a country where 
around 80% of the population are farmers, over a third could be undernourished. 
This thesis will unveil the historical and political reasons why this is the case, and 
offer a possible explanation to the contradiction that sees small-scale farmers 
worldwide producing the majority of food but at the same time suffering most from 
food insecurity.  
The issues of hunger and inequality have been analysed by many scholars over the 
years, and has gained more and more coverage over time, so much that the 
terminology such as ‘food security’, ‘the right to food’, and ‘food sovereignty’ are 
now commonly used to refer to specific branches of the literature that have explored 
the topic and the problems of food in connection to politics, economics, and socio-
cultural factors. Such investigations are illustrated in Chapter 2 of this thesis. For 
now, it is important to mention that this thesis borrows the concept of food security 
as used by the FAO in 2006. Food security was here defined as ‘the situation that 
exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to 
sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food 
preferences for an active and healthy life and are not at undue risk of losing such 
access’ (FAO, 2006).  
Hence, the FAO identifies four dimensions of food security, related to access, 
affordability, utilisation and stability of enough, nutritious and diverse food. The 
long term dimension of food security is extremely important, hence vulnerability is a 
factor to be considered when assessing the food insecurity condition of a determined 
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household,
2
 as explained by Kalibwani (2005) and Guha-Kasnobis et al. (2007). 
While the term food security is often used with reference to the global scale, in this 
thesis it will be used in its household dimension, for reasons that will be explained 
later on. Moreover, issues such as power, equity, control and sustainability, generally 
neglected by the global talks on food security, at least according to the Food 
Sovereignty movement, will also be considered.
3
  
Food insecurity is a political problem, both at its global and national level. This 
thesis claims that such dimensions cannot be ignored. Achieving food security on a 
global level is one of the biggest challenges of politics in modern days. Despite the 
progress in technology and in some social development indicators (for example 
primary education), food insecurity is still a problem in the twenty-first century, and 
affects not only less developed countries, but also developed ones too, both as 
regards under-nutrition and obesity. The commitments to fight hunger and food 
insecurity undertaken at the international level are several, with the right to food 
having been recognised in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Righs of 1966 
where signatory states committed themselves to take the measures ‘[…] needed to 
improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food […] to ensure 
an equitable distribution of world food supplies in relation to need’4 (ICESR, 1966, 
Art. 11, 2a). Nevertheless, the increasing unreliability of weather patterns, differing 
                                                          
2 For example, the households that heavily rely on agriculture to satisfy their food needs could 
have enough food to satisfy the family’s needs during the post-harvest season but suffer in the 
period before harvest. Such households depend on seasonality and are to be considered 
vulnerable to food insecurity. 
3 As it will be explained in Chapter 2, according to the Food Sovereignty movement, these issues 
are often ignored in the discussions over food security (Declaration of Nyeleni, 2007 and 
Sustainable Development Commission, 2009). 
4 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 11, 2a, 1966. 157 states 
have signed the Covenant.  
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economic interests, and limited political will (including the right to food not being 
enforced) have hindered efforts towards enabling a growing population to have 
access to sufficient, safe, nutritious and diverse food. Moreover, as mentioned at the 
beginning of this chapter, it is essential to understand why food producers are often 
the ones that most lack this access.  
Scholars such as Harriet Friedmann (1993), Geoff Tansey (1995) and Philip 
McMichael (2009) have tried to provide an answer to these questions by locating 
food producers in the global food system and its historical context. According to 
these scholars, in the current ‘global food regime’ the control over food production is 
increasingly in the hands of large corporations instead of farmers who are unable to 
compete with mass scale production. Moreover food is being progressively 
commoditised
5
 and financial speculation on crops distorts the agricultural market 
leading to volatile food prices and increasing poor households’ vulnerability towards 
food insecurity. Under these circumstances, reaching food security at the national 
level becomes increasingly complicated and small scale farmers’ households are 
often the ones that suffer the most.  
As a consequence, many farmers worldwide are leaving their lands and moving to 
the cities and/or looking for off-farm side activities to satisfy their households’ 
needs. These phenomena have been defined as respectively deagrarianisation and 
depeasantisation by authors such as Henry Bernstein (2001) and Deborah Bryceson 
(2009). They are seen as symptoms of a food system in which large corporations 
lobby national and international political representatives to influence and assume 
increasing control over the future of food. Hence, for many small scale farmers, 
unable to compete with the large scale highly mechanised - and often subsidised - 
                                                          
5 Food produced, seen and commercialised likewise any other commodity. 
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agricultural production of these multinational corporations, agriculture is often seen 
as a burden, an activity that does not guarantee a state of food security and a 
dignified livelihood.  
Following this line of analysis, and looking at the future of food security, many 
academics and activists have demanded a different food system where small scale 
farmers and sustainable agriculture are at the core (including scholars such as 
Vandana Shiva, 2000, Eric Holt Gimenez, 2006 and 2012, Rajeev Patel, 2008, Julia 
Wright, 2010, and movements such as Slow Food and Via Campesina).  Others 
believe that only technology and a second green revolution can improve food 
production and hence provide sufficient food to a growing world population 
(researchers such as Norman Borlaug 2000 and 2003, and Albert Sasson, 2012, and 
organizations such as the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa - AGRA, 
Sasakawa Africa Association -SAA and the Syngenta Foundation). This study places 
itself in the first camp, and is thus part of the literature that advocates the exigency of 
a new food system where the needs, concerns and requests of farmers should be at 
the centre of international and national policy and not subordinated to agribusiness or 
the market logic. In this thesis, food insecurity is not merely regarded as a problem 
concerning the provision of food to an increasing population, but as a deeply 
political issue that requires a strong stance of governments to assist farmers in their 
struggle to achieve food security in a sustainable and democratic way. 
It is exactly at this point where the main argument for opting for the first camp lays. 
Whereas the second camp looks at food insecurity as an issue where the central 
problem is constituted by a shortage of food supply, a perspective that begins with 
farmers, as put forward throughout the next chapters, reveals a much wider range of 
issues. In other words, a quantitative perspective on food security that tends to focus 
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on the global level considers the problem as one in which certain stocks of resources 
are unable to produce a certain amount of food. In short, the problem is one of 
efficiency and of maximisation of production. However, once the theme is addressed 
from the starting point of actual farmers, the wider social aspects of food security 
come to the forefront. Once the daily lives of farmers are observed, food security is 
not merely defined through a quantity of food or calories, but as a deeply social 
issue, characterised through complex relationships between different actors. As will 
be expanded later on in the next chapter, with reference to the literature on the topic, 
preferences, access to diversified food and subjective perceptions all play an 
important role in the definition of food security. This thesis hence focuses on the 
effective conditions of the household and its political dimensions and turns away 
from a globalised perspective that operates on quantifiable parameters. 
The approach taken in the thesis is also informed by my own intellectual 
development. Being raised in Italy and having witnessed the difficulties of small 
scale fruit and vegetable producers in Sardinia, I have always been interested in 
food, but just as much in the lives of the producers. I approached the issue of food 
security in developing countries during my post-graduate studies, and wrote my first 
research essay on the topic of food security in Southern and East Africa as part of my 
Master degree in 2009. In the aftermath of the food price spike crisis of 2008, 
debates about the concept of food security had become popular in the arena of 
international politics. For instance, at the G8 Summit at L’Aquila in 2008 the Aquila 
Food Security Initiative was launched, and at the G20 Summit in 2010, the 
Development Working Group was created, declaring global food security as one of 
the nine commitments of the G20 group.  
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Back then however, I was mainly interested in the statistically measurable 
performances of the countries analysed (Malawi and Zimbabwe), as outcomes of 
national agricultural policies framed within the regional guidelines on food security 
of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). In this approach the 
social aspects of food security and its political implications were little discussed, and 
I mostly focused on statistical data based on food production (availability), 
utilization and access. Nevertheless, after having spent almost two years in Tanzania 
as a teacher and development worker myself, it seemed to me that the issue of food 
security, as previously mentioned, is much more complex than just statistical data, 
and that the political dimensions of the problem ought to be at the centre of the 
debate. In particular, I felt that statistical data were not offering me the answers I was 
looking for and neither were telling me much about the subjective perceptions of the 
people who are mostly affected by food insecurity.  
Also, the time spent in the communities of the villages where interviews were 
collected made me realise how important it is to analyse the issue of food insecurity 
in its proper cultural and political context. Discourses on the global food regime as 
summarised above, seemed to offer me, on the ground and in the Tanzanian context, 
only a partial explanation on why and how the majority of the population was 
involved in the agricultural sector but was still food insecure. For instance, on the 
ground, all I could see was an informal economic exchange of agricultural products, 
and land so dry and unproductive that would be difficult to imagine investors 
running to grab it. The description of the global food regime felt like an abstract 
concept in these circumstances. In order to understand what triggers food insecurity 
in countries were agriculture is the main economic activity, I realized that I needed 
to immerge myself in the specific context of the country I wished to analyse.  
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The initial inspiration that drove this research originated from observing the students 
of one of these villages, named Kwala, in Coast region, at about 80 km distance from 
Dar es Salaam. The secondary school (KWASS) student performances were 
extremely weak, and according to students and teachers alike, the poor concentration 
in the classroom was directly connected to the malnutrition and hunger experienced. 
These students belong to farming households, in an area of the country where local 
market exchange and production for self-consumption are widely diffused, while the 
presence of multinational companies or other sort of foreign investments is basically 
inexistent. It became clear rather quickly that in such a context, the events at the 
international level only had a partial indirect influence over the food security 
dynamics in these villages, and the problems of the agricultural sector had to be 
investigated using a different perspective. In an attempt to contextualise the issue of 
food insecurity in rural Tanzania, this research found a connection between food 
insecurity and farmers’s relationship with the state, that in several ways complicated 
and hindered the development of a successful, pro small scale farmers agricultural 
policy that could have improved the food security condition of many rural areas in 
Tanzania.    
Hence, while recognising the validity of the literature on the global food system as a 
general preamble and as a guideline on the issue of food security, this thesis 
underlines the importance of a contextualised approach, stressing that although it is 
true that the general tendency towards a global food regime (as defined by 
McMichael and Friedmann, 1989) is in place, my exposure to Tanzanian farmers has 
demonstrated that there are also many different local food systems to take into 
account. Hence a simple generalisation of these systems could give a misleading 
answer to the problem of food insecurity. Again, this thesis argues for an approach 
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that is open to more generalised theorising, but that collects the data at the local level 
and that thus takes into account the characteristics of the subject population. 
1.2. The importance of contextualisation: towards a study of state-society 
relationships 
In these terms, this dissertation aims at contributing to the general literature on food 
security by providing an analysis of a specific case study, Tanzania. This analysis 
follows a bottom-up approach with a qualitative empirical focus. The original 
contribution comes from the fact that, in this study, the issue of food security is not 
merely analysed under its social household perspective, but is investigated through 
the political lens of the dynamics of power between the state and the food producers 
in the specific context of Tanzania, for the reasons enunciated in the previous section 
and with particular reference to the qualitative data collected. Indeed, national 
policies influence very directly upon the local specifications of the farming 
communities. This research borrows concepts developed broadly by the general 
literature on food security, the politics of food, farmers' movements and state-society 
relationship, and tries to build a bridge that aims at connecting these concepts 
together.  
In a specific manner, the thesis explores the impact of the relationship between 
farmers and the state on food security in farming households in the Tanzanian 
context. Hence the main research question is: 
How has the relationship between the state and farmers shaped food security in 
rural Tanzania since its independence? 
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The ways in which the relationship between the Tanzanian state and small scale 
farmers affects households’ food security in rural areas are explored from different 
perspectives, by looking at both farmers and state officials’ declarations and the 
interaction between these two subjects. It is argued that this relationship has a direct 
impact on farmers’ food security as it affects the framing, the implementation and 
the outcome of agricultural policies.  Moreover, the effects on farmers’ food security 
are looked at by analysing the extent to which this relationship conditions and shapes 
the political interaction between the farmers and the state. Whether this interaction is 
characterised by cooperation or attitudes of contestation, this thesis proves that there 
is a strong connection between the state-farmer relationship and the ability of 
farmers to improve their food security situation, and this by actively participating, 
contesting or addressing issues at the state level.  
To this end, literature theorising state-society engagement, incorporation and 
disconnection are employed. Besides theories on the nature of the state in relation to 
power, one of the questions around the concept of ‘state’ and ‘society’ is whether the 
society and the state are separate entities or whether society is instead an inclusive 
part of the state (Migdal, 2001 and Li, 2005). While these positions will be more 
thoroughly introduced in the literature review chapters (chapters 2 and 3), it is 
important to underline at this stage that this study borrows the framework of analysis 
put forward by Scott (1998), Chabal and Daloz (1999), and Ferguson and Gupta 
(2002) indicating that state and society are two separate entities, where the state is 
seen as being ‘above’ society.  
It is also important to outline here that the Tanzanian state is best described as a 
complex body composed of several organisms which hold different levels of power, 
mainly at the local, district and national level. This hierarchical structure of power 
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connects the state authority to the regional, district and local authorities. 
Nevertheless, the devolution of powers to lower authorities is mostly only apparent, 
since regional and district officials are usually appointed by the political party in 
charge and follow the indications given by the party.
6
 The case for local 
representatives (village chairpersons) is rather different as they are directly elected 
by the villagers, and hold little decisional power. For example, they can decide and 
organise the village-owned land concessions between the villagers, but they need to 
have the consensual agreement from the district in matters such as land selling, 
education and health. The structure of the state as summarised above provides 
indications on the limits of communication between the Tanzanian central authority 
and the society that will be explored in this study. Long bureaucratic processes and 
internal conflicts between the different levels of power within the state (national, 
district, local) complicate the relationship between state and society in several ways. 
Moreover, as we will see, the political structure of the state is fundamental to 
understand the dynamics of power and political engagement between the state and 
rural society.  
The state-farmers relationship is analysed following the theoretical framework 
provided by authors such as Rothchild, Chazan, Hyden and Bratton, and in particular 
the definitions provided by Azarya and Olorunsola on society incorporation and 
disengagement to the state (in Rothchild and Chazan, 1988). Is Tanzania’s rural 
society an incorporated society or a disengaged one in relation to the state? And how 
does this affect the outcome of agricultural policies and eventually food security in 
                                                          
6 The party currently in power is named Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and is in power since 
independence, despite a multiparty system being in place since 1992. In the last elections, in 
2010, it gained the majority of the votes (more than 60%) that culminated with the re-election 
of Jakaya M. Kikwete as President. Currently, the CCM party occupies 263 out of 357 seats at the 
National Assembly. Electoral turnout in the mainland in 2010 elections was recorded at around 
39% (Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance website, 2014).  
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farming households? In answering these questions, this study argues that Tanzanian 
rural society presents the characteristics of a disengaged society in relation to the 
state, and analyses the terms and characteristics of this disengagement. In short, an 
incorporated society is a society where its individuals feel part of the state and take 
active part in the state processes and decisions, while a disengaged society is 
described by Olorunsola (1988) and Ayoade (1988) as a society that looks at the 
state with scepticism and considers it inefficient in satisfying the population’s needs. 
This research will analyse the extent to which Tanzanian rural society’s 
disengagement is the result of a desire of autonomy from state control and a lack of 
confidence in the capabilities and willingness of the state in improving the 
conditions of society. As we will see in Chapter 4, this distrust needs to be 
investigated through a historical lens, since it finds his roots in the creation and 
development of the very idea of the state since independence.  
Tanzanian rural society, which appears to be disengaged from the state, and hence, 
using the term borrowed by Hyden (1980, 1983), ‘uncaptured’, is therefore a sceptic 
society that tends to alienate itself from the state. Several authors have found the 
reasons of this disengagement in the Tanzanian cultural or historical tradition. For 
instance, Hyden blames the ‘economy of affection’ of Tanzanian rural society for 
hindering the process of development and compromising a fruitful collaboration 
between the state and its society. With the expression ‘economy of affection’ he 
indicates the network of relations within societies in which kinship and community 
ties affect the development and the political behaviour of individuals. As a result, 
according to Hyden, members of society expect special favours or special treatments 
from political representatives within their community (‘expectation of reciprocity’). 
The impossibility to please everybody within the community inevitably led to these 
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expectations not being met. Consequently the disillusion of society is visible, just as 
is the alienation from the state, according to the scholar. Authors like Rothchild and 
Chazan (1988), Daloz (2003), Kelsall (2004) and Chabal (2009) come to very similar 
conclusions. 
Ayoade (1988) and Barker (1989) stress how in Tanzania high expectations were 
actually actively raised by the state after independence in the attempt to create a 
strong idea of nation state. The failure in fulfilling them stirred up a process of 
disillusion and disengagement from the state by the society. This thesis embraces 
these theories partially, arguing that recent events have contributed to the 
development of a controversial relationship between the state and rural society. 
Hence, this study argues that the distrust towards the state is the result of a mixture 
of causes, among which are the failure of past policies, corruption and bad 
implementation of programmes in more recent years. 
Furthermore, some neo-patrimonial features, such as the presence of corruption and 
clientelal practices and the tendency of state officials to use state resources at their 
personal advantage, as described by Bayart et al. (1999) and Daloz (2003), were also 
identified in the Tanzanian state and could be interpreted as a result of the historical 
development of the relationship between state and society. For example, clientelism, 
corruption practices, and the personification of politics were evident during the 
Nyerere era and are still pervasive in Tanzania today. These aspects developed by 
the neo-patrimonial literature are employed in this study to analyse the relationship 
the state has with society and how it may affect the outcome of agricultural policies.  
Clearly, the alienation between state and society frames society’s (dis)engagement 
with politics. The disconnection between the state and rural communities is certainly 
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not a novelty, it is common in many countries worldwide, even in developed ones. 
As a matter of fact, in several parts of the world farmers’ movements are growing in 
popularity. For instance, the movement of Via Campesina originated in Latin 
America and is embracing the concept of Food Sovereignty
7
 which claims a direct 
control over resources and food policies, is now popular within many communities 
of farmers worldwide.  
Given Tanzanian farmers’ discontent, and the historical importance of cooperative 
associations in agriculture (explained in Chapter 4), we would expect to find great 
cohesion and strong rural movements in the country. Nevertheless, as it will be 
explained, generally rural movements in East Africa, including in Tanzania, receive 
little acknowledgement, and little media coverage. But how much are rural 
movements spread in reality? This research will analyse farmers’ political 
engagement and assess the assumption (and general first impression) that rural 
movements in Tanzania are not strong. Moreover, it will question the literature that 
considers a lack of strong movements in the countryside to be a symptom of political 
apathy, individualism or passivity (Hyden, 1980, Bernstein, 1981, Forrest, 1988, 
Kelsall, 2004, and Becker, 2009). 
                                                          
7 Signed by several rural movements in over 80 countries in 2007, the Declaration of Nyeleni 
provides a comprehensive definition of Food Sovereignty: ‘the right of peoples to healthy and 
culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and 
their right to define their own food and agriculture systems. It puts the aspirations and needs of 
those who produce, distribute and consume food at the heart of food systems and policies 
rather than the demands of markets and corporations. It defends the interests and inclusion of 
the next generation. It offers a strategy to resist and dismantle the current corporate trade and 
food regime, and directions for food, farming, pastoral and fisheries systems determined by 
local producers and users. Food sovereignty prioritises local and national economies and 
markets and empowers peasant and family farmer-driven agriculture, artisanal - fishing, 
pastoralist-led grazing, and food production, distribution and consumption based on 
environmental, social and economic sustainability. Food sovereignty promotes transparent 
trade that guarantees just incomes to all peoples as well as the rights of consumers to control 
their food and nutrition. It ensures that the rights to use and manage lands, territories, waters, 
seeds, livestock and biodiversity are in the hands of those of us who produce food. Food 
sovereignty implies new social relations free of oppression and inequality between men and 
women, peoples, racial groups, social and economic classes and generations’. 
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This thesis stresses the need to contextualise farmers’ political actions and 
engagement with the state in the social and political history of Tanzania, suggesting 
that the reasons behind the state-society disengagement are key to understand 
farmers’ attitudes towards politics. Again, the world food system as presented by 
McMichael, and the reaction - often expressed in direct contestation - that has been 
witnessed from small scale farmers worldwide facing the challenges of the global 
food regime do not necessarily portray a valid picture of the Tanzanian food system 
or Tanzanian farmers’ reaction to certain dissatisfactions. In fact, countries such as 
Tanzania, in which capitalist exploitation has not completely pervaded the society 
and where foreign influences in the form of agribusinesses are limited may tell us a 
different story concerning food security and small scale farmers’ everyday 
difficulties, although we will see in Chapter 3 and 4 that the limited penetration of 
capitalism is debated by several scholars such as Ponte, 1998 and 2000, Meertens, 
2000, Bernstein, 2004, Thomson, 2010 and Cooksey, 2011. Again, history and 
contextualisation play a considerable role in determining food politics dynamics and 
understanding food security nowadays. 
Nonetheless, the focus of this study on the state-farmer relationship and the 
affirmation that ‘foreign influences are limited’ should not be understood as an 
interpretation of the Tanzanian state as being completely autonomous. On the 
contrary, it will be illustrated in Chapter 6 that one of the objectives of the state 
policy is to tie the linkages with international organizations as well as with non-
governmental organizations. And indeed the latter are widespread in the country, 
although in some areas more than in others. Hence, the state policy is influenced by 
external forces and in particular by the political agendas of donors, as claimed by 
Hyden and Bratton (1992), Li (2005), and Lund (2006). This thesis will analyse the 
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ways in which the state-society relationship is complicated by these influences and 
what this means for food security in rural households (Chapter 7). 
1.3. Case selection and focus of the study  
The choice for Tanzania as a case study has several reasons. First, it is a country of 
which I had a first-hand knowledge having lived there for almost two years and, 
secondly, it seemed an appropriate country to analyse the state-farmer relationship in 
relation to food security. This is because the large majority of Tanzanian population 
(around 75%) is composed by small scale farmers but, with more than 40% of its 
population living in food-deficit regions, and about a third of the total population 
being classified as undernourished by the FAO, malnutrition remains a considerable 
problem. Moreover, it is important to note that there is also an issue of food 
diversification, with about 70% of all energy obtained from staples such as maize 
and rice. As it will be explained in chapter 5, the lack of differentiation is a problem 
as it is associated with Vitamin A, calcium and protein deficiency (FAOSTAT, 
World Bank and African Development Bank data). 
Given these poor records, we may expect to find a general neglect of the agricultural 
sector in state’s policy. On the contrary, and what also makes Tanzania an interesting 
case study, agriculture has always officially been recognised as a significant and 
important activity by the state, from the socialist governments in the aftermath of the 
independence in 1961 to the introduction and transition to liberalism. Nevertheless, 
and despite the potential of the country in terms of water resources, its low 
population density and high availability of land, agriculture has failed to flourish and 
to improve rural areas, while poverty is amongst the highest on the African 
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continent.
8
 Truly, in order to understand the persistence of malnourishment despite 
attempts to reform the agricultural sector over the years, it is essential to understand 
its political history and the evolution of the state-farmers relationship over time.  
With 4 climatic zones (the coast, the central plateau, the northern and the western 
and central highlands), and over 100 different ethnic groups, Tanzania is very 
diverse, and while statistical data offers a general view of the country as a whole, 
regional and local conditions may vary greatly. This is why this thesis employs a 
local perspective, underlining the importance of qualitative data in analysing the role 
of politics and its effects on the food security conditions of certain communities of 
farmers. This particular approach and the political analysis in relation to food 
security that characterise this study and distinguish it from the general literature on 
food security find their main focus in the figure of small scale farmers in rural areas 
of Tanzania. The choice of farmers as the object of study has several explanations, 
many of which have already been mentioned. Representing the majority of the rural 
population in Tanzania, they are also the main recipients of state agricultural policies 
and they have, at least in the chosen case study, a direct connection with the state 
through the figure of the extension officer - a state official working in the village that 
is supposed to train, advise, inform and assist farmers. This figure will emerge 
several times during the analysis of the state-farmer relationship as it represents the 
main point of connection between farmers and the state.  
This study will guide the reader into the lives of the farmers interviewed, showing 
their vulnerabilities and insecurities, but nevertheless their force to overcome 
difficulties of everyday farming in a resource-poor context. Similarly to other 
                                                          
8 Tanzania ranks 8th in the world in the Poverty Headcount Index, with over 67% of the 
population living under 1.25$ per day (PPP) (World Bank, Development Research Group). In the 
Human Development Index Tanzania is ranked 157th out of 187 countries (UNDP, 2014).  
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analyses, this thesis tells a story of dynamics of power within society, of hierarchies, 
law and traditional customs. The voices of small scale farmers will emerge and will 
uncover a complex web of relationships and connections: their engagement with the 
state and their reaction to state policies directed at controlling them, their torn 
relationship with agriculture and with nature which is their only source of survival, 
even if it represents a hostile source at times. 
1.4. Argument of the thesis  
With reference with what has been already said in the previous sections, the 
objectives and the arguments of this study will be here defined. Contrasting with 
analyses of food security that stress the importance of increasing food production by 
using modern technologies and biogenetics as an answer to malnutrition, it is argued, 
with the example of Tanzania, that food security needs to be analysed according to 
its socio-economic and political context  and it is not only about availability of food, 
but also about the ability to acquire food and to satisfy a wide range of food needs 
within the households, including personal preferences.  
It is also argued that past and current agricultural policies in Tanzania did not 
achieve the expected success. The failure of agricultural policies, that intended to 
boost food security to farming communities in several ways, through increased 
production and/or increased economic value, is the result of an antagonistic 
relationship between farmers and the state that is historically grounded and related to 
the dynamics of power within the state structure. This influenced the way farmers 
came to perceive the role of the state in different spheres of everyday life, including 
their nutrition. As a consequence this shapes the way they address malnutrition and 
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contest government policies, affecting their level of success in improving their 
conditions.  
In other words, by providing an empirical contribution to the literature on food 
security and state-society relationships, this thesis will argue that food security in 
rural Tanzania is related to the way farmers - the majority of the rural population - 
relate to and regard the state, in particular the higher state apparatus, and its role in 
improving their food security condition. It will be explained how the disconnection 
between farmers and the state apparatus complicates the implementation of policies 
for local politicians and officers, contributing to unsatisfactory results in terms of 
agricultural performance and to an unsecure food condition, especially in rural areas.  
Also the thesis will demonstrate, perhaps counterintuitively, that farmers seem 
relatively unwilling to cooperate with each other, which leads to unsuccessful 
cooperative attempts and the lack of a strong political farmers’ movement. 
Nonetheless, while the unwillingness of farmers to work in a cooperative way can 
partly be justified by the failure of previous communitarian schemes enforced by the 
state (such as the villagization project), the lack of a strong movement that unifies 
farmers is a more complex phenomenon, that will be explored in its historical roots, 
and in the way the farmers came to see themselves in relation to the state. 
Concerning foreign influences, this dissertation will analyse the role of external 
actors and their influences on the state-farmer relationship and food security in rural 
areas. In general, this study found that farmers are more willing to cooperate and 
welcome projects coming from third parties like international organizations and 
NGOs if they feel empowered and can have decisional power over the governance 
structure. It will be explained how this may create dependency and cut society off 
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even further from the state, as the state loses sovereignty, control and presence over 
agricultural projects in the countryside. 
In conclusion, by analysing the reciprocal relationship between the state and the 
farmers, this thesis underlines how the estrangement between these two actors has 
brought Tanzanian farmers into a loop of distrust and fatalism in their relationship 
with the state and in relation to other farmers. In this environment, no policy seems 
to be successful in improving the conditions of the countryside and the food security 
condition of rural households. Feeling powerless in the face of the state, farmers 
refrain from direct political action and express their discontent in other ways, 
ranging from reticence towards cooperating with governmental officials to open 
social conflict. 
1.5. Structure of the thesis 
The connections between farmers’ food security and state-society relationship are 
explained throughout the study and supported by both theoretical and empirical 
literature. The question rotates around the concept of food security, a political 
concept that has evolved over time and today has gained considerable importance in 
both global and national governance structures.  
There are mainly three interconnected objectives in this study, and the structure of 
this study will explore them in a coherent manner. First, this study aims at exploring 
food security in farming households. Secondly, the evolution of the relationship 
between farmers and state is analysed, and, finally, the connection between these two 
findings is investigated.  
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The objectives of this research are reflected in the structure of this dissertation itself. 
In chapter 2 an analysis of the term food security and its evolution will be presented, 
followed by an analysis on the literature around the right to food, food systems, and 
rural movements. The literature on the relationship between the state and the society 
will be presented and analysed in chapter 3. Chapter 4 will introduce the case study, 
outlining some important historical events and agricultural policies that have 
characterised Tanzania as a country and the current condition of agriculture in the 
countryside. This chapter will focus, in particular, on the agricultural policies in the 
afterwards of dependency, in 1961, and Nyerere’s influence in the creation of the 
newly born state. Chapter 5, 6 and 7 are the core of the thesis, where the results of the 
empirical research will be presented, analysed and interpreted in light of the 
theoretical literature exposed in chapters 2 and 3 and the events reported in chapter 4.  
Specifically, chapter 5 defines the methodology of the study and analyses the results 
of the interviews concerning the level of food security in the households interviewed 
and the challenges faced by the farmers interviewed. Chapter 6 will focus on the 
results of the research concerning the state-farmer relationship and its effects on food 
security in rural households. Finally, chapter 7 will focus on analysing farmers’ 
coping strategies and their political reactions towards unsatisfactory agricultural 
policies. The final chapter will offer concluding remarks in the light of what has been 
written and return to the research question, trying to connect all the issues at stake.  
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Chapter 2 - Food security: a concept in evolution 
2.1. Introduction 
Essentially, this research is about food security and farmers’ livelihoods. ‘Food 
security’ as a concept has evolved to embrace different perspectives, becoming a 
widely studied multi-dimensional and multi-disciplinary theme. Hence, this chapter 
will present the literature around the topic of food security, starting from the various 
definitions and evolution of the term and moving over to its political and economic 
implications. In relation to the research question (How has the relationship between 
the state and farmers shaped food security in rural Tanzania since its 
independence?) this chapter will then analyse the connection between food security, 
farmers and the state, situating this study in its theoretical framework. The political 
and social dimensions of food security will be explored by looking at the ways the 
state and farmers interact and affect the food system: the farmers as both food 
producers and consumers and the state through its policies. 
2.2. From Malthusian fears to Food Sovereignty 
This section will provide the theoretical framework of the concept of food security, 
underlining the complexity of the term and the various approaches over time.  
Talks about ‘food security’ gained prominence in the 1970s and were shaped by the 
Malthusian theory. Originally developed in 1798 by Thomas Robert Malthus, in his 
Essay on the Principle of Population, the Malthusian Theory is the idea that the 
increase of population outpaces the increase of the means of subsistence, hence the 
idea that population growth should be controlled if famine, war, and social diseases 
were to be prevented. Paul R. Ehrlich recalled this theory in his book The 
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Population Bomb, in 1968, in which he predicted a catastrophic famine and death 
rate increase in the 1970s as a consequence of food shortage and population 
growth
9
. Issues of supply and production were regarded as the chief determinants of 
food security. The definition provided by the UN at the first World Food Summit 
reflects this tendency, by defining food security as 'the availability at all times of 
adequate world food supplies of basic food-stuffs to sustain a steady expansion of 
food consumption and to offset fluctuations in production and prices' (UN, 1975, 
p.6).  
Nevertheless, the Malthusian predictions did not seem to have materialised,
10
 and 
since then food security has become much more than just a matter of supply and 
production. Yet, dysfunctions in the global food systems are evident, with food 
prices on the rise and undernourishment still widespread. Since the 1990s there has 
been a decline in both the relative percentage and the absolute number of 
undernourishment - from over 1 billion to 805 million in 2012-14 -, but the 
achievements are not equal all over the world. The majority of undernourished 
people for instance still live in developing countries, and in Africa the number of 
undernourished people has actually increased from 182 million in 1990-92 to over 
220 million in 2012-14 (FAO, 2014, p.8). This underlines that the problem is 
mostly due to food access (ability to purchase the food available) rather than 
supply, as remarked by Amartya Sen (1981). Similarly, the FAO and WFP claim 
that there is currently enough food to feed a growing population, but stress the 
                                                          
9
 The population growth rate had seen a rapid acceleration since the 1950s, but a decline in world 
food supply during 1973 and 1974 - for various reasons, including the increase in the price of oil, and 
weather disruption in different parts of the world - saw a rise in the prices of grain and recalled fears 
of food scarcity. 
10
 The world has reached 7 billion people (from around one billion at Malthus’ time) and food 
production has kept pace, experiencing an increase in the per capita availability of calories, from 
2220Kcal/person/day in the early 1960s to 2790Kcal/person/day in 2006-08 (FAO, 2012) 
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challenge of many people to access it (FAO, 2012).  
Predictably, the Malthusian theory, re-proposed by scholars such as Ehrilch et al. 
(1993), met several criticisms, for different reasons. For instance, Friedman (1982) 
noted that even before the decline in food production of the 1970s, hunger and 
malnutrition were present in various parts of the world, hence food production and 
population growth were not the only factor affecting the food crisis in those years. 
Economic and political reasons seemed instead to be behind the crisis and in 
particular the economic recession in the USA and the subsequent decline of 
surpluses of grain exported from the country. Once again, this points at poverty and 
unemployment plus the ability to purchase the food available as the causes of 
hunger rather than population outstripping food supplies (Friedman, 1982, p.283, 
Brandt, 1990). Furthermore, as Amartya Sen observes (1981), there can be 
starvation even when the world food supply is not in decline, as many people may 
still be unable to afford to buy the food available. Indeed, sustained food 
production does not necessarily mean that there will be equal distribution of that 
supply all over the world (Guha-Khasnobis et al. 2007b). 
For these reasons, Amartya Sen thought that food security should be analysed in its 
household and individual dimension: food security is connected to the relationship 
that the individual - or the household - can have with the commodity through the 
possession of entitlements. Food security is therefore defined as having enough 
entitlements to be able to generate a relationship of exchange with the commodity 
(food in this case). He identifies four kinds of entitlements related to food security: 
Trade-based entitlements derived by trading something one owns with a willing 
party, production-based entitlement generated by arranging production using one’s 
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own resources, own-labour entitlement related to the capability to own one’s own 
labour power in order to create trade-based and production-based entitlements, and 
inheritance and transfer entitlements deriving from gifts, transfers or inheritance 
(Sen, 1981, p.2). 
The personal dimension of food security was also explored by Staatz et al. (1990) 
who recognised that food security can be perceived at different levels (national, 
regional, household and individual), and affirmed that promoting food security 
involves assuring both an adequate supply of food through production and trade, 
and access to that supply. Moreover, by stating that food security is also the 
condition for an 'active, healthy life' the World Bank underlines the individual 
dimension of food security and social importance of being food secure (World 
Bank, 1986). A shift towards the household perspective is also evident in 
Reutlinger (1982) and Frankenbergen and Goldstein (1991), who claim that the 
condition of 'food insecurity [is perceived] when the viability of the household as a 
productive and reproductive unit is threatened by food shortage' (Frankenbergen 
and Goldstein, 1991, p.2). Maxwell (1992 and 1996) and Devereux and Maxwell 
(2001) emphasise the perceptions and feelings of the food insecure themselves, 
underlining the value of personal choices as well as the role of coping strategies 
adopted during food shortages.  
Nevertheless, only in more recent definitions of food security, the aspect of 
sustainability has increasingly assumed importance. For example, Lang and Barling 
(2012), underline that ‘the only food system to be secure is that which is 
sustainable, and the route to food security is by addressing sustainability’ (ibid., 
p.321, on the importance of sustainable food systems see also Wright, 2010; 
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Wibbelmann et al., 2013). The sustainability aspect of food security has also 
emerged strongly in the International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, 
Science and Technology (IAASTD), an international commission that analyses the 
effectiveness of public and private sector policies and institutional agreements in 
reaching food security. The IAASTD report, in particular, underlines the 
importance of food diversification, noting that the total dependence on a few staple 
crops, experienced by several countries, created a decline in nutritional security, 
besides increasing community vulnerability towards unpredicted weather events, 
crop diseases or economic events such as the sudden rise of some crop prices 
(IAASTD, 2009). The importance of crop diversification is also strongly 
recognised by the FAO, in order to improve food security, nutrition and health, to 
improve employment and the distribution of high value products and to improve 
the resilience of farming systems and environmental services (FAO, 2012b, p.9).  
The evolution of the concept about food security shows the importance of adopting 
a multifaceted approach. Recent definitions are more inclusive, and seek to 
embrace all the elements (access, availability, utilisation, stability, preferences and 
sustainability) brought up by different theories in different years. For example, 
Guha-Khasnobis et al. (2007a and 2007b) stress the importance of analysing 
household vulnerability to food insecurity. According to the scholars, food security 
is a complex concept which depends on many different factors, and should be 
considered in its long term dimension. Therefore, individual or household 
vulnerability to food scarcity should be addressed by policy-makers in order to 
promote food security in the long run. The concept of vulnerability has been 
included in all modern definitions of food security (Kalibwani, 2005; Baro and 
Deubel, 2006; Guha-Khasnobis et al., 2007a and 2007b). An analysis of food 
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security through the lenses of vulnerability implies the importance of predicting 
food availability, analysing production trends and monitoring seasonal variations in 
order to predict supply shortages (crop, droughts and flood monitoring). Yet, it is 
also extremely useful in identifying the households that are at risk of becoming 
food insecure because of their social condition, facilitating the formulation of 
political responses which prevent food insecurity and assist the households that are 
most vulnerable. It is clear that the concept of food security is a complex one and 
has been analysed and defined in different ways throughout the years and different 
scholars. Nevertheless the need for a simple and comprehensive definition remains, 
and is perhaps provided by the one proposed by the FAO in 2006: 
'Food security [is] a situation that exists when all people, at all times, 
have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and 
nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an 
active and healthy life and are not at undue risk of losing such access' 
(FAO, 2006).  
As a matter of fact, this definition embraces all four main elements initially 
identified by the FAO as related to food security during the World Food Summit of 
1996 (FAO, 1996): 
i. Food availability: the availability of sufficient nutritious quality food, supplied 
through domestic production or imports, including food aid.  
ii. Food access: the access to natural resources and the acquisition of entitlements 
so that individuals can access appropriate food for a nutritious diet. 
iii. Utilisation: the importance of the good and sustainable utilization of food 
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through an adequate diet, clean water, sanitation and health care. 
iv. Stability (or vulnerability, as defined by Guha-Khasnobis et al, 2007a and 
2007b): being food secure is seen also as a long term condition, whether 
vulnerability should be addressed in order to protect the weakest part of the 
population in case of sudden shocks, such as economic or climatic crisis, or cyclical 
events such as agricultural seasons.  
In my view, these four elements and the definition of food security provided by the 
FAO in 2006 (see above), summarise and include all the different aspects of food 
security underlined by different scholars over time. For example, the food 
availability and access elements can be read as also including the ability of 
individuals or households to satisfy their food preferences, embracing hence also 
the subjective dimension on the matter. Furthermore, the importance of a 
diversified diet is expressed in the utilisation element, while the sustainability 
aspect is implied in the stability element, since without a sustainable approach to 
food security there would not be food security stability. This study adopts this 
notion of food security, in its wider and multifaceted dimension.  
Nevertheless, besides various definitions of the term, the question on how to best 
achieve it practically is still far from being answered. Moreover, the FAO 
definition of food security has been considered reductive by some scholars (for 
instance Windfuhr and Jonsén, 2005; Pimbert, 2008; Rosset, 2008; Patel, 2009 and 
2011; Schambacher, 2010; Wittman and Desmarais 2010; Holt-Gimenez and Patel, 
2012) that introduced the concept of ‘food sovereignty’, focusing on the 
importance of control over food and resource. According to these scholars, the 
FAO definition of food security neglects issues such as power, equity, control over 
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resources and environmental sustainability. On the contrary, they affirm, the 
concept of food sovereignty is embedded in larger questions of social justice and 
the rights of farmers and indigenous communities to control their resources. The 
Forum for Food Sovereignty held by the International NGO/CSO Planning 
Committee (IPC) in 2002 (and later on in 2004) provided this definition of the 
term:  
‘Food Sovereignty is the right of individuals, peoples, communities, and 
countries to define their own agricultural, labour, fishing, food and land 
policies, which are ecologically, socially, economically and culturally 
appropriate to their unique circumstances. It includes the true right to 
food and to produce food, which means that all people have the right to 
safe, nutritious and cultural appropriate food and to food-producing 
resources and the ability to sustain themselves and their societies.’ (IPC, 
2014). 
The concept of food sovereignty has assumed more relevance and visibility with the 
evolution of the global food system and the expansion of industrial agriculture and 
multinational corporations worldwide. In fact, food sovereignty as a concept 
opposes to the commoditisation
11
 of food, looking at a more localised and self 
sufficient food system where the needs of small scale farmers are at the forefront. 
Small scale farmers worldwide have indeed been penalised by the expansion of a 
global and industrial food system, and as remarked by Bryceson (2009), they have 
generally been increasingly forced to leave the countryside and/or find another 
source of income outside agriculture. But how exactly has the food system changed, 
                                                          
11 Food seen, sold and produced as a commodity, where the prices are set by international 
markets (McMichael, 2006). 
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and why has it done so? The next section will explain this in more details, and will 
locate this study in its global context. 
2.3. Food security as a political issue: the evolution of the global food system 
The ‘food regimes’ literature developed by Philip McMichael and Harriet 
Friedmann (1989) provides a Marxian analysis of the evolution of the global food 
system within the process of globalisation. It is essential to understand the 
dynamics behind the current globalised food system in order to assess the new 
challenges that the achieving of food security faces on a global level. Moreover, 
this section will locate this study, helping us to identify the current dynamics under 
which farmers contest food policy and governments’ action.   
In The Origins of Third World Food Dependence Friedmann identifies a first food 
regime, from 1870 to 1929, driven by colonialism, when European settled in 
wheat-producing areas of the world to supply grain to the growing European 
working classes (Friedmann, 1993; see also Crow et al., 1990). This led to an 
agricultural crisis in Europe, as local grain farms struggled to face competition of 
cheaper grains from settled regions. As a consequence, states in Europe started to 
protect the agricultural sector by setting up price supports, market control policies, 
and tariffs on imports (Friedmann and McMichael, 1989). This regime collapsed 
during the Great Depression and the World War II when Europe started promoting 
self-sufficiency in wheat.  
The second food regime could be identified in the years 1947-1972. This was the 
surplus regime or food aid regime as defined by McMichael (2005) with the 
signing of the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). This food regime 
was linked to the American food policy and the exigency of finding new markets 
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for the increasing surplus of wheat produced domestically and by the geopolitical 
dynamics of the Cold War (see also Hopkins, in Clapp and Cohen, 2009, pp.79-93). 
Given the logic of food aid and the difficulties of local economies in competing 
with the highly subsidised agricultural products of developed countries, ‘third 
world’ countries were encouraged to increase their food imports while investing in 
industrialisation and in the production of crop for the export market. Indeed, during 
the 1960s there has been a booming of agricultural exports in these countries. 
Following the success of the Green Revolution in Asia, foreign donors started 
actively supporting farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa, helping them to modernize their 
agriculture, improve staple food packages and the use of fertilizer with subsides 
(Bryceson, 2009).  
However, by the end of 1960s, several countries worldwide started to experience 
the decline of world grain production caused by several factors including weather 
distruption in several parts of the world. This led to a decline of USA grain 
surpluses, and the consequent rise of the world wheat price. Soon, food aid was 
transformed into food sales. As a consequence, the end of this second food regime 
saw the start of third world countries’ indebtedness, as they experienced an 
unexpected shift from surplus to scarcity on a world scale (Friedmann and 
McMichael, 1989). The food crisis of the early 1970s was further exacerbated by 
the oil crisis and the decision of the USSR to buy three quarters of all commercially 
traded grain in the world in 1972-73 (Friedmann, 1993). In the following years, the 
recession in industrialised economies, related to the oil crisis, brought the food 
prices down, reducing the foreign-exchange earnings of many African countries 
which were mainly exporting primary commodities to industrialised countries. The 
loss of foreign exchange earnings further undermined the ability of several African 
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governments to pay back the loans they had incurred in the previous years in order 
to modernise their agricultural sector. Moreover, warfare and droughts in various 
countries in the African continent - for instance conflicts in Sudan, Angola, 
Mozambique, Uganda and Zimbabwe and a severe drought in the Sahel region - 
further exacerbated foreign-exchange shortages in these countries by increasing the 
need for food imports.  
McMichael (2005) identifies a new regime from the 1980s – a corporate food 
regime - which was no longer related to the political or economic hegemony of 
single states but driven by the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on 
Agriculture (AoA) and the adoption of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in 
developing countries. The increased liberalisation of the agricultural market 
allowed international agribusiness companies to gain substantial control and power 
in all spheres of the food supply chain. Ideally, the Agreement on Agriculture was 
set up in order to prevent market distortions caused by industrialised governments’ 
tariffs and subsidies aimed at protecting their domestic agricultural market 
(Pritchard in Rosin et al., 2012, pp.46-59; also Dawkins, 1999). Actually, one of 
the consequences of the Agreement on Agriculture was that the prices for 
commodities reached historically low levels. Since its implementation in 1994, 
world prices for agricultural primary commodities have in fact fallen 30% or more, 
clearly affecting producers worldwide which were receiving a lower price for their 
produce (McMichael, 2009). More recently, the increasing financial speculation 
over agricultural products is playing a significant role in the food price volatility, 
increasing producer vulnerability to sudden changes in the prices on the global food 
market. Indeed, this is often the result of speculation on agricultural futures 
contracts rather than it being driven by the demand-supply market principles 
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(Clapp, 2009, pp.43-57).  
Moreover, as a consequence of the adoption of SAPs accorded by the IMF and the 
World Bank, the state generally withdrew its support from the agricultural sector, 
especially in the area of food crop production, whilst promoting the expansion of 
monoculture plantation and commercial agriculture for the export market of high-
value crops. Farmers in many countries were encouraged to sell their lands to food 
corporations, and increasing parts of land were degraded and misused, as a 
consequence of intensive monoculture plantation and the increased use of 
pesticides (McMichael, 2006; Patel, 2008).  
The globalisation of the food system, or better, the way the commoditization of 
food over the years has been shaped through the internationalisation of world 
markets and the increasing role of finance within agriculture, has shifted the control 
over the production of food from farmers towards large corporations. This has been 
criticised on different levels from several authors (Tansey and Worsley, 1995; 
McMichael, 2007; Clapp, 2008; Patel, 2008; IAASTD, 2009; Rosset, 2009; 
Godfray et al., 2010). It has been charged as being unsustainable as it promotes a 
model of intensive agriculture that does not take into account the preservation of 
resources and the respect of the environment, while enriching food corporations 
and further impoverishing small scale farmers. It has therefore been deemed 
ineffective in providing adequate and nutritious food to an increasing population 
worldwide. 
What is more, since issues of power and democracy are brought to the fore, it has 
been argued that control over food production and supply chains is increasingly in 
the hands of a few agribusinesses, which might undermine the possibility of states 
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to promote food security. It is in this context that the concept of food sovereignty 
situates itself, arguing that the global food regime is eroding the ability of farmers 
to decide their own farming system and keep the control over their land.  
The food sovereignty dialectic has the merit to have brought the needs of small 
scale farmers and rural communities at the centre of the discourse around food and 
agricultural issues within the context of a globalised food system. Nevertheless, the 
food security language is of easily application to different contexts, even where the 
food regime as identified by McMichael and Friedmann has had a limited 
influence.  Furthermore, the food security language remarks that the problems 
surrounding the food system are strictly political: seeing food as a ‘security’ issue 
underlines the importance of the single states and international community to 
provide a political answer to the problem of food insecurity in all its aspects: lack 
of access to diverse food, scarce quality of food, vulnerability and so on. The food 
security terminology has therefore been employed in this study, where the role of 
the state in affecting the food system at local and national level is recognized, 
despite many are the influences coming from international agreements and the 
globalisation of the agricultural sector.  
Nonetheless, opting for the food security terminology instead of the food 
sovereignty one does not imply that the small scale farmers are left out of the 
debate. On the contrary, as it has been mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
farmers are at the centre of this study. By analysing farmers’ relationship with the 
state and their engagement with politics, this study suggests that the relationship 
between the two subjects (state and farmers) is extremely important in achieving 
food security. This aspect will be better explored in the next chapter, while the 
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following sections of this chapter will illustrate the two subjects in a separate 
manner. Starting with the state, the next section asks what exactly is the role of the 
state in promoting food security, and what are the instruments at its disposal to 
achieve food security for its citizens. The last two sections of this chapter will 
instead illustrate the figure of the farmer.  
2.4. The role of the state in promoting food security 
As I have claimed before, food security is heavily related to politics. For instance, 
the FAO highlights the importance of political will in eradicating hunger and 
ensuring long term food security for all, when it claims that:  
‘The world has the resources and technology to eradicate hunger and 
ensure long-term food security for all, in spite of many challenges and 
risks. It needs to mobilize political will and build the necessary 
institutions to ensure that key decisions on investment and policies to 
eradicate hunger are taken and implemented effectively’ (FAO, 2009).12 
In this study, in line with the definition elaborated by Max Weber in 1919, the state 
is recognised as an important agent, a political entity which exercises power over 
society and regulates public matters, and hence clearly influences the agricultural 
sector and national food security. Nevertheless, historically there has always been 
great debate on the level of state intervention to transform or protect the 
agricultural sector (Schultz, 1953; Bates, 1981; Timmer, 1991). For instance, as it 
was mentioned above, during the 1980s and as a consequence of international 
                                                          
12
 A very similar idea was expressed by scholars such as Pinstrup-Andersen (1999) and Ching (2009) 
who have stressed the need for governments to invest in agricultural research and biotechnology in 
order to increase the productivity of agriculture whilst also implementing measures to eradicate 
poverty and promote sustainable development (Pinstrup-Andersen et al., 1999, Ching et al., 2009).  
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agreements signed with global financial institutions such as the IMF and the World 
Bank, many countries were asked to remove their subsidies to the agricultural 
sector in the name of the global liberalisation of agricultural markets (McMichael, 
2006; Patel, 2008; Clapp, 2009). At the same time, policies in developed countries 
which aim at protecting the agricultural sector from foreign competition - for 
example in the USA and the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union -, 
have been more resistant to change.  
Despite the difficulties of individual states to implement agricultural policies in full 
autonomy in the context of the new food regime, the role of the state in promoting 
food security is recognised at international level and remains of valuable 
importance. For instance, the right to food was recognised in 1948 in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, art. 25), which ratified the right of every 
person to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food, indicating the 
duty of the states to protect this right. In 1966, the UN adopted the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), in which 157 
ratifying states clearly expressed their commitments to take the measures and 
specific programmes needed to improve methods of production, conservation and 
distribution of food. This involved making full use of technical and scientific 
knowledge, disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition and developing 
or reforming agrarian systems to ensure an equitable distribution of world food 
supplies in relation to need (ICESR art.11, 2a). The right to food, according to the 
Convenant, is associated to the ‘fundamental right to freedom from hunger and 
malnutrition’, and it is realized when ‘every man, woman and child, alone or in 
community with others, has the physical and economic access at all times to 
adequate food or means for its procurement’ (ICESCR, General Comment No.12, 
 
 
48 
1999). 
Considering food as a right implies a different approach when analysing food 
security issues. If food is a right, food security is a political issue that must be 
considered part of a broader economic and political condition of the society that 
enables the individual to meet certain conditions: an economically stable situation 
that enables to have access to an adequate, nutritious and diverse amount of food, a 
democratic set of institutions and government and the freedom to express oneself in 
order to be able to address any issues at political level and participate at the 
political life of the country, the right to have health care and sanitation and social 
security programs to alleviate the inequalities across the society. As a consequence, 
food security is not only about availability, access, utilization of food and 
vulnerability but is also related to a wider frame of analysis and social issues. 
Hence no food policy can be successful if it is not connected to a broader set of 
policies enhancing the development of other aspects of the society and addressing 
poverty. Besides, this highlights the importance of the state fulfilling the right to 
food and promoting food security in the long run. 
Despite the right to food being widely recognised at the international level, little 
effort has been made towards enforcing it and official agreements such as the Right 
to Food Guidelines (RTFGs)
13
 are still unclear on how to assess and monitor the 
                                                          
13 In the World Food Summit: five years later held in 2002 to evaluate the achievements since 
the WFS of 1996, an Intergovernmental Working Group (IGWG) was established in order to 
create a set of Right to Food Guidelines (RTFGs) (FAO, 2002). The Guidelines in general 
recognize the need of nutritional information, the importance of safety nets in assisting 
vulnerable sections of the population, and the need of inclusive and non-discriminatory policies 
towards improving availability and access to nutritious food. More recent attempts to define the 
right to food have been made by the FAO, such as The Right to Food and Access to Natural 
Resources, that stress the need for policies to focus on the access to livelihood assets (e.g. access 
to natural resources and to employment and/or credit) in order to improve food security. The 
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implementation of this right (Rae et al., 2007). Olivier De Shutter, the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Food, remarks that ‘legal recognition of the right to 
food and multi-year strategies that hold authorities accountable are the only way to 
ensure policy coherence over time and thus lasting success’, hence each country 
should establish a legal framework for the right to food (De Shutter, 2012). 
Nevertheless, even in the countries where the right to food is legally recognized - 
such as in India, Mexico and Nicaragua - the progresses towards food security have 
been uneven (De Shutter, 2012). According to Riches, a ‘depoliticisation of 
hunger’ is the reason of the failure of the states to fulfil the right to food; hence, 
besides being included in a legal framework, food insecurity needs to be addressed 
as a political problem (Riches, 2002). 
The right to food literature is interesting as it underlines the importance of food as a 
basic need of each individual, and the responsibilities of the state in warrantying 
such need. Nevertheless, how can the states enforce the right to food, and insure 
that there is enough, safe, nutritious, and diverse food for all its citizens? The ways 
in which the state could promote the right to food on the long term is by creating 
the right conditions for food security to flourish. There are diverse approaches used 
by states in developing countries with a prevalent agricultural economy to do so. 
Some states focus on improving their agricultural sector, while others concentrate 
on welfare policies to support the part of their population that is most vulnerable to 
food insecurity.  
Concerning policies strictly related to improving the agricultural sector, several 
organisations, such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), 
                                                                                                                                                                    
report also reminds the role of the state in promoting the respect of human rights and in the 
redistribution of food and resources (FAO, 2008a).  
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the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), the FAO and the World 
Bank have advised developing countries states to support agricultural research, the 
development of new technology to improve agricultural production and improve 
the social conditions of producers. According to Timmer (1991, p.3), investments 
in new technologies have generally increased farmers’ incomes, food production 
and consequently helped address the problem of rural underdevelopment and 
malnutrition. 
14
 Yet, as a consequence of what has been described in the previous 
section as the rise of the corporate food regime, private companies such as 
Monsanto and Syngenta (which was recently awarded with the ‘2013 World Food 
Prize’) rather than governments are increasingly supporting agricultural-related 
research and the spread of technology. This has led to several criticisms as several 
scholars and activists of civil society have accused multinational corporations of 
controlling the food system at the expenses of small scale farmers who cannot often 
afford the new technology produced and sold by these companies. These scholars 
argue that a greater involvement of the state and local communities in running the 
research could instead focus on the real needs of small scale farmers, better address 
inequality of access to resources, and consequently improve the conditions and the 
food security of the most vulnerable farmers (Shiva, 2000; Patel, 2008; Holt-
Gimenez, 2009).  
The state could also promote innovation and good agricultural practices via 
agricultural extension services. Extension officers are the most direct contact 
between farmer communities and the state itself, and implementation and 
preparation are essential to guarantee success, as shown by many studies. Again, 
however, extension services need to be part of a more comprehensive approach and 
                                                          
14 This approach to agriculture is based on the theories of Schultz (1964), according to which 
poverty in rural areas is mostly due to lack of technology. 
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need to be based on a solid collaboration between the state and the farmers, in order 
to be successful. As Timmer (1991) claims:  
‘wide cultural and educational gaps between scientists, government 
extension agents, and farmers seem to be the major reasons for 
continuing problems in establishing effective two-way channels of 
communications [between the state and the farmers]’ (Timmer, 1991, 
p.8; on the challenges of agricultural extension see also Maiangwa, 
Omolehin Adeniji and Mohammed, 2010).  
Moreover, agricultural extension programmes have often been criticised because of 
their top-down approach, which fail in involving local communities (Norton, 2004, 
Chapter 8, in particular pp.417-424). In response to this criticism, and in the 
attempt to involve communities through a bottom-up approach, new knowledge 
transfer programs have been recently formulated and implemented by the FAO in 
particular to involve local communities, for example the Farming Field Schools 
(see chapter 7).  
Furthermore, states in developing countries could improve their agricultural sector 
and help farmers by investmenting in irrigation schemes and transport 
infrastructure. Infrastructures increase the accessibility of farming communities to 
inputs and markets where they can exchange their produce and improve their diet 
diversification. Marketing opportunities often work as a stimulus to agricultural 
production and increase farmers’ economic return by improving their livelihoods 
and their ability to purchase better quality or diverse food (Fan, 2004, pp.3-4, 
Norton, 2004, pp.96-97). What is more, in periods of famine, adequate 
infrastructure allows alleviation operations to reach rural populations in a quicker 
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and more cost-effective way. Recently, in developing countries, irrigation and 
infrastructure investments are often pursued by the public sector or in conjunction 
with the private sector and international organizations. However, given the 
complexity and the large amount of money involved in such projects, concerns over 
the efficiency and the long term durability of such schemes arise, especially in 
countries where corrupt practices are an invasive reality (Timmer, 1991, p.9-11; 
Narasaiah, 2003, pp.64-75; Norton, 2004, pp.247-254). Furthermore, the 
development of infrastructure in politically marginal areas may be neglected in 
favour of more politically important ones, as Blimpo et al. underline (2013, pp.61-
63).  
Although they are less widely used now – as a result of the increasing liberalisation 
of the agricultural markets at the international level - marketing boards and price 
interventions were especially used in the 1970s by many states to better control the 
agricultural output of the country and its exports. The general consequence was the 
creation of a monopoly in the food marketing system, which in some occasions 
favoured the consumers at the expenses of producers (as we will see in the case of 
Tanzania, chapter 4), since the state had an interest to keep the prices of food low 
and farmers could not sell to third parties or export to nearby countries, at least 
legally. This meant a decrease of the competitiveness and of the incentive to 
produce, pushing farmers to look out for alternatives, often black markets, to sell 
their produce at a better price. In other circumstances, where marketing boards 
subsidized farmers at the expense of the consumers, budgeting, inefficiency and 
corruption undermined their success (Barrett and Mutambatsere, 2005). A negative 
account of the state’s involvement in the agricultural sector and the consequence of 
price distortion is presented by scholars such as Amara and Founou-Tchuigoua 
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(1990) and Norton (2004, pp.55-104). Other scholars have written about the effects 
of food export-oriented policies on food security (Houck, 1991, pp.116-122; 
Valdés, 1991, pp.84-115). Nonetheless, many researchers (such as Timmer, 1989, 
1991, p.23 and Lindert, 1991, pp.29-83) have shown that a stabilisation of prices 
has been proven to be beneficial in protecting farmers from the consequences of the 
international volatility of prices. According to these scholars, a stable food system 
promotes investments and expenditure on consumer goods, leisure, and education 
while also improving farmers’ self-esteem and households’ perception of their food 
security. 
Another area where the state could be influential and affect food security is through 
its land policy. Land legislation differs between countries, but usually states have a 
major role in determining rights and usage related to the land, affecting farmers, 
agriculture and food security in different ways. The food sovereignty movement 
underlines the importance of local communities in controlling land and resources, 
but the land legislation worldwide is very diverse and the state still represents a 
major actor in land tenure policy in many countries. Usually, state policy over land 
ownership has to find a balance between equity and efficiency, trying to promote 
foreign direct investments while also protecting local villagers’ rights (Timmer, 
1991, p.16). In practical terms, land ownership also affects the ability of farmers to 
obtain a loan from the bank, as land represents an asset that can be mortgaged: 
generally, landless farmers face more difficulties to get a loan approved to improve 
their production and their livelihoods (Norton, 2004, pp.109-196).  
Another area where the state can affect food security is through its response to a 
food crisis. In situations of food shortages, there are several ways the state could 
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activate an emergency food programme. One of these is via food transfer from 
surplus areas to deficit regions or through food imports. Given the risk of 
negatively impacting local producers, Clay underlines the need for a broader food 
policy analysis and an assessment of the areas most affected and in need of food aid 
(Clay, 1991, pp.202-236). For instance, Reutlinger agrees in affirming that 
financial aid - money transfer to the households most in need - may be preferable to 
food aid, since poverty is one of the triggers of food insecurity. With financial aid, 
households could purchase the food locally following their needs and preferences. 
Indeed, the state could fund activities such as food-for-work, school meals, or food 
vouchers (Reutlinger, 1999, p.7; Norton, 2004, pp.72-74). In answering this 
criticism, the World Food Program, in collaboration with the governments in which 
it operates, has recently changed its food aid strategy by introducing the P4P 
(Purchase for Progress) programme, buying part of the food aid directly from local 
small and medium scale farmers and farmers’ organizations in order not to distort 
the local food market system.  
The extent to which the state can influence food security, agriculture and farmers’ 
livelihoods varies according to the institutional approach of each state, the 
developmental strategy chosen and the political structure in relation to society. 
However, it is clear that the success of policies cannot be guaranteed if the 
expectations of relevant communities are not addressed, as it will be noted in the 
following chapters and in the analysis of the agricultural policies of the Tanzanian 
state. This study looks at farmers as a social class, and tries to understand how the 
state can affect their food security. The reasons why this study focuses on this 
group of people and the evolution of the figure of the farmer worldwide will be 
explained below.  
 
 
55 
2.5. Farmers and food security within the global food regime 
Farmers are central to the topic of food security both as producers and consumers 
of food. In particular, small scale farmers produce nearly 70% of the total world 
food supply (FAO, 2013, p.22). However, most of them are unable to produce 
enough food or earn sufficient income to meet their own household needs because 
of a scarcity of land, and lack of inputs and capital, as explained by the UK Food 
Group (2010, p.1). Hence, as the IAASTD notes, the majority of farmers 
worldwide are also net food buyers. Worldwide, most farming communities are 
particularly vulnerable to food insecurity and they represent the most food insecure 
people despite being food producers (IAASTD, 2009). The UK Food Group notes 
that the majority of the hungry in developing countries are from rural areas and 
come from marginalised farming families (UK Food Group, 2010). In addition, a 
study of the World Food Programme underlines how rural households are more 
prone to food insecurity than urban ones, since the more the household depends on 
agriculture to satisfy its needs, the more vulnerable it is to food insecurity (WFP, 
2013). Moreover, agricultural households are the ones where diversification of food 
is lowest and where the share of income spent on food is the highest, more than 
75% (WFP, 2013).  
The relationship between farmers and food has evolved over time, as a 
consequence of the changes in the food system, and academic discussions have 
followed concerning the evolution of farming itself. For instance, in analysing the 
figure of the farmer within the globalised food system, scholars have debated 
whether farmers in rural Africa are integrated into the capitalist economy or not 
(see Hyden, 1983; Bernstein, 2001, 2004, 2010), and whether the term ‘peasant’ is 
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still appropriate to describe farmers in this part of the world. Such contextualisation 
of the role of farmers within the modern economy is important to understand how 
farmers impact on food security and how they are affected by state policy and 
international agreements on the matter. With reference to the African context where 
the case study of the thesis is located, this section will present some of the 
arguments on the evolution of farmers and the differentiation of the food system.  
Concerning the transition to capitalism, this study agrees that it is not complete in 
Africa and that ‘the capitalist mode of production has not yet fully penetrated the 
continent’ (Thomson, 2010, p.87). In particular, the agricultural sector seems to be 
resistant to capital, as demonstrated by the fact that only 10% of farming is in the 
hands of large companies and that small scale farmers worldwide still produce the 
majority of food, even though agribusinesses are dominant in the processing and 
supply side of the food chain (Lewontin, 2000, p.93-106).  
Likewise, in referring to the general African context, Hyden argues that farmers are 
not ‘capitalistic’ in the sense that they work only to satisfy their needs. According to 
the writer, the peasant mode of production, driven by the ‘economy of affection’ – 
defined as an informal network of interactions and mutual support between 
individuals united by kinship, community, religion or other affinities - limits the rise 
of a productive local bourgeoisie, greater effectiveness in the public sector, effective 
distribution of resources, and behavioural changes in society where individuals 
would feel confident to act in political and economic life (Hyden, 1980, pp.194-198). 
The economy of affection, defined as a peculiarity of African societies, suffers from 
the lack of specialisation, little division of labour, little exchange of products, and no 
interdependence between farmers (ibid., p.7). In short, the peasant mode of 
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production limits the development of the free market, which is seen by Hyden as a 
positive force, able to spur development (Hyden, 1980, p.22 and 1983, pp.197-198). 
Similarly, Chabal underlines how tradition may be playing a role in the failure of the 
process of modernization that could promote a better life for the people in Africa 
(2009, pp.170-171). According to Hyden, Africa is therefore still in transition from a 
pre-capitalist peasant mode to capitalism, and is perhaps ‘the only continent where 
the peasants have not yet been captured by other social classes’ and where 
‘capitalism failed to capture the peasants’ (1980, pp.9-11 and 1983, pp.212 and 250).  
From a   slightly different perspective, Bernstein (1990, 2004 and 2010) sees farmers 
as both capitalists and workers, or better, petty commodity producers, because they 
own or have access to the means of production and they use their labour. Thomson 
(2010) agrees that most farmers, especially in Africa, still own their land, but adds 
that farmers seem to have limited contact with the capitalist market, from which they 
depend only for products that cannot be produced by them. Nonetheless, Bernstein 
believes that by the end of the colonial period farmers were indeed fully 
encompassed in the process of capitalist commodity production (2004, p.129), even 
though he also stresses the ability of peasants to change and adapt to new 
circumstances in order to still have an impact in current economic and political 
processes (2001 and in Crow, 1990, pp.69-80; also William, 1982, p.387). 
In conclusion, it is true that the peasantry class has been historically disempowered 
and destabilised all over the world, converted in new off-farm labour activities, as a 
consequence of capitalism. However, the ability of farmers to adapt to a changing 
food system and to retain their role at the centre of this regime must be recognized, 
besides also stressing the differences between the several African states in which the 
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transition to a capitalist mode of production in agriculture has happened at a different 
pace. Yet, a general differentiation of the class of farmers can be identified, as a 
consequence of the changes in the food system and the commoditization of 
agriculture. In recognizing this differentiation, the term ‘farmer’ instead of ‘peasant’ 
is commonly used in this dissertation, as a term which takes into consideration a 
wider range of different typology of farmers.  
Barker (1989) provides a classification of the farming class: 
 pure self-provisioners – which sell no crop and are mainly self-sufficient 
with little local exchange; 
 small-scale commodity producers – which use family labour to produce 
crops for sale, not to meet their own needs directly; 
 peasant farmers – which farm the land, mainly with family labour, using 
simple equipment, providing directly for many of their needs and selling 
some of their production; 
 wage workers – they sell their labour as their main source of income and 
engage in agriculture only as a minor side-line; 
 capitalist farmers – they sell almost all their crop and hire most of their 
labour. 
Yet, in reality, these categories are not well defined nor easily applicable. For 
example, the pure self-provisioners are increasingly falling into the peasant farmer 
category, given the widespread use of monetary values as a form of exchange, which 
makes the production and the provision of food a selling-buying activity, even at the 
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local level. Moreover, the division between small-scale commodity producers and 
peasant farmers is often not clear. In fact, given the lack of storage space and the 
need for income, peasant farmers often act as small scale commodity producers, 
selling their products to buy it later at smaller quantities, as also confirmed by the 
results of the empirical fieldwork in Tanzania (see chapter 5). Moreover, the farming 
techniques are often the same in the two categories, and the activities of small scale 
commodity producers may be restricted by a limited access to market. Wage workers 
are often employed on a seasonal basis and usually involve people with no access to 
land, but could also be represented by farmers that, beside farming their own land, 
also work as wage workers for other (capitalist) farmers in order to gain additional 
income. The figure of the capitalist farmer is more clearly defined as it differs 
greatly from the majority of farmers in rural areas by the acres owned and the 
farming methods used, which are usually mechanised. They hire labour, and they are 
often considered food secure, having enough food to feed their families throughout 
the year and to sell it to make a secure income.  
In addition to - and perhaps also because of - a greater differentiation, it has 
become increasingly difficult for farmers to unify and raise their voice, and for the 
agricultural issue to make it to the frontline of national policies (Kelsall, 2002). 
According to Kelsall (2002), class differentiation could work as a dis-unifying 
element within certain communities, in the sense that poorer and smaller farmers 
may find it harder to join efforts with other categories of farmers, both because they 
have different needs and as they look at each other as belonging to different social 
groups. As a consequence, this may affect food security in the sense that the wider 
interests of farmers lack representation on the political level and agricultural 
policies may be misleading or favour the interests of the wealthier and more 
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powerful category of farmers in the country, usually the capitalist farmers. The 
influence of group differentiation with regards to the creation of a politically 
unified class of farmers in the specific case of Tanzania will be analysed in chapter 
7. The next section will look at the general literature on farmer movements in 
Africa and their political relevance.  
2.6. Farmer Movements in Africa – a complex historical perspective 
Despite class differentiation, in certain parts of the world farmers have been able to 
get together and create movements that have become powerful at national and 
international level. This has been the case of the food sovereignty movement, for 
example, which has mobilised farmers all over the world, and brought their voices 
at international level. At least in democratic states, political decisions are highly 
influenced by local movements and resistance (McMichael, 2009), as demonstrated 
by the success of the anti-GMOs movements in Europe (Shurman and Munro, 
2010) and the increasing importance of movements such as “La Via Campesina” in 
South America (Rosset, 2003; McMichael, 2007; Holt-Giménez, 2009). 
Nonetheless, as it will be explained in this section, farmer movements in Africa 
seem to generally differ. 
This section refers to farmer movements in Africa, following the line of many 
scholars that look at Africa as a complex but unified reality. Nonetheless, it is 
important to state that the 54 states in the African continent differ greatly in terms 
of their history of independence and hence some general arguments reported below 
about ‘African movements’ may be more appropriate for some states rather than for 
others. An in-depth analysis of the case of Tanzania will therefore be provided in 
chapter 7.  
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In general, it is recognised that the colonial history and the lack of a land property 
scheme in many African countries following independence have been influential in 
characterising rural movements (Moyo and Yeros, 2005). Given these constraints 
faced by civil society, most of the literature that analyses rural movements in 
Africa highlights their weak character, and the difficulties of creating strong social 
movements able to unify society and influence politics in a substantial way. Dwyer 
and Zeilig, for example, acknowledge that  
‘these movements, formidable though they have been, have not 
ultimately coalesced into a sustained force for social change akin to the 
labor movements of late nineteenth and early twentieth-century western 
Europe, which permanently transformed the lives of that continent’s 
working class. Africans, in contrast, have seen their living standards 
decline and many of their societies deteriorate into political repression 
and, in some cases, virtual anarchy’ (Dwyer and Zeilig, 2012, p.2). 
While Dwyer and Zeilig (2012) find the reasons behind the failure of African 
movements in the complexity of the state structure and the effects of globalisation 
which hinder the creation of a strong civil society, Bratton and de Walle (1992) and 
Fatton (1995) find the cause of the unstable democracy in Africa in a 
disempowered, politically weak civil society. Therefore, according to these 
scholars the empowerment of civil society is the key to the consolidation of 
democracy, but presents numerous challenges, among which are the heterogeneous 
nature of society, the fear of military intervention, and the influence of ‘predatory 
rule’. According to Diamantino Nhampossa (no date), representative of the 
National Union of Peasant Farmers (UNAC) in Mozambique, the difficulties of 
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creating a strong farmers’ movement specifically lie in the complexity of 
peasantries, the high level of illiteracy, the low political consciousness, and the lack 
of basic services and infrastructures that keep the rural population isolated from the 
rest of the country with the big urban centres.  
Recalling the idea previously mentioned of farmer differentiation affecting the 
creation of a unified farmer group in society, Kelsall stresses how the ‘fluid 
identities’, meaning the heterogeneous character of farming communities caused by 
the current depeasantization, may limit farmers’ ability to aggregate and to act 
collectively (Kelsall, 2002, pp. 64-65 and 163). On a similar note, Claude Welch, 
writing at the end of the 1970s, found in the complexity of society characterised by 
different religious beliefs and traditional practices, the reason behind the lack of 
evident political action in rural communities (1977, p.4). Further obstacles to 
political activism according to Kelsall are: the lack of information and 
transparency, hence an ineffective communication system between the state and 
rural areas, and the lack of time, since as a consequence of economic liberalisation 
farmers have to look for other sources of income and off farm activities (2002, 
pp.56-57 and p.63).  
But are African movements really ‘weak’ or are they just ‘different’? And does the 
lack of strong movements mean that rural communities are ‘passive’? Challenging 
the depiction of African movements as weak, other scholars stress the fact that 
democracy is a Western phenomenon that does not necessarily describe Africa's 
realities where individuals see themselves as members of communities rather than 
members of the state, hence the idea of rallying together against what they regard 
as a distant entity, the state, makes little sense to them. Chabal (2009), for example, 
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underlines how traditional theories - such as the development, Marxist, 
dependency, socialist, indigenous, neo-patrimonial and democratic ones - suffer 
from a Western perspective on the matter, and an effort to read Africa by applying 
the same rules and values leads to only partially correct conclusions. Instead of 
focusing on explaining whether Africa is or is not different from the rest of the 
world, Chabal stresses the need for the political behaviour of society to be analysed 
under the lens of tradition and the attachment to public virtue values, recalling the 
idea of economy of affection developed by Hyden (1980). Larmer also stresses the 
importance of analysing popular movements ‘in situ’ and in depth, considering the 
specific circumstances and underlining the diverse nature of movements in Africa. 
He further claims that ‘it has normally been the case that Western observers have 
been unable to see past their own expectations and norms, to understand the real 
extent of [African] social movements’ achievements’ (Larmer, 2010, p.260). 
From a different perspective, the presence of an authoritarian state could be the 
reason behind the lack of strong movements, since people can be afraid to show 
dissent (Mamdani et al., 1988). As a matter of fact, social movements in post-
colonial Africa were repressed and unions were dissolved in many states (Larmer, 
2010). In this case, civil society may choose different strategies for their protests, 
for example they may opt for the ‘exit’ option (as opposed to the ‘voice’ option) as 
a coping mechanism, removing themselves from a direct confrontation with the 
power elites (Hirschman, 1978, Scott, 1998). Such arguments support the idea of 
peasants expressing their discontent through indirect action such as rejecting 
policies and/or through several social coping mechanisms. In any case, societal 
responses to policies need to be analysed and understood according to the political 
and historical contexts in which they are expressed (Scott, 1986, Isaacman, 1993 
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and Harrison, 2002). 
In fact, it is important to note that farmers in many parts of Africa may have 
physical limits to express their dissatisfaction in a direct way, for example to 
participate in public protests or meetings where they could address their issues to 
politicians. Being often scattered through the countryside with little access to 
market and information channels and with little assets to reach bigger villages and 
towns, they often have difficulties to organise as a group and mobilise to participate 
in the political life of their country. At the same time, 
'as the relatively disadvantaged peasants and sub-regions show lower 
expectations and make less far-reaching demands, they allow central 
state authorities greater latitude in expenditure policies than do other 
classes and subregional interests' (Rothchild, 1997, p.185).  
There are potentially multiple causes that result in ‘disadvantaged peasants’ 
showing lower expectations and making less far-reaching demands. One of these 
are the physic limits rural people face, and the restricted ‘political consciousness’ 
of which Diamantino Nhampossa talks (no date). Nevertheless, distrust, disillusion 
and scepticism towards the state and politics may be behind the ‘lower 
expectations’. As we will see in the next chapter and in the context of Tanzania, 
this could be a consequence of the state neglecting rural areas over time and/or the 
failures of state policies (Chazan et al., 1999, p.125).  
The idea of social movements being generally weaker in Africa thus needs 
contextualisation and further analysis, especially considering the more recent 
uprising in Northern Africa. Perhaps it would be more adequate to talk about media 
neglect, as underlined by Bryceson (2009), Brandes and Engels (2011), and Dwyer 
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and Zeilig (2012), which reckon that media attention worldwide has provided little 
coverage to what has been happening in the African continent. Of a similar opinion, 
Mamdani et al. (1988) and Joseph (1993) affirm that rural movements in Africa 
have been left out from the political discourse, neglected by both the media and the 
states. In fact, besides the most recent movements, there have been others in the 
past that should have been given more attention at global level, as Larmer remarks 
(2010). The scholar identifies a phase of social movement activism following pre-
independence and post-independence, in the years after the adoption of structural 
adjustments and the consequential weakening of state control, which gave the 
opportunity for new autonomous movements in most countries in Africa. Another 
phase of social movements is identified in the onset of pro-democracy movements 
in the early 1990s, where in several sub-Saharan African countries citizens 
protested to demand civic reforms and the end of political repression (Bratton and 
de Walle, 1992; Larmer, 2010).  
During the 1990s the expansion of international and local NGOs also fostered the 
creation of new movements (Chazan, 1994; Brandes and Engels, 2011). For 
example, the pastoralist movements in Tanzania have been supported by NGOs like 
Oxfam (Fernando, 2012). However, the unity of these movements ‘commonly 
masked profound divisions regarding the outcomes they wish to see from this 
process of democratisation’ and raises the issue of dependency upon international 
NGOs and funding agencies (Larmer, 2010, p.256). According to Larmer (2010), 
one of the consequences of this dependency and the influence it exercises could led 
to the depoliticisation of social conflict. These aspects will be further analysed in 
chapter 7 with special reference to the case of Tanzania. 
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In conclusion, because of several constraints faced by civil society - such as lack of 
access to information, disillusion towards the state, weak structure and unclear 
objectives and methods, fear towards state response to protest -, social movements 
in Africa have generally been politically weaker than movements in other 
continents, for example in South America. They have not been successful in 
changing the political structure of the state and in affecting agricultural policy, 
especially if compared with movements in South America. This weakness is also 
the result of a general neglect manifested by political elites and by the media, both 
at national and international level. Nonetheless, it is indispensable to analyse social 
movements in socio-economic, political and cultural perspective, highlighting that 
the historical evolution of social movements may differ in single African states and 
that forms of protests are often manifested in an indirect and hidden way, as we 
will see in the case of Tanzania. 
2.7. Conclusion 
In this chapter the literature around the term ‘food security’ has been introduced, 
underlining the evolution of the term over time. When referring to food security, 
this study borrows the definition developed by the FAO in 2006, which defines 
food security as  
‘a situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social 
and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets 
their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life and 
are not at undue risk of losing such access’ (FAO, 2006). 
In addition, in line with the analysis provided by Amartya Sen (1981), a household 
perspective is employed, and food insecurity is also analysed according to the 
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ability of the household to purchase the food available, hence food insecurity is 
looked upon as related to a condition of poverty and unequal distribution. 
Furthermore, the personal perceptions of being food secure/insecure and the 
possibility to have a diversified diet are greatly taken into consideration as 
suggested by Maxwell (1992 and 1996), Maxwell and Devereux (2001), the 
IAASTD (2009). Issues of sustainability, power and control over natural resources 
are also considered in this study, embracing some of the reflections provided by the 
movement for food sovereignty. 
By embracing a comprehensive definition of the term food security, with all the 
connotations mentioned above, this study stresses the important role of two major 
subjects in the matter of food security: the state and the farmers. A focus on 
farmers, as both producers and consumers of food, is essential if issues such as 
quality and food diversification, sustainability, control and power are to be 
analysed. Moreover, in countries such as Tanzania, where they represent the 
majority of the population and are at high risk of food insecurity, farmers are to be 
considered central in analysis of food security. 
The important role of the state in the issue is given by the right to food literature, 
where the state is considered central in promoting food security and in creating the 
right conditions for its citizens to achieve food security. Despite the 
commoditisation of food and the expansion of a global food regime as described by 
McMichael (2009) and Friedman (1993), a contextualisation is needed in order to 
analyse the food insecurity condition of a determined country and find political 
solutions to overcome it. The state is still a major player, and the relationship that 
the state has with rural communities can be determinant to the success or failure of 
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policies aimed at improving food security, especially if in the country analysed the 
majority of its population is composed of farmers.  
The commoditisation of food is not the only factor affecting food security amongst 
farmers. As we will see, with the case of Tanzania, there could be different reasons 
behind food insecurity, and the political relationship between the state and farmers 
is one of them. This is why a contextualisation of the food system in the country 
analysed is essential and an analysis of the political state-farmers relationship is 
central in this study. 
By looking at the issue as a political one, and being the relationship between state 
and farmers the core of the study, an analysis of political responses to policies from 
farming communities is inevitable. Besides looking at the ways state’s action can 
affect food security, this chapter also looked at the ways farmers can react to 
discontent or unsatisfactory policies. With special reference to Southern and 
Eastern Africa, it was noted the lack of strong farmers’ movements, which has been 
interpreted as a form of disempowerment (Bratton and De Walle, 1992; Fatton, 
1995), apathy (Kelsall, 2002) or individualism (Hyden, 1980) by several scholars. 
Nevertheless, as it will be analysed in depth in the following chapters, and in 
particular in chapter 7 with reference to Tanzania, this study underlines the 
different forms contestation can assume, which needs to be analysed in perspective 
according to the historical and social development of a determined country. The 
following chapter will clarify this political aspect, by analysing food security in 
relation to the political dynamics of the state-farmers relationship.  
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Chapter 3 - The state-society relationship 
3.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter the evolution of the term ‘food security’ and its connection 
with both farmers and the state was described, introducing the research question and 
providing the academic context in which this study is located. Moreover, the political 
aspects of food security were remarked upon, stressing the importance of the state in 
promoting and creating the right conditions for assuring food security to its citizens 
within the power dynamics that exist in the global food system. Nevertheless, while 
farmers are central to the debate, and the state has an important role in promoting the 
development of food security in rural areas, there are many impediments that keep 
many farmer communities in a condition of food insecurity. 
In the previous chapter, the case for analysing food insecurity through the political 
lenses of state-society relations was proven worth of being explored. The assumption 
is that such relationship affects food security for several reasons. For instance, a 
conflictual relationship between the state and farmers could contribute to the 
formulation of misdirected policies and/or complicate the implementation of policies 
aimed at achieving food security, whilst also limiting the ability of farmers to contest 
unwanted policies and their interaction with agricultural programs sponsored by state 
officials.  
In order to explore this aspect of food security and address the research question, this 
chapter will introduce the literature on the state-society relationship, with particular 
reference to Africa. This literature will help understand how the terminology is 
employed in this study, and will provide important elements that will help us 
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understand why state-society relations matter when talking about food security. In 
the previous chapter it was anticipated that, as a starting point, the term ‘state’ is 
used with reference to the classical definition proposed by Weber, describing it as a 
separate entity which holds the power and exercises it over a community of citizens, 
which we will commonly call society. Yet there is great debate on the general 
definition of the terms ‘state’ and ‘society’, as there are different forms of state and 
different societies, and even more diverse relations between the two bodies. Starting 
with this premise, and conscious of the fact that it is easy to fall into the trap of 
generalisation, this chapter will present some of the theories of state-society 
relations, referring in particular to the Tanzanian context.  
In using Weber’s definition of the term ‘state’ this study assumes that the state and 
the society are two separate subjects. But, what is the grade of separation between 
the two bodies? And does this separation impact on the ability of one to influence the 
other? The following section will discuss this in more details.  
3.2. State and society: two separate entities? 
There are no doubts that the relation between society and the state has a direct link 
upon the way the state exercises its power. Yet, it has also a direct link to the way 
society relates to the state and sees the state’s responsibilities in the various spheres 
of everyday life (Scott, 1998; Ferguson & Gupta, 2002; Lund, 2006). The different 
ways the state and society perceive each other condition the framing of policies on 
one side, and the democratic participation in political life, and hence the degree of 
state legitimation, on the other side. Hence, for the scope of this study, it is important 
to understand whether society feels like an inclusive part of the state or if instead it 
sees the state as a separated subject.  
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While Scott (1998) focuses mainly on analysing the dynamics of the relationship 
between the state and the society as separate entities, Li (2005) rejects the idea that 
the state is an autonomous entity, and underlines the importance of civil society, 
public figures, researchers and so on in influencing policy and changing dynamics of 
power within society. Hence, Scott's reading of the state and his analysis are mainly 
driven by a vision of the state as 'above' society. Li's vision differs in the claim that 
there is no space beyond the state (therefore society is part of the state), and no 
subjects outside power, in the sense that power is not exclusively in the hands of the 
state, since the latter is conditioned by numerous bodies that attempt to govern, 
including donor external agencies (Li, 2005, p.386, on this point also Lund, 2006, 
p.686 and Hyden and Bratton, 1992, p.6). Moreover, as Hyden and Bratton (1992), 
Lund (2006) and Li (1988) underline, the power is exercised from different bodies 
within the structure defined as 'state', and this power is conditioned by influences 
coming from civil society itself. Similarly, Migdal (1988) affirms that society and 
state are to be considered interconnected and the structure of one influences the 
action and the capabilities of the other. Nevertheless, he also remarks the separation 
of the two subjects, claiming that the state is an institution above society, which 
seeks to control. 
While a definition of the state with reference to the specific case of Tanzania will be 
provided in the following chapter, it can be said that the Weberian definition of the 
term ‘state’ is employed as a general assumption in this study, and following Scott’s 
approach, state and society are analysed as separate subjects where the state is above 
society; it is also recognized, however, as underlined by Li (1988) and Hyden and 
Bratton (1992) that the state is influenced by other subjects, for instance by 
international organizations, multinational companies, national industrial lobbies and 
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society itself. Moreover, different levels of power within the state structure are 
recognised, implying also that the engagement between them and the society could 
differ. The next section will clarify the dynamics of power behind the state-society 
relationship, explaining how state and society influence each other even in countries 
where the state is perceived as above society. 
3.2.1. Vertical encompassment, personification of politics and 
neopatrimonialism in African politics 
Following the debate on whether the state is within or outside society, most analysis 
of African politics agrees in describing the state-society relationship according to a 
pyramidal power structure, which sees a leader at the top, followed by a dominant 
political party at the national state level and lower state apparatus - such as districts 
and local administrative bodies - at the bottom, with limited autonomy. 
Exemplifying this is the theory of vertical encompassment: the tendency of the state 
to create an image of itself as being above society but at the same time seeking 
consent and legitimation by trying to include society (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002 and 
Scott, 1998). The way the state is presented to the citizens through the figure of state 
officials is a way to confirm the hierarchy of power and to stress the separation 
between them and members of society. Symbols and appearance are a way to 
distinguish the space, and stress the authority, of the state. For instance, this 
approach can be traced in the attitude of high officials of wearing expensive clothes, 
owning expensive cars and so on (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002 also Lund, 2006, 
p.690-694).  
Yet, while we would expect such tendencies to have a negative impact on the 
relationship between state and society, according to Daloz, and within the economy 
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of affection described by Hyden (see chapter 2), this ostentation of wealth and 
prestige of goods is what African society has come to expect from the state and acts 
as a factor of political legitimacy (Daloz, 2003, p.281). Hence, the vertical 
encompassment notion can only be fully understood if we take as a starting point the 
existence of what Hyden defines as ‘economy of affection’ in most African rural 
societies. Daloz claims that the legitimacy of the African elites is strictly connected 
to the ability of such elites to ‘nourish the clientele on which their power rests’, and 
therefore, ‘leaders are never wholly dissociated from their supporters’ (Daloz, 2003, 
p.278; Chabal and Daloz, 1999, p.15). In these circumstances, the ostentation of 
wealth confirms the leader’s capacity to supply and satisfy its network of dependants 
(Daloz, 2003, p.281).  As a consequence, politicians tend to acquire the maximum 
visibility and popularity by distributing (some of) the wealth acquired. At the same 
time, by doing so, state officials acquire more political power, hence higher ability to 
extract resources (Daloz, 2003, p.280). It could also happen that politicians, in their 
attempt to embrace society's expectations, take personal credit for policies welcomed 
by the community in order to keep high popular support. For example, the building 
of a hospital or of a school may be presented more as a 'present' of that particular 
politician rather than a result of the operation of the government (Chabal, 2009, 
pp.77-84).  
In other words, in the dynamics of vertical encompassment we see a state that 
distinguishes itself from society, but that at the same time tries to gain popularity and 
consent. Yet, consent is not only sought for mere electorate reasons, but also for 
social and anthropological reasons. As Hyden (1980 and 1983) and Chabal (2009, 
pp.43-57) underline, the social structure and culture of many African communities is 
characterised by kinship and extended family support, where wealthier individuals 
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are expected to take care and help poorer members of their families. It could be said 
that ‘individual rationality is essentially based on communal logic’, meaning that 
individuals behave in a way that is in line with social and religious foundations and 
‘relations of power are predicated on the shared belief that the political is communal’ 
(Chabal and Daloz, 1999, p.156). As a consequence, ‘political action is in large 
degree driven by what we might call the imperative of exchange’ or the 
‘expectations of reciprocity’ (Chabal and Daloz, 1999, p.157). In saying this, the 
authors stress the vertical links within the political system, and how politics can 
assume personalised forms and affect the nature of political relations. State officials 
are not only seeking personal power and resources, but also people’s affection, 
respectability and status.  
Under these circumstances, the separation between the state and the society becomes 
more faded, with the two entities appearing connected and the public and the private 
interests being confused, so that in certain circumstances nepotism, clientelism and 
abuse of public resources for private benefits can be considered acceptable (Daloz, 
2003, p.278; Chabal and Daloz, 1999, p.9; on this see also Bach and Gazibo, 2013). 
These aspects of African politics, exemplified in the attempt of state officials to 
create an informal patron-client relationship with other members of society, have 
been conceptualised as neopatrimonialism by several scholars, who also talk about a 
generalised ‘personification of politics’ observed in several African countries over 
time (Médard, 1991, pp.323-353). In analysing the effects of these practices, Bayart 
(1993) claims that they are at the basis of the ‘incompleteness’ of the state in Africa. 
According to him, beyond practices of clientelism, political elites tend to manipulate 
conflicts and political disorders in order to personally accumulate resources that 
belong to the state, and raise the attention of the international community in order to 
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ensure a continuous inflow of financial aid into the country. As a consequence, the 
African state is ‘incomplete’ as ‘it functions as a rhizome of personal networks and 
assures the centralization of power through the agencies of family, alliance and 
friendship, in the manner of ancient kingdoms’ (Bayart, 1993, pp.261-262). In the 
book The Criminalisation of the State in Africa he goes even further, outlining how 
these forms of corruptions and the use of public office for personal enrichment are 
now becoming more dangerous and reaching global criminal networks as a 
consequence of the process of liberalisation. State criminalisation is assuming the 
forms of large scale frauds and plundering of natural resources, drug trade, growth of 
private armies, and so on (Bayart et al. 1999).  
While according to Daloz (2003) neopatrimonial practices may work in favour of 
individual state officials in maintaining their popularity within their electoral 
constituencies, the effects of these practices on the general perception of the state can 
be deleterious. Migdal claims that neopatrimonialism may actually undermine the 
vision of the state since, by allowing corruptive practices, clientelism, and the 
affirmation of 'strongmen', some state leaders undermine their own state agencies, 
reducing in this way the power and the credibility of the state in the face of citizens 
(Migdal, 1988, pp.206-258; Moore, 2001; and Lund, 2006, p.687-689). This great 
‘informalisation’ of the state could also lead to arbitrariness and exploitation from 
public officials (the rule-makers) at the expenses of common citizens (the rule-
takers) (Chabal 2009, p.151). Furthermore, the failure of the state to provide basic 
services to its people leaves a gap that is often filled by informal economies giving 
opportunities to public officials to abuse their power and use public resources to their 
own advantage (ibid., p.132). In these circumstances, through neopatrimonialism, 
clientelism and corruption, it is possible for Africans elites ‘to enrich themselves 
 
 
76 
whilst the continent is failing to develop’ (Chabal and Daloz, 1999, p. xxi and 14). A 
similar take on neopatrimonialism is expressed by Fatton (1992) which, through an 
analysis of African politics based on state-society hegemonic power dynamics, 
claims that rent-seeking tendencies and clientelism ‘have devastating effects on the 
rest of society’ as the ruling class is predatory (from here the notion of ‘predatory 
rule’) and tends to maximise its individual wealth irrespective of the rest of society 
(Fatton, 1992, p.3).  
Nevertheless, according to Fatton neopatrimonialism and the personification of 
politics cannot be understood by an analysis of culture and society structure linked to 
the ‘imperative of exchange’ and ‘economy of affection’ as defined by Hyden (1980 
and 1983), Daloz (2003) and Chabal (2009). This is because, according to him, 
consent is not voluntary but indirectly imposed by the ruling elite to society. He talks 
about a ‘very fragile pact of consensual domination’ between the state and society 
which requires:  
‘…the ruling class to develop non-violent strategies of control that can 
draw the subaltern classes into accepting lopsided political and economic 
relations for pragmatic reasons. However unequal these relations may be, 
they entail certain norms of reciprocity based on exchanges of favour and 
resources. The ruling class must convince subaltern classes that such 
reciprocity represents a credible contract without which their already 
limited life-chances would be limited even more’ (Fatton, 1992, p.4).  
Fatton’s analysis questions the nature of societal consent, and perhaps his theory 
reflects the reality of the dynamics of state-society relations in some African 
countries. But it is very difficult to generalise and embrace one theory as a general 
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rule for all African countries. We can assume that neopatrimonial and personification 
of politics is common to many African countries, and that it has negative effects on 
society, as underlined by various scholars, and this will help us understand some 
aspects of the state-society relationship in the context of Tanzania, as we will see in 
the next chapters. Moreover, societal responses to such attitudes may vary and much 
depends on the nature of the state. For instance Fatton’s fragile pact of consensual 
domination implies the presence of ‘a hard structure of class dominance bent on 
continuous extractions from relatively powerless people’ (Fatton, 1992, pp.20-22). 
Nevertheless, this scholar also notes that, in the long term, such structure of the state 
alienates society, which tends to choose the ‘exit option’ and keep its distance from 
politics. Hence it becomes very difficult for the state to gain full control over rural 
society and impose its pact of consensual domination (ibid., 1992). For this and other 
reasons, not all scholars agree in defining the ‘African state’ as strong. In analysing 
power dynamics in African politics, many scholars have interrogated themselves on 
the role and ‘strength’ of the state and its ability to control society. In the following 
section these arguments will be presented and will show how a different 
understanding of the state may lead to a different interpretation of the state-society 
relationship. 
3.2.2. Weak, failed states? 
As noted above, in order to understand the state-society relationship, some authors 
have focused on analysing state capabilities and performance. Many of them have 
subsequently defined the general African state as in crisis, abnormal and/or 
unsuccessful (for instance Migdal, 1988; Forrest, 1988; Rothchild and Chazan, 1988; 
Faaland and Parkinson, 1991; Fatton, 1992; Hyden and Bratton, 1992; Chazan et al., 
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1999; Wai, 2012). For instance, the failure of the ‘African state’ has been identified 
with the inability of the state to comply with certain qualities (or abilities) recalling 
the Weberian idea of state. According to Migdal (1988) an efficient state should have 
the following characteristics:  
a) capacity to penetrate society;  
b) regulate social relationships; 
c) extract resources; 
d) appropriate use of resources (Migdal, 1988, p.4).  
Likewise, Forrest (1988) claims that the inability of African states to penetrate 
society - an aspect also stressed by other scholars such as Fatton, (1992) Bayart 
(1993) and Herbst (2000) - is a symptom of postcolonial African states’ failure to 
achieve ‘hardness’. For both Migdal (1988) and Forrest (1988), the quest for 
‘hardness’ is qualified by the ability of the state to have structural autonomy, to 
penetrate society and acquire hegemony over intermediary and local level politics, to 
extract resources and to gain political legitimacy. Therefore, many post-colonial 
African states are described as weak (or ‘soft’ by Forrest, 1988), as they lack 
sufficient capabilities to have a full control of society, especially in remote areas.  
The reasons why the state has difficulties to control certain parts of society are 
different. Political instability and the difficulties in encompassing and controlling a 
divided and diverse society are the basis of state failure according to Jackson and 
Rosberg (1982). For Faaland and Parkinson, instead, the general scarce ability of 
independent African states to implement long term reforms is determinant in 
characterising state failure (Faaland and Parkinson, 1991, pp.247-274). According to 
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Migdal (1988) and Forrest (1988) the fragmentation of social control is attributable 
to both the consequences of the colonial rule and to the spread of the world economy 
that has required many African states to limit public expenditure and hence reduce 
their physical presence and their control over some sectors, such as the agricultural 
one. Rothchild and Chazan (1988) agree in blaming the unsmooth process of 
transition from colonisation to independence as one of the causes of state failure. 
Because of this transition, and the dependence on colonial power in the post-
independence period, many African states struggle to develop a fully democratic 
system, able to represent and give voice to rural isolated areas (Rothchild and 
Chazan, 1988, Azarya, 1988).  
Historical reasons are also very relevant in Herbst’s understanding of the state in 
Africa. He claims that the inability of African leaders to preserve order, hence state 
failure, ‘occurs most often and most dramatically in Africa’ rather than elsewhere, 
because of the particular nature of the state and its boundaries (Herbst, 2000). 
According to Herbst, relatively young African states have great difficulties in 
exercising their power because of the difficulties in reaching and controlling rural 
culturally variegated and isolated areas scattered throughout the national territories. 
He stresses the need to develop alternative policies in line with the different African 
realities, perhaps advanced by African scholars themselves, and hypothesises the 
creation of new nation-states that could promote development and consolidate the 
sovereignty of single states. 
In short, rather than looking at the difficulties of the state-society relationship 
through the lens of a lack of communication, involvement and understanding, the 
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authors mentioned above emphasize the state’s lack of (or weak) military force to 
control society, measuring the weakness of the state by its ability to coerce society.  
 From a different perspective, for other scholars the failure of the state in Africa is 
attributable not to a lack of strength, but, on the contrary, to the use of authoritarian 
measures to gain control over society. For instance, according to Rothchild and 
Chazan (1988) despite the different historical and political formation of the several 
African states,  (see The Diversity of African Politics, in Chazan et al., 1999, pp.5-
34) there are some common characteristics which allow to talk of the failure of the 
African state in general terms: extensiveness of public sector with increasing 
bureaucracy and state control, patrimonial and clientelistic qualities, the emergence 
of a political élite class and the lack of communication with society. Likewise, for 
Hyden (1992) bad politics is characterised by: 
a) the personalized nature of rule; 
b) the frequent violation of human rights;  
c) the lack of delegation by central authorities; and 
d) the tendency for individuals to withdraw from politics. 
Therefore, the use of coercive measures (military force) and extensive bureaucracy 
are used by the state to control every aspect of social life. While this would be 
regarded as a strength by scholars such as Migdal and Forrest, for Hyden and 
Bratton the use of coercive measures and the tendency to control every aspects of 
society are understood as a weakness of many African states, because they results 
in society’s disengagement from politics (Hyden and Bratton, 1992). This 
pessimistic vision of the state in Africa recalls the idea supported in Hyden’s 1983 
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book No Shortcut to Progress, where the limits of the post-colonial African state to 
‘progress’ (intended in the economic sense)15 were blamed upon the state’s internal 
problems and the limits of the ‘peasant mode of production’. This referred to rural 
producers’ tendency towards subsistence production and the economy of affection 
mentioned in chapter 2 (Hyden, 1983, p.194). The title of this book shows Hyden’s 
conviction that change should happen gradually, and of the historical and cultural 
circumstances of a specific country that must be considered in analysing state-
society relationships.  
According to these scholars, at the root of the decision of several post-colonial states 
to achieve control over their respective societies through the use of coercion there is 
a profound distrust of the state towards its citizens (on this also Scott, 1998). For 
example, in the context of agriculture, most African state-driven policies to 
modernise the agricultural sector were characterised by a sense of cynicism towards 
traditional agricultural practices of local farmers and a complete faith in scientific 
agriculture and modern methods promoted by Western countries that led to the green 
revolutions in several parts of the world (Scott, 1998, pp.226, 231). Thus, in order to 
push for the adoption of these practices, many states turned to the use of coercion 
and strict control, assuming - perhaps rightly - that the rural communities would 
have otherwise refused to change their mode of production (which in many cases 
they did anyway, as we will see analysing the case of Tanzania in the next chapter).  
However, these accounts are interesting as they highlight the connection between 
state action and society’s political engagement. For instance, one of the 
consequences of centralisation and increasing state control was that it led to de-
                                                          
15 At the base of progress, in Hyden’s vision, are economic relations, which also determine the 
historical context of a country (1983, p. 191). 
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politicisation and social atomisation according to Hyden and Bratton (1992) and 
Scott (1998). In Hyden’s words, 'the final implication of Africa's 'bad' post-
independence politics is the tendency for individuals to evade rather than engage the 
political authorities' (Hyden, 1992, p.24). This attitude, according to the author, is 
the consequence of the fear of citizens to contest state policies (ibid., p.25). 
Bernstein also stresses how a state with high objectives but scarce resources to 
pursue them may tend to extend its control over society through expansion of 
bureaucracy (an 'overextended' state), and as a result fail to encompass society in any 
effective way (1981, p.57). 
It is clear however that different states have different characteristics, and a different 
kind of relationship between the state and society. For this reason, in Hyden and 
Bratton’s (1992) Governance and Politics in Africa several African states are 
analysed and grouped in four types of regimes according to nature of state and 
society responses: communitarian, characterised by the pressures of a great varieties 
of social organizations and different ethnic groups to the state; libertarian, market-
based, where citizens see themselves as autonomous individuals; corporatist, where 
institutions are determinant factors in policy making; and statist (the state is the main 
deciding actor) (Hyden and Bratton, 1992, pp.16-20). Each regime represents a 
different way the state poses itself to society, and consequently a different way for 
society to engage with the state. 
The possibility of a crisis is common to all regimes, implying that there is no right or 
advanced way to governance, but each model determines either a higher or lower 
risk of governance crisis (ibid., p.20). According to these classifications and the 
analyses brought forward with different empirical examples, the authors argue that 
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communitarian regimes, mostly to be found in Sub-Saharan Africa, are the ones most 
prone to governance crisis because of the informal character of relations between the 
public and the private spheres, and the state’s difficulties to deal with all the 
pressures coming from different groups and to fulfil all the expectations raised from 
different parts of society. Hyden and Bratton also found that in communitarian states 
the governance structures tend to be more fragmented and less structured, and 
society participation and association tend to be weak. 
In summary, it can be said that there are different readings of the African state, 
characterised by mainly two approaches: the state is too weak to control its society, 
or it is too coercive to involve its society in a constructive way. These two 
approaches are not necessarily contradictory. In fact, the use of the force could 
perhaps be an answer to the difficulties to control society and to satisfy the different 
requests and needs coming from different ethnic and social groups. This, added to 
the practice of clientelism and corruption, of which we talked in the previous section, 
may lead to society disengaging from the state for mainly two reasons: fear and/or 
distrust. A loss of credibility leads citizens to look at other ways to develop their 
economic interests, for example in parallel markets (Hyden, 1983, p.201). Once the 
society disengages from the state, politicians lose the ability to influence society and 
to successfully implement policies which are contrasted by the rural communities 
(Hyden, 1983, p.202). Neopatrimonialist theories are useful to analyse and 
understand society dissatisfaction and disengagement with the state. Nevertheless, 
this study recognizes that there are some issues with the use of this literature. The 
next section will review some of the criticism to the neopatrimonialism and state 
failure literature and will clarify the position of this study in merit of such criticism. 
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Society engagement/disengagement options will be analysed in more details in 
section 3.3. 
3.2.3. Criticisms of the neopatrimonialist approach and the state failure 
literature 
Most of the criticism of the literature on neopatrimonialism and state failure focuses 
on two aspects: the use of Western ideas of state in the African context, and the 
generalization of African countries. For example, Allen underlines the difficulties in 
talking about a common path of African states, since within Africa there are many 
different form of politics and political systems (Allen, 1995). According to the 
scholar, studies that look at Africa as a single reality lack consistency and cannot 
really talk in the name of the entire continent, because they represent only one of the 
many crucial political processes within African politics (ibid., p.317). Despite 
Bayart’s claim to distance his work from the paradigm of Africa as being a unique 
reality and from giving an African-pessimistic reading, in The Criminalization of the 
State in Africa (1999) in particular, he actually refers to ‘Africa’ in general terms. 
For instance, according to Wai  
‘while claiming to interpret Africa on its own terms, Bayart reproduces 
and reinforces some of the most offensive, obtuse and cynically 
prejudicial stereotypes, which not only ridicules and disparages the 
continent’s political and social formations, but in fact calls into questions 
the very humanity of the African person’ (Wai, 2012, p.38).  
Hence, Wai defines African states as ‘unfinished political projects’ (2012, p.34) and 
strongly criticises the neopatrimonialist literature in general, saying that: 
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‘neo-patrimonialist literature on African states […] not only constructs a 
mechanistic conception of state rationality based on the experience of the 
Western liberal state as the expression of the universal, but also denies 
the specificity of the continent’s historical experience, by either denying 
its independent conceptual existence or vulgarising its social and political 
formation and realities, dismissing them as aberrant, deviant, deformed 
and of lesser quality’ (Wai, 2012, p.27).  
Nevertheless, in his account on how neopatrimonialist and state failure theories are 
Western-centric and misleading, and in blaming scholars for ‘creating a reality in the 
service of the hegemonic power’ by using these theories (ibid., 2012), Wai does not 
seem to propose any alternative readings that would allow us to analyse African 
states in a more accurate way. The same goes to DeGrassi (2008), who criticises 
neopatrimonialist literature for not being rigorous, using a limited number of case 
studies and generalising; but then concludes: ‘Certainly, I am not arguing that no 
African state is neopatrimonial’ (DeGrassi, 2008, p.122).  
Perhaps it is true that the application of the word ‘state’ to African realities raise 
controversies, since it is a construct of Western political philosophy, but at the same 
time the denial of the status of ‘statehood’ to African countries negates the power 
struggle presents in African societies. Power struggles are common to Africa and 
everywhere else in the world, according to Bayart, who prefers to use the 
Foucaultian understanding of governmentality and power in his analysis of the 
African state (Bayart, 1993, p.263, and 1999). Therefore, the concept of state 
becomes useful if the intent is to analyse the power struggle between those who hold 
the power (policy-makers) and those on which the power is exercised (policy-
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takers),
16
 even though we recognize that the African state may present different 
features from those usually attached to the term state in Western countries. 
Furthermore, the use of certain terms such as state and society, and the use of 
neopatrimonialist analysis offer the advantage to describe the African continent 
showing a general trend, facilitating its analysis and understanding. This does not 
imply that all the African states have the same characteristics. This is recognized also 
by Hyden and Bratton (1992), which actually identify at least four state regimes in 
Africa, as it was noted in the previous section. 
Certainly, the risk of analysing African states following a western logic, as stressed 
by Wai (2012), exists and cannot be negated. To obviate this risk some authors such 
as Chabal and Daloz (1999) try to propose a different approach. These authors try to 
distinguish themselves from the two most common approaches in understanding 
African states. One is the approach that takes a Western perspective as a starting 
point, taking for granted the validity of concepts such as corruption, state, society, 
development and the thinking of African societies as traditional and reticent to 
change. The other is the one that considers Africa’s politics on the basis of 
generalized African state dysfunctions and which mostly blames external forces for 
these failures (ibid., p.144). According to Chabal and Daloz, African development is 
following a different path from the one followed in different parts of the world, 
hence in order to understand the mechanism of politics within African countries we 
need to use a different perspective and analyse political issues by framing them in 
their cultural and historical context. For example, in studying modernity and 
tradition, the question, according to these authors, is not whether Africa is more 
traditional than others, but how tradition and modernity live together. Moreover, 
                                                          
16 The notion of policy-makers and policy-takers has been outlined by Streeck (2010). 
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according to these scholars, if the Weberian definition of state and power had to be 
interpreted strictly, it would actually provide a good key of reading of African states, 
giving justice to the African contexts, since it defines rationality ‘in terms of what 
individuals and political actors believe for themselves to be rational, and not in terms 
of what outside observers might consider to be the case’ (Chabal and Daloz, 1999, 
p.151). This perspective is particularly interesting, and, as we will see in the 
following chapters, could help contextualise and understand some attitudes and 
behaviours of the members of society in relation to their engagement to politics and 
their vision of the state. For instance, concerning neopatrimonial attitudes, the 
approach suggested by Chabal and Daloz (1999) would allow us to explore how such 
tendencies are welcomed from the society and how they are portrayed by state 
officials. By locating neopatrimonialism in its particular social context it is easier to 
both assess its consequences and address its causes.  
Actually, for some authors, neopatrimonialism in the African context is not 
necessarily negative. According to Kelsall (2013), for example, it is true that 
neopatrimonialism is present in many African countries, but neopatrimonial 
literature should not consider it as a problem, interpreting it through the lenses of the 
Western concept of democracy. According to Kelsall, neopatrimonialism is not an 
insurmountable problem, and since it is slow to change it should be taken into 
consideration in formulating and implementing a different kind of governance 
tailored to the realities of many African states. This kind of governance should not 
necessarily be based on the liberal ‘good-governance’ model, but should take into 
account the character of state-society relationships based on the model of the 
economy of affection. From this perspective, Allen illustrates some examples of 
countries in Africa that, despite being highly centralised and having clientelist 
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relations, were stable and more successful than others (Allen, 1995, p.16). In short, 
both Kelsall and Allen claim that neopatrimonialism, in some conditions, can even 
assist development (ibid., 1995, Kelsall, 2012). For instance, Kelsall talks about 
‘developmental patrimonialism’ in the cases of Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, and Malawi 
(Kelsall, 2012, pp.18-48), claiming that the secret to success is more on how 
clientelism and rent-seeking are organized (ibid., 2013). 
In short, besides the two different takes on neopatrimonialism presented in the 
previous paragraph, the majority of the criticism of neopatrimonial and state failure 
literature lies in the conviction that African countries are different from each other, 
have their own peculiar histories, and are ruled by different socio-cultural systems, 
hence they need to be analysed under different parameters than those used to analyse 
Western countries. This idea is however also defended by those same scholars such 
as Chabal, Daloz, Hyden, Chazan, Rothchild, and Kelsall who also talk about 
neopatrimonialist features characterising many African realities. They analyse 
African realities through the lenses of the ‘economy of affection’ or ‘expectation of 
reciprocity’ and community values, while at the same time also underlining the 
presence of clientelism and personification of politics. This study embraces the 
literature brought forward by these authors to analyse state-society relationship in 
Tanzania.  
In light of these analyses of the African state, the next section will review some 
literature on societal responses in relation to the state, which will provide essential 
elements to analyse how the society (in particular rural society) engage with the 
state.  
 
 
 
89 
3.3. Societal responses and interaction with the state: the processes of 
engagement and disengagement 
So far this chapter has presented the state-society relationship from the state’s 
perspective, discussing the ways the state positions itself toward society. This section 
will analyse in more detail societal responses and the political engagement of 
individuals in relation to the state. Recalling the concept of state and society as 
separate entities as described at the start of this chapter, society is used in this 
dissertation in contradistinction to the state, to indicate a group of people (rule-
takers) under a common government.  
To analyse the relationship between the state and the society, and the ways this 
influences policies and eventually food security in rural areas, Azaria’s definition of 
incorporation and disengagement are employed. Azarya indicates these processes as 
the most common responses of society to state actions (1988, pp.6-9). With the term 
incorporation, he describes the process whereby the population is involved and take 
part actively in state processes and decisions in order to share its resources. There is 
great cooperation between the state and society, which wishes to stay as close to the 
government as possible. According to the scholar this interaction is positive and, 
thanks to the communication between the two subjects and the involvement of 
society into policy framing, it boosts economic output, facilitates the emergence of 
new entrepreneurship, and creates an attractive environment for foreign investments. 
Generally, in an incorporated society, local politics is strictly related to and 
dependent on the central government, but can also have a relevant influence upon 
state’s decisions. As a consequence, regional and income inequalities are also likely 
to widen, favouring the areas or regions of the country where local politicians are 
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more influential (Azarya, 1988, p.7). Furthermore, an incorporated society doesn't 
necessarily mean a more politically active society, as we will see later on.  
On the other hand, disengagement is described as the process in which society 
manifests scepticism and keeps its distance from the state, which is considered 
inefficient in satisfying the population's needs. In other words, according to 
Olorunsola the society would disengage (withdraw) from the state because it lacks 
confidence in the capabilities and willingness of the state to improve the condition of 
society (Olorunsola, 1988, pp.189-207). As we will see with reference to Tanzania, 
the disillusion of citizens could be the consequence of continued policy failure and 
high expectations previously raised and not fulfilled (Ayoade, 1988, pp. 100-118). 
On this, Ayoade underlines how the decline in authority in many African states is 
attributable to the failure of the post-colonial states' leaders in meeting people's 
expectations, and in creating a strong unified and autonomous state in the years after 
independence. The failure to provide the expected and promised benefits on a large 
scale, and to satisfy what Ayoade defines as the 'Santa Claus' syndrome, created a 
gap between the state and the society, with the alienation of people from the state. 
Schwartz has also described society’s alienation by using the term ‘estrangement’, 
which, according to the scholar, is caused by the ‘perception that one does not 
identify oneself with the political system’ (Schwartz, 1973, p.7).  
Disillusion is also at the basis of Barker’s analysis of society’s disengagement from 
politics. One of the scholar’s considerations in his analysis is that 'state politics does 
not tap the political energies of rural communities'. In other words, by imposing a 
specific model of agricultural modernization the state takes little account of the 
realities of rural areas meaning that the state’s policies reflect inadequately the 
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exigencies of rural communities that struggle to conciliate tradition and modernity 
(Barker, 1989, p.201). Another reason for disengagement is linked to a desire among 
social groups for autonomy from state control. For instance, according to Hyden, 
rural resistance to state policy reflects peasants’ efforts to preserve their way of life 
and affirm their autonomy, besides also revealing the difficulties of the state to 
communicate to rural masses (Hyden, 1980, p.16). According to the scholar, the state 
struggles to capture the farming class, which seems indifferent to politicians and 
unwilling to cooperate with the state, seen as ‘an alien body in the society’ that lacks 
the instruments to make effective changes (Hyden, 1980, pp. 86-91 and 1983, p. 
201). As Hyden explains, ‘the worst thing to happen [...] is not the economic 
stagnation [...] but the tendency for the state to be further cut loose from society’; 
such tendency, according to this scholar, is an obstacle to progress and development 
(ibid., p. 202).  
In addition, society may decide not to cooperate with the state because it does not 
trust its advice. For example, the new modern agricultural methods indicated and 
pursued by government’s under the rubric of the green revolution were often not 
suitable for local conditions, resulting in ‘ecological failures’ and were often 
misleading or disregarding towards the reality of the conditions of rural populations 
(Scott, 1998; Barker, 1989). Thus, certain kind of policies could have a negative 
impact on local communities. For example, policies aimed at relocating people may 
disorientate and make them more vulnerable to state power and control, weakening 
them, or could foster tensions between society and the state or within society itself 
(Scott, 1998, p. 235; Li, 2005, p.391). Such policies, therefore, are doomed to 
failure, as they are welcomed with only scepticism and distrust.  
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While active cooperation or passive support are usually typical of incorporated 
societies, where there is a respective trust between state and society, in a disengaged 
community individuals can oppose the state by being politically active, or by 
showing complete disinterest. The modalities of disengagement from politics vary, 
and can be understood through different behaviours, as Schwartz (1973), Fatton 
(1992) and Scott (1985) illustrate. As we saw in the previous chapter, a direct way to 
confront the state is commonly perceived as being through direct protests, creation of 
strong representative movements and active political participation. 
However, disengagement can be expressed in more indirect ways, through scarce 
participation in elections, expressing a low opinion of state officials, exhibiting a 
general disinterest in the political affairs of the country, boycotting or not complying 
with state advice, etc. Disengagement can also assume the forms of political 
detachment in several ways, for example by relying on other bodies to satisfy some 
public needs usually covered by the state (for instance relying on external agents that 
operate in the country such as NGOs and international organizations to provide 
health assistance or education) or by following tribal traditions and costumes more 
than the national set of rules (Chazan, 1988, p. 130). Yet, disengagement, according 
to Azarya, 'does not include active opposition to the regime if the objective is to 
replace the rulers and/or change government policies', in the sense that 
disengagement is more characterised by political apathy and disinterest rather than 
direct confrontation (Azarya, 1988, p.8). The society does not aim to change the 
state, but rather to keep a distance from it and to get increasingly detached from it. 
Therefore, these indirect ways to confront the state are useful in an analysis of 
society in many African countries, especially in the ones where direct confrontation 
is sporadically witnessed. Fatton and Scott, for example, argue that the subordinate 
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class (in this case the farming class) has often resisted exploitation in indirect ways; 
hence the lack of direct action should not be interpreted as apathy towards politics, 
but as a different way for society to react to discontent (Fatton, 1992, p.31-32; Scott, 
1985, p.335).  
The state can react to incorporation or disengagement in different ways. Usually the 
state encourages incorporation and fights disengagement, but it may also prefer to 
limit the level of society involvement in the state affairs if it wishes to avoid 
pressures from the society on various fronts or if it lacks the capability to keep 
control over extended responsibilities and resources (Azarya, 1988, pp.15-18). It can 
be the state, therefore, which disengages from the society, especially when it feels 
too much pressure from citizens or particular groups (Olorunsola, 1988, p.190). As 
Chazan points out, in an attempt to reach independence from citizens or pressure 
groups, the state can limit or contrast the involvement of society into political affairs 
(1988, p.123).  
Incorporation and disengagement represent two different ways that society and the 
state relate to each other, although it is important to note that such dynamics are not 
fixed, and the level of political incorporation or disengagement of society can 
change. Nevertheless, the precarious balance of state-society relationships that exists 
in many African countries and contributes to internal societal atomization needs to 
be accounted for and analysed as it influences the policies adopted by the state and, 
as a consequence, several aspects of citizens’ everyday life, including food security 
(Chazan, 1988, p.130).  
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3.4. The State-society relationship within the global food system 
From the analyses of the African state illustrated in this chapter, it is clear that many 
states in Africa suffer from several issues that limit their ability to successfully 
develop and fight poverty and hunger. One of these issues is surely the relationship 
that these states have with their respective societies: relationships that seem more 
characterised by societal disengagement rather than incorporation, as we will see in 
the specific case of Tanzania in the following chapters. Hence, the question is how to 
resolve the controversial relationship between the state and the society in order to 
create an environment of mutual cooperation and the framing of more effective 
policies.  
The incorporation or disengagement of society are not fixed phenomena and could 
change over time, for example with the advent of globalisation and as a consequence 
of the democratisation process. While the next chapter will analyse the role of 
democratisation and globalisation in the specific case of Tanzania, in general many 
scholars agree that the process of democratization is essential to society’s 
participation in politics and to improving the relationship between the state and 
society. Hyden, for example, underlines the importance of strengthening the civic 
public realm and having a higher involvement of citizens in policy making in order 
to achieve progress and economic growth (1992, p. 25, and 1983, p.209). Similarly, 
Joseph claims that a democratization process would lead to higher accountability of 
the government process and consequently would renew social participation in 
politics (Joseph, 1990). Moreover, he sees democracy as the only way the state can 
gain the trust of its citizens and involve them in the political life of the country. 
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While many African countries present some aspects of a democratic system and have 
introduced multiparty systems, the democratisation process is long. According to 
Bayart, the ‘move to multiparty politics is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
democracy’, since political elites in most countries are able to retain power even in 
multiparty elections, keeping ‘farmers and the rural youth at a respectable distance 
from the throne’, and making of democracy the incarnation of the postcolonial 
‘passive revolution’ (a term borrowed from Gramsci) and the symbol of the anti-
politics machine (as described by Ferguson) (Bayart, 1993). According to Bayart, 
common citizens are kept out of politics against their will and are manipulated by the 
several political elites. Other scholars disagree with this characterisation of 
multiparty politics.  They argue that the introduction of a multiparty system may not 
necessarily lead to any substantial changes in the quality of governance, though it 
may change the level of clientelism since more political parties compete for votes 
(Kelsall, 2004, p.34, 54, 55; Chabal, 2009, p.104). Moreover, in some countries 
democracy has not led to the expected economic development, leading to further 
disillusion and mistrust from citizens towards politics (Chabal, 2009, p.141).  
The process of liberalisation also impacted the relationship between state and society 
in several ways. According to Hyden, the internationalisation of the world economy 
could be a facilitating force in the development process since it creates new 
economic opportunities (Hyden, 1983, p.204). Of a different opinion, Fatton blames 
capitalism as being only a way for elites to enrich themselves at the expenses of 
citizens. He describes capitalism in Africa as a ‘peripheral and bastardized form of 
capitalism that has failed to create a ‘higher’ mode of production capable of 
superseding the precolonial and colonial heritage’ (Fatton, 1992, p.7). This scholar 
claimed that the implementation of SAPs has exacerbated conditions among the 
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poorest part of the population while providing opportunities for enrichment to ruling 
elites. In particular, ‘Structural Adjustment Programs have aggravated Africa’s 
subordination to international financial resources, further eroding the ever-tenuous 
sovereignty of African states’ (ibid., p.127). Likewise, Kelsall defines the adoption 
of the SAPs and of the good governance agenda as the result of the common 
assumption that African states are neopatrimonial. He goes on to suggest that at the 
heart  of these schemes  is a belief that  African states cannot  develop effective 
economic reforms by themselves and for this reason  need to be ‘guided’ by 
developed nations to ‘develop’ the continent and promote good governance (Kelsall, 
2004, pp.12-17). In other words, the good governance agenda, according to Kelsall, 
is only a ‘way to try to make African states more like Western states’ (ibid., p.13). 
Furthermore, there are concerns about the internationalisation of the economy having 
a negative impact on the sovereignty of nation states, although it is recognized that 
different states are affected by the globalisation of the economy in different ways. 
For Weber, in contrast to Marx or Smith, the state is at the centre of the process of 
transformation towards a capitalist society. Fatton, while criticising the neoliberal 
agenda, also recognises that states still can have a central decisive role, and that 
domestic policies matter decisively as they set the parameters and the extent of 
which states will be dependent and incorporated in the international economy (1992, 
pp.120-121). Other scholars argue that states have lost power as they are liable to 
global agreements and influenced by global markets. Hence, the state is a victim of 
the globalisation system and the relationship between state and society assumes little 
relevance in analysing power dynamics (Speiser and Handy, 2005). Nevertheless, in 
the particular case of Tanzania, this study supports Fatton’s analysis, and claims that 
the Tanzanian state, despite being encompassed in the global food system, still 
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retains a certain level of autonomy and is able to condition the political life of its 
own country. 
It is true, however, that the effects of liberalisation on the relationship between state 
and society are difficult to unpick. According to Fatton, the opening of the state to 
globalisation could have a negative effect in the state-society relationship. In 
Fatton’s view, the globalisation of the economy tends to create the formation of a 
transnational capitalist class and a relationship of collaboration amongst ruling elites, 
where they get mutual benefits at the expense of society (on this also Sklair, 2002). 
In short, globalisation favours the powerful and wealthy while it is detrimental to the 
poorest part of society. Moreover, as a consequence of internal and external 
influences and pressures, the state is in continuous change and formation, and the 
distinction between state and society is less clear (Lund, 2006, pp.686, 697-699). Of 
a different opinion, Ferguson and Gupta claim that globalisation and economic 
liberalisation represent a way to empower the citizens to 'discipline themselves', 
because they devolve state’s responsibilities to other entities such as multinational 
corporations and international organisations which respond to donors’ interests 
(Ferguson and Gupta, 2002, p.989). 
This last point deserves attention. What does it mean that citizens can ‘discipline 
themselves’? Does it imply that otherwise they are not ‘disciplined’? Furthermore, it 
is more likely that the devolution of a state’s responsibilities, besides furthering the 
distance between the state and the society, opens the door to possible cases of 
manipulation of citizens, for example from multinational companies which promise 
the building of roads, schools and hospital in exchange of land. Besides the 
expansion of multinational corporations, including agribusinesses, the effects of the 
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expansion of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) funded by external countries 
should be assessed. Because of the nature of these organisations, they act in a 
transnational regime, where the space is not clearly defined, and their work is strictly 
linked to the donors’ will (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002, p.994). While the presence of 
these entities may represent an opportunity for citizens to be more involved in local 
development policies, and perhaps to have a voice and be represented at the higher 
levels of politics, actually, in the context of transnational governmentality (as 
defined by Ferguson and Gupta, 2002, pp.989-990), it is increasingly difficult for the 
society to have a say in the policies that affects them.  
Therefore, in some circumstances, the claim that democratisation and liberalisation - 
linked to the phenomenon of globalisation and expansion of civil society - led to 
more pluralism and societal participation in politics is misleading. There are reasons 
to believe that in the context of transnational governmentality the state is still 
sovereign, but it has become increasingly difficult for society to have a direct impact 
on politics because of external and internal influences. This has raised doubts about 
the legitimacy and accountability of the state; a state that on certain occasions seems 
more inclined to please external donors than its internal citizens, as social 
movements in the various global governance meetings have pointed out in the 
various G8, World Bank and IMF meetings.  
In the context of agriculture and rural society, in several countries the process of 
liberalisation has had negative effects on rural communities, since the states have 
developed closer ties with large scale farmers and neglected small scale ones, 
considering them ‘ignorant’: 
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 'large capitalist farmers maintain a privileged relationship with state 
officialdom and superior access to state-controlled financial credit and 
farm inputs and to civil service personnel, resulting in social conflict with 
the less-advantaged classes in their midst'. (Chazan et al., 1999, p.122) 
State distrust towards rural communities and the withdrawal from the provision of 
social assistance (both in agriculture and in social services as a consequence of the 
adoption of the neoliberal agenda) has surely contributed to straining the relationship 
between the state and rural societies. Nonetheless, as we will see in the following 
chapters, liberalisation has affected developing states in different ways and through 
different modalities, and it would be difficult to talk about a common liberalisation 
path for all African countries.  
3.5. Conclusion 
In light with what has been said in chapter 2 concerning the role of the state in 
promoting food security and the importance of policies to be framed around the 
needs of rural communities in order to succeed, this chapter has analysed the 
dynamics of state-society relationships in order to understand the reasons why food 
security is not being attained in many African countries. In particular, the theoretical 
background offered in this chapter provides essential reflections to understand how 
certain policies are formulated by the state and the way they are welcomed from the 
society at which they are directed. For instance what has been described as ‘society 
disengagement’ can help understand some of the attitudes resulted from the 
empirical data collected in Tanzania during the fieldwork for this study, as we will 
see in the following chapters.   
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What has emerged in this chapter is that the relationship between state and society is 
a complex one, and varies according to the historical and cultural background of 
each country. For the scope of this study we will embrace the general principle 
expressed by Scott (1998) according to which state and society are two separate 
entities. It is recognised, however, that the state is a complex structure, in which 
different levels of power are present and hence it is conditioned by internal and 
external pressures (Li, 1988; Hyden and Bratton, 1992; and Lund, 2006). State and 
society, despite being two separate entities, influence each other.  
It is in these conditions that the relationship between the state and the society 
assumes political relevance. In this study this relationship is analysed through the 
lens of vertical encompassment, which implies that the state is an entity above 
society (vertical dimension of power), but at the same time tries to gain consent and 
popularity amongst society through forms of personification of politics, clientelism 
and neopatrimonialism (as identified by Médard, 1991; Bayart, 1993; Chabal and 
Daloz, 1999; Daloz, 2003). In short, the state appears as a friendly master. 
Nevertheless, the various levels of power within the state have a variable relationship 
with society, so that the officials belonging to the local level of power results closer 
to society, while the officials at the higher ranks of power are usually felt as 
outsiders by the society.  
This intriguing relationship has been explained by looking at the structure of some 
African societies by authors such as Hyden (1980 and 1983), Chabal (2009) and 
Chabal and Daloz (1999). These authors have identified what drives the relationship 
between the state and the society in the dynamics of the ‘economy of affection’ and 
‘expectation of reciprocity’. These two aspects, which summarise the importance of 
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kinship and community ties for the African societies analysed, explains why in local 
politics the public and the private spheres are confused and why clientelism is 
pervasive, and in some respect expected and accepted. 
Nevertheless, this structure of relationship inevitably leads society to consider the 
high levels of the state as 'an outsider’ and to develop a conscious detachment from 
national politics. In fact, while neopatrimonialism in the form of clientelism and 
corruption is practiced with the intent to gain consent, it has negative repercussions 
for the country as a whole (Fatton, 1992). As a consequence, the citizens lose faith in 
the ability of the state to improve their conditions and to implement major successful 
policies at national level (Migdal, 1988; Moore, 2001; Lund, 2006; Chabal, 2009). In 
these circumstances, the state fails to embrace or encompass society in an effective 
way and to implement successful policies. The societal disengagement from politics, 
as defined by Schwartz (1973), Hyden (1980), Azarya (1988), Olorunsola (1988), 
Ayoade (1988), Barker (1989), and Scott (1998) is hence studied as a consequence 
of distrust and discontent towards the state and the result of previous historical 
failures, which will be analysed in the following chapter.  
Moreover, in this chapter it was mentioned that the processes of democratisation and 
liberalisation do not seem to have had a positive effect in improving the relationship 
between the state and society. These phenomena, however, needs to be analysed 
within the context of the country analysed, since many African countries can be 
considered to be still in transition towards both democratisation and liberalisation. 
Clearly, however, the changes at international level are to be considered when 
analysing the relationship between a state and its society, especially since these 
imply the emergence of new actors that can affect the state internal dynamics of 
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power. The following chapter will underline the origins of the relationship between 
the state and society in Tanzania, introducing the case study and setting the 
background in which this relationship has evolved over the years.  
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Chapter 4 - State-society relations and agricultural policy in 
Tanzania 
4.1. Introduction 
The previous two chapters presented the theoretical framework in which this study is 
located. In particular, the previous chapter underlined the connection between the 
state-society relationship and the formation and outcome of policies in the African 
context.  
This chapter will introduce the case study of this research, defining the state and the 
evolution of its relationship with society in the specific context of Tanzania. By 
introducing this case study, we will be able to locate this research in its socio-
historical context, which will help understand the results of the empirical data 
illustrated in chapters 5, 6 and 7. Besides a clarifying section on what the state is in 
Tanzania, this chapter will provide the historical background of the country, with 
reference to the agrarian change and the evolution of the state-farmer relationship 
since Tanzanian independence in 1961. The reason why this thesis looks at the state-
society relationship since independence is related to the fact that it is after 
independence that the state institutions of Tanzania were consolidated and the 
policies implemented by the new state widely affected rural communities. It is 
certainly true that colonialism set the basis to the creation of a certain kind of 
peasantry in the country, but the internal contradictions of the independent state led 
to the greatest changes in the countryside and are at the origin of a controversial 
relationship between the farming rural masses and the state.  
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In the independent state, especially under the guidance of Julius Nyerere, the 
imperative for the state was to establish a close connection with the peasantries; a 
connection that would allow the state to control the countryside and to impose a 
certain development path. Nevertheless, as we will see, the application of Ujamaa 
(Nyerere’s vision of socialism) resulted in a burdensome relationship between the 
farmers and the state for different reasons:  a misreading and misinterpretation of 
Tanzanian society by the ruling elite, a top-down policy approach, and the adoption 
of coercive measures. But what do we exactly refer to when talking about the 
Tanzanian state? In the section below details on the nature of the state in Tanzania 
will be presented.   
4.2. The Tanzanian state 
As claimed in the previous chapter, during this study the term state is used to 
indicate the political entity that is recognised as the expression of power and rule by 
a determined group of citizens. Nevertheless, the role and the perception of the state 
varies according to the kind of regime, the level of social involvement in politics and 
decision-making and also cultural practices. Therefore, in this section the state will 
be defined in the Tanzanian context. Theories of incorporation and disengagement 
(explained in the previous chapter) are used to define the character of the state in 
Tanzania and understand the dynamics of social engagement in politics. 
Furthermore, considerations on the importance of political and economic changes 
over the years are provided to offer an indication of the evolution of the state 
expansion and the switch in the balance of powers.  
According to Snyder it is difficult to draw a clear distinction between the state and 
society in Tanzania, as many households have members that work in the public 
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sector, and may take part in village political life in different ways. For example in 
many villages, and even in parts of the city of Dar es Salaam, for every ten 
households there is a representative which is supposed to attend village meetings and 
bring forward the requests, suggestions and concerns of the households he/she 
represents (Mitchell, 1991, Munro, 1996, Snyder, 2008). The scholar Matthew 
Costello sees this as a negative factor, as it increases bureaucracy and clientelist 
practices, leading to politics being ‘swallowed’ by the administrative machine 
(Costello, 1996). Yet, the incredible expansion of bureaucracy over the years since 
independence should not be interpreted as the weakening of politics into the 
administrative routine, but rather it should be analysed as one of the elements that 
characterises Tanzanian politics and the relationship between the state and its 
citizens. 
In fact, it is exactly the distribution of power at the administrative level that has 
shaped the image of the state in the eyes of the Tanzanian society. While the 
distinction between society and state may be blurred, the distinction between lower 
level state apparatus and higher ones is instead very clear, marking the fact that the 
state in Tanzania is on different levels: local, district and central. Often, lower level 
state apparatus, in particular local officials, are captured by the forces of civil 
society; hence they are closer to society than to central state forces. In fact, generally 
local officials are elected by citizens and are ‘peasants like everybody else’ with 
variable effectiveness (Becker, 2009, p.92). On the other side, at district and regional 
level, officials are usually appointed, and may not be locals to the area where they 
are appointed. According to Becker the distance between higher level officials and 
common citizens is also an aesthetic one, and for example ‘the hallmark of a higher 
official was a four-wheel drive car, which stood out a lot in a region where private 
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car ownership was very unusual’ (ibid., p.92). Moreover, often they had very little in 
common with local people, for example it could happen that  
‘in a Muslim town they were mostly Christian: Like their income, their 
power derived from the capital; they had no local roots and did not seek 
to acquire them’ (ibid., p.92).  
As a consequence, most regional and district officials are seen as ‘outsiders’ from 
villagers, while local officials are seen as a part of the society and not necessarily 
identified with the state, as it will be noted in chapter 6, while analysing the 
interviews undertaken during the fieldwork. 
At the same time, the diffident approach of farmers towards the state is also the 
reaction to a certain state’s attitude and perception of the figure of the farmer. For 
instance, in the case of Tanzania, as we will see in chapter 6, many officials 
interviewed often referred to farmers with negative connotations, using adjectives 
such as ‘backwards’, ‘stubborn’, ‘lazy’, and ‘ignorant’. In particular, farmers in 
Coast Region are regarded as un-productive, not worth investing in and ‘not serious 
about agriculture’ (see chapter 6 for a full report of these interviews). These general 
stereotypes would be of little importance to the analysis of this research if it was not 
for the fact that they are behind some important political decisions that shaped the 
current conditions of farmers in this area. For instance, Coast region has been 
excluded from the regions where the agricultural subsidy is implemented because, 
according to an official in the Department for Food Security in the Ministry of 
Agriculture interviewed in August 2013, people in Coast region ‘are not really 
farmers, they produce too little’. Hence, the state’s perception of farmers influences 
political decisions and has an impact on farming households of specific areas. As a 
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consequence, the state is increasingly perceived as a separate entity disconnected and 
far from its people’s needs.  
Yet, it should be noted that the perception and the relationship with the state has 
evolved over time, and has not been homogeneous in the different parts of the 
country. Some areas, better represented at the political level (for instance 
Kilimanjaro), reacted better to certain policies than other areas, usually more 
isolated. It may be also for this reason that some negative stereotypes are mostly 
addressed to a certain kind of farmer in specific areas of the country. Truly, the 
making of the Tanzanian nation-state has not been an easy task in the post-colonial 
days, given the presence of so many tribes, different languages and cultures. That 
was the reason why Nyerere pointed to the adoption of Kiswahili as a common 
language for all Tanzanians, with the hope of unifying a very diverse population and 
promoting the country’s stability. Nevertheless, as shown in this chapter, since 
independence, the state portrayed an image of itself as being above society, under an 
attitude often described as patronising and paternalistic, following a top-down 
approach to the implementation of policies. The aim was to lead the process of 
nationalisation, under a pan-African socialism that aimed at unifying the different 
tribes and communities. However, the distrust towards rural society and the exigency 
of transforming the socialist state led to the state assuming full control of society 
(Spalding, 1996a). As we will see, the harsh ruling of the cooperative associations 
and the consequent abolishment of these, the extended civil service and government 
official presence in the villages, and the long bureaucratic processes, prove that the 
young Tanzanian state was concerned about possible loss of power and aimed at 
gaining full control over society, at times resorting to coercive measures (William, 
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D.V. 1982). This certainly contributed to creating an image of the state as ‘above’ 
society.  
An historical perspective is also adopted by Stein (1985), who provides a definition 
of the Tanzanian state as an outcome of the colonial past and the nature of class 
relations, as opposed to the ‘paternal’ socialist state image provided by writers such 
as Mwansasu and Pratt (1979). By analysing the nature and the expansion of the 
ruling bureaucratic class seeking to extract surplus from producers in the post-
independence years, Stein explains the expansion of the state and its increasing 
control over the economy. The reading of the state under an economic Marxist angle 
also helps understand how the state created an image of itself as ‘above’ society:  
‘Socialism’ to this class was synonymous with the intervention of the 
state in economic affairs. It meant that the state was the only agent that 
could bring modernisation and development to the ‘backward’ elements 
of society. It set the state as an organ apart from and above the direct 
producers’ (Stein, 1985, p.123). 
Nevertheless, this definition seems reductive. As a matter of fact, this vision does not 
explain the efforts of the young Tanzanian state towards rural and social 
development, and does not give justice to the progress Tanzania saw in the social 
sector in the post-independence years. In the eyes of citizens, the state, increasingly 
identified with the figure of Nyerere was not seen merely as the ‘exploiter’, at least 
in the post-independence years. As Sundet underlines,  
‘The state’s attempts to expand its control over the agricultural sector 
must be seen as an integral part of the overall development strategy, not 
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simply as a manifestation of a class conflict between bureaucrats and the 
peasantry’ (Sundet, 1994, p.41).  
Nevertheless, given its post-colonial and avowedly socialist political path, the 
Tanzanian state has been the object of several studies in which the state formation 
has mostly been analysed through the lens of class struggle  (for example Saul, 1974; 
Shivji, 1975; Boesen and Raikes, 1976; von Freyhold, 1977; Samoff, 1979; Resnick, 
1981; Stein, 1985). That said, one of the objectives Nyerere expressed on different 
occasions was to create a ‘Pan-African Socialism’, an innovative construct that 
would ‘skip’ the class struggle unifying the citizens under the communal way of life. 
Therefore, analyses of the Tanzanian state under a Marxian framework need to take 
into consideration this particular form of socialism that Nyerere wanted for Tanzania 
(on this also Leys, 1976, Forrest, 1987, Bayart, 1993).  
The next section will describe in details Nyerere’s influence and his vision of Pan-
African socialism for Tanzania. In particular, the following sections will look at the 
roots of this controversial relationship between the state and the farmers in Tanzania 
as the historical events, either because of a patronising and control-driven approach 
or because of a distant and neglecting one, seem to have contributed to detach 
society from the state even further. This is particularly true for the rural population, 
where public services are often scarce and people struggle to have access to basic 
needs. Nonetheless, this disconnection should not be read as passivity towards 
politics, as Kelsall (2004) puts it, but should be analysed according to the process of 
development of the idea of the state in the Tanzanian context. While farmers have 
often being portrayed as helpless, passive, difficult to be ‘captured’ by the state 
(Hyden, 1980; Forrest, 1988), and while they ‘struggle to participate in political 
processes within arenas defined by state institutions’, they also ‘continue to pursue a 
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polycentric, informal political practice at the local level’ (Becker, 2009, p.76). 
Although we will see in chapter 7 the characteristics and the limits of this 
participation, in general it can be said that the political nature of rural society is best 
expressed at the local level, with which it can relate, rather than with the higher state 
apparatus. Therefore, in my analysis, the references to ‘the Tanzanian state’ indicate 
that part of the state felt as ‘outsider’ by rural society, represented by the high state 
apparatus and its representatives (from regional level upwards).  
In the next section, the origins of the detachment between the state and the society 
will be explained by looking at the process of democratisation and the impact that 
the first years after independence had on shaping the idea of state and of society.  
4.3. The democratisation process in Tanzania: independence, the affirmation of 
the single party system and the influence of Julius Nyerere 
Inequality and differentiation between farmers were present since before the colonial 
era,
17
 but under colonial rule they grew considerably, as several European-owned 
plantation industries were expanding consistently, in particular in some areas of the 
country (Bukoba, Kilimanjaro, Sukuma, Usambara, Iringa). Population growth and 
the introduction of new crops such as maize and rice that gradually started to replace 
sorghum, bananas and millet were the major causes of agricultural change in the 
countryside during colonialism. Nonetheless, farmers did not lose their autonomy 
and ‘nowhere [...] had commercial crops done more than supplement subsistence 
agriculture’, as primary importance was given, by both farmers and the colonial 
government, to subsistence food production (Iliffe, 1971, p.32). Although colonial 
                                                          
17 Tanganyika became part of the German East Africa and was under the control of the German 
Empire from 1885 until the end of the First World War, when the League of Nations conceded 
Britain a mandate to control the area (Gentili, 1979).   
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powers both under German and British rule were aware that a need of modernisation 
of farming methods was needed, they did not impose modern agricultural schemes 
upon farmers (ibid., pp.33-39). In reality, the initial attempt of the German Empire of 
dispossessing and appropriating local land was contrasted by the indigenous 
population and gave rise to the Maji-Maji rebellion in 1905,
18
 forcing the colonial 
power to change their colonial policy and give more autonomy to the indigenous 
farmers and space to traditional rulers (Taylor, 1963; Gentili, 1979). The British 
mandate, started in 1920, followed a similar line of indirect rule. In 1926, the system 
of Native Authorities was created, where indigenous authorities, under the 
supervision of the colony rule, were officially recognised as administrators of their 
local areas (Gentili, 1979). Nevertheless, this did not placate the insurgence of the 
first independence spirits. In 1929 the first political organisation, the TAA 
(Tanganyika African Association) was created by a small educated élite, which 
claimed self-reliance and criticised the colonial system. With the intent to prevent 
possible rebellions, the British government substituted the Native Authorities system 
with a more inclusive system, where Tanganyikans were allowed to be part of the 
bureaucratic apparatus and participate in democratic elections for the legislative 
council and – with some limitations – for the executive one (Pratt, 1976, p.28).  
Nevertheless, the nationalist movements grew stronger with the years, culminating in 
another protest against dispossession of land in 1951. In the name of individual land 
ownership, in 1951 the local Meru people were evicted from Engare Nanyuki, in 
                                                          
18 The Maji-Maji rebellion was, according to Taylor (1963), the most widespread revolt East 
Africa had never seen before. Started in 1905, from a group of tribes near the Rufiji River, it 
quickly extended to other tribes and other areas, against the oppressive German rule. The 
German response was harsh: ‘by 1907, when the death of one of … the original insurgents, 
Abdulla Mpanda, brought an end to the revolt, devastation was almost complete… The 
inhabitants had been robbed, killed, and enslaved by the German askaris; crops and villages had 
been destroyed and cattle carried off. Casualties from warfare and famine numbered about 
120,000 people’ (Taylor, 1963, p.19).  
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favour of wealthy European farmers, who had covered the land for settlement (Iliffe, 
p.38; Kelsall, 2002, pp.26-31). The ‘Meru land case’ became a national rather than 
tribal issue and a cause employed by those citizens pressing for decolonisation. In 
1954 the TAA became the Tanganyikan African National Union (TANU), guided by 
the charismatic figure of Julius Nyerere, and including members from different 
social groups (Havnevik and Isinika, 2010). The movement embraced the land issues 
raised under the Meru case and promised self-reliance, pan-African socialism and 
rural development and prosperity. Initially, the Britain government tried to counter 
the popularity of TANU by supporting another party, the UTP (United Tanganyika 
Party), mostly represented by Europeans and Asians. But in the elections of the 
legislative council of 1960 TANU, with the motto ‘freedom and development’, won 
70 out of the 71 seats, forcing Britain to accept the declaration of independence, 
which was proclaimed on the 9
th
 December, 1961 (Gentili, 2010). Nyerere was 
consequently elected Prime Minister, and became the President of Tanganyika the 
following year, in December 1962. Under his leadership the government 
implemented some reforms that limited the power of labour unions and the right to 
strike, but also increased the minimum wage.  
The first years after independence were certainly not easy ones, with several crises, 
such as in 1964 when the army mutinied asking for higher wages and the substitution 
of British officials with Tanganyikan ones. Nyerere’s stated aim was to lead his 
country in a peaceful transition towards what he called a ‘pan-African socialist 
society’, including the process of union with Zanzibar and the creation of an East 
African community. However, he faced some challenges, such as the dependence on 
the former colonial powers: for instance, eventually he had to call the British 
government to intervene to resolve the army mutiny. Moreover, the presence of 
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colonial plantations producing food to export under capitalist schemes was in 
contrast to his villagization project and self-reliance spirit. The clash between the 
will of being an independent and socialist country and the influence that colonial 
power still had in the country’s politics eventually caused a diplomatic crisis with 
West Germany in 1964, following the unification of Tanganyika with Zanzibar and 
Pemba, which had close ties with East Germany. West Germany did not see this 
unification with benevolent eyes, afraid of the potential new influence of East 
Germany on state affairs. Therefore, West Germany stopped providing assistance to 
Tanzania, followed in 1968 by Britain, a cause of the strong stance taken by Nyerere 
on Britain’s role in Rhodesia and on the supply of British arms to South Africa 
(Coulson, 1982, pp.141-143). 
Nyerere insisted that TANU was to be the only party in the country, since it aimed to 
represent the interests of all Tanzanians, and in 1965 the first National Assembly 
one-party elections were held, where 101 MPs (candidates chosen by the party and 
belonging to the party) were elected. At the Presidential elections, held in the same 
year, Nyerere was re-confirmed as President (two candidates chosen by the party 
were running for election - for a detailed account of 1965 elections see Bienen, 1967, 
chapter 12). Under the single party system, the decisions were made at centre level, 
following a top-down approach, and local politicians were under strict control of the 
central government and had to respond to TANU party officials (Kelsall, 2002, 
pp.609, 614; and Heald, 2005, p.278). Therefore little opposition was allowed, 
although it is interesting to notice how, according to Kelsall, ‘few organised groups 
seemed to want to express views outside the party’ and ‘few people before the 1990s 
showed much interest in party competition’ with Zanzibar being an exception 
(Kelsall, 2002, p.608; and Pinkney, 2005, p.105). According to Scott, political élites 
 
 
114 
were often weak in contesting the party's policy because they assumed that in order 
for development to take off, certain policies had to be implemented, added to which 
was the high admiration Nyerere received from his people (Scott, 1998, p.246). In 
short, during the first years of independence the young state tried to create a strong 
political party the population could relate to, in order to keep their support, but at the 
same time this was a way to set the basis to extend state control over the different 
areas of the country. Following the unification of Tanganyika and Zanzibar the two 
ruling parties, the TANU and the Afro-Shirazi Party were later merged, out of which 
eventually the Chama Cha Mapinduzi party (CCM) was created in 1977. 
Initially, TANU/CCM had the support of the large majority of the population. Later 
on, however, this started to attenuate: forms of dissent started to emerge, for 
example, farmers against the process of villagization, or trade unions against the 
labour legislation (Pinkney, 2005, p.106). In the late 1970s, open resistance and 
protests were evident in the rise of the military Sungusungu movement in the west 
cotton zone as a consequence of villagization and in particular the increasing 
commoditization of cotton (Mapolu in Shivji, 1986, p.129; Campbell, 1987, pp.35-
41). As we will see in the following section, villagization was one of the policies that 
contributed most to the growing tensions between the state and farmers, despite the 
fact that opposition in the countryside was contained by the ability of the state to 
establish a facade of democratic village representation (with a supposed process of 
decentralisation) in conjunction with the charisma of Nyerere, the ‘Mwalimu’ 
(teacher) and father of the country19 (Kelsall, 2002, p.609).  
                                                          
19 For example, Heald (2005) stresses how in reality the Sungusungu protest was cleverly 
contained by the action of the state, that quickly recognized the movement, opened a 
constructive dialogue and informally allowed these communities to continue practising their 
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Nyerere’s philosophy of Ujamaa - a word ‘created’ by the President himself to 
indicate socialism, self-reliance and rural development - deeply shaped the political 
history of Tanzania during the post-independence years, and his passionate speeches 
greatly impacted the way citizens came to see and relate to the state. Nyerere’s belief 
that Africans were socialist by nature made him stress the values of working and 
living together in a peaceful way following three main principles: reciprocal respect, 
common property and obligation to work in order to develop an equal society and 
improve people’s livelihoods (Hyden, 1980; Coulson, 1982; Shivji, 1995; Ibhawoh 
and Dibua, 2003). The idea was to reach development by recognizing African 
traditional values, and promote a cooperative society whilst skipping the capitalist 
stage of development and the class struggle as identified by Marx (Thomson, 2010). 
Two of his main objectives were to promote primary education and the use of the 
Swahili as national language, and improve the provision of health care in the 
countryside. Thanks to his commitment to develop the countryside by providing 
these services, he managed to get the approval of a large part of the population.  
Yet, notwithstanding the successes in expanding social services to rural communities 
and ‘unifying’ the many tribes that lived in Tanzania, many scholars have criticized 
his ideology. Ibhawoh and Dibua for example, argue that the Ujamaa ideology was 
more utopian than practical and shared the same premises of the developmentalism 
that considers African farmers as poor victims of underdevelopment that need to be 
saved and emancipated (Ibrawoh and Dibua, 2003, pp.61-70). As a result,  
‘…the Ujamaa’s commitment to the modernization paradigm […] 
resulted in a situation where improving the conditions of peasants meant 
                                                                                                                                                                    
traditional set of laws and punishments, even proclaiming it as the village security organism 
(in 1983, Heald, 2005, p.180). 
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alienating them from their cultural and social realities in favour of 
transplanted Western ways of life’ (ibid., p.61).  
Yeager blames Nyerere for having created a society where personal freedoms and 
incentives have been negated, limiting the modernisation and development of society 
(Yeager, 1989). Analysing the ideological nature of Ujamaa, Shivji underlines how 
Ujamaa, despite being widely legitimized by citizens, stands on rights such as 
equality that are not recognized by rural citizens, or better are ‘alien and not organic’ 
to their perceptions (Shivji, 1995, pp.153, 158). It can be recognised, in summary, 
that the Ujamaa ideology reflected the characteristics of a top-down approach, 
despite the benevolent intentions of Nyerere. Indeed, the ability of Nyerere to talk to 
the masses and to portray himself as a good father to his people denied the very need 
for a social compact movement and frustrated the emergence of any norm of 
contestation. This is especially true in the countryside, since Nyerere claimed that 
rural development was at the top of his priorities and was particularly paternalistic 
towards rural dwellers.  
In fact, the importance of rural development and self-reliance was confirmed in the 
Arusha Declaration in 1967. This declaration stressed the interventionist role of the 
state, the principles of a socialist state based on self-reliance, absence of exploitation, 
the value of hard work and the importance of the state in protecting human rights, 
including the right of expression (Havnevik, 2010). It is clear however that behind 
the adoption of the Arusha Declaration there were strategic political and economic 
reasons, especially the need to maximise the use of scarce resources and encourage 
hard work in the countryside (Olorunsola, 1988, pp.190-195). The outcomes of the 
declaration can be seen in the processes of decentralization and villagization.  
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The decentralization process was a way to manage more efficiently the villages 
through the strengthening of the civil service and a supposed promotion of citizens’ 
participation to the village life and the decision-making process. However, as noted 
before, these policies seem to have made rural participation even more difficult, by 
abolishing or reforming some important channels of political participation such as 
the elected district councils in 1972 (Olorunsola, 1988, p.192). If the objective was 
to get closer to the peasantries, as Hyden claims, it was more to control them than to 
involve them in the political life of the villages, to which farmers rather showed 
indifference (Hyden, 1980, pp.134-141, 153). The reform of the village council 
election, with the creation of the village assembly, was supposedly intended to 
promote self-government in the villages. In fact, the influence of the central party 
and the irregularities in the decision-making process within the assembly were clear, 
since the final decisions were often implemented only if approved by district or 
central government, making of decentralisation only a façade of local participation 
and democracy (Olorunsola, 1988, p.193).  
Furthermore, decentralization, by stressing the inefficiency of local district councils, 
gave occasion to the central government to step in and take control in primary 
education, health and infrastructures services provision (Olorunsola, 1988, p.193). 
Hence, ironically, the result of decentralisation was an increase of state central 
control in the countryside and a way to ensure the continued influence of the ruling 
class on the peasantries (Coulson, 1982, p.254, Ninsin, 1988, pp.234-265). What is 
more, the continuous expansion of state control and bureaucracy (the numbers of 
people employed in the civil service grew consistently from independence until the 
1980s) implied a constant increase in the administrative costs of this political regime 
(Chazan et al., 1999, p.51-53).  
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Given the importance of the villagization policy in shaping the countryside and in 
affecting the way farmers and state relate to each other, the section below will 
discuss this in detail. 
4.4. Villagization 
With the process of villagization, Nyerere wanted to apply the principles of Ujamaa 
in the countryside, in order to discourage farmers from assuming tendencies linked 
to the economy of affection (explained in chapter 2) and the capitalist influence in 
Tanzania (Hyden, 1980, p.97). According to Nyerere, Ujamaa’s three pillars - 
respect, common property and obligation to work - implied the transformation from 
individual to communal agricultural production and the concentration of the 
government’s efforts on developing the peasants’ economy by increasing national 
food production (Hyden, 1980, p.101). After a proposal in 1962, the government 
officially nationalised all land in 1963 with the ‘Freehold Titles (Conversion) and 
Government Leases Act’ (Rwengasira, 2012, p.69). Also in 1962, a ‘Village 
Settlement Agency’ helped the creation of new settlements, as suggested by the 
World Bank (Hyden, 1980, pp.70-71). Even on this occasion, the hostility with 
which the land reform was met by local opposition leaders, many of which were 
petty-capitalist farmers, was placated by way of persuasion by the government (ibid., 
1980). Again, Nyerere’s charisma convinced the majority of the population to accept 
the imposed policies in the name of the common good and development of the 
nation. 
Another controversial policy was the abolition of cooperatives. In theory, 
cooperatives would fit in the Ujamaa model and were highly regarded by Nyerere as 
the basis of a more ethical society. Indeed, there were already a good number of 
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cooperatives operating in the country since before independence (Lyimo, 2012, 
pp.41, 44). Nonetheless, Nyerere’s idea of cooperation went further: he wanted to 
create a community that would work and live together with no interest in profit 
making. In order to do so, cooperatives had to be a part of community life, where 
every aspect of the daily routine was to be shared. To gain farmers’ support in 
achieving this transition, initially the state helped the cooperatives by providing 
inputs, but inefficiency, corruption and mismanagement of funds grew consistently 
(Coulson, 1982, p.152; Lyimo, 2012, pp.44-45). As a consequence, and in order to 
control them, the state decided to progressively nationalise all forms of cooperatives 
in the country, thinking that an increase of bureaucracy and control would increase 
efficiency. Therefore, cooperatives were officially abolished in 1976 and replaced by 
crop authorities that put the agricultural production, sale and distribution under the 
control of the central government (Lyimo, 2012, pp.66-78).  
In reality, and in line with Nyerere’s conception of socialism and cooperation, the 
abolishment of cooperatives was also a way to contrast the creation of a wealthy 
group of farmers at the head of the cooperatives (Bryceson, 1993, p.62).20 For the 
same reasons, also private retail outlets were abolished, and substituted by Ujamaa 
shops (Hyden, 1980, pp.132-134). What is important to note is that since the shops 
were not replaced immediately, a shortage of goods in rural areas was experienced, 
increasing people’s discontent. Moreover, farmers were forced to sell their produce 
through parastatal corporations such as the National Milling Corporation and the 
National Agricultural Production Board, where the price was decided by the state. As 
a consequence, many producers felt that the state was ‘playing against them’ and 
                                                          
20On this, also Scott (1998, pp.233-234) talking about the clash between the state and the 
Ruvuma Development Association, a cooperative scheme in Songea region that rebelled 
against the state policy and got banned as an illegal organisation in 1968. 
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diverted to the black market to sell their produce (Bryceson, 1993, pp.53-60). 
Furthermore, Nyerere was very critical towards large-scale farmers and people 
owning more than a certain amount of land. Soon the vision of individualistic 
acquisition of wealth and the possession of large plots of land was condemned and 
seen as shameful by the majority of the population (Hyden, 1980, p.138; Coulson, 
1982, p.145). The campaign against capitalist farming reached its peak between 1970 
and 1972, and as a consequence many European farmers, cultivating mostly in 
Arusha and Kilimanjaro, left the country (Hyden, 1980, pp.102-104). 
According to Scott there were bureaucratic (concerning the state’s attempt to control 
rural population) but also aesthetic reasons behind the implementation of the 
villagization policy (Scott, 1998, pp.225-241). The attempt was to miniaturize, to 
create model villages that symbolize order and efficiency and could be easily 
monitored (ibid., 1998, pp.226-227 and 237-238). Importantly, during the first years 
the settlement schemes were brought forward by persuasion, Nyerere being averse to 
the use of the force and relying on the willingness of farmers to follow his advices. 
Farmers were persuaded to settle in communal villages with the promise that living 
in villages would facilitate the provision of services and modernization in agriculture 
techniques, including electrification and tractors (Scott, 1998, p.230). Nonetheless, 
many farmers were reluctant to relocate and, in 1973, the government had to make 
villagization compulsory, with the deployment of a large number of government 
officials and in some cases even the army to force people out of their original homes 
and relocate them to the new villages. This is a very important event, which 
reinforced the conflictual relationship between the Tanzanian state and rural 
communities.  
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While at the start the government concentrated its efforts on promoting its socialist 
image of society based on the wellbeing of its citizen, and on the provision of basic 
services such as food, education and health, after the failures of voluntary settlement 
schemes, the increasing government expenditure and the removal of all forms of 
assistance from West Germany and Britain, the state assumed a more authoritarian 
tone. The need to increase agricultural production, including export crop production 
became imperative for economic reasons. The villagization policy therefore recalled 
the colonial method where resettlement and mechanization were used to create large 
plantations to stimulate cultivation for the world market, despite the fact that the Pan 
African Socialism of Nyerere had its roots in anti-colonial movements (Bernstein, 
1981, pp.49-50; Bryceson, 1993, p.62; Scott, 1998, pp.227, 239; Chazan et al., 1999, 
pp.161, 168, 169).  
As previously mentioned, initially mechanisation was promoted in order to secure 
farmer’s consensus and compliance. However, this was often done in a non-efficient 
way, for example often farmers would rely on the machines and plough a plot of land 
too large for their capacity to take care of it effectively. Other times too much or too 
little mechanisation was provided compared to the workforce or the production 
objectives given to the community, or too many or too little people compared to the 
acres of the land to cultivate (Hyden, 1980, p.72). The modalities to which 
modernisation was promoted by the state were proven ineffective and had a negative 
impact to the relationship between the state and farmers. According to Hyden it is 
exactly because of the help received that farmers developed high expectations and 
were less inclined to cooperate with the state, complicating even further the state-
society relationship, since ‘extending social amenities to the rural population without 
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ties inflates expectations and prohibits government from interacting effectively with 
the peasants’ (ibid., 1980, p.123).  
In short, the policy failed to reach rural communities. The Farmers’ Training 
Centres21 for example, were only beneficial to those with an interest in modern 
farming and who were more inclined to participate (ibid., 1980, p.77). The idea was 
that the ‘best farmers’ would be an example for others, but the majority of farmers 
seemed to be reticent in taking advice. The agricultural staff were also inclined to 
help the few farmers with an interest in modern agricultural practices, since most 
peasants resisted the imposition of outside control over their life and work and were 
not inclined to follow the advice of extension officers, which they did not trust (ibid., 
1980, pp.74-78). It was also increasingly difficult for extension agents to supervise 
the communal plot and implement sanctions on those who were not collaborating. 
The villagers had their own private plot, but were supposed to work in a cooperative 
way in a communal village plot owned by the community as a whole the products of 
which were sold directly to the state. However, work in the communal plots was 
resented by farmers that saw no benefit coming from it and would prefer to 
concentrate their efforts in their personal plot. Therefore, to better identify the 
farmers that were spending little time in the communal plot, many extension agents 
would often prefer to split the communal plot for each household (Sumra, 1979, 
p.205; Coulson, 1982, p.42; and Scott, 1998, p.240).  
                                                          
21  The functions of these centres were reviewed in 1972 when they became part of the Ministry 
of Education and basically lost their specific target in farming education. The abolition of these 
centres was a mistake, sustains Msambichaka (1987, p.127), as education in farming methods is 
what Tanzania lacks most. 
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Ujamaa villages are generally considered to be both ecological and economic 
failures by many scholars (Sumra, 1979; Temu, 1979; Hyden, 1980; Bernstein, 1981; 
Harriss, 1982; Raikes, 1982; Coulson, 1982; Ellis, 1988; Bryceson, 1993; Sijm, 
1997; Scott, 1998). Local knowledge and practices were dismissed, and the sites 
chosen were often far from fuel-wood and water, characterised by semi-arid 
unproductive land, lending further support to the argument that the extension of state 
control rather than socialism per se was the main objective of the process (Scott, 
1998, pp.234-239, 246). In name of modernisation, extension officers forced 
monoculture even in small plots - against the fact that monoculture is considered to 
be successful mostly under large-scale mechanized farming - contributing to lower 
yields. The real reason for this choice was in fact to ease inspection and calculation 
tasks (ibid., 1998, p.243). People had to get used to different soil, different climates, 
and different crops to cultivate with little experience in handling the new machinery 
and techniques provided (Hyden, 1980, p.71). Moreover, in some areas (for example 
in Handeni district) people continued cultivating the same crop, despite the fact that 
the new soil was not suitable for it (Sumra, 1979, p.204). In addition, there was a 
general social distress, as people did not know each other and often came from 
different tribes. For these reasons illnesses were also common, especially in the years 
immediately following the implementation of the villagization scheme (Coulson, 
1982, pp.258-261). As summarised by Temu, bad planning, over-mechanisation, 
lack of voluntary participation and a general failure by the settlers to view the 
schemes as their own contributed to the failure of the villagization project (Temu, 
1979, p.199). 
Furthermore, the failure of the state to provide adequate basic public services was the 
consequence of the inability of the government to monitor and invest the right 
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amount of money into the public sphere. Mismanagement, corruption, and 
misallocation of funds resulted in great fiscal deficits and the excessive control of the 
state led to inefficiency, causing shortages of goods to buy and low availability of 
seeds and fertilisers in rural areas (Ellis, 1988). Sijm also argues that the Ujamaa 
policies and in particular villagization hindered agricultural development as it 
discouraged the production of food crops, and resulted in a growing tension between 
the peasantry and the state (Raikes, 1982; Sijm, 1997, pp.210-223; Scott, 1998, 
p.239). In fact, between 1973 and 1975 the state had to import large amounts of 
food, and food crop production only recovered in 1977-78 (Bryceson, 1993, p.9). On 
a nutritional note, the settlement schemes did not improve diets, as farmers would 
plant crops with a ready market and not crops needed to diversify their diets. An 
inefficient marketing system was also one of the reasons that limited farmers’ 
enthusiasm to produce surplus (Sumra, 1979, p.205). Likewise, Hyden stresses 
farmers’ rejection of government control in agriculture in contributing to the decline 
in agricultural production (Hyden, 1980).  
Msambichaka also agrees that the agricultural policies of the late 1970s were 
wrongly focusing on the production of export crop at the expenses of food crops. 
According to him, fewer foodstuff varieties were promoted by government policy: 
rice, wheat and maize, despite crops like bananas, cassava, sorghum and millet were 
still highly consumed by Tanzanians (Msambichaka, 1987, pp.117-144). Export only 
production focused on sisal, coffee and cotton and took the place of many food 
crops, especially in areas such as Kilimanjaro, Kagera and Mwanza. 
Notwithstanding, the export crop sector performance was also poor (ibid., 1987, 
p.121). Msambichaka blames the state pricing policies that were adverse for farmers 
who by this stage were mostly relying on parallel markets to sell their produce. 
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Despite this article being published in 1987, for this scholar the differences between 
regions were already quite evident, both concerning the government investment in 
infrastructure and mechanisation. Also problems of limited inputs and capital were 
already apparent. In line with the vision of agricultural development of those years 
(increased food production through modernisation) Msambichaka was a supporter of 
modernisation via the use of chemical fertiliser, gradual mechanisation and improved 
seeds, and blamed the government for neglecting irrigation (ibid., 1987, p.132). In 
fact, by 1980 only 144,000 ha were under irrigation (ibid., 1987, p.133).  
4.4.1. Behind failure: the impact of villagization on the relationship 
between farmers and the state 
As we have seen, many scholars stress the impact of villagization on agriculture and 
on farming communities. However, few scholars analyse the impact that this had on 
the relationship between the farmers and the state. Despite Nyerere’s popularity, and 
despite his stated benevolent intentions to bring development to the countryside, it 
seems clear that he failed to reach the peasantry. The reason behind this may need to 
be found behind a misleading understanding of farming communities from the state. 
Little voluntary participation in politics can be interpreted as the consequence of a 
will of farming communities to escape state control over their way of life, as Hyden 
explains (1980). This autonomous attitude of farming communities was an obstacle 
to the creation of a socialist state, hence the state looked at farmers as a problem. The 
solution was for the socialist state to gain control over agricultural production and 
land in order to promote modernization and increase productivity by using advanced 
technology (Harriss, 1982, pp.350-398). Nevertheless, under the ‘modernisation’ 
mirage, the state imposed technology upon farmers without much analysis of social 
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context. According to Harriss (1982) and Raikes (1982), even in the post-
independence years, farmers were perceived by state officials as resistant to change, 
therefore their concerns were disregarded. Control was also justified from the 
government in order to fight the ‘passive resistance’ of farmers who were trying to 
resist modernization by applying innovations incorrectly (Raikes, 1982). 
The forced villagization was therefore an answer to the unsatisfactory participation 
of peasants in the government’s call for the voluntary creation of cooperative work 
schemes in the countryside. Incentives such as public services like schools, clinics, 
and irrigation schemes (often unsuccessful, such as in Kahe near Kilimanjaro and in 
Mbarali near Mbeya) were provided by the government in order to persuade farming 
communities to cooperate with the state (Coulson, 1982, p.159; Olorunsola, 1988, 
p.191). In 1967, with the Arusha Declaration and later with the decentralisation 
initiative in 1972, the government appointed government personnel to the regions in 
order to control agricultural production and to combat growing rural class formation 
(Raikes, 1982, p.371). Therefore, it can be said that the expansion of public services 
and the developmental legislation was a way to legitimize government’s action in the 
eyes of the population, and to allow the expansion of civil services in villages in 
order to weaken the peasantry and to limit people’s ability to challenge government’s 
decisions (Bernstein, 1981, p.44; Shivji, 1995, p.156). In short, if farmers were not 
willing to cooperate with the state, they had to be controlled in order to guarantee 
state’s stability.  
Seen in this light, villagization was ‘a desperate reaction to peasant resistance’  as 
Coulson describes it; a way to disorientate farmers hoping that this would result in 
them being more open to change and to the introduction of new crops and farming 
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methods (Hyden, 1980, pp.25, 72, 111; Coulson, 1982, p.162). Importantly, the 
process was brought forward by the conviction of Nyerere that farmers did not 
understand what was good for them and needed to be 'educated' (Bernstein, 1981, 
p.45; Scott, 1998, pp.231, 234). In his public speeches, Nyerere showed his deep 
disappointment by saying that ‘People who refused to accept development changes 
were stupid, if not ignorant or stubborn’ (The Daily News, November 7, 1973, in 
Havnevik, 1993, p.205). Nyerere, as a virtual embodiment of the Tanzanian state, 
showed little faith in rural communities, considering them ignorant and backward. 
This is extremely important in looking at the farmer-state relationship, as it 
demonstrates that not only were farmers alienating themselves from political 
processes, refusing to cooperate and accept state control over their activities, but also 
the state was de-linking itself from society, shaping itself as a separate entity. The 
personification of politics, under the figure of Nyerere, and the identification with 
the political party (first TANU, then CCM), can also be said to be one of the major 
elements that contributed to shape the idea of the state as a separate entity (Chazan et 
al., 1999, pp.52-53 and 168-169). This tendency also contributed to boost clientelist 
practices, since officials were eager to earn the trust and collaboration of rural 
communities. 
Of further interest is the analysis of Spalding, who claims that the failure of the 
policies put in place by Nyerere needs to be found in a misreading by Nyerere of 
Tanzania’s reality and society. By analysing different tribes (the Makonde, the 
Ndendeuli and the Shambala) throughout Tanzania, this scholar underlines how the 
qualities and characteristics of Tanzanian societies are not uniform or monolithic, but 
they rather suggest an individualistic political culture, centred on the family under a 
hierarchical structure (Spalding, 1996, p.93). She argues that:  
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‘… outside the family unit, there was little ‘egalitarian’ social 
organisation as Nyerere intends it. Villages did not hold their land in 
common, and food or seeds were borrowed if shortages were found, 
rather than given as a right. In some communities, cooperation was used 
for agricultural chores, but the produce of the fields was strictly the 
family’s. It appears that Nyerere’s picture of a primitive African or 
Tanzanian socialism is not supported by evidence.’ (ibid., 1996, p.104). 
Moreover, Spalding notices how, even before independence, farmers were able to 
make independent choices and experience autonomy in subsistence and lifestyle 
preferences, not being used to obey a central authority (ibid., 1996, p.103). The 
autonomous and independent character of peasantries is also underlined by Hyden 
(1980, p.16). According to both Spalding and Hyden, individualistic attitudes can be 
traced in the unwillingness to cooperate that seems to characterise farmers in 
Tanzania. Nevertheless, while individualistic attitudes may lead to think that farmers 
encompass modern capitalist rationality, Hyden specifies how farmers’ 
individualism is actually ‘not really capitalist but one stemming from peasant 
autonomy and reluctance to co-operate with others’ (Hyden, 1980, p.131). In 
conclusion, Nyerere’s conviction that Africans have always been socialists by 
tradition (Nyerere, 1962) is, according to Spalding (1996) and Hyden (1980) 
mistaken and contributed to policy failure. 
In general, the logic behind the modalities in which officials and extension agents 
implemented the villagization policy followed a top down approach: it was in fact 
more driven by the need of offering numerical results to the central authority in a 
short period of time (in order to gain better paid government positions) than to listen 
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to people's opinions and exigencies in the countryside (Bernstein, 1981, p.45; Scott, 
1998, pp.243-245). As a consequence this is at the basis of its failure, as it hastened 
the relationship between rural people and the state, creating, as Scott says, 'an 
alienated, sceptical, demoralised, and uncooperative peasantry for which Tanzania 
would pay a huge price, both financially and politically' (Scott, 1998, p.237). 
Olorunsola (1988), Coulson (1982) and Hyden (1980) also affirm that Tanzania’ 
state-centric policies of the after-independence years seem to have alienated farmers, 
who continued to resist collective farming (Hyden, 1980, p.193). As explained by 
Scott, ‘if people find the new arrangement, however efficient in principle, to be 
hostile to their dignity, their plans and their tastes, they can make it an inefficient 
arrangement’ (Scott, 1998, p.227). Essentially, the villagization project did not 
succeed because it did not meet farmers’ needs and expectations and because farmers 
felt that their autonomy was under threat. As Kelsall (2003, p.75) notices, farmers 
‘do not appear to feel morally bound to obey the law or to work within 
formal political institutions in cases where they perceive their interests - 
howsoever these might be defined - to be constrained or threatened’ 
(Kelsall, 2003, p.75).  
To confirm this thesis, and to understand the counter-effects of state-centric policies 
in Tanzania, it is important to note that in the areas where the state was less 
aggressive in exercising its control - for example in Tanga with the TANU Youth 
League cooperative initiative, and with the Ruvuma Development Association - the 
schemes performed generally better and farmers were more inclined to cooperate 
(Hyden, 1980, pp.74, 75). The success of these schemes has therefore to be found in 
the ‘autonomy and reciprocity within the context of an economy of affection’: a 
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collaboration between farmers where the limits and the premises of the ‘peasant 
mode’ (traditional farming habits) were respected (ibid., 1980, p.75).  
In the same way, some areas in which people were already living in populous 
villages, agricultural production was satisfactory, and villagers were represented in 
the political élites were spared from forced villagization, for example West Lake, 
Meru, Kilimanjaro, and the slopes of Mount Rungwe (Coulson, 1982, p.249 and 
Scott, 1998, p.236). To test whether the different approach in the after independence 
years determined a different outcome in terms of the current relationship between 
farmers and state in Tanzania, this research looks at two distinctive regions: 
Kilimanjaro and Coast. As we will see in the following chapters, it appears that in 
general the aggressive top down approach assumed by the state in Tanzania hastened 
the breakdown in the putative relationship between the farmers and the independent 
Tanzanian state. Nevertheless, the villagization was only but one of the agricultural 
policies implemented by the state since independence, and more recent policies have 
also complicated the relationship between the state and rural society even in areas 
where originally the state was less aggressive.   
4.5. State, agriculture and society in the post-Nyerere era  
If socialist agricultural policies failed to achieve the expected results in terms of 
economic and social development, could a political and economic shift towards 
market liberalism improve the agricultural sector and reinvigorate the relationship 
between state and rural society? 
As a matter of fact, in 1979, with the war in Uganda and the world oil crisis, the 
economy of Tanzania was clearly struggling, destabilizing the food market and 
supply and putting into crisis the National Milling Corporation (Bryceson, 1993, 
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pp.88-90). Soon it became very difficult to pursue the development goals without the 
help of external finance. In 1984, therefore, the government gradually started to 
liberalise the economy following the advice of the IMF in order to obtain financial 
assistance (Bryceson, 1993, p.31). In 1986, Nyerere resigned as President, signalling 
the start of a new phase where Ujamaa was destined to be only a memory. With Ali 
Hassan Mwinyi from 1986, and the adoption of structural adjustment programs 
(1986-1996) the liberalisation process was fully under way and the fall of the 
centralised system and parastatals provided opportunities for the political elites to 
enrich themselves and to become part of the newly privatised companies as 
executive or board members.  
Furthermore, as a consequence of liberalisation, agriculture stopped being at the 
centre of governmental policy as attention was instead diverted towards guaranteeing 
the growth of industrialisation and the extension of private property and liberal 
market rule. The lack of state support, and the state’s withdrawal from agricultural 
marketing as a consequence of the adoption of structural adjustments programs 
(SAPs) under an Economic Recovery Program (ERP) with the IMF in 1986, led to 
rural areas being neglected in favour of urban areas, to the privatisation of food and 
cash crop marketing, and, ultimately, to declining per capita production of food 
grains (Sijm, 1997; Meertens, 2000; Skarstein, 2005; Cooksey, 2011). In addition, 
subsidies for agricultural inputs were removed in 1991, causing a continued decline 
of productivity levels per capita for important food crops such as maize and rice and 
export crops such as coffee and cotton (Msambichaka and Naho, 1995; Meertens, 
2000, pp.337-342). Although the government partially reintroduced the subsidies 
again in 2003 to stave off a decline in food production and support the production of 
major food crops, food poverty declined only marginally in rural areas from 1991 to 
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2007 and the agricultural share of GDP has been in decline since 2000, 
demonstrating the limits of liberalisation to improve conditions and food security in 
rural areas (Mashindano and Kaino, 2009, p.13; TGNP, 2011).  
Moreover, the removal of price control and subsidies on food crops and agricultural 
inputs affected negatively rural remote areas where farmers had to face increasing 
costs of production (Meertens, 2000). Road infrastructures remained scarce and the 
great majority of villages were left isolated and with limited food and market access. 
In fact, according to Merteens, farmers in rural remote areas were the worst affected 
by policies of liberalisation: they were receiving even lower payments for their 
produce, since they had to accept the conditions and the price offered to them by 
traders, which were very few in this area because of the scarce infrastructures (ibid., 
2000, p.342). What is more, another consequence of liberalisation was the increasing 
volatility of prices in the market, especially maize, the most important staple food in 
Tanzania (Kilima et al., 2004; Chile and Talukder, 2014). This surely contributed to 
the harsh food insecurity conditions of a large part of the population, especially in 
the countryside and in isolated rural areas, where low prices and insecurity pushed 
producers to sell a large amount of their produce at harvest time to raise available 
cash for other needs (ibid., 2004).  
Nonetheless, and perhaps as a consequence of the difficulties faced in the 
countryside, after the failure of the cooperative farms during Nyerere, farmers 
looked at the new opportunities of enrichment offered by the liberal model and 
looked at education as a way to escape the countryside (Kelsall, 2002, p.210). On the 
other side, with liberalisation, basic social services such as schooling and health 
assistance became more expensive, pushing farming households to seek off-farm 
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income and affecting their ability to farm their land (Ponte, 2000, p.1017; also 
Skarstein, 2005). As a consequence of these reforms, Ponte argues that rural 
household had to adapt to an increasing commercialisation of rural life, where off-
farm activities were more important as a source of income than during the pre-
liberalisation period, and where hired labour was increasingly employed for farming 
activities (Ponte, 1998, 2000).  
This contributed to the process of de-agrarianisation, despite, as Bryceson notices, a 
counter-tendency (migration from towns to rural areas) can be noted in periods when 
there is a decline of food supply to urban areas, such as in 1979 and 1988 (Bryceson, 
1993, pp.152-153). In short, poorer rural households became more vulnerable under 
market liberalisation, and inequalities became more evident because of weakened 
social networks and the declining government provision of public services (Ponte, 
2000).  
It is important to recognize that political élites have always been reticent in reducing 
the control of the state over agricultural market (especially over the export crop one), 
despite the reforms put in place since the mid-1980s (Cooksey, 2011). For instance, 
periodic bans on maize export are still employed during a food crisis, for internal 
food security reasons. The same goes with rice import tariffs and a strategic grain 
reserve. Although the reserve only deals with a very limited amount of grain 
production compared to the total production of the country, it still symbolises the 
reticence of the state to fully liberalise the sector (Minot, 2010). Cooksey also 
underlines how important it is to consider the different outcomes in different parts of 
Tanzania and for various farming and livestock categories; for instance, farmers 
living closer to the cities and the areas with better road connection could access the 
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market easier to sell their produce than farmers in more rural and isolated areas 
(Cooksey, 2011; also Ponte, 1998). It is clear however that in general the process of 
economic liberalisation created the right conditions for farmer differentiation in the 
countryside, opening opportunities for a few wealthier farmers with capital and 
assets to invest, but worsening the conditions of the majority of small scale farmers 
with no capital and little land.  
Even the introduction of the multi-party system does not seem to have brought major 
changes in politics or to have improved the already weak relationship between the 
state and society. Under the suggestion of Nyerere - which remained the President of 
the CCM party until his death in 1999 - and the pressures of external donors, the 
multi-party system was introduced in 1992 and the first multi-party election was held 
in 1995 and welcomed with great approval from the international community, which 
thought of it as a great step forward for democracy (Pinkney, 2005, p.107). Yet, over 
the years the CCM has remained the ruling party and the opposition parties lack a 
proper political manifesto and the financial resources to lead a proper electoral 
campaign. Citizens’ turnout to elections in Tanzania has been generally lower than 
50%, and has declined over the years recording the lowest rate of 37.53% in the last 
parliamentary elections of 2010 (the turnout for Presidential election was at 40.71%) 
(IDEA Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2015. On this also Kappia, 
2013). According to two studies, one by Fikiri (2010) and one by Kappia (2013), the 
reasons of low electoral turnout at the 2010 elections are to be found in a lack of 
trust of the election results (corruption and fear for the elections being rigged), lack 
of transparency in the electoral process and lack of commitment by political leaders 
in power. Lack of interest in politics also emerged, where ‘over a quarter of 
respondents mentioned politicians were not honest, responsible, accountable and not 
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committed’ (Kappia, 2013, p.151). Moreover, Fikiri (2010) claims that 
administrative officials ‘often use their powers to mobilize citizen and public 
workers to vote for the ruling party and commanding the police to threaten voters or 
favour the ruling party in their operations’ (Fikiri, 2010, p.21). Coercion was also 
recorded in previous elections of 1995, 2000 and 2005, according to Makulilo (2009, 
p.443). This adds to episodes of violence being recorded during elections against 
opposition parties and their supporters, making of fear a further reason of low 
participation to elections (Fikiri, 2010, reports some interesting episodes, p.34)
22
. 
Low election turnout further indicates the complexities of the relationship between 
state and society. Since Nyerere, it can be said that the separation between state and 
society has in some respects grown, as we will better see in chapter 6, where the 
effects of more recent agricultural policies will be analysed in depth (Pinkney, 2005, 
pp.108-109). 
According to a study by Massoi and Norman (2009), even the decentralisation of 
power from central state to regional and village apparatus failed to involve the 
community. For instance, in 1984 the Local Government system was reintroduced, 
and was followed by the ‘decentralization by devolution policy’ in 1996, which 
allowed local governments to formulate policies in line with the needs of the village 
and collect the revenues to implement them. According to Massoi and Norman, 
‘currently the contribution of decentralization by devolution in planning process at 
the grassroots level is minimal and ineffective’ because of the inability of the 
councils to involve the community (Massoi and Norman, 2009). Actually, according 
to Kelsall (2002), under the social and political circumstances of the country, 
decentralisation represented a further potential for clientelism, corruption and 
                                                          
22 For example, in 2001, following protests over the elections results, there were clashes with 
the polices which caused at least 38 deaths (Fikiri, 2010, p.34). 
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instability, which have the effect of maintaining an unfair system in which only the 
richest part of the population benefits to the detriment of the poorest and weakest 
parts (Kelsall, 2002, p.213). As Kelsall argues, ‘there is reason to think that the old 
bureaucratic-centralist pattern of politics is being replaced by an increasingly 
patrimonial system’, where it is increasingly difficult for ordinary citizens to become 
involved in the policy making (Kelsall, 2002, p.608). Especially in rural areas, 
political participation is low, and often citizens’ claims are completely dismissed and 
do not reach the district and national level (Kelsall, 2002, also Pinkney, 2005, pp.110 
and 112).  
While the effects of liberalization on agriculture have been widely analyzed by 
different scholars, it is difficult to find in them an account of how the relationship 
between the farmers and the state has evolved since the mid-1980s. Given the 
increase in inequality and class differentiation, conflicts and distrust grew within 
society itself, and this can be seen in the diffidence manifested by farmers towards 
extension officers, as will be explained in detail in chapter 6. Perhaps, while the 
analyses of Nyerere’s period suggested that farmers were showing indifference and 
trying to retain their autonomy from a state that was imposing its presence, in more 
recent times, farmers’ indifference is more characterised by discontent and 
disappointment towards a state that had failed to implement effective agricultural 
policies to improve the agricultural sector and their livelihoods. Chapter 6 and 7 will 
analyse in depth the reasons behind this discontent and how it is manifested. In 
general, in Tanzania, discontent usually translates in low participation to politics and 
distrust in public officials at district and central level. According to Kelsall, the 
difficulties in imposing their will on district leaders and to organize in groups is 
mostly due to people’s lack of time due to the changes as a consequence of 
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liberalisation. Hence, Kelsall claims that the main factors affecting participation are: 
(1) the process of de-agrarianisation that pushes people to look for other sources of 
income; (2) scarce information; and (3) the presence of ‘fragmented economic 
identities’, or better the presence of heterogeneous social identities that characterises 
rural communities in Tanzania (Kelsall, 2004, p.70). With this last claim, Kelsall 
refers to a supposed absence of a tradition of cooperation, which, according to this 
scholar, limits people’s ability to act and express disagreement towards 
government’s action (ibid., 2004, pp.70-71). The validity of this claim will be 
analysed in depth with reference to the results of the empirical data collected for this 
research and exposed in the following chapters.  
Another aspect worth mentioning and part of the globalisation process is the 
increasing presence of international organisations that operate in different parts of 
the country and that has been regarded by the international community as a positive 
opportunity for the affirmation of the democratic process. The Tanzanian 
government is tied by many international and national initiatives23 stressing the 
importance of good governance and attempting to fight corruption and to increase 
efficiency (Kelsall, 2002). Nonetheless, these agreements increased Tanzanian 
dependency on external aid and pushed national policy to follow a set of directions 
coming from foreign donors, limiting the sovereignty of the state and complicating 
even further its relationship with society. By signing a whole raft of economic 
agreements with different donors, the Tanzanian government confirms its will to 
promote the democratisation process in the country; but on the other side it 
compromises on its ability to pursue more autonomous policies, clearly setting the 
                                                          
23 For example, the reform of the civil service, the Public Sector Reform Programme - PSRP, the 
Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative, The Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility – PRGF, 
the Programmatic Structural Adjustment Credit – PSAC-I and the Local Government Reform 
Programme –LGRP. 
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path of the country towards full economic liberalisation (Shivji, 2006, p.11). Besides 
this, the state’s ability in coordinating these projects and enforcing the laws in a 
climate of general increased bureaucracy is debatable (Kelsall, 2002; Pinkney, 2005, 
p.109). Also, it is debatable whether the form of capitalism pursued by the state 
under the direction and influence of foreign donors is legitimate and democratic and 
what effects this has on the relationship between the state and its citizens (Pinkney, 
2005, p.115). This will be analysed in detail in chapter 6, where it will be noted that 
most of the agricultural reforms implemented by the Tanzanian state are financially 
supported by different international organisations.  
The liberalisation process has not only facilitated the influences of international 
organisations via cooperation with the state, but has also opened opportunities for the 
expansion of foreign non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the country 
(Pinkney, 2005, p.110). The number of NGOs has grown considerably over the 
years, reaching more than 2700 NGOs in 2000 (URT, 2000c). Nevertheless, while 
their presence has improved the provision of basic services in rural and isolated areas 
of the country, the most influential and largest NGOs are mainly sponsored by 
foreign countries, to which they are accountable. Therefore, at times their projects 
reflect Western logic and ideals more than addressing the real needs of Tanzanian 
population. For example, 
‘donors are more sympathetic to tourists who want to photograph wild 
animals than to peasants who want to eat them, and to 'elitist' groups 
which want to strengthen women's rights rather than to village 
communities that might take a more traditional view’ (Pinkney, 2005, 
pp.112-113).  
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As a result, the voice of the people is often unheard, and the presence of foreign-
sponsored NGOs maintains Tanzanian dependency to foreign influences, weakening 
the autonomy of the state, as people tend to rely on these organisms for the provision 
of basic services instead of addressing their requests to the central state authority, as 
we will see in more detail in chapter 7.  
As mentioned previously, the gap left by the state in providing certain public 
services has been increasingly covered by international and local non-governmental 
organisations – a phenomenon referred to by many scholars as ‘transnational 
governmentality’ as explained in the previous chapter -  and communities are 
increasingly looking at them as the first point of reference for their basic needs. This 
has not only created a certain aid-dependency but also amplified the distance 
between the society and the state. For instance, in one of the villages interviewed, the 
village of Kwala, Kibaha district, many people expressed concern about the 
cessation of the activities of the USA NGO ‘Newton-Tanzania Collaborative’. This 
was the only NGO concerned with a wide range of community development projects 
in this particular village during 2004-2012.
24
 A local council member admitted he 
was ‘worried for the absence of projects and International NGOs, where could 
people ask for their needs and express their concern? Who would help the village to 
develop?’ (E.M, Kwala, 2012). Similar concerns were expressed by the secondary 
school headmaster, worried about the future of the library, the computer lessons and 
the maintenance of the rain water harvesting system. Furthermore, as we will see in 
the following chapters, most of the villagers interviewed believed that it was useless 
                                                          
24 The organisation Newton-Tanzania Collaborative decided to end its activities in 2012, 
because of the lack of funds and the difficulties to officially register their activities at national 
level. Many authors wrote on the difficulties for NGOs to register and the high control and limits 
they face from the Tanzanian state (i.e. Mushi, 2001). 
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to ask for the help of the government to sustain these projects and seemed more 
inclined to rely on international organisations.  
What is more, often members of these organisations were asked to supervise public 
meetings, bring suggestions on the implementation of village governmental 
sponsored projects, and even keep an eye on the public funds donated for specific 
projects. In a way, several episodes witnessed during the empirical fieldwork point to 
the conclusion that villagers seem to trust foreigners more than their local 
administrators. Corruption is expected and in some ways justified; often it is even 
‘covered’ by other members of society. This is probably why villagers preferred to 
delegate watchdog responsibilities to foreigners rather than dealing with them 
themselves (and risking conflicts within the community). 
For instance, in 2013, in the village of Kwala, the government had promised to assist 
with the building of a ‘teachers’ compound’ at the secondary school. In order for the 
state to support the project, the school had to raise a determined amount of money to 
initiate the project. For this objective, a council was created in the school, with 
representatives from the secondary school, the primary school and the village 
council. The money to start the project was publicly raised from private donations of 
parents, teachers and villagers in 2013. The council, and in particular the secondary 
school representatives, asked Luca Scarpa, the director of Newton-Tanzania 
Collaborative (the NGO operating in the village at the time) to help supervise the 
project as they were afraid that the money raised would have not been used in an 
efficient way. The NGO hence helped writing a contract with the builders, buying 
the materials and devolving some responsibilities to the various members of the 
council, including two village council members that were supposed to count the 
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number of bricks the builder was making and the number of cement sacks used and 
remaining every day. Apparently things were proceeding well: the builders were 
building bricks, and the supervisors were not reporting any anomalies. But when 
eventually the money was over and the builders stopped working because there was 
no more cement available, the number of bricks was much lower than what it should 
have been and did not even suffice to build the foundations of the building. Clearly 
something was going wrong, someone had either stolen the cement bags or the 
bricks, and the responsibilities could only be of the builders and/or the two 
supervisors, who denied any involvement and started blaming each other. The 
council, unwilling to press any charges against the people responsible for the loss 
and with the intention to continue with the project as if nothing had happened, 
suggested Newton Tanzania Collaborative to offer the money missing to finish the 
initial works and hide a possible public scandal. An attitude and a request that made 
the organisation doubt several of the members of the council. Eventually, the 
organisation accepted to offer the missing money, but on the condition that a 
declaration of what had happened would be made public, and the members of the 
council changed. The council refused categorically to do so, afraid to expose the 
members responsible to the public opinion, and to lose the trust of the villagers that 
had donated the money for the project. The council preferred to cover the people 
responsible for the loss rather than to press charges against them. A compromise was 
finally reached when the people responsible were asked by the council to reimburse 
the cement they had stolen. At the time of writing, neither the money nor the cement 
had been returned, nobody talked about the teachers’ compound anymore, the bricks 
had been used to build a dormitory for the girls of the school, and the people 
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responsible for stealing the cement (and probably reselling it) still enjoyed the same 
positions in the public council.  
Trying to make sense of this and similar episodes, it is interesting to note how 
villagers react to episodes of corruption. While corruption is recognised as an 
obstacle to the successful implementation of projects (see for instance villagers’ 
lamenting episodes of corruption during elections), and it is fought by villagers by 
delegating responsibilities to foreigners, in Becker’s words, ‘the tolerance for local-
level corruption suggests that it is fairly widespread’, and may ‘serves as a reminder 
of the entrenched mistrust of villagers against higher officials’ (Becker, 2009, p.94). 
Besides, corruption is also sometimes used by local politicians to ‘defend the village 
against party-government interference and to augment their personal power’ (Forrest, 
1988, p.430). Furthermore, it can be argued that because of historical reasons - 
colonialism first and the influence of other actors in internal policy making in the 
post-colonial era - the vision of the state and its role has never been clear, and the 
misuse of power from government officials and the widespread corruption could be 
due to ignorance rather than to selfishness (Becker, 2009). On a similar note, 
Costello affirms that the social role of the state was only partly understood by post-
colonial administrators, and the distribution of authority was contested (1996, 
p.143). Chapter 6 will analyse in depth this aspect and the relationship between state 
and rural society in Tanzania.  
To summarise this section, it can be argued that the process of liberalization, the 
change to a multiparty system and the increased presence of international 
organisations and NGOs resulted in the state losing power over society and therefore 
changed the image that the citizens have of the state. For instance, the progressive 
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withdrawal of the state from the economic and social spheres and the entrance of 
new actors in the scene may have blurred the image of the state in the society and 
complicated the already difficult relationship between the two, increasing the 
perception of the state as a separate entity. While scholars such as Cooksey debate 
the extent to which the process of liberalisation has been fulfilled in Tanzania, 
implying that the state still has a strong hold over the productive processes, it cannot 
be denied that the country’s move towards a more democratic and liberalised 
political economy (under the banner of ‘good governance’) has been remarkable 
since the mid-1980s, thanks also to a sustained foreign aid assistance (Harrison et al., 
2009). As a matter of fact, the retreat of state control from the social sector can easily 
be observed by looking at the health and education public services, that starting from 
the mid 1980s, saw a considerable cut in public expenditure. For instance, while 
education at all levels was free during Nyerere, tuition fees - even in primary schools 
- were re-introduced in 1984 for secondary schools and gradually for primary 
schools. Fees have been again removed, only in primary school, in 2001, although 
students are still asked for ‘contributions’ for toilets, school materials and so on. In 
short, there are no doubts that the Tanzanian state is following the route to 
liberalisation, although state control remains strong in some sectors, for example in 
those requiring land. As will be explained further on, most of the land officially 
belongs to the President of Tanzania, hence private companies have to go through 
long bureaucratic processes in order to obtain land and invest in the country. 
Moreover, the social and economic impact of the liberal market in some remote areas 
for agricultural producers also needs to be assessed.  
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4.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the case study of this research, and highlighted the 
origins of the controversial relationship between the Tanzanian state and farmers.  
The reading of the Tanzanian state provided by Snyder (2008), Becker (2009) and 
Costello (1996) confirms what has been said in chapter 3: at a local level, the public 
and the local spheres are confused: local state officials use public resources for their 
own benefits and to increase their public consent, and episodes of clientelism are 
frequent. This has negative effects on the effectiveness of the reforms, and episodes 
of mismanagement of public funds have been registered in several occasions in the 
past (see example of cooperatives provided earlier in this chapter).  
The origins of the disengagement between the higher level of the state and rural 
society are to be found in the historical development of the country. For instance, in 
the years following independence, Nyerere tried to formalise state institutions by 
extending state control over rural areas. In particular, the Tanzanian government 
appointed officials to directly control certain sectors, for instance the agricultural one 
through the figure of the extension officer, but the difficulties to involve rural society 
into an effective collaboration with the state were already evident (Bernstein, 1981; 
Coulson, 1982; William, D.V., 1982; Sundet, 1994; Spalding, 1996; Scott, 1998; 
Chazan et al., 1999; Kelsall, 2002; Heald, 2005; Pinkney, 2005). 
While the charismatic figure of Nyrere is central in Tanzanian history, as his 
achievements on the social sphere have been remarkable and he has promoted unity 
and stability, this chapter explained how the expansion of bureaucracy and control 
has had negative effects on the relationship between the state and society. In fact, the 
expansion of bureaucracy and control set an image of the state as above society, and 
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delineated a top-down approach that was not well accepted by rural communities 
seeking to keep their autonomy.  
In particular, a paternalistic approach and a general distrust towards farmers pushed 
the Tanzanian state to make villagization compulsory in 1973.  This policy had 
several negative effects on farmers and on the agricultural sector as indicated by 
many scholars (Sumra, 1979; Temu, 1979; Hyden, 1980; Coulson, 1982; Harriss, 
1982; Raikes, 1982; Olorunsola, 1988; Ellis, 1988; Yeager, 1989; Bryceson, 1993; 
Scott, 1998; Sijm, 1997; Ibrawoh and Dibua, 2003). Furthermore, this chapter 
suggested that the villagization policy complicated the relationship between the state 
and rural communities, and contributed at creating an ‘alienated, sceptical, 
demoralised and uncooperative peasantry’ (Scott, 1998, p.237). Hence, the process 
of disengagement between state and society finds its origin in the years following 
independence, and in particular as a consequence of the policies of the early 1970s.   
Nevertheless, villagization has only been one of the diverse agricultural policies 
implemented by the Tanzanian state, and, as it will be explained in the following 
chapters (in particular chapter 6), is certainly not the only one that has contributed to 
complicating the relationship between the state and the farmers. The wave of 
liberalisation in the 1980s with the election of Ali Hassan Mwinyi as President 
opened the doors to a new phase, which, as it was noted, did not improve conditions 
in farming households (Sijm, 1997; Meertens, 2000; Ponte, 2000; Skarstein, 2005; 
Mashindano and Kaino, 2009; Cooksey, 2011). The increasing presence of NGOs 
and international organisations in the country as a consequence of liberalisation has 
had different effects: on one side it is certainly having a positive impact in the lives 
of many people, while on the other side it influences state’s policies and it is creating 
dependency, as it will be explained in more detail in chapter 6 and 7 (Pinkney, 2005; 
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Kelsall, 2002). In conclusion, it can be said that while it was expected that the 
processes of liberalisation, democratisation and expansion of civil society would 
foster people’s participation in politics, this has not been so in Tanzania. Moreover, 
these processes did not contribute to ease the controversial relationship between the 
farmers and the state, and actually may have made this even more complex. 
The next chapter will introduce the results of the empirical research in regards to the 
food security condition of the households interviewed in two regions of Tanzania: 
Coast and Kilimanjaro. By providing details about the farming households 
interviewed, the next chapter will also analyse the issues faced by farmers and 
explain the context in which agricultural policies are implemented.  
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Chapter 5 - Food security and agriculture in contemporary 
Tanzania 
5.1. Introduction  
The previous chapter has introduced the case study of this research, offering an 
historical reading of the evolution of the state-society relationship in rural areas of 
Tanzania. As a key issue in the research question, this chapter will look deeper into 
the problem of food insecurity in Tanzania, by providing an insight into food 
consumed, patterns and habits of farming families in the light of the empirical results 
collected through interviews in 125 households in Coast and Kilimanjaro regions. 
Through an analysis of the households interviewed and their declarations on food 
consumed and the problems that farmers face in the countryside this chapter will 
identify and describe how insecurity is perceived. While the food security debate is 
usually centred on statistical data (for instance the MDG reports), this research, and 
this chapter in particular, will argue that numbers do not provide a clear enough 
picture on the matter, and in particular statistical data tell us very little about who the 
food insecure are, their feelings and perceptions, their coping strategies and the 
reasons behind this insecurity. Moreover, often the data gathering is so controversial 
that it gives a distorted understanding of the issue, posing doubts on its reliability 
(for instance see the example provided in chapter 6 on how the Tanzanian 
government identifies the food insecure households). As established in Chapter 2, 
food security is not only about calories intake or frequency of food consumption. 
People’s understanding and perception of their condition is also important. As we 
will see, even when three meals per day are consumed there is often an absence of a 
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diversified food intake and therefore no guarantee that the household’s dietary needs 
will be satisfied.  
This chapter presents the first part of the results of the data collected through the 
interviews with the farming households, letting the voices of the people vulnerable to 
food insecurity emerge and tell their stories. These accounts confirm the importance 
of a qualitative approach and allow us to see what lies behind farming households 
and their struggle towards food security in rural Tanzania. In particular, the data 
gathered will reveal some details about the farming communities interviewed, the 
differentiation and interactions between households and their food and eating habits 
and patterns. These details will help us understand farmers’ perceptions on food 
security in perspective and in relation to the environment where they live. As it will 
be noted, there are differences in farmers’ feeling of insecurity according to the 
connections they have with the market and in relation to the wealth of neighbouring 
households. This confirms the idea that food security as a subjective perception is 
linked to the environment surrounding the household and to its economic condition, 
as underlined in particular by authors such as Sen (1981), and Devereux and 
Maxwell (2001). This is the reason why an asset analysis is introduced and will 
guide us in the analysis of the interviews (assets being the best estimate of 
households’ wealth in situations where fixed salaries are unusual).  
Finally, this chapter will present the reasons why farmers feel that they are not able 
to become food secure. The differences between the two regions where interviews 
have taken place are mostly due to cultural and geographical reasons, but 
nonetheless the attitudes of the people interviewed about their struggles towards food 
security share a common concern and feeling of dissatisfaction with politics and state 
action, as it will be elaborated in chapter 6. 
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5.2. Methodology 
The complexity of the research question (How has the relationship between the 
state and farmers shaped food security in rural Tanzania since its independence?) 
requires an approach that puts together literatures from different disciplinary 
spheres. Therefore, this study makes use of several concepts that are widely 
deployed – food security, state-society relations -, but tries to do so by creating a 
connection between them and by applying this approach to a specific case, the one 
of Tanzania.  
A qualitative approach has been judged to be the most appropriate in a study that 
mainly brings an empirical contribution to the literature on food security and state-
society relationships and wishes to analyse subjective perceptions of farmers on the 
matters. In particular, 8 villages have been surveyed, where 223 interviews were 
collected, of which 88 to farmers in Coast region (around the village of Kwala, in 
Kibaha district) and 37 to farmers in Kilimanjaro region (around the village of 
Usangi, Mwanga district). A further 55 teenagers belonging to farming households 
were interviewed and observed as part of  an agricultural project run in the secondary 
school of the village of Kwala (Coast region) to analyse approaches to the 
agricultural sector and group work by younger generations. 43 between 
representatives of agribusiness, NGOs and politicians at local, district and national 
level have also been interviewed. 
Tanzania has a large variety of climatic areas. The regions where the interviews were 
conducted were chosen by taking into consideration their specific climatic 
characteristics, which they share with other areas of the country. The Kibaha district 
in Coast region, despite being in proximity of the coast, is arid with generally high 
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temperatures, condition shared also by other regions in the centre and in the south of 
the country. The Mwanga district in Kilimanjaro is, on the other side and similarly to 
other regions in the north of the country, characterised by more moderate 
temperatures and higher rainfall. By analysing two areas with different 
characteristics, the intention was to test how determinant were geographical and 
cultural conditions on farmers’ answers. In fact, these two areas are also different in 
terms of culture and tribal compostition. In Kibaha district, the main tribe is the 
Zaramo, mainly of Muslim religion, while in Mwanga district the majority of the 
population identifies itself in the Pare tribe, mainly Christian. The two areas were 
also chosen for their reputation among state officials (see section 6.6 for more 
details): the Zaramo people have an unfortunate reputation of being unproductive, 
while on the contrary the Chagga and the Pare tribes that live in the North of the 
country are seen as more active and entrepreneurial.  
A general outlook of the areas surveyed, and the characteristics of the households’ 
conditions in these areas, is presented in tables 1 and 2 in section 5.4 of this chapter. 
More in details, tables 3 and 4 will classify the farmers interviewed into three 
groups, in order to present the socio-economic aspects of the sample interviewed and 
to provide the contextual background in which the research is located. These tables 
provide several details of the areas, the culture and the socio-economic condition of 
the communities interviewed.  
The sample chosen is representative of the majority of farmers in Tanzania: small 
scale (generally they do not cultivate more than two acres of land), living in rural 
villages and sharing similar economical constraints (distance from the market, lack 
of storage facilities and so on - see section 5.6 for more details). The farmers 
interviewed were selected in different ways: In some circumstances (for example in 
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the village of Mahundi in Coast region) the village chairperson offered to invite the 
farmers to be interviewed. He chose a representative sample of farmers: according to 
their wealth, the acre of land under cultivation and the average productivity. But 
most of the time the farmers were chosen by myself: in the evening I would walk 
around in the village and visit houses, asking people if I could interview them, while 
during the day I would visit the farms nearby the villages and ask the farmers that I 
met on the way to be interviewed. This allowed for the sample to be highly 
variegated. When possible, the sample includes both male and female farmers. The 
higher presence of male farmers amongst the interviewees is not intentional, and is 
the result of a series of factors: an higher eagerness of male farmers to be 
interviewed, a tendency to see males as head of the household and of the farm (and 
therefore the ‘natural’ referent to be interviewed), and, in some occasions, a higher 
involvement of the males in farming activities (whereas women would help in the 
farm but also run house duties and other economic activities in the village such as 
petty business and catering). 
The politicians were chosen according to the relevance of their role for the scope of 
the study. Setting interviews with national level politicians has not been easy. It 
often required several un-answered emails, phone calls, physical visits to the 
ministries, filling of documents and missed appointments. In some cases, the 
politicians interviewed have not given consent to record and use the interviews in 
this thesis. Hence, while their answers have still shaped my understanding on the 
subject, they neither appear nor have been reported in the analysis. Interviews to 
district and local politicians and officials have been easier. Expecially at local level, 
politicians were easily reachable and willing to talk to me and to share their opinion.  
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My knowledge of the language spoken in the area and the fact that most farmers 
already knew me because of my previous experience as a teacher in the local 
secondary school of Kwala –one of the villages interviewed in Kibaha district-, made 
it easier to approach and to be welcomed by people. Furthermore, I was 
accompanied by a senior teacher –named Athumani Msangi- which had been 
working in the secondary school of the village for several years and was widely 
known and respected amongst the community members. Athumani also accompanied 
and helped me to conduct and translate the interviews in Mwanga district, in 
Kilimanjaro region. Thanks to the fact that he belongs to this area, many people 
knew him and were willing to talk to us here too.  
The results of the interviews are supported, interpreted and explained thanks to 
almost two years of direct living experience in these villages. The living experience 
has been fundamental in enabling me to approach, communicate, and gain the trust 
of the communities interviewed, and therefore more honest declarations from the 
part of the interviewees and a better ability to analyse the interviews. Inevitably, this 
opens the questions of bias in the analysis, as I was emotionally attached to the 
communities and the place where I was living and I held the interviews, and I knew 
many of the farmers interviewed. Nevertheless, I tried to be as objective as possible, 
and to approach farmers without any expectation or pre-concepted hypothesis. My 
research has been, especially during the first year, a learning process in evolution, 
and with time more issues would attract my attention. It is not therefore surprising 
that I decided to conduct the interviews in Kilimanjaro region only after having 
surveyed Coast region: That was the time when I realised how deep the stereotypes 
on farmers were, and I was curious and eager to discover if there was some thruth to 
them. Other topics, connected to the main research question, also came into analysis 
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and evolved only while I was conducting the interviews: such was for example the 
question on farmers-pastoralists conflict and the issue of cooperative associations. 
The farmers were asked 14 semi-structured questions concerning: 
- Family size 
- Farm size 
- Members of the family to farm 
- Crops cultivated 
- Diet patterns 
- Cooking habits 
- Food being purchased  
- Satisfaction with food consumed 
- Problems of farming 
- Help received from the state 
- Opinion on the current state agricultural policy 
- Opinion on the extension service 
- Collaboration with other farmers 
- Plans for the future  
To complement the research finding, a number of 43 officials and members of 
international organizations were also interviewed, in the English language. They 
were asked several questions, according to their level of expertise and role within the 
state. Mostly, the questions rotated around the following:  
- Role and objectives of their organizations/branch of the state were they are 
employed 
- Opinions on problems of agriculture and of farming households in rural areas 
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- What their organization/state department does to address these problems 
- Opinions on differences between farming communities in different areas of 
the country 
- Attitude of farmers towards state’s projects 
- Channels used to communicate with rural communities 
- Opinion on best practices/policies to improve food security and nutrition in 
rural areas 
- State collaboration with private sector and international organizations 
The large amount of data gathered is the result of interviews that often lasted a day, 
and where words were accompanied by visits to houses and farms, cooking and 
sharing of meals, meeting all members of the households. These visits allowed me to 
gain a deep understanding of the habits and conditions of the households 
interviewed, and to analyse the information gathered in relation to their living 
conditions. Thus this study is the result of extensive research, life experience and 
academic reflections, which allowed me to reflect on the results of the interviews in 
relation to the theoretical literature on the topic. 
Statistical data has also been used and discussed in light of the results coming from 
the interviews. The arguments of this study are supported by empirical data, 
theoretical research and observation of facts and events in the areas interviewed 
during 2010-2014.  
The farmers interviewed have been anonymised, in order to protect them from being 
identified by governmental officials. A comprehensive list of interviewees, with date 
and location is provided in appendix 2 and 3. 
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5.3. The measurement of food security  
In chapter 2 various approaches and definitions of the term food security were 
presented. Food security is generally being defined as the situation that exists when 
‘all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe 
and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active 
and healthy life and are not an undue risk of losing such access’ (FAO, 2006). 
However, besides all the definition of the term, how do we measure food security in 
practice? The need to find an easy and quick method to measure food-related 
problems has led to the present use of quantitative data based on caloric intake of 
food per capita, the level of undernourishment and local food availability and 
consumption. These assessments, widely used and approved by international 
organizations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and World 
Bank, are the determinant of most policy decisions both at national and international 
level. For example, the National Nutrition Strategy, the Guideline for Councils for 
the preparation of Plan and Budget for Nutrition (both written by the Ministry of 
Health and Social Welfare of Tanzania, 2010 and 2012) and the Institutional 
Analysis of Nutrition in Tanzania (Leach and Kilama, 2009) are completely based on 
statistical data of physical malnutrition, such as child stunting and wasting.  
Hence, for a researcher interested in mapping food security in Tanzania, it would be 
very easy to find indicators on the level of undernourishment, food production, 
malnourishment in children and so on. For instance, the World Bank underlines that 
the percentage of undernourished people in Tanzania is equal to the 38.8% of the 
total population, and its absolute number has been on the rise since 2007 (World 
Bank indicators, 2014). This data is calculated merely based on dietary energy 
consumption (kcal per person) and does not tell anything about the kind of food 
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consumed, and the reasons behind malnourishment. Likewise, the FAO also talks 
about ‘the depth of the food deficit’ based on the availability of kcal per person, 
being calculated as 274 kcal per person in Tanzania (FAOSTAT, 2012). While in 
theory it is recognized that poverty and hunger are strictly related, and food security 
is not only about availability but also about distribution and the ability to purchase 
the food available, by describing the problem through the use of this data (that links 
malnutrition to food production per capita), the risk is to discard the complexity of 
the problem of hunger and provide only a superficial understanding of food 
insecurity.  
Other indicators widely used to assess food insecurity are child stunting (height for 
age), wasting (weight for height) and underweight (weight for age). These data are 
considered to be particularly important, and they are generally recognised to be more 
reliable than adults’ undernourishment and malnourishment indicators, because the 
majority of the children born in a clinic get their weight and height measured. 
Furthermore, such indicators also provide an insight into malnourishment in 
pregnant women since undernourishment in children starts before the child is born, 
during pregnancy
25
 (DeRose et al., 1998, pp. 37-39; TDHS, 2010). In Tanzania, the 
World Bank calculates stunting at 34.8%, underweight at 13.6% and wasting at 6.6% 
for children aged 0-5 (World Bank Indicators, 2015). Malnutrition in children is 
officially recognised to be a problem, with the Tanzanian Ministry of Health and 
Social Welfare admitting that malnutrition is directly or indirectly associated with 
more than 50% of child deaths, and that this is a top priority in government policy 
(TDHS, 2010, p.49). Alongside malnutrition exists data on food nutrient deficiency 
                                                          
25 According to the TDHS there is a strong connection between the condition of women in the 
society and children food related issues. 85% of women are not involved in decisions 
concerning their own healthcare, and 93% have little or no say on household’s expenses, 
including food (TDHS, 2010). 
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disorders. The World Bank calculates that about 60% of children under 5 years old 
are anaemic (World Bank Indicators, 2015). Vitamin A, zinc, iron and iodine 
deficiency disorders are very high in Tanzania according to the Tanzania 
Demographic and Health Survey (TDHS) (2010), and the Ministry of Wealth and 
Social Welfare (2011), because of a lack of food diversification. In fact, The World 
Food Programme estimates that 70% of all energy is obtained from staples such as 
cereals, roots or tubers (WFP, 2013, p.16).
 26
 
However useful, these data do not give us any details on how farming households are 
affected by food insecurity, what are their perceptions, how they distribute the food 
in the household, why they feel insecure and what their coping strategies are. The 
qualitative approach used in this study looks at these aspects in order to understand 
the issues farming households in the areas surveyed face every day. As explained in 
the introduction, a contextualised approach and a deeper understanding of food 
security through the voices of the people affected could lead to more effective 
policies and to actively involve the communities in the decision making. It could 
also explain the dynamics of power behind food insecurity, and the coping strategies 
chosen by farming households. As explained in chapter 1, the focus is on farming 
households for the reason that small-scale farmers represent the great majority of the 
population in Tanzania (Salami, Kamara, Brixiova, 2010, pp.12-13). Moreover, 
despite being food producers, farming households are the most affected by food 
insecurity, as underlined by the results of a survey ran from 2008 to 2011 by the 
World Food Programme (WFP, 2013). According to this WFP study, rural 
households are more prone to food insecurity than urban ones, and the more farming 
households depend on their own produce, the greater the vulnerability to food 
                                                          
26 In poor dietary intake households this ratio reaches the 80% (WFP, 2013, p. 16). 
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insecurity. In fact, the highest incidence of food insecurity was found in the 
agriculture-based livelihood households, while households where the major 
economic activity was not related to agriculture were least likely to experience food 
insecurity. Furthermore, agricultural households are also the ones where the food 
expenditure share is the highest, reaching more than 75% of their total income, and 
the diversification of food consumption is lower (ibid., 2013, pp.26, 31-35). 
Being farmers and feeling at the same time insecure and/or unable to fully provide 
for the family creates a complex social and, as we will see in the next chapter, 
political scenario, leading to anger or resignation depending on the circumstances. 
Such a scenario affects society on different levels, as it complicates the relationships 
between farmers and within households, and has repercussions on the individual 
farmers’ personal self-esteem, eroding their confidence to change their condition. 
This will be better analysed in the next two chapters, where we will have a deeper 
look into farmers’ political engagement and their responses to food insecurity. In this 
chapter, the following sections will try to contextualise the food debate and bring 
farmers’ perceptions to the fore by analysing the results of the interviews conducted 
with 125 farming households (inhabited by a total of 584 people) in eight rural 
villages in Tanzania. The villages surveyed in the Coast region, around the village of 
Kwala, Kibaha District, are: Kwala, Mperamumbi, Msua, Dutumi, Mongomole and 
Mwembengozi. In Kilimanjaro region the villages surveyed around the area of 
Usangi, Mwanga district are: Kigare and Makandeni. Farmers from different social 
groups were interviewed around the villages and in the fields nearby. The analysis of 
food security that will emerge will compare the objective condition of food security 
(in line with the FAO definition and aspects of sustainability) and the subjective 
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perceptions of the people interviewed. In order to do so, the next section will first 
contextualise the socio-economic conditions of the households interviewed. 
5.4. Household assets analysis 
The villages surveyed for this study are mostly inhabited by farmers. However, as 
was mentioned in chapter 2, not all farmers are the same, and the villages are 
characterised by a certain degree of social differentiation. Inequality is not striking 
visible in these villages, but it is there and needs to be accounted for because it has 
an impact on how farmers perceive their food and poverty condition, and on how 
farmers replied to the questions. There are two major claims made in this section: 
first, that there is a strong connection between poverty and food security, as 
explained by the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF, 2007) and 
Amartya Sen (1981, see chapter 2). Second, that the subjective dimension of food 
security is conditioned by how the person interviewed relates itself to other members 
of society.  
Hence, to assess and measure food security in the villages surveyed, this section 
starts with an assets analysis (as a measure of the household’s wealth), a table which 
will indicate the criteria used to classify the households interviewed according to the 
wealth owned. This classification will allow us to make some considerations around 
the connection between poverty and food security. For instance, a farming household 
may face food insecurity because of a bad harvest. It may or may not have different 
options: if it owns some assets it could decide to sell part of them to face a temporary 
food insecurity period, with the optimism that the next harvest will be better. If it 
does not have any assets it may reduce the amount of food consumed in the 
household, withdraw the children from school to save on tuition fees, sell the land 
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and so on. Its insecurity will probably be higher if it does not have any assets and it 
is forced to give away an important part of its assets such as the land. Such 
hypothetical scenario could change the household’s livelihood greatly, trapping it in 
a condition of poverty and insecurity from which it is difficult to recover.    
The asset analysis presented in the tables below is more reliable than income-related 
indicators because the majority of people in rural areas depend on agriculture and 
informal exchanges for their livelihoods and do not have a constant income. This is 
why international organisations such as the United Nations Capital Development 
Fund (NCDF) have employed this methodology to analyse agro-pastoral 
communities in north Tanzania (2007). Following the Rural Appraisal methodology 
model used by the UNCDF (2007, pp.61-66), the assets are grouped in four 
categories according to the nature of the capital available/owned: social, financial, 
physical and natural. The elaboration of these tables has been possible thanks to 
details coming from the interviews and my personal observation of the communities 
where the interviews have taken place. Given the differences found in the two 
different regions interviewed (Coast and Kilimanjaro), two different asset analysis 
are provided. The differences between the two regions are further explained later on 
in this section. Besides the differences in the two regions, it needs to be noted that 
this classification does not mean that all the households in a determined region have 
the same characteristics, but it provides a general outlook of the average household 
and the assets available in each region. Hence, following the criteria of the tables 
below, the households interviewed will then be classified in poor and very poor, 
resilient and wealthy (see table 3 and 4). The connection between their socio-
economic status and food security will then be analysed.  
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Table 1. Households Asset analysis (Coast Region) 
Social Capital Extended large families.  
Good integration between different communities and good social values (mutual 
cooperation). Regular village meetings are held. In some of the villages there 
are some microfinance service initiatives voluntarily organized by various 
members of the community. In these initiatives a common fund is saved and 
managed in order to help the members in difficult situation throughout the year.  
Education levels are very low among household members. The majority may 
have finished Primary School, but the rate of absentees in school is very high. 
Children most often go to the farm or seek other forms of income to help the 
family. 
Financial Capital No capacity to save.  
Some livestock consist in poultries and more rarely goats. No jewellery, except 
in some pastoralist tribes such as Maasai and Barbaig, where body ornaments of 
low value and decoration are considered important.  
Some off-farm employment is often sought. These include: for women activities 
such as cooking and selling cooked food in the village, sewing, fetching water 
for others (especially if the water resources are far), and digging other people’s 
farms. Children’s off farm jobs include working as house-girls (or house-boys) 
for other families, which consist in looking after smaller children, cooking and 
cleaning the house of wealthier families (such as teachers or doctors). Other off-
farm jobs typically covered by men include driving people from the villages to 
the main road (town of Chalinze and Vigwaza) by using motorbikes, working as 
barbers, brewers, charcoal cutters/makers or shop owners. 
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Physical Capital Irrigation system is non-existent.  
No use of chemical fertilizers (or very rare) and/or improved seeds.  
Some cattle manure available locally.  
No mechanization of agriculture. All the work is hand- driven. This is due to 
lack of capital to invest into agriculture. 
No electricity, no piped water, no telephone lines, no gas pipes, increasing use 
of mobile phones charged through local shops that have electricity.  
No road infrastructures. Most of the villages are accessed from dirt sandy roads 
with motorcycles or bicycles. International companies have not as yet shown 
any interest in investing or buying land in this area. 
Natural Capital Land: households hold small parcels of arid to semi-arid land, mainly acquired 
through inheritance.  
Water is scarce, especially during the months May-October.  
Lack of water: most of the land is characterized by soil erosion. Soil is mostly 
sandy, no rocks or clay to retain water underneath the land. In some areas water 
well systems have revealed to be ineffective as a way to get water, therefore 
most of the water is collected from canals or river nearby.  
Grazing areas for cattle is extended.  
Trees are increasingly cut to produce charcoal.  
 
Table 2. Households Asset analysis (Kilimanjaro Region) 
Social Capital Mostly elders, women and children. Good sense of community. Village meetings 
held regularly and every 10 households elect a ‘leader’ (decided democratically). 
Microfinance initiatives common within groups of women from the same ethnic 
or religious group. Education levels are higher compared to other parts of 
Tanzania, with most of the children getting a Secondary School education.  
Financial 
Capital  
No or little capacity for savings. The great majority of households are supported 
by extended family members that work in nearby cities/towns. The majority of 
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households have cows (kept inside the house and fed) for cultural and traditional 
reasons. Owning chickens is also common. Owning a car is rare. Very few 
households rely on agriculture to meet their needs, while the majority seek other 
forms of employment, in particular collecting and selling grasses to feed the cows, 
collecting and selling firewood. Other common jobs are builders, driver, petty 
business services etc.  
Physical 
Capital 
Irrigation in agriculture has proven difficult; despite this water is available at the 
household level. No use of chemical fertilizer, cattle manure is commonly used. 
Some pesticide used especially for coffee and banana plants (more rare). No 
mechanisation in agriculture, due to lack of capital and to logistical difficulties 
(many villages are located in the slopes of the mountains). Electricity is getting 
more common thanks to a recent government plan to increase the diffusion of 
electrical cables in the area. Piped water is available to most households. Poor 
road infrastructure, the villages are accessed through dirt roads by bus, bicycles 
and motorbikes. Land acquisition in this area is extremely difficult, as land is 
passed on using a hereditary system, and it is not culturally acceptable to sell land 
to foreigners.  
Natural Capital Land: every household has a piece of land, acquired mainly through inheritance, 
often, however, the piece of land is very small. Water is available, but the water 
streams are under stress as water usage in the villages has increased over the 
years. Soil erosion is also common because of deforestation (the main source of 
energy is firewood). The soil has lost fertility over the years, as it is used 
intensively by generations. Rains are scarce and unreliable. Maize cultivation is 
therefore getting harder and unsuccessful.  
 
5.4.1. Households classification in the two regions interviewed 
As a general preamble, we can say that the majority of the people interviewed can be 
defined as asset-poor (or ‘entitlement-poor’) small scale farmers (around or less than 
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two hectares cultivated), who farm but are often net purchasers of food. In fact, most 
households lack the resources either to produce enough food to consume or to 
generate enough income to satisfy their food requirements. However, it is interesting 
to note that social differentiation occurs and affects the households’ vulnerability to 
food insecurity. To assess this, the households have been grouped according to their 
possession of capital as compared to the general tables provided in the tables above. 
Beside providing an indication of households’ vulnerability to food insecurity, this 
classification also offers a detailed description of the sample interviewed. Generally, 
we find that group 2 households (resilient) are often vulnerable to food insecurity 
while group 3 (poor or very poor) are highly vulnerable (or currently food insecure). 
The majority of the wealthier households interviewed (group 1) can be generally 
considered food secure, but can still experience seasonal food insecurity. However, 
as we will see with some examples from the interviews, while there is a clear 
connection between possession of entitlements and food security, the connection 
between the subjective perceptions of food security and the possession of 
entitlements is not always so straightforward. As a consequence, the connection 
between an objective condition of food security and personal perceptions may vary. 
The classification is based on objective observations (such as house condition) and 
declarations from the participants interviewed. 
Following these criteria, the households have been classified into 13 wealthy 
households (Group 1), 69 poor but resilient households (Group 2) and 43 poor and 
very poor households (Group 3). The classification for Coast region will be 
presented and explained first.  
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Table 3. Classification for Coast region 
Assets Group 1 (wealthy) Group 2 (poor but 
resilient) 
Group 3 (poor and very poor) 
House Brick walls, iron roof, 
electricity, water tap 
close to the house 
Sometimes brick or 
Mud walls (sometimes 
covered with plaster), 
iron roof 
Mud house walls, thatch roof 
Land owned 10-15 acres or more 2-10 acres Less than 2 acres – with some 
exceptions (sometimes land 
owned is not a clear indication 
of wealth, especially when the 
family has the capability to 
cultivate only parts of it).  
Education  Most have Secondary 
Education or higher 
Most have standard 7 
education (primary 
school) 
Some primary education or 
never been to school 
Other assets Sewing machine, 
refrigerator, bicycles, 
motorbike, tractor, TV 
Sewing machine, 
Bicycle, radio  
Little or no assets 
Other 
activities 
May own shops, bars, 
trading, milling, 
transport services 
Small businesses, beer 
brewing, charcoal 
production, food trading 
and catering 
No other activities, sometimes 
they farm for other people 
Number of 
households 
11 43 34 
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The majority of the households interviewed in Coast region has a limited availability 
of capital, which makes them vulnerable to food insecurity, especially during pre-
harvest seasons. The results of the research suggest that there is a close connection 
between the wealth of the household and its food security condition. Only eleven of 
the households interviewed, the ones categorized as wealthy, can be considered food 
secure throughout all year. They reported consuming three meals per day, and their 
diet is diversified, with consumption of rice, meat and fruit and vegetables. The 
households classified as poor but resilient are the households that reported 
consuming between two to three meals per day, and their diet is mostly characterised 
by the consumption of ugali, amaranth and beans. There is clearly a lack of 
diversification in their diet, which points to a poor food security and a high 
vulnerability to food insecurity in the pre-harvest periods. The last group, the 
poorest, is also the group most vulnerable to food insecurity. Most households 
reported consuming only two meals throughout the day, one of which is breakfast 
(tea with sugar and mandazi or chapatti) and the other, usually consumed in the 
evening, is represented by ugali with amaranth or beans. The households classified in 
group 3 have difficulties to find other forms of income rather than that provided by 
their activity as farmers, because of the old age of the components of the households, 
or logistic reason: they live far from the villages in isolated areas or they are unable 
to reach the village and the market nearby because of a lack of transportation. For 
this reason, they mostly depend on their land and their produce (and informal 
exchanges with farmers nearby) and are very vulnerable to food insecurity, 
especially during years of bad harvest.  
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The differences between the Coast and the Kilimanjaro region require a further 
classification for the households interviewed in the northern region of Kilimanjaro. 
The reasoning behind these differences will also be explained following the table.  
Table 4. Classification for Kilimanjaro region 
Assets Group 1 (wealthy) Group 2 (poor but 
resilient) 
Group 3 (poor and very 
poor) 
House Cement, painted house, 
gate, electricity, water 
tap, biogas 
Brick or mud house, 
may have electricity, 
water tap 
Mud house walls, no 
electricity 
Land owned More than 6 acres 1-6 acres Less than 1 or 2 acres or 
land borrowed 
Education A level, University Secondary school Primary school or less 
Other assets Car, TV, motorbike Bicycle, cows, 
chickens, sewing 
machine etc.  
Little or no assets 
Other activities Retired from other job, 
holding pension, big 
farms with employers. 
Petty business, sell 
milk, drivers, builders 
No other activities or 
work for other people, sell 
firewood or grass for 
cows 
Number of 
households 
2 26 9 
The differences between the two regions interviewed can partly be explained by 
climatic and cultural factors. For instance, in Kilimanjaro Region it is very common 
to have laminated roofs because of the cold weather, electricity is more common 
because the connection is cheaper (there are more electricity points of connection 
available) and water is mostly available in all households given the availability (on 
the slope of the mountains) and the pipe systems built by the villagers. On the other 
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side, land is scarcer in Kilimanjaro region – the presence of national reserves, higher 
population density, and less arable land available on the slope of mountains -, 
therefore farmers usually own a smaller piece of land than farmers in Coast region, 
where the land is abundant, albeit less fertile. The ownership of animals such as 
cows is very common in farming households in Kilimanjaro region, because it is 
considered customary by the Kipare tribe. In Coast region this is very rare: Sukuma 
tribe farmers sometimes have cows and donkeys, but farmers belonging to other 
tribes in this region do not. As a consequence, in Kilimanjaro region the availability 
of manure is usually not a problem and the consumption of milk and meat is higher 
within the households. Another difference concerns the level of education within the 
households, which is usually higher in Kilimanjaro, for both historical and cultural 
reasons.  
Moreover, concerning food consumption, most of the people in Kilimanjaro region 
reported eating three times per day. However, the ability to consume three meals per 
day is given by the fact that in most households the younger members of the family 
have jobs in the nearby cities and they are expected to help/provide for the rest of the 
household - usually parents and younger siblings - that live in the villages on the 
slopes of the mountains. As a consequence, the prevalence of elders as part of the 
population in the villages surveyed in Kilimanjaro is higher than in those surveyed in 
Coast region, where migration to Dar es Salaam has proven difficult, given the 
generally lower education level of people living and the higher distance to the city.  
In relation to the food consumption habits registered, the wealthiest group can be 
considered food secure all year, and their diet is characterised by the consumption of 
cereals, fruits, vegetables and meat. The farmers classified as poor but resilient 
(group 2) experience seasonal food insecurity, although they still manage to consume 
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three meals per day most of the time, and to sporadically integrate their diet with 
meat and vegetables beside the common consumption of ugali and bananas. The 
poorest group reported consuming only two meals per day most of the time, 
breakfast (tea or coffee with sugar and bread or chapatti) and an evening meal 
composed of ugali and bananas or beans.  
In comparing the two regions, both in terms of assets owned and food consumed, the 
first impression is that the households in Kilimanjaro region are better off than the 
ones in Coast region. However, a deeper analysis reveals a great vulnerability to 
food insecurity also in the households interviewed in Kilimanjaro region. For 
instance, the ‘three meals per day’ pattern reported in this region is not necessarily 
an indicator of food security in these areas. In fact, the majority of the households 
interviewed that reported to be eating three meals per day rely on outside help to 
satisfy their food needs, which makes them very vulnerable and does not give any 
indication of food security on the long term.  Furthermore, the presence of electricity 
or/and a house made of bricks is also often a result of the help received from younger 
members of the households employed in the cities (Moshi and Arusha in particular), 
so it is not directly an indicator of the specific wealth of the household. In other 
words, the aesthetic condition of the houses in which some households live in 
Kilimanjaro region are not directly or necessarily connected with their food security 
condition. A connection that, in comparison, was instead clearer in Coast region.  
Given these differences, the wealth of the households is considered on its relative 
dimension and in some circumstances some factors have been more determinant to 
influence the classification of a household in a group instead of in the other. Clearly, 
there are many other factors that may make certain households more vulnerable to 
food insecurity than others; for example, the old age of its members, the distance to 
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the farm and/or the market, the specific composition of the household (a high 
number of young children or sickness within the household, for example), help 
received from the state or NGOs etc. The classification, when possible, takes account 
of all these factors. A few snapshots of particular individuals are presented in 
Appendix 3 to provide examples of the classification.  
5.5. Food related issues and patterns in the households interviewed 
But how does food insecurity manifest itself in practical terms? And what are the 
eating patterns of the households interviewed? This section analyses dietary habits 
within these households and the problems related to food consumption reported, for 
instance the lack of food diversification. Moreover, food preferences and food 
security as related to personal perceptions and satisfaction are analysed. 
5.5.1. Food consumption and food diversification 
According to the FAO the most consumed commodities in Tanzania (quantity 
measured with Kcal/capita/day) are the following: 
Table 5. Commodities consumed in Tanzania (FAOSTAT, 2009) 
Commodities Utilized 1000 Metric tons (domestic 
utilization) 
Per capita supply (kcal/day) 
Cassava 5183 225 
Maize 2528 519 
Bananas 2253 85 
Sweet potatoes 1312 79 
Rice (millet equivalent) 873 195 
Wheat 728 127 
Beans 617 131 
 
 
171 
Potatoes 533 24 
Meat 419 48 
Sugar (raw equivalent) 377 86 
This data is confirmed by other studies on nutrition in Tanzania; for example, 
Mazengo et al. (1997) report that the ten foods most frequently eaten by rural and 
urban subjects of their survey in Ilala district (Coast region) are, in order of 
frequency: Ugali, tea with sugar, coconut, sweet potatoes, rice, cassava, cassava 
leaves, vegetable oil, beans and bread.  
The results of the interviews conducted in Coast and Kilimanjaro regions tend to 
confirm this tendency, with the foods the most consumed in the households 
interviewed being as below (as a percentage of households that regularly consume 
the indicated food): 
Table 6. Commodities consumed in the households interviewed 
In almost all households the morning meal is represented by tea with sugar, and ugali 
is commonly eaten at both lunch and dinner in Kilimanjaro and Coast region (as 
shown in the table above, 96% of the households interviewed reported eating ugali 
regularly). However, an unbalanced diet based almost exclusively on the 
Ugali (white maize flour) 96% Sorghum/millet 2% 
Tea with sugar 94% yams 2% 
Rice 40% Sweet potatoes 2% 
beans  30% porridge 2% 
Bananas 21% milk 1% 
vegetables 14% Fish 1% 
potatoes 6% eggs 1% 
meat 3%   
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consumption of ugali is often regarded as associated with Vitamin A, calcium and 
protein deficiency, as demonstrated by several studies (FAO - Latham, 1997, Part 
IV, Chapter 26, Table 33; On this also: Berry, ed., 1994, pp.76-77). Rice is 
consumed in largest percentage in Coast region, where 47% of the households 
interviewed reported eating it regularly, compared to Kilimanjaro, where only 24% 
of households consume it regularly. On the other side, only in less than 1% of 
households in Coast region bananas are consumed regularly, while they are a major 
staple food in Kilimanjaro region, consumed by the 70% of households. 
Nevertheless, diversification of food is clearly a problem in both regions.  
Ugali is nowadays recognized as the main staple food in Tanzania, but it was not 
always the case. Traditional crops like sorghum, millet and bananas were widely 
consumed before the colonization period, although it is believed that these crops 
were already losing ground in favour of maize and rice cultivations since the 
nineteenth century, before the arrivals of the Germans in the 1880s (Iliffe, 1971). In 
fact, there are records of maize being cultivated in several parts of the country since 
the early 1880s, while rice may have been introduced even before, in the 1850s in 
Unyamwezi, a region around what is now known as the town of Tabora, in west 
Tanzania (ibid., pp.8-9). Moreover, the first colonial settlements were more 
interested in tobacco, sugar, coffee, and later, after 1898, sisal and cotton plantations 
(ibid., p.13). The shift in favour of maize and rice was probably fostered by a 
growing population, an increasing trade in the mid of the nineteenth century and 
maize being easier to cultivate and requiring less labour compared to smaller grains 
such as sorghum. Practical reasons aside, nowadays maize is often preferred to rice 
not only because of its cheaper prize on the market, but also because of individual 
preferences, as explained in the following section.  
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5.5.2. Food preferences and distribution within the household 
Food preferences are discordant. A good number of people (usually younger) 
admitted that they usually eat ugali but would prefer to eat something else (rice for 
example). On a sample of 55 teenagers interviewed (belonging to farming 
households) aged between 13 and 18 years of age, only 14 prefer ugali to rice, 
although 90% of them usually eat ugali and beans at the school canteen and in their 
households. On the other side, in general older people interviewed claimed that they 
like to eat ugali and would not be willing to swap it with other crops (wheat or 
sorghum for example). A farmer in Kilimanjaro, for example, claimed, with a certain 
emphasis, that ‘food other than ugali is not food for me, if I only had bananas or 
potatoes to eat I would not survive! Ugali makes you strong!’ (R.A.Ms., 2013). 
Another farmer in the same region said:  
‘the government wants us to plant sorghum instead of maize because the 
weather conditions are not good for maize, but how can we cultivate 
sorghum, there is no market for it, and what would we eat? In the past 
people used to eat more sorghum, but I am not sure my wife now knows 
how to even cook it’ (K.S., 2013).  
Meat consumption is very rare in both regions interviewed, and it is considered a 
luxury, being mostly reserved to celebrations and special occasions, where a chicken 
or a goat is slaughtered - beef and goat meat is usually bought from local pastoralists 
in Coast region, while chicken meat usually comes from the household itself - and 
shared within the household, served with pilau rice.
27
 However, in poorer households 
the focus is more on quantity of food served rather than on quality or diversification: 
                                                          
27 Rice cooked with spices and often potatoes. 
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in other words, during celebrations, in poorer households ugali will be consumed in 
larger portions.  
 Cooking habits are also quite fixed: there is little variation in the way the food is 
cooked. This emerged from the interviews and was confirmed by my personal 
experience of living in the village of Kwala for about two years in different 
households. For example, potatoes are almost never boiled, but cooked with other 
vegetables in a stew or fried, vegetables such as peppers and aubergine are not 
grilled or cooked with rice, but they are usually cooked together in a sort of 
ratatouille style, eggs are used to make chapatti (similar to crepes) or chips mayai 
(an omelette with eggs and fried chips), but not boiled or fried alone and so on. The 
same goes to ugali, always cooked in the same way without adding any salt or 
spices. This attitude towards food does not facilitate the intake of a differentiated 
diet, and makes people more vulnerable and less resilient to food insecurity and price 
volatility of some crops in the market. Moreover, it ‘certainly contributes at the 
failure of certain government policies, such as those policies that try to introduce 
new staple crops’, as claimed by the food security and cooperatives officer in 
Mwanga district (2013).  
Concerning cooking methods, the great majority of families interviewed - more than 
80% - use firewood instead of the more expensive charcoal to cook their food. In 
coast region almost all the families interviewed cook outside, unless it rains. In 
Kilimanjaro, because of the colder climate, the households cook inside the house, 
using a stone made of clay. Only a few houses use biogas to cook, just three of the 
households interviewed in Kilimanjaro region. No farming household in the areas 
interviewed in Coast region has a biogas system, also because farmers do not usually 
own cows in this region. The extensive use of firewood is creating several problems 
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in both regions interviewed: as a consequence of deforestation, in Coast region there 
are several areas that suffer from aridity, while in Kilimanjaro region the erosion of 
the soil in some villages on the slopes of the mountains causes landslides during 
heavy rains, destroying several houses.  
5.5.3. Food security and farmers’ perceptions 
Beside households’ food consumption patterns, this study considers food security in 
its wider dimension, embracing the idea developed by Maxwell and Devereux (2001) 
that personal perceptions and people’s feelings should also be considered in a 
household food security analysis (see chapter 2). Hence, in this section we will look 
at farmers’ perceptions of food security and analyse them under their contextual 
perspective. 
From the results of the interviews done for this study it emerges that the majority of 
the households interviewed - around 58% - reported consuming three meals per day, 
including breakfast consisting of tea with sugar. Yet almost 29% of the households 
only consume two meals per day (breakfast and evening meal), and 17% consumes 
between two to three meals per day, depending on the time of the year or/and ability 
to find food by other means. Moreover, from the interviews it emerges that the 
ability to consume three meals per day is not necessarily connected to agricultural 
performance/harvest. In fact, of the families interviewed the great majority has to 
find another source of income other than agriculture to be able to buy the food they 
need (coping strategies will be further analysed in Chapter 7), confirming that beside 
food supply and distribution, the ability to purchase the food available is important 
(Sen, 1981). Moreover, the fact that 58% of the households consume three meals per 
day is not a guarantee of diversification, quantity of the food consumed or 
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satisfaction. For example, J.R.S., a farmer that live with his wife and three children 
in the village of Msua (Coast region) claims that:  
‘thank God most of the time we eat three times per day; however, my 
wife makes sure that we eat three times a day by sharing the food during 
the day, hence we feel a bit less hungry after the meal and we can 
continue with our activities, but we are almost never fully satisfied. 
Moreover, to be able to have two full meals in a day my wife is forced to 
buy maize flour all the time, while the kids would like to eat rice 
sometimes, but simply we cannot afford that’ (J.R.S., 2012). 
Indeed, feeling food secure and consuming three meals per day are not necessarily 
connected. From the result of this study’s interviews it emerges that the majority of 
the households struggle to meet their dietary needs and feel food insecure. In 
particular, nearly 70% of the farming households describe themselves as ‘not having 
enough food’. Another 11% of the households describe themselves as having enough 
only in years of good harvest, while only 20% of the households claim that they have 
enough food to meet their dietary requirements.  
However, interestingly, not all households that reported having enough food 
consume three meals per day, confirming the idea that perception and quantity of 
food consumed are not necessarily connected. Furthermore, within those households 
there are very few that rely exclusively on agriculture, confirming that the great 
majority of households that do rely on agriculture as a source of food or income are 
food insecure. In fact, of the 125 households interviewed only 11 households (9%) 
meet these conditions at the same time: being dependent on farming for a living, 
feeling that they have enough food and consuming three meals per day. Yet even in 
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these households there is no guarantee of food diversification and food security on 
the long term  
Moreover, the households that define themselves as having enough food do not 
necessarily belong to the wealthier category (group I of tables 3 and 4 of this 
chapter), indicating that perceptions of security also depends on the contexts in 
which the household live. In short, the wealth of a house may indicate the 
vulnerability to food insecurity of a certain household, but that does not necessarily 
correspond to the personal perception of security of the household. For instance, 
some households may feel that they have enough food for the household for certain 
reasons: a limited number of people in the household, help from other family 
members or from the government - in the form of food aid or support to the elders - 
high expenditure on food as part of total income, little knowledge of the importance 
of differentiation and problems related to malnourishment, and/or they may be 
advantaged by the good location of their farm and hence have a higher production 
per acre than other farmers. For example Mongomole, in Coast region, is closer to 
the river than other areas, hence the soil is more productive and there is the 
possibility to cultivate vegetables as irrigation is possible. The farmers of this area, 
by selling the vegetables they produce at the local market have more cash income 
available at their disposal.  
But the greatest differences in how people perceive their poverty and their food 
insecurity are found according to the community where such households are located. 
For instance, in the village of Kwala (Coast region), where social differentiation is 
higher and the contact with the ‘outside world’ is facilitated by the presence of an 
American NGO and the presence of electricity and tv in some shops on the main 
road of the village, people tend to be more critical, have higher ambitions and look at 
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themselves with a more negative attitude. On the other hand, people living in more 
isolated areas, such as a community I interviewed between Mperamumbi and Msua 
(Coast region, at about 10km from the village of Kwala on a dirt road), composed of 
11 scattered very poor farming households that live out of agriculture and charcoal 
production, tend to see their situation through different lenses, and to be more fatalist 
and resigned about their condition. For example, S.M., around 40 years old (he is not 
sure about his age), welcomed me in his thatched hut where he lives with his wife 
and two young children, who both showed swollen stomachs. Compared to other 
households interviewed, my first impression was that this was one of the poorest. 
S.M. and his wife farm 1 ½ acre planted with millet, maize and rice, primarily for 
their own consumption. When asked if food was enough for his family, he replied: 
‘sometimes food is enough, other time it is not enough, but what can we do, it is not 
a problem, we go to bed hungry and we think about that tomorrow’ (S.M., 2012). He 
said that they only eat twice a day. I also asked him why sometimes the food was not 
enough and if the lack of rain was a problem and he replied: ‘Rain is not a problem, 
it depends on God; if God gives us rain it rains otherwise there is no rain. The major 
problems are insects, birds and pastoralists’ (ibid.). A farmer that lives nearby, S. H., 
(a 32 year old woman with 4 children) has similar answers; she said that food is 
enough during harvesting time, but then ‘it finishes and we do not have enough’ 
(S.H., 2012). When asked why her farm cannot produce and what are the problems 
that she faces every day, she thought at it as if she has never thought of it before, and 
after few minutes she said: ‘We don’t have problems, this is how life works. 
Maybe... buying seeds is difficult’ (ibid., 2012). When asked about future plans, the 
farmers interviewed in this area had to think a lot before answering.  
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Hence, this demonstrates that the way farmers perceive their condition is related to 
the conditions of the households around them. Although farmers in Kwala were in 
some respects wealthier compared to the community of farmers in Mperamumbi, 
they tended to define themselves in much more negative terms than farmers in 
Mperamumbi. For example, in smaller and more remote communities (such as 
Mperamumbi), most households only consume two meals per day. Nevertheless, this 
is perceived to be normal, as it is a condition shared by all nearby households. 
Therefore, they feel most insecure when they cannot provide two meals per day for 
the household. On the other hand, in larger communities, such as in Kwala and 
Dutumi (Coast) and Kigare (Kilimanjaro), farmers may feel insecure if they are not 
able to provide a certain amount or a certain crop to the family, based on food 
preferences and on a frequency of three meals per day, comparing their condition to 
the conditions of wealthier households of the area. Differentiation is however not as 
defined as we may think, and is not the only determinant of a different perception of 
‘security’ between farmers. In fact, as mentioned previously, in the seven villages 
surveyed there are only a few wealthy farmers able to make a living out of 
agriculture alone (only 11 households out of 125). Most of them are also extension 
officers, so despite agriculture remaining their main activity, they can also count on a 
state salary, and others do not live there on a regular basis (they usually have other 
houses in bigger towns nearby).  
While differentiation could lead to clashes within society amongst members of 
different social status, in the villages surveyed this does not happen. Poorer farmers 
tend to compare their conditions to the condition of wealthier households, but from 
the interviews it emerged that wealthier farmers are usually seen with respect and 
admiration, as they are usually able to employ other farmers in their farms and they 
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let or borrow some agricultural inputs such as tractors and water pumps to the rest of 
the farmers. For instance, in the village of Kwala (Coast region), E.M. is not only the 
wealthiest amongst all farmers but amongst the wealthiest people in the village 
(wealthier than state officials, teachers and doctors). Graduated in UK, he comes 
from Kilimanjaro region, belongs from the Chagga tribe, but has lived in this village 
for more than 30 years. He owns his own tractor, motorbike and car - the only car in 
the village - and his house is the only house in the village with glass windows 
(usually houses in this region only have bars in their windows). He also has his own 
milling machine and sells most of the rice he produces. He is highly admired by the 
community, and involved in local decisions in several ways. For instance, he is 
always invited to official meetings and ceremonies and he has been nominated to be 
part of the Secondary School decision board. He is a role model for the younger 
generations
28
, and farmers talk about him in a positive way, reporting how much he 
helps them (by hiring them to farm his land, or borrowing the tractor, or providing 
advice).  
In this sense, differentiation is pushing poorer farmers in the village to make efforts 
towards improving their current situation of insecurity and their farming conditions. 
When asked about plans for the future, farming’ households in the larger villages 
show more hope for a better future and tend to have bigger plans, such as ‘get a loan 
to buy a water pump’, ‘have electricity in the house’, ‘be part of a farmers’ group 
and ask for a loan to buy a tractor’. On the other side, the answers from households 
in smaller and more isolated communities concerning their plans for the future 
reflect a scarce faith in a change of their current situation, showing resignation to 
                                                          
28 In a survey I conducted in Kwala Secondary School in 2012, on 55 students interviewed (aged 
13-18 and all belong to farming families), few were the ones that want to pursue farming in the 
future (only 21), and within them 9 mentioned the name of E.M. as their inspiration.  
 
 
181 
plan to continue farming as they currently do or burn charcoal to get more income. 
These attitudes will be better discussed in Chapter 8, when analysing farmers’ 
responses and coping strategies against food insecurity. In the next section we will 
look at why the condition of food insecurity persists in many households 
interviewed.  
5.6. Farmers’ challenges 
Given the large number of farmers feeling that they do not have enough food, one of 
the questions aimed at exploring the reasons why that is the case. Looking at 
farming-related issues from a farmer’s perspective will help us understand why and 
how food insecurity is manifested and, more importantly, will help us identify some 
of the elements that lie behind and explain the failure of some agricultural policies 
and the fraught relationship between farmers and the state, which will be the focus of 
the next chapter.  
The following table introduces the most common problems reported by the farmers 
interviewed.  
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In a country where agriculture is reliant on rain, changes in rain patterns heavily 
affect production. Rains are often late or scarce, and farmers claim to be ‘confused 
about the seasons’: they plant the seeds too late, or too early, increasing the risk of 
them being attacked by insects and armyworms. Other times the rains are too heavy 
and ruin the harvest, or create landslides, as reported in Kilimanjaro region. Strong 
wind is also a problem in Kilimanjaro region, where bananas plants are affected and 
sometimes uprooted.  
Lack of inputs, such as hoes and rakes is a problem affecting many farmers. The 
shops to buy the inputs are far away, and many farmers lack the capital to purchase 
them. Farmers also blame the quality of seeds, often not productive, or expired and 
rotten. The majority of farmers buy seeds, and save their seeds very rarely (because 
of lack of storage and/or scarce harvest), being therefore very dependent on price 
fluctuation of seeds. The two major seed companies in the areas interviewed are the 
Tanzanian KIBO Seeds Co. Ltd. and Seed Co. Ltd., while The Agricultural Seeds 
Agency (ASA) is the agency that distributes seeds at a subsidized price by the 
government (although the subsidy is not valid in all regions of Tanzania, as we will 
see in the next chapter).  
Furthermore, the seeds distributed at a cheaper price thanks to the subsidy policy are 
of dubious quality, as several farmers in Kilimanjaro region blamed the ASA for 
bringing the seeds too late and for providing rotten seeds. For instance, A. H. K., 
which plants maize, says:  
‘Our government is not accountable and effective. Sometimes we want to 
plant during the season, but the government brings the seeds late, 
sometimes they get rotten on the way, for example the Irish Potato seeds. 
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Everybody blames other people, they blame each other. We elect people, 
but they do not do what we like them to do, especially about inputs. They 
told us that the seeds have arrived but when we go in the shop there is 
nothing. In private shops there are plenty of seeds, but the price is too 
high for us! This year they gave us some rotten seeds, we planted them 
but nothing came out! Nobody pays us back for the loss’ (A.H.K., 
Kigare, 2013). 
Another farmer, H.A.K. adds: ‘Sometimes the seeds provided for by the government 
are useless for this area. They may grow, but are not good for the hills, so they don’t 
reach full growth and don’t produce any maize’ (H.A.K., Kigare, 2013).  
Very few farmers use fertilizer or pesticide because they cannot afford to purchase it, 
and this limits the agricultural outcome of their fields. In fact, the relatively wealthier 
farmers that use fertilizers have registered a considerable increase in production of 
about 30%, and an experimental agricultural project run in the secondary school of 
the village of Kwala lead to similar results. Nevertheless, ‘knowledge on dosage and 
effective use of fertiliser is the key, otherwise plants will die and the soil will be 
impoverished’, as reported by M.K. (Kwala, 2012). Use of manure is common in 
Kilimanjaro region, while in Coast region it is rare because of the hostilities between 
farmers and pastoralists (see chapter 7) and the difficulties and costs of 
transportation.  
While some of the issues reported such as weather, lack of inputs, birds and wild 
animals’ attacks, lack of capital (which translates in difficulties in getting a loan 
from banks) and poor infrastructure are common to most of the farmers interviewed, 
there are some important differences between Coast and Kilimanjaro regions. For 
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instance, as indicated in the table below, the conflict with pastoralists is a major 
problem only in Coast region, while no farmer in Kilimanjaro mentioned it. The 
same goes for the lack of mechanisation since in the villages surveyed in 
Kilimanjaro region it would be logistically impossible to use a tractor, hence lack of 
mechanisation is not considered to be a problem. Problems that emerge in 
Kilimanjaro, and are only marginal in Coast region, are related to the land: being too 
small, over-used (not fertile) or difficult to acquire due to land legislation and land 
inheritance customs. 
 
Some of the issues reported are inherently political, while others are less political 
and more influenced by weather patterns and natural events. But, as explained in 
chapter 2, there are different ways the state could intervene to mitigate these 
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problems and improve the agricultural sector, the livelihoods of farmers and their 
food security condition. In the next chapter we will analyse this in detail, by looking 
at the most recent agricultural policies implemented by the Tanzanian state and how 
these policies have been received by rural communities.  
5.7. Conclusion 
This chapter has offered some insights into the problem of food insecurity in rural 
Tanzania. Official statistical data are considered useful but their limits are also 
recognised, especially considering the circumstances in which this data is gathered 
(an example is provided in chapter 6, section 6.5.1, where the methodology used to 
assess the level of food insecurity in rural parts of Tanzania is explained). The 
qualitative approach illustrated in this chapter, on the other hand, has allowed us to 
get a more detailed picture of the farming households interviewed, their food 
security condition and the problems they face on a daily basis.  
On the basis of this data, this chapter has identified and classified the households 
interviewed following an asset analysis, which provides a general overview of the 
socio-economic conditions of each household. According to this classification the 
households have been so classified: 43 poor and very poor households (group 3 in 
the tables 3 and 4), 69 poor but resilient households (group 2) and 13 wealthy 
households (group 1).  
The interviews confirm the scarce diversification in the diet of the households 
interviewed, with ugali being regularly consumed by 96% of the households. 
Certainly, there are economic reasons behind the choice of ugali instead of rice, but 
the personal preferences are diverse, in the sense that several people interviewed are 
used to having ugali and do not mind eating it every day, while others, especially 
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young people, would prefer to eat rice but cannot afford it. What is important to note 
in these declarations is that there is a lack of awareness on the importance of a 
diversified diet. Hence, especially given the changes in weather pattern which is 
making the cultivation of certain crops more difficult, it is essential that farmers are 
informed of the importance of a diversified diet and on how to integrate different 
crops that could have higher success of growth or could integrate or partly substitute 
maize (such as sorghum in Kilimanjaro region).   
Furthermore, as suggested by Maxwell (1992) and Devereux and Maxwell (2001) 
the personal perceptions of food security are also given great space in the analysis 
provided in this chapter. As a matter of fact, more than half of the households 
interviewed consume three meals per day. Nevertheless, this frequency does not 
mean that they feel less food insecure or that they consume the quantity or the 
quality of food they would need to consume in order to feel satisfied. In fact, nearly 
70% of the households interviewed claimed not to have enough food. The perception 
of security is also related to the condition of the households nearby, and are thus 
relative to the context in which the household live. Keeping in mind both perceptions 
and effective quantity of food consumed it is clear that the majority of the 
households interviewed which rely on agriculture are food insecure: only 11 
households out of 125 who live of agriculture, feel food secure and eat three times 
per day, and still there is no guarantee of quality and diversification of food.  
This chapter also looked at the problems that farmers face, illustrating the 
differences in Coast and Kilimanjaro region. Unreliable weather is one of the biggest 
issues reported, but we will see in the following chapters how other problems 
reported, for instance the conflict with pastoralists reported in Coast region, the lack 
of inputs, capital, transport, storage facilities and infrastructures reported in both 
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regions, are relevant for this study. In fact, these problems hinder the ability of the 
farmers to get the required entitlements (in the words of Sen, 1981) to acquire 
enough food to satisfy the needs of their households and improve their food security 
condition. Furthermore, many of the issues are inherently political and require a 
political response to be resolved. In the following chapter this aspect will be clarified 
and explained in depth.  
  
 
 
188 
Chapter 6 - The state-farmer relationship and its effects on 
food security in rural Tanzania 
6.1. Introduction  
While in the previous chapter the relationship between farmers and food was 
analysed, in this chapter the complex relationship between farmers and the state will 
be unpacked. Following what has been said in chapter 2 and 3 concerning the role of 
the state in the agricultural sector, this chapter will look at the Tanzanian state, 
through the actions of its officials either at the national or the local level, in 
improving agriculture and responding to farmers’ needs, in light of current and past 
policies that shaped food security in the countryside. In particular, the effectiveness 
of the most recent Kilimo Kwanza (literally ‘Agriculture First’) policy will be 
evaluated by looking at primary and secondary literature, practical results, and 
farmers and officials’ opinions. Further on, the chapter will try to understand the 
reasons why the recent agricultural policies have failed to improve small scale 
farmers’ conditions. In order to do so, it is important to comprehend how such 
policies were received by rural communities and in which spirit they were originally 
formulated. Accounts of farmers’ experiences with state officials, next to accounts of 
officials’ opinions on farmers, will be provided in order to explore how the 
relationship between the two subjects may have conditioned the outcome of policies. 
Essentially, this chapter tries to understand how such a relationship has shaped food 
security in rural farming households in Tanzania.  
The main argument of this chapter is that current and past agricultural policies in 
Tanzania have failed to improve food security in rural areas because they were not 
designed around the needs of small scale farmers. The state authorities’ vision of 
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small scale farmers as unproductive or even ignorant, backward, lazy and stubborn, 
is behind the formulation of such policies, and pre-determined their failure. Farmers’ 
distrust towards the state is, consequently, due to a series of dissatisfactions about 
the poor results of the state’s interventions to improve rural livelihoods. The 
reciprocal cynicism between the two subjects - state and farmers - works as a cycle 
to prevent policies’ success in improving food security in rural households in 
different ways: policies poorly reflect farmers’ needs and the reality of the 
countryside, and farmers are not willing to cooperate towards making the policies 
successful because they do not feel included in the decision making. Moreover, a 
series of disillusionments, including those presented in chapter 4, has developed a 
sense of fatalism and powerlessness within farming communities towards formal 
politics, which limits their willingness to contest policies and deliver their requests to 
the state as the key political institution. A broken communication between the state 
and the farmers - in particular those living in isolated areas - seems therefore to be 
central in understanding why policies have failed to improve food security to a 
considerable degree in rural areas.  
In the following paragraphs the recent agricultural policies of the state, looking at 
their stated objectives and their relative success, will be analysed. Following this, the 
impact of these policies on the farmers, and how these policies were welcomed by 
the communities, will be illustrated. Finally, theoretical considerations will help to 
define the state-society relationship in light of these events and the empirical data 
collected.  
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6.2. The role of the Tanzanian state in agriculture 
In the previous chapter we identified some of the problems that farmers believe 
affect their livelihoods, in particular their ability to produce enough food to directly 
or indirectly sustain the needs of the household. But how much are these problems 
‘political’, or dependent on political decisions? This section will try to answer this 
question by analysing the initiatives of the Tanzanian state and its officials to 
improve food security and agriculture in rural areas.  
Chapter 2 identified some of the areas of intervention that highlight the importance 
of the state in improving agriculture and farmers’ livelihoods. These areas are: 
- Agricultural research and development of new technologies; 
- Know-how transfer to rural areas and diffusion of good agricultural practices 
and knowledge via extension services; 
- Irrigation and transport infrastructures; 
- Direct intervention: marketing boards and price interventions; 
- Land legislation; 
- Food aid. 
Many of these interventions would actually prevent or mitigate many of the 
problems that farmers identified and presented in Chapter 5. For example, the 
problem of weather unreliability could be alleviated by increasing the availability of 
irrigation systems, providing better infrastructures to transport water to the fields and 
promoting awareness about weather forecasts via a more efficient communication 
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between the national weather forecast service and the farmers.
29
 Problems of land 
could be addressed by the state apparatus via more clear land legislation and 
systematic implementation of policies, while better agricultural practices could be 
diffused by an improved communication between farmers and the state via the 
extension service.  
Tanzania represents an interesting case study because the post-colonial state has 
embraced and recognized its role in assisting farmers and developing the agricultural 
sector. Although there was a general neglect of agriculture during the 1980s and 
1990s due to the adoption of structural adjustment programmes and liberalisation 
(see chapter 4), Tanzanian state officials have always remarked on the importance of 
agriculture for the development of the country since independence. For instance, 
Nyerere’ s vision of a socialist Tanzania was based upon rural development and 
agriculture. In 1982, worried about the constant international pressures towards 
liberalisation and modernisation in the global economic climate, he said:  
‘Because of the importance of agriculture in our development, one would 
expect that agriculture and the needs of the agricultural producers would 
be the beginning and the central reference point of all our economic 
planning. Instead, we have treated agriculture as if it was something 
peripheral, or just another activity in the country […]. We are neglecting 
                                                          
29 This is being done from some private companies in Tanzania. Since 2013 the Finnish 
company Sibesonke Ltd., for example, partnered with mobile companies in Tanzania such as 
TIGO, Vodacom and Zantel, and in cooperation with the Tanzanian Ministry of Agriculture, Food 
Security and Cooperatives, and the Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Development, is assisting 
farmers by providing market centred information system via mobile SMS such as: weather 
forecasts, agronomy best practices and market prices for the major crops grown in the country. 
The initiatives, TIGO Kilimo, Z-Kilimo and MFarming are designed to allow the Ministries to 
better reach the 33 million Tanzanian farmers with relevant up-to-date farming content on 
mobile phones. Sibesonke provides both the cross-network technology platform and the 
business model. The overall target is to substantially increase farming productivity and food 
security in the region in a financially sustainable way (http://www.sibesonke.com/Ministry-
cooperation-Tanzania.html and Yankami, 2013, p.8-10).  
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agriculture. If we are not, every ministry without exception, and every 
parastatal and every party meeting would be working on direct and 
indirect needs of the agricultural producers. We must now give it the 
central place in all our development planning. For agriculture is indeed 
the foundation of all our progress.’ (Nyerere, 1982). 
The importance of agriculture has also been remarked by the several policies 
implemented over the years, especially during Nyerere’s government and more 
recently with Mkapa (1995-2005) and Kikwete (2005-present). The post 
independence policies such as the Arusha Declaration, the Vijiji vya Ujamaa 
(villagization), Kilimo cha Kufa na Kupona (Life and Death Efforts to Improve 
Agriculture) and Chakula ni Uhai (Food is Life) characterised the Nyerere years and 
aimed at developing rural areas and improving the agricultural sector by emphasising 
the importance of hard work and community values. From 1985, Mwinyi supported 
economic reform and a change towards liberalisation, favouring the industrial and 
transport sectors, but neglecting sectors such as agriculture, education and health 
(Havnevik, 1993). In 1990, an Investment Act was passed by the Parliament (but 
started being implemented in the mid 1990s), and was meant to increase and 
facilitate investments in the sectors of agriculture, cattle breeding and tourism.  
Mkapa followed the path initiated by Mwinyi, and actually accelerated the process of 
liberalisation. He tried to attract foreign investments by investing heavily in 
infrastructure development and implementing measures against the widespread 
corruption with the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan of 1996 in 
order to create an investment-friendly environment in the country (Ewald, 2002). In 
1997 he launched the Agriculture and Livestock policy in which the new approach 
towards agriculture and rural development of the state emerged. The policy 
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emphasised the commercialisation of agriculture and market-led development, 
signalling the progressive swift of the state from small scale farmers-oriented to 
liberalisation and large scale-driven agriculture (Mbilinyi and Nyoni, 2000). The 
idea of improving agriculture via modernisation and commercial transformation is 
certainly not new, and was already pursued during Nyerere’s years. As explained in 
chapter 4, during villagization, the provision of modern inputs was structured so as 
to represent a ‘prize’ for the farmers that embraced the principles of Ujamaa and 
joined the resettlement schemes. However, there are some differences to be noted 
between Nyerere’s approach to agricultural development and more recent 
approaches. Nyerere underlined the important role of small scale farmers in bringing 
about rural development, and looked at large scale farmers with suspicion, so much 
so that the possession of large plots of land was condemned and seen as shameful. 
The campaign against large scale farmers reached its peak during the years 1970-72, 
and as a consequence many European farmers that owned plantations in the north of 
the country left (Hyden, 1980, pp.102-104). On the contrary, the recent approach of 
the Tanzanian state towards agricultural development is very different. In particular, 
modernisation is not only seen as related to the spreading of mechanisation, but also 
involves a desire to transform small scale farmers into middle and large scale 
farmers in order to be more effective. Small scale farmers are no longer seen as the 
engine of agricultural transformation but as what should be transformed for 
agriculture to be successful.  
Yet, the political exigencies to appeal to a society made prevalently of small scale 
farmers pushed Mkapa’s succeeding government guided by Kikwete to adopt a 
series of different policies and initiatives that claimed to be supporting farmers and 
local communities, but still praised investments and a commercial transformation of 
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agriculture. This inner dichotomy in the state’s approach to agriculture can be traced 
to the several initiatives and policies adopted.  The shift from small scale agriculture 
towards intensive and industrial agriculture aimed at increasing both the productivity 
per ha cultivated and the area under cultivation via mechanisation and use of 
chemical inputs can be identified in the Abuja Declaration of 2006 on Fertilizer for 
the African Green Revolution signed by the members of the African Union, which 
stated that the transformation and modernisation of agriculture is the key for broad 
economic growth, reduction of mass poverty and food insecurity (JGDPG, 2009, 
p.16). Furthermore, the emphasis on modernisation and commercial agriculture is 
also found in the agricultural programmes and policies - formulated and promoted as 
national state initiatives but largely financed by external donors - signed and 
implemented during the more recent governments. This includes the Tanzania 
Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan (TAFSIP), part of the 
Comprehensive Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), adopted in 2011 
and in the Southern Agricultural Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) and its related 
initiatives such as the Tanzania Agricultural Productivity Program (TAPP) that is 
currently under implementation. All these policies envision a transformation of 
agriculture from subsistence to commercial, essentially embracing the objectives 
expressed in the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (NAFSN) promoted 
by the G8 and embraced by the Tanzanian state in 2012 (Lugoe, 2010; Ngaiza, 2012; 
Cooksey, 2013).  
On the other side, the Kilimo Kwanza (Agriculture First) initiative formulated in 
2009 together with the Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP) (2001 
– 2013) and the Agricultural Sector Investment Programme (2005) presented 
themselves as programmes close to farmers’ interests. Nevertheless, according to 
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Cooksey, Kilimo Kwanza actually ended up being just a political ‘slogan’, while in 
practice only the interests of large scale farmers have been supported, in line with the 
objectives of the CAADP/TAFSIP and the New Alliance for Food Security and 
Nutrition (NAFSN) (Cooksey, 2013).  
In general, the more recent agricultural policies implemented in Tanzania reveal the 
state’s ambition to develop the agricultural sector by bringing modernisation and 
greater involvement of the private sector. While it is debatable how these 
imperatives would favour small scale farmers, the essence of the policies themselves 
need to be assessed according to their stated objectives. Essentially, after around 15 
years it is questionable whether these policies have succeeded in transforming the 
agricultural sector in Tanzania. Moreover, even if they had been fully implemented, 
modernisation and public-private partnerships would have done little to help small 
scale farmers to improve their conditions and in particular their food security.  
Furthermore, it is clear that behind the intents of these iniatives lies the assumption 
that small scale farmers are unproductive and inefficient. This idea is echoed by 
some scholars such as Denise Wolter, who in her analysis of Tanzania’s poor 
agricultural performance, affirms that what is holding Tanzania back is the 
predominance of subsistence and small scale farming and therefore a change towards 
large scale farming is needed (Wolter, 2008 and 2010). The interviews confirmed 
this widespread assumption. Many private sector representatives, researchers and 
officials agree on the idea expressed by the principal agricultural officer at the 
national level: ‘if Tanzania wants to overcome food insecurity and malnourishment it 
needs a change and the transformation of small scale farmers into middle or large 
scale’ (Kidole, 2013). Mr Legge, sales manager at Mining and Agriculture 
Construction Services (MACS), also claims that ‘80% of the farmers in Tanzania are 
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not real farmers’ as they are ‘subsistence farmers not even able to satisfy their needs 
because they are not productive’ (Mr Legge, 2013). This negative attitude towards 
small scale farmers is extremely important to understand the reasons behind the 
changed approach of the state towards the agricultural sector and to analyse the 
complex farmer-state relationship and the outcome of policies. In the next section the 
most recent policies on agriculture will be analysed in further detail, to uncover and 
analyse the state’s vision of agriculture and farmers. 
6.3. Current agricultural policies in Tanzania: modernisation and partnership 
with the private sector 
In this section some of the most important agricultural policies that define the state’s 
approach to the sector and which affect rural communities will be analysed. 
Tendencies of modernisation and a willingness to create a strong partnership with the 
private sector emerge in the frameworks of these policies, although it will be noticed 
how in reality things do not seem to be going as planned. This section will analyse 
the policies related to the SAGCOT, the NAFSN and the CAADP, while the Kilimo 
Kwanza policy will be explained in more detail in the next section.  
Perhaps one of the most important initiatives in driving modernisation and 
partnership with the private sector is the SAGCOT, which was launched at the World 
Economic Forum summit in 2010, and is still in the phase of implementation. It is 
supposed to represent a ‘new, long term commitment by many different 
organizations to develop a modern, private sector-led approach to agricultural 
development’ in Tanzania (Ngaiza, 2012). Embraced by the Government of 
Tanzania, in partnership with different international organizations, the private sector 
and agribusinesses companies, this initiative also envisions the development of the 
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agricultural sector as led by large commercial farmers. In fact, one of the objectives 
of the initiative is to ‘bring 10,000 small scale farmers into commercial farming’ 
(SAGCOT, 2014).   
The SAGCOT is funded by many different bodies, including the overseas 
development agency USAID, which has dedicated a large portion of the overall Feed 
the Future funding for Tanzania (between 50% to 80% of the total 77 million US$ 
per year) to projects in the corridor, claiming that ‘the SAGCOT promises a 
transformation in the fortunes of hundreds of thousands of Tanzanian farmers 
working in the corridor, which boasts rich farmland and infrastructure including 
roads, rail, power and an international port at Dar es Salaam’ (USAID, no date). An 
illustration of the general objectives of the project is provided in the image below 
(from SAGCOT, 2011, p.61): 
 
The SAGCOT project has been accused by some journalists - for instance Provost in 
the Guardian (2014), politicians such as the Member of Parliament Zitto Kabwe 
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(Provost, Tran and Ford, 2014), the UN Development Programme (2013) and the 
World Development Movement (2014, pp.23-24) of having a negative impact on 
farmers of the area while favouring private investors. Among these are multinational 
corporations such as Unilever, Yara International (which announced an investment 
of $20 million into a new fertilizer terminal in the port of Dar es Salaam), Dupont, 
Monsanto, SABMiller, Diageo, Syngenta and General Mills. Through SAGCOT, the 
government has earmarked nearly a third of the country (7.5 million hectares) for 
commercial farming projects, setting aside thousands of hectares of the country's 
most fertile land for private investors (Provost and Kabendera, 2014). With the 
demarcation and the land rights certification in the villages in the SAGCOT region 
not yet being completed, concerns about the use of the land allocated for the project 
and possible issues of displacement of local communities are justified (Provost, 
Harris and Dzimwasha, 2014).
30
 A study reported by the Tanzanian newspaper The 
Citizen in an article of Felix Lazaro reported several land rights disputes in Ruvuma 
region: in Litukila village a company called Montara Continental got 50,000 acres of 
land, and some local farmers argued that the company had manipulated their 
decision to sell their land by bringing them food in a period where most households 
were going hungry. In another village called Lipokela the investors were 
accompanied by the police during negotiations with villagers, which accepted to sell 
their land with small monetary compensation because they were afraid of the police 
(Lazaro, 2014).   
                                                          
30 Only three of the Tanzania’s 14 policy commitment (SAGCOT and New Alliance Initiative) 
have been completed, according to the 2013 progress report of the New Alliance initiative 
(Provost, Kabendera, 2014). The 3 completed agreements concern the demarcation of village 
land in Kilombero district, with secured certificate of land rights for smallholders and 
investments; the VAT on spare parts for machinery and equipment hectares been reduced; the 
time required to release new varieties of imported seeds hectares been reviewed and aligned to 
international best practices. 
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Despite supporters of the SAGCOT claiming that Tanzanian businesses and farmers 
groups are also involved in the process, and that the participation and involvement of 
civil society and farmers in the decision making is warranted by a Memorandum of 
Understanding (SAGCOT, 2014), this is questionable. In fact, most of the platforms 
created within the SAGCOT to give the possibility to farmers to have a voice and 
participate in the decisions - such as the Agricultural Council of Tanzania (supporter 
of the SAGCOT), the Agricultural Non State Actors Forum (ANSAF) and the 
Tanzanian Horticultural Association (TAHA) - are membership organizations 
welcoming groups or associations of farmers, but not individual smallholders. 
Therefore, there are practical limitations to small scale farmers’ involvement in the 
formulation of projects within the SAGCOT. As a matter of fact, the great majority 
of farmers that I interviewed in Coast region (part of the corridor) were not part of 
any farmers group and they did not even know of the existence of these membership 
platforms or of the SAGCOT initiative in general.
31
 
Basically, the SAGCOT requires farmers to learn agricultural processes through aid 
programmes and subsequently apply and further develop these processes to their 
own plots. From my interviews however, it seems that very few farmers had 
knowledge about these training schemes, hence the majority were not able to go 
through the learning process as described above. Despite the Tanzanian state 
authorities actively supporting this initiative, the lack of communication to, and 
involvement of, small scale farmers’ communities is clear. This attitude of the 
Tanzanian officials is a clear signal of a divided state-society relationship, where the 
state is perceived to be above society, an idea put forward by several authors 
                                                          
31 As it will be analysed further in chapter VII, many farmers tend to work autonomously, and 
not linked to a group or an association. This is probably for historical but also practical reasons, 
as will be noticed in the next chapter. 
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including Scott (1998) and Ferguson and Gupta (2002) with the term ‘vertical 
encompassment’ (see chapter 3).  
Other aspects of the SAGCOT have also been criticised, and the relationship 
between the Tanzanian state and the private sector in the implementation of the 
SAGCOT objectives appears weak, compromising the outcomes of the projects. For 
instance, the CEO of the UK-based agribusiness Agrica claimed that very few 
tangible benefits have so far being achieved, as his company is still to see a change 
in the tax rules and an improvement in infrastructure that ‘would help the company 
not to get cut off from the rest of the world every rainy season’ (Provost and 
Kabendera, 2014). In this environment it is difficult to guarantee an effective use of 
the agricultural produce (and hence a constant income to producers), since it needs to 
be processed and reach the market even during the rainy seasons or risks going to 
waste in the absence of proper storage infrastructures.  
One of the projects linked to the SAGCOT is the Tanzania Agricultural Productivity 
Program (TAPP), which also has the objective to ‘improve productivity and change 
the farmers from subsistence to commercial farming’, as explained by Mr Maregewe 
(interview, 2013), the TAPP programme manager. The TAPP is funded by USAID 
and works in cooperation with local NGOs, the private sector and the Tanzanian 
government. In practice, the TAPP promotes new technology and a market-led 
agriculture, by running several demonstration plots in which farmers can become 
confident and learn how to use the technology available, and by doing market 
research and advising farmers on what to sell. As of 2014, the project involves 
around 19,000 farmers, mobilised in groups of 10-15 farmers involved in the demo 
plots. Usually, one of the farmers donates a piece of land, and USAID funds all of 
the inputs and incentivises the group to write a constitution and set targets. The 
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TAPP assists farmers for about a year and then farmers should manage the plot by 
themselves. The TAPP Programme manager seems proud of the project even though 
he admits that:  
‘after the TAPP’s assistance farmers will have to demonstrate that they 
are managing the profits in a clever way (by keeping aside a certain 
amount for seeds and fertilisers for the next season) and taking care of 
the technology, otherwise we will take it back from them. In exceptional 
circumstances USAID sponsor the farmers for a second time, for 
example when there has been weather disruption. The project is 
successful, and more farmers want to join. Nevertheless, it is difficult to 
include new members in already created groups because existing 
members do not wish to share the profit with new members, and often 
there are conflicts within members, this is why a written constitution is 
very important’ (Mr Maregewe, 2013).  
Nevertheless, the TAPP, and similar small projects related to SAGCOT have little 
relevance and have so far failed to improve the agricultural sector in a substantial 
way to open a breakthrough in agricultural production. The reasons for this are to be 
found in the lack of synergy between the different projects and initiatives within the 
SAGCOT scheme and the other initiatives both at national and international levels. 
For example, although ‘TAPP always stresses the importance for farmers to keep a 
garden nearby their house for their own consumptions’ (Mr Maregewe, 2013), the 
focus is on horticultural production and high value crops. However, farmers have 
often reported a lack of market to sell or store these products - and the presence of a 
trader to facilitate this is also often problematic - and they seldom integrate the 
produce into their diet.  Therefore, the promotion of these crops has a limited impact 
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on the lives of producers - especially those in isolated areas - if it is not supported by 
proper investments in infrastructures and in social initiatives to promote diet 
diversification. As admitted by Mr Maregewe (2013), ‘[TAPP] tries to promote high 
nutritious crops but it is difficult to change dietary patterns within the households’, 
implying that other initiatives and projects should concentrate on improving these 
aspects and work in synergy with the TAPP efforts to improve agriculture and food 
security in rural areas. Moreover, all of TAPP demonstration plots make use of 
irrigation, but this is something very difficult for small scale farmers to maintain and 
reproduce in their own plots. This underlines the importance of designing projects 
that reflect the conditions of the rural areas to which they are directed, and also 
points at the need to develop policies that adopt a multi faceted approach to the 
agricultural sector and address the different needs of farmers.  
Another initiative framed around the same idea of agricultural transformation with a 
stress on the importance of external donors-state relationship is the G8 New Alliance 
for Food Security and Nutrition initiative, joined in 2012 by 10 countries including 
Tanzania. The New Alliance is also characterised by a considerable involvement of 
the private sector and of donor countries in the agricultural sector of several 
countries involved, with the commitment of improving food security, achieving 
sustained and inclusive agricultural growth and raising 50 million people out of 
poverty by 2022 (Feed The Future, 2014).  
As with SAGCOT, farmers, despite being named as the central beneficiaries of the 
initiative, are left out of the decision-making process, whereas the private companies 
that sit in the leadership council, such as Unilever, Syngenta, Yara and Cargill help 
to decide the future of agriculture in the countries involved and are even refusing ‘to 
make their full investment plans available for public scrutiny on the basis of 
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commercial confidentiality’ (Provost, Tran and Ford, 2014). This initiative has been 
strongly criticised by the World Development Movement and described as a ‘new 
wave of colonialism in Africa’ by the Chairman of the Tanzanian parliament’s 
Public Accounts Committee and MP from the opposition party CHADEMA , Zitto 
Kabwe, as reported by The Guardian (African civil society networks and 
organisations statement, 2013; Hamouchene, 2013; Provost, Ford and Tran, 2014). 
Zitto Kabwe is also convinced that the New Alliance and other similar initiatives 
only benefit large scale farming while ‘turning small scale into mere labourers’, and 
that they do not help to liberate people from poverty (Provost and Kabendera, 2014). 
Just as with the previous examples, this initiative shows the lack of involvement of 
farmers and the top down approach of policies, which fails to address farmers’ issues 
in an effective way and contributes to creating an alienation of society towards the 
institution of the state that imposes and promotes these policies.  
The New Alliance is in line with the objectives stated in the Comprehensive Africa 
Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), which claims to be an ‘African-led 
and Africa-owned’ initiative, and has been presented in 2003 under the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) of the African Union (CAADP, no 
date, NEPAD, 2009). The CAADP, like the SAGCOT and the NAFSN, presents 
itself as a partnership between the Tanzanian government, the private sector, and 
civil society. The objective is to bring on board the private sector in order to build a 
modern and commercial agriculture that ‘will lead to economic growth and food 
security and overall reduction of poverty’ (CAADP, no date, NEPAD, 2009). Within 
its objectives is the commitment to attain agricultural growth at 6% annum and to 
devolve at least 10% of the national budget to the agricultural sector, confirming the 
commitments undertaken on the occasion of the Maputo Declaration on Agriculture 
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and Food Security signed in 2003 (Bitegeko, 2012).
32
 These two commitments are 
however far from being reached, with Tanzania spending only about 6% of the 
national budget in the agricultural sector. Furthermore, according to Cooksey this 
initiative, despite being promoted as ‘African-owned and African-led’ in the 
NEPAD-CAADP webpage, is another initiative where the role played by 
multinational corporations is actually counter-effective in promoting food security 
and rural development (Cooksey, 2013). According to the scholar a more transparent 
approach is needed if these policies want to gain the trust of citizens, most of which 
are unaware or very critical towards these initiatives, especially towards the risk of 
land grabbing represented by unclear and manipulated investment agreements.  
The national government’s policy under which the programmes mentioned above are 
implemented is the Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS, implemented 
in 2001) and the more recent Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP), 
implemented in 2006/2007, which embraces the approach and the objectives of the 
SAGCOT, New Alliance, and CAADP initiatives. As mentioned, these programs are 
in large part sponsored by external donors, such as USAID and the World Bank, that 
lend money to the government and provide assistance in the formulation of the 
initiatives. Despite the claims of the Tanzanian state officials to be involving society 
in the decision making and that this is reflected in the policies implemented, it is 
clear that the role of external donors and of the private sector is becoming 
increasingly important in deciding the future of agriculture in Tanzania.  This is 
confirmed by declarations such as the one coming from Mbogo Futakamba, the 
Tanzanian Deputy Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture, Food 
Security and Cooperatives, which reads: 
                                                          
32 Nonetheless, at today, only 8 countries reached the 10% agreed (Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Malawi, Mali, Niger and Senegal).  
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‘We are witnessing remarkable contributions from non-state actors like 
non-governmental and civil society organisations, various associations, 
local think tanks and the private sector. Not only does the government 
have high regard for the contributions by non-state actors, but it believes 
that these partnerships should be nurtured and developed’ (FANRPAN, 
2012).  
The problem with these policies is not the collaboration with the private sector and 
third parties (which of course should also be questioned), as much as it is the 
complete disregard towards farmers’ needs and requests, and the lack of a common 
ground of action and a common approach within the multiple and different initiatives 
in the Tanzanian countryside. Without coordination and a clearly shared vision of 
what the future of agriculture should be like, the projects follow confusing paths, 
pointing to different direction but without actually achieving the ‘big results’ 
promised by the state authorities. Moreover, as will be underlined further on, most of 
these policies are unknown or judged ineffective by a large amount of farmers 
interviewed. 
Cooksey questioned the coherence and the feasibility of such a variety (and pro-
private-companies approach) of agricultural policies in Tanzania, looking in 
particular at the relevance of these policies compared with the catchy slogan to gain 
popular consent in the countryside: Kilimo Kwanza, which claims to be putting 
agriculture and farmers first and stresses the state’s commitment towards improving 
livelihoods and farmers’ conditions (Cooksey, 2013). But is Kilimo Kwanza really 
different from the other policies mentioned so far? Has it been able to harmonize the 
different agricultural initiative in the name of a common national vision of the future 
of Tanzanian agriculture? And is this vision pro small scale farmers? In the next 
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section this policy will be analysed more in depth, by also looking at the results of 
the empirical research.  
6.4. Kilimo Kwanza: what agriculture first? 
Kilimo Kwanza (Agriculture First) is a national policy formulated by the Tanzania 
National Business Council (TNBC) and introduced by President Kikwete in 2009. It 
is portrayed and presented in the countryside as a policy designed around the needs 
of the farmers of Tanzania. In comparing it to past initiatives, Mashindano and 
Kaino, recognize the lack of adequate inclusion of society of previous policies and 
claim that although:  
‘Kilimo Kwanza is not different from past themes like Kilimo cha Kufa 
na Kupona or Siasa ni Kilimo, […] the difference is that Kilimo Kwanza 
stands to gain from the lessons of previous initiatives, which include the 
need to ensure adequate local participation in planning, funding and 
implementation of the projects related to the policy’ (Mashindano and 
Kaino, 2009, p.19).  
But if closely analysed, the Kilimo Kwanza policy is actually little different from the 
SAGCOT, New Alliance and CAADP mentioned previously, and instead shares the 
same assumptions and objectives - so much so that initiatives such as the SAGCOT 
are actually described as being part of the Kilimo Kwanza Growth Corridor 
Initiatives (SAGCOT, 2011, p.2). In fact, it is often advertised as a policy promoting 
a Green Revolution for Tanzania since it aims at ‘accelerating agricultural 
transformation in the country by addressing the various sector challenges and taking 
advantage of the numerous opportunities to modernize and commercialize 
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agriculture in Tanzania’ (Mashindano and Kaino, 2009; Ngaiza, 2012; Swenya et al. 
2013).  
Moreover, as Lugoe’s analysis of the Pillar V of Kilimo Kwanza on Land underlines, 
this policy argues for a re-distribution of land ‘in such a way that smallholder 
peasants become a minority against the majority of medium scale farmers’ in order 
to have ‘a real breakthrough in food production’ (Lugoe, 2010, p.17-18). Pillar 1.2 of 
Kilimo Kwanza literally states that the policy objective is to be ‘transforming 
peasant and small farmers to commercial farmers’ by 2015 (TNBC, no date, no 
pagination). Hence, if this is supposed to be the national vision of the future of 
agriculture in the country, it does not promise to be pro small scale farmers. 
To understand better how the Kilimo Kwanza policy is structured, it is worth 
mentioning its ten pillars, which are, as summarised by Coulson (2010):  
1. A national vision 
2. A mobilisation of financial resources – including a rural development bank 
3. Institutional reorganisation – good governance, good co-ordination 
4. ‘Paradigm shift’ – production of the right crops (food crops are given top priority) 
5. Land titles, and use of land to ‘promote harmonious exploitation’ 
6. Better incentives, including removal of market barriers 
7. Industrialisation – processing (forward linkages), fertilisers, seeds, machinery and 
tools (backward linkages) 
8. Science, technology and human resources development – using an increased 
percentage of government income 
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9. Infrastructure – irrigation, storage, ports, airports, roads, markets 
10. Mobilisation of all Tanzanians. 
These pillars are very generic, and in order to understand exactly what each of them 
entails it is necessary to read the description of all pillars in detail. I will mention 
some of the most important aspects of them and assess their outcome, comparing 
secondary data to the results gained from the empirical interviews collected in Coast 
and Kilimanjaro region. Generally and as previously mentioned, it is clear that 
Kilimo Kwanza shares with the policies analysed above an attempt to transform, 
modernize and commercialize agriculture. In fact, pillar number 1.2 reads 
‘Modernise and commercialise agriculture for peasant, small, medium and large 
scale producers’ aiming at ‘transforming peasant and small farmers to commercial 
farmers through emphasis on productivity and tradability’ by 2015 (TNBC, no date).  
In order to do so, and as stated in pillar 2.1, Kilimo Kwanza planned to increase the 
budget allocation to agriculture (as suggested and agreed upon in the Maputo 
Declaration) to 10% by 2011 and to irrigate over 7 million hectares by 2015. 
However, as reported by Makoye in 2013, Tanzania is investing only about 6% of 
the national budget to agriculture, and of 29.4 million hectares that could be irrigated 
only 589,245 are under irrigation according to Christopher Chiza, the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperative (Makoye, 2013).  
Moreover, pillar 7 expresses the need to increase the use of fertilizers, the production 
of agrochemicals and to improve seed production. This is to be done in cooperation 
with the privatised company TANSEED and in conjunction with a subsidy 
programme to provide ‘small scale farmers with high quality and certified seeds’ 
(TNBC, no date). Within this, pillar 7.6.2 stresses the need to ‘embark on local 
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manufacturing of agricultural machinery and farm implements’. Nevertheless, the 
successes on this front are debatable: the use of fertiliser is still very limited, with 
about 4.4 kg of fertiliser used per hectare of arable land in 2012, which had actually 
declined compared to the previous figure of 7.5 kg per ha in 2009 when Kilimo 
Kwanza was introduced (World Bank, 2014). Moreover, the amount of fertiliser used 
per hectare in Tanzania is lower than the average across Sub-Saharan Africa which 
stands at 13kg per hectare, and lower still compared to the amount of fertiliser used 
in nearby Kenya which is over 30kg per hectare (World Bank, 2014).  
Interview data confirms the limited usage of fertiliser, with the majority of farmers 
interviewed in both regions not using chemical fertiliser. In Kilimanjaro the majority 
of the farmers use their own cattle’s manure to fertilise their banana and maize 
fields. In the Coast region, less than 13% of farmers interviewed use chemical 
fertiliser, and not regularly. Farmers claim that they do not use chemical inputs 
because of the difficulties in accessing them, and in paying the cost of transport to 
purchase them from towns, which points to a lack of infrastructure, scarce 
distribution and capital. In some regions, as part of Kilimo Kwanza, there are 
subsidies to buy fertiliser but very few farmers know how to take advantage of them. 
Yet, fertiliser could help farmers to increase their production, given that proper 
assistance in dosage and utilization is provided. For instance, H.Z., a fairly 
successful rice farmer in Kwala, claims that the use of fertilizer has been very useful 
to him as he is now harvesting an average of 27 bags of rice from one and a half acre 
of land, compared to the 14 bags of rice he used to harvest when he was using less 
fertiliser.
33
  
                                                          
33 One bag of rice is equivalent to about 100kg of rice, before processing (70-85 kg after being 
processed).  
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The use of modern seeds is also problematic. Of the farmers interviewed, only 40% 
save the seeds for the next season, and even if they do, they still buy part of the seeds 
every year. Nevertheless, the quality of the seeds envisioned in Kilimo Kwanza and 
available on the market or through state’s distribution points is contested by several 
farmers. For instance, in Kilimanjaro several farmers make use of the state subsidy 
program that allows them to get seeds at a cheaper price, but many noted how the 
seeds are often delivered late, are of low quality, or are not suited to the soil of the 
area. In other areas, such as in Coast region where the subsidy program is not active 
(the reasons for this will be explained later on), farmers rely exclusively on the 
private sector to get their seeds. Furthermore, it is difficult to establish the quality of 
these seeds, since up to 70% of them are imported, according to Zawadieli Mrinji, 
farm manager of the Agricultural Seeds Agency (IPP Media, 2013). Dangers of 
counterfeit and unproductive seeds are common, as reported by several media 
agencies and farmers interviewed (AllAfrica Global Media, 2012, IPP Media, 2013).   
Hence, the attempts to increase the amount of farming inputs and modern seeds 
seems to have failed, and agricultural performance in general does not seem 
satisfactory on several fronts, as will be examined in section 6.5. In the next two 
sections the other objective pursued by state officials - the partnership with the 
private sector - will be analysed in light of the empirical results. 
6.4.1. Partnership with the private sector – foreign investments and the question 
of land 
Kilimo Kwanza also shares (at least theoretically) the same pro-private sector 
attitude of the policies described in the previous section. In the words of Revelian 
Ngaiza, the Head Unit of Investment Policies and Private Sector Development (from 
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the Division of Policy and Planning within the Ministry of Agriculture Food Security 
and Cooperatives) the private sector is to be considered the ‘engine of economic 
growth-mandated to be the lead implementing agent of Kilimo Kwanza’ (Mr Ngaiza, 
2012). Hence, all the pillars of Kilimo Kwanza reflect this approach and promote the 
involvement of the private sector in the various spheres of agricultural development. 
In reality however, the private sector laments the lack of transparency, the 
corruption, and the frequent state’s intervention in the market, thereby revealing a 
complicated relationship between local and international businesses and the 
Tanzanian state.  
The current Tanzanian government claims that it is trying to attract private investors 
through adopting a ‘holistic approach to agriculture’, by addressing a diverse number 
of issues such as transport and infrastructure that affect agriculture in different ways 
(Bitegeko, 2012). For instance, in pillar 9 the objectives to improve infrastructure, 
irrigation schemes, storage facilities, ports (Dar es Salaam, Kisarawe), airports 
(Mwanza, Mbeya and Iringa), railways and road systems for the trading of 
agricultural commodities are illustrated. The national authorities aim to reach these 
objectives by attracting both national and international investments (pillars 2, 5, 6, 
7). Inevitably, an opening to foreign investments often leads to the acquisition of 
land and the opportunity for the investors to gain an economic return by having 
access to the country’s resources. In fact, requests for land have increased in the last 
few years, and Pillar V of Kilimo Kwanza was meant to amend the Village Land Act 
No.5 of 1999 in order to ‘facilitate equitable access to village land for investments’ 
by 2010 (TNBC, no date, no pagination) also in view of the implementation of the 
SAGCOT initiative. Land deals can become problematic and create social distress if 
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the procedures to acquire land are not followed rigorously and if the local population 
is not aware of their land ownership rights or is manipulated.  
Nevertheless, the issue of ‘land grabbing’ in Tanzania seems complex. On one side, 
politicians and officials claim that the legislation regulating land deals is clear and 
involves the villages concerned, but on the other side, the land ownership regulation 
is weak and the demarcation of land incomplete. From the interviews and the 
empirical data collected, the problem of unclear land ownership emerges, but at the 
same time the phenomenon of ‘land grabbing’ in the eyes of officials, international 
organisation representatives and even some farmers interviewed seems confined to 
few sporadic episodes. For instance, according to Mr Rohrabach, a representative of 
the World Bank in Tanzania, only about 6% of land is currently under foreign 
ownership, and the episodes of so-called ‘land grabbing’ are isolated (Mr Rohrabach, 
2013). At a conference on ‘Land Justice for Sustainable Peace in Tanzania’, held in 
Dar es Salaam on the 9-13 September 2013, the Prime Minister, Mr Pinda defined 
‘land grabbing’ as a ‘misplaced fear’ and identified the real problem of the country 
being ‘underutilization of land’, since, of 44 million hectares of arable land only 
about 20% is currently under cultivation (so 8.8 million hectares of cultivated land). 
Of these 8.8 million hectares of cultivated land, only 40,000 hectares are allocated to 
63 foreign companies, which count to less than 0.5% of productive land in the hands 
of foreign companies (Pinda, 2013). The Minister of Land, Housing and Human 
Settlement, Prof. Tibaijuka, shared the Prime Minister’s opinion and added that 
‘about 91% of arable land is in the hands of smallholders and livestock farmers, and 
that the land legislation protects the rights of the citizens of Tanzania’ (Tibaijuka, 
2013).  
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Truly, compared to other countries in the area, the process to obtain land is long and 
bureaucratic, as explained by Neville and Dauvergne (2012) and by Rwegasira 
(2012). Hence, in theory the Minister’s statement is correct, as the national 
legislation on land ratifies that ‘all land in Tanzania is public land vested in the 
President as trustee on behalf of citizens’ (The Land Act, 1999).  The land that was 
covered by property rights before the introduction of the Land Act and of the Village 
Land Act of 1999 can be purchased by citizens on the market. Citizens can apply for 
a right of occupancy for the land that was not covered by property rights before 
1999; such right is granted by the Commission for Lands nominated by the Ministry 
of Land in agreement with the President (The Land Act, 1999). Non-citizens have to 
go through a longer procedure, and need to also get a Certificate of Approval by the 
Tanzania Investment Centre in order to apply for a right of occupancy grant. The 
land is classified as general land, village land and reserved land. If the demand 
involves village land, the village should also be consulted and consent needs to be 
gained before a grant of occupancy is issued. The law also clearly states that the 
communities have the right to receive a ‘fair’ compensation that needs to be agreed 
by those involved. The village land is administered locally by the village councils, 
which allocate land to their villagers upon application. However, no local authority 
shall grant any right of occupancy or authorisation to people residing outside their 
area of competence, unless this has been previously agreed by the Commission for 
Lands. Once land is granted, for a maximum of 99 years with the possibility of 
renewal, the occupier (citizen or non-citizen) needs to comply with certain 
conditions, variable depending on the purpose of the grant (The Land Act, 1999, 
Rwegasira, 2012, Chapt. III). Land can be revoked if these conditions are not met. 
For instance, it can happen that if the land has an agricultural use purpose, the grant 
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of occupancy could be revoked in case of land being used for other purposes other 
than food production (Rwegasira, 2012, Msemakweli, 2013).  
Nevertheless, it is important to note that mistakes and omissions are frequent in land 
registration, since less than 10% of land has been surveyed and the registration of 
village land deeds is administered at the local level (US Department of State, 2013). 
Moreover, precisely because of the unclear and often un-registered land deeds, along 
with the lack of transparency and slow follow-up in land investment agreements, not 
all fears of land grabbing are ‘misplaced’, as confirmed by the land conflicts 
episodes presented above as a consequence of initiatives related to the SAGCOT. In 
the past there have also been further episodes where foreign investments have had a 
negative impact and the rights of the local communities have not been respected, for 
example the Sun Biofuels Tanzania Ltd, in Kisarawe, a British investment accused 
of having displaced about 10,000 people in 12 villages that agreed to allocate land to 
the company (Sulle and Nelson, 2009). In 2011, the company went bust without 
fulfilling the initial promises of compensation, job and social services to the local 
communities, which were left without land and jobs (Carrington, 2011). Moreover, 
Pillar V of Kilimo Kwanza is a source of concern, because it facilitates access to 
village land for commercial reasons, while failing to effectively protect the interests 
of small scale farmers and regulate village land holding titles (Vorley et al. 2012, 
p.20, Lugoe, 2010, p.17-18). 
Furthermore, the procedures for the acquisition of land are not always followed 
rigorously and are not well known by the communities, so, according to Oswald 
Mashindano, a senior researcher at the Tanzanian-based Economic and Social 
Research Foundation agency (ESRF) interviewed in 2013, it  has been the case that:  
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‘village leaders are the ones that conspire and start the conflicts. For 
example when talking about land grabbing, maybe there is not a real land 
grabbing problem, as local leaders may have actually agreed to give 
away village land without consulting the citizens, but they may still 
change their mind when they realise the real impact of their action at the 
last moment, and convince the population that the council has not signed 
the agreement, although it had actually done so in the first place. There is 
a big gap of information between the state and the community, and often 
procedures are not followed in the right way’ (Mr Mashindano, 2013). 
It could also happen that occupancy rights are confused or treated as property rights, 
and transferred to third parties in an illegitimate way. For instance, a farmer 
interviewed in Mwembengozi claimed that ‘the land is given by the village 
government, and when the village council gives you the land it becomes yours and 
you can do whatever you like with it, even sell it if you wish’ (Mr Mbelwa, 2012). 
These mistaken understandings of the land legislation create confusion and increase 
internal conflicts and discontent towards the state.  
In addition, there are reasons to believe that the desired and promoted increase in 
foreign investments will not directly help the poorest areas of the country, nor help 
increase food production where it is most needed. In fact, as SAGCOT demonstrates, 
the areas the most longed for by private investors are the areas the most fertile and 
close to water sources, exactly the land that farmers have little interest in selling and 
where food security is less of a problem, as claimed by Mr Kidole, from the 
Department of National Food Security in the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and 
Cooperatives (2013). This claim is confirmed by a study conducted by the Oakland 
Institute, which affirms that most of the investments in the agricultural sector, such 
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as the AgriSol Energy LLC investment agreed between the Tanzanian government 
and US, have mostly been framed to benefit large-scale agriculture and have 
negative effects on local small scale farmers, which are often pushed to relocate to 
other areas (Oakland Institute, 2012).  
Yet, and as stressed by the Minister of Communication, Science and Technology, 
January Makamba, interviewed in 2013, it is also important to contextualise land 
deals. According to the Minister, to talk about ‘land grabbing’ without exploring the 
reasons why certain farmers in certain areas are willing to sell their land means to be 
only looking at the problem superficially. It is true that often land agreements are 
signed under the hope of fake promises or scarce knowledge of land rights. But it is 
also true that farmers’ agreement to sell their land should be understood as an 
indication of dissatisfaction with the current condition of being a farmer while at the 
same time struggling to meet the households’ needs. Land ownership is not the only 
factor guaranteeing farmers to be successful and food secure, but if farmers agree to 
sell the land it is perhaps because they do not see their future improving under 
agriculture (Makamba, 2013).  
The empirical results clearly demonstrate this. You can have plenty of land but still 
feel food insecure. As explained in Chapter 5, the farmers interviewed in Coast 
region do not report having problems over land control or ownership, but they blame 
the lack of resources (inputs) for their inability to make the most of it. To give just a 
few examples, in the village of Kwala, R. K. has ten acres, but she claims that she is 
only able to cultivate two, while in a nearby village called Mongomole, another 
farmer, Al. N., has thirty acres but he only cultivates ten because of the lack of 
resources (water, seeds, fertilisers, machinery) to cultivate more. Many of the 
farmers interviewed in this area reported youths’ detachment to the agricultural 
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sector and their personal dissatisfaction with the level of productivity of their fields, 
revealing a desire to sell their land and find another source of employment. Although 
being part of the SAGCOT corridor, the area in Coast region where I held the 
interviews has not experienced land conflicts or been involved in foreign investment 
land deals. Actually, all the farmers interviewed had a right of occupancy of at least 
one acre for farming and another acre for housing, conceded by the village council. 
The former chairperson of Kwala interviewed confirmed land not being a problem 
for farmers in the area, and the village being able to concede a piece of land to all 
villagers that would request so (Mr Msemakweli, 2012).  
The situation though is different in Kilimanjaro region, where farmers lament the 
limited amount of land but are absolutely firm when stating that ‘nobody can buy 
land here, it is not an option, the land belongs to your family, not to the individual, 
and can only be passed to future generation through inheritance’ (Chairperson of the 
village of Kigare, 2013). Informal and traditional channels such as inheritance, 
allocation by the head of the family or clan, and gift are used commonly as land 
transfer systems throughout Tanzania. However, the national legislation does not 
regulate these transfer channel and therefore their occupancy is confusing and open 
to contestation, especially in situations where knowledge of legal ways to obtain land 
is scarce (Rwegasira, 2012, p.94).  
In summary, it can be said that land investments are at the moment still scarce in 
Tanzania, despite the political commitments aimed at facilitating them. However, 
given the confusing legislation on the matter, the present commercial interests in 
land, and finally the national willingness to attract foreign investments, concerns 
over land grabbing are not completely misplaced. It is true that land is only but one 
of the problems farmers are facing and needs to be addressed alongside other issues, 
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but while land titles alone may not guarantee food security, they may protect farmers 
from exploitation and manipulation, while also facilitating bank loan requests, 
allowing farmers to grow and be more productive, while at the same time preventing 
land conflicts. 
While land governance under new agricultural policies in Africa has received much 
scholarly and media attention, Kilimo Kwanza and other related policies in Tanzania 
do not only concern foreign investments on land but also promote public-private 
partnership in inputs provisions (seeds, fertilisers, and mechanisation), knowledge 
building, food manufacturing and market development. The next section will have a 
closer look at whether Kilimo Kwanza has succeeded in creating a strong public-
private sector partnership with the companies that operate nationally in these other 
spheres. 
6.4.2. Partnership with the private sector – the state’s engagement with 
domestic agro-businesses 
Despite the intentions expressed in Kilimo Kwanza and in other agricultural policies, 
in general the involvement and cooperation with the private sector, even with 
Tanzanian companies, seems weak. For example, according to Mr Rohrabach, an 
economist at the World Bank in Tanzania, the problem is that the successive 
governments are still interfering a lot with the market, and liberalisation is still far 
from being achieved in Tanzania, as the state is highly involved in the agricultural 
and food system. Thus, he reports that: 
‘the World Bank recently suggested the Ministry of Agriculture of 
creating a partnership with the National Seeds Trade Association, a 
private company dealing with seeds, and the Ministry replied “why 
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would we do that, we have our own public sector, agency and supplier”! 
The problem is not that the state wants to retain control, the problem is 
when the state prefers one player instead of another just because of 
corruptive [sic] practices and clientelism, instead of looking at quality 
and efficiency. Market regulation is a necessity, but it can be negative in 
circumstances where corruption is a reality’ (Mr Rohrabach, 2013).  
Another account on the matter comes from Mr Legge, sales manager at Mining, 
Agriculture and Construction Services and interviewed as part of this research in 
2013. Sharing similar concerns, he claims that the recent agricultural policies are not 
successful, and that the state’s interference in the market is having a negative impact 
for the country. He adds that often the government imports more food than the 
country needs, driving the prices down. While this could be good for consumers in 
urban areas, cheap prices are not good for producers that depend on agricultural 
produce income to live (on this also Andrew MacMillan, 2014).  
There are also other ways in which low prices affect farmers in rural areas. The 
communities interviewed are fairly isolated and only have partial connections with 
international market. Because of the lack of storage space, they have to sell a 
consistent part of their produce after the harvest when the prices are lower (because 
of the high offer), and purchase food daily during the year through middlemen and 
small shops in the villages, where prices are higher than in urban areas (because of 
the added transport costs to reach the villages). Hence, compared to urban areas, 
farmers in rural areas are affected by a lower purchasing power parity, which makes 
them poorer and more vulnerable to food insecurity.  
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The interference of the state in the agricultural sector is not limited to the 
import/export market. Another claim coming from the private sector is that, in trying 
to promote mechanisation and higher use of chemical inputs and modern seeds, the 
state as represented by the government wants to ‘be the only player in the game’ (Mr 
Lukas, 2013). For instance, Mr Lukas, general manager of Lonagro Tanzania 
Limited, a company that sells agricultural machineries in Dar es Salaam, criticises 
the national officials for  ‘raising fake hopes, and wasting money, while making 
deals with companies overseas and not with the companies that operate nationally’ 
(Lukas, 2013). He refers to a recent agreement between the Tanzanian and the Indian 
governments, which lead to the company Suma KJT importing tractors from India to 
support the Kilimo Kwanza project (see also AllAfrica, 2013). According to Mr 
Lukas, the importation of tractors from India was a mistake and: 
‘after few years you go to the villages and you notice that the tractor is 
not in use anymore, because farmers do not know how to take care of it 
and repair broken parts…beside spare parts being expensive because of 
the high taxes on them. The companies in partnership with the 
government do not offer any support or assistance’ (Lukas, 2013). 
Actually, in this instance, the critique of Mr Lukas seems to have substance, since, as 
it will be noted in the following section, the problem of assistance and maintenance 
is evident and has been witnessed in several villages visited in Coast region, were it 
is common to see dismissed rusty tractors near the townhalls.   
Historically, as showed in Chapter 4, the Tanzanian state has retained high control 
over the agricultural sector and in general over the economy of the country. This 
could in part explain why there are some residual tendencies to control some 
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industries key of the sector, such as the seed company.
34
 For many researchers and 
members of the private sector interviewed ‘the agricultural failure of the country, 
better understood as the failure of the Green Revolution in Tanzania, has its roots in 
the past history and in the failure of past agricultural policies’, as explained by a 
senior researcher from the Research for Poverty Alleviation Institute (REPOA) 
interviewed in 2013. Mr Lukas and Mr Legge are of the same opinion, blaming the 
socialist past of the country. They share the same vision of liberalisation of the 
economy still being far away in Tanzania, and affirm that they are looking forward 
to ‘proper liberalisation in the country’ (Mr Legge, 2013).  
As already mentioned in Chapter 4, it is true that, in the past, initiatives that largely 
involved the state – and which resulted in mismanagement of cooperatives and 
public funds, empty shelves during the nationalisation of the food market, and forced 
villagization settlements –  are not a nice memory in the minds of many Tanzanians, 
and are even less so in the minds of private sector businesses managers that were 
highly affected by such policies (for instance small food shops in the villages were 
closed down and new ones, state-owned were opened). Under these premises, the 
recent attempts of the national political apparatus to create a partnership with the 
private sector have not proven easy, and many private sector representatives remain 
sceptical.  
 
                                                          
34 The national seed company, TANSEED, was state-owned until 1990, but the state has since 
created a new agency under the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives, the 
Agricultural Seed Company (ASA). Launched in 2006, ASA produces for both the local and the 
export market, and its duties are related to: expanding seed production and distribution 
networks so as to facilitate seed accessibility by farmers, promotion of increased private sector 
participation in the seed industry development through establishment of public-private 
partnerships or joint ventures in seed production and distribution, promotion of increased 
demand of certified seed by farmers and strengthening research capacities for breeding and 
producing varieties that address farmers’ specific demands (http://www.asa.or.tz/asaa/). 
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6.5. Policy implementation problems and farmers’ dissatisfaction 
The agro-business private sector is not the only dissatisfied actor concerning the 
outcome of the agricultural policies illustrated. In order to understand the terms of 
the relationship between farmers and the state, this section will present the results of 
the interviews with farmers concerning their satisfaction with, and opinion on, the 
Kilimo Kwanza policy. Many farmers interviewed reported to be sceptical about this 
policy, saying for example that ‘Kilimo Kwanza is only a slogan with no actual 
meaning’, ‘nothing has changed in their lives’ and they ‘farm in the same ways 
[they] used to farm in the 60s’ ‘Kilimo Kwanza is only on paper, there is no 
implementation, they make lots of promises during elections but then they disappear’ 
(various farmers in Kwala, Mperamumbi, Dutumi, and Usangi, 2012 and 2013). The 
farmers interviewed, in both Kilimanjaro and Coast region do not hide their 
disappointment, for example a farmer in Dutumi argues:  
‘Through the years our life is the same, there has been no improvement, 
unless you find another source of income, cultivation will not help you to 
get a decent life. There is a lot of land in Dutumi but it is not used 
effectively because of the lack of tools and inputs. I have ten acres, but I 
can only cultivate one!’ (I.R., 2012).  
In Chapter 4 the problems faced by the farmers interviewed were presented. A good 
part of these issues are related to a dysfunctional policy environment and a 
disconnected economic sector. For instance, many farmers interviewed claimed that 
one of the biggest challenges is to get a loan to purchase agricultural machineries 
such as tractors, ploughs, irrigation pumps etc. It is easier to get a loan if they are part 
of a group, but in a group they find it difficult to manage the machines. Indeed, the 
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establishment of a Tanzania Agricultural Development Bank (TADB – pillar 2.2 of 
Kilimo Kwanza), and of community banks and financial institutions in rural areas 
(pillar 2.10) planned for 2009 and supposed to facilitate the loans, have yet to be 
formalised.  
Nevertheless, often the problems are related to policies’ misunderstanding of the 
reality of the countryside and even when agricultural inputs are provided there are 
problems of training and implementation. For instance, there is a program that aims 
at providing villages with power tillers or tractors which can be rented and shared by 
farmers (‘farm trac’ project, part of the Kilimo Kwanza policy) but often there are 
conflicts between farmers on how to share, manage and take care of the machineries 
provided. For instance, the words of S.O.M., a farmer from Dutumi, summarised the 
claim made by many of the farmers interviewed: ‘last year I got a tractor late and we 
were late to cultivate our plot, as a consequence my harvest was too scarce and it will 
be difficult to rent the tractor again for the next season’ (S.O.M., 2012). From the 
interviews in Coast region it emerged clearly that hiring a tractor has proven difficult, 
as many farmers need it in the same period, and there are few tractors to share.  
Moreover, other farmers are of the opinion that renting a tractor is a further cost and a 
risk. To rent a tractor costs them about 60,000 TZ Shillings per acre, more or less the 
equivalent of buying 60kg of maize flour, which could cover the needs of a family of 
four for a bit more than a month.
35
 Yet, if they pay this cost there is no certainty of a 
good harvest, especially if the rains are unreliable. The chairperson and the extension 
officer of Kwala, Mr Msemakweli and Mr Kimicho, add that one of the biggest 
problems is when the tractor (to be shared between 1020 farmers in the village of 
                                                          
35 Calculated according to the governmental indication of 400g per maize flour per person per 
day.  
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Kwala) needs fixing or a spare new part. The council has no money to pay for it, and 
‘farmers are not willing to take responsibility and to pay for the tractor to be repaired 
or for spare parts’ (Mr Kimicho, Kwala Extension Officer, 2012). Mr Msemakweli 
and Mr Kimicho’s concerns echo what Mr Lukas (from Lonagro Tanzania Limited) 
argued about the lack of follow up with project implementation. As a matter of fact, a 
tractor donated by the state through the farm trac project to the village of Kwala 
could be seen in front of the village council, with the tyres deflated and with several 
rusty parts. It has been there unused from 2011 – and it was still there during my last 
visit to the village in April 2015 - since the village or the farmers do not have funds 
to repair it.  
Another interesting example that demonstrates implementation problems is the 
controversy over the water pumps in Dutumi. Several farmers and the chairperson, 
Mr Mkali Saidi Kanusu, interviewed in Dutumi, reported that ‘a group of ten elders’ 
was given five water pumps from the government in 2011, but these water pumps 
have disappeared. Actually, the situation is not very clear, with some farmers saying 
that the water pumps are not working anymore, and others saying that they were 
given to the children of these elders and are difficult to trace because of a lack of 
control and transparency. Anyway, it seemed clear that most of the farmers 
interviewed were annoyed by this situation, and felt that the authorities were not 
treating them in an equal way.  For instance, one of the farmers said, in an agitated 
tone:  
‘we feel very confused, the state helps old people that do not even use 
these water pumps, while it should help all farmers, especially those that 
are working hard and farming! There is no control on how the inputs 
given are used or even if they are used and not sold to others for profit! 
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The state of Tanzania is an ‘office state’ they waste money and there is 
no effective improvement for us!’ (A. H., Dutumi, 2012).  
The chairperson agrees in saying  that the project was mismanaged and that ‘the state 
should give each family a water pump machine, because farmers are far from each 
other and sharing inputs is problematic’, just as with the tractors (Mr Kanusu, 2012). 
These feelings of unfairness that emerge from farmers’ declarations strengthen the 
distrust of farmers towards state’s ability to improve their conditions and provide 
effective policies.  
A further example that illustrates the failure and apparent mismanagement of 
initiatives within Kilimo Kwanza, and the related complicated relationship between 
farmers and the state is the case of the irrigation scheme project in the village of 
Kwala. During the fieldwork in September-December 2012, many farmers around the 
village of Kwala were enthusiastic about an irrigation scheme being implemented by 
state departments and supposed to cover 500 acres and help about 540 farmers of the 
area by providing water for about one acre for each farmer. This project raised hopes 
of a fruitful cooperation between the farmers of the area and the state, and was 
promoted as a Kilimo Kwanza/SAGCOT initiative. When interviewed in 2012, many 
farmers, along with the chairperson of Kwala, Mr Msemakweli, were confident in the 
future success of the project. As reported by the extension officer of Kwala, Mr 
Kimicho:  
‘The cost of the project is 1 billion Tanzanian Shillings to build the 
channels, install the water pumps, and the water tanks […]. This project 
represents an important farmer-state cooperation, within the framework 
of Kilimo Kwanza. The farmers that are part of the project are providing 
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the land and the manual work, which represent the 20% of the total cost 
of the project’ (Mr Kimicho, 2012).  
The chairperson of the irrigation scheme, Mr Ramadhani Shabani Zanda, explained 
that the idea started in the village, with the focus to increase the production of rice. 
The village committee wrote a proposal and the government agreed to fund it. The 
village set aside 2,000 acres for the project. Started in 2008, by 2012 150 acres were 
‘ready to be planted in the coming season’ (February-March)36 and the farmers 
involved decided to share these by using a quarter of an acre each. 15 members did a 
training course on cultivation in Morogoro and were supposed to assist the rest of the 
farmers. According to the chairperson of the scheme, ‘with this project farmers will 
be able to harvest up to 30 bags of rice per acre, instead of the two to three bags they 
harvest now!’ (Mr Zanda, 2012).  
However, one year later things were different. In August 2013, another round of 
interviews revealed disappointment and frustration in the farmers involved. Of the 
500 and more farmers involved, only 200 had participated in the cultivation of the 
plot during the past season. As reported by Mr Zanda, ‘many farmers did not 
participate because the project started late (March), when most farmers had already 
lost hope and found another plot of land to cultivate’. Moreover, there were many 
problems:  
‘The small canals are not finished, the engineer decided to build them 
with soil instead of with cement, so the channels got washed away with 
the rain and they still need to be repaired. The water pump failed to 
pump the water, because the level of the pump was above the level of the 
                                                          
36 The first stage is considered completed, while four more stages were still to be implemented. 
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pond. They took long time to solve this problem, there was a time 
consuming bureaucracy and because of the many engineers involved 
traceability of responsibilities has proved difficult to identify. The seeds 
in the nurseries were growing, so farmers had to water them manually 
and it was really hard because of the distances and no means of transport. 
Later on, when farmers were ready to transplant the plants from the 
nurseries to the main plot, there was another problem to do with 
electricity. The meter was outdated, so we went to TANESCO
37
 in Dar 
es Salaam to ask for it to be replaced. This also took long time. 
Eventually most plants died and farmers left’ (Mr Zanda, 2013).  
Mr Zanda was the only farmer left carrying on with the project and taking care of his 
plants. He had to hire a water pump, paying about 40,000 Shilling per time and had 
used it four times when interviewed (August-September 2013) and planned to do 
three more irrigations before harvesting. Many farmers lost a lot of money with this 
project, some claim that they lost more than 200,000 Shillings and a whole farming 
season, and tried to ask for a refund and to complain, but it was difficult to estimate 
the exact losses. The costs of the project went up to two billion, and Mr Zanda 
admitted that there is no binding document that forces the government to fund this 
project until completion. Many farmers swore that ‘never again we will trust the 
government or participate to these projects’. Others claimed that:  
‘asking for a refund is useless, nobody is willing to take responsibility 
for the mistakes made, the government told us to plant maize, since we 
now lost the rice cultivation. But how can they even suggest that? We 
                                                          
37 TANESCO is the Tanzania Electric Supply Company.  
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would need again tractors to level the soil! The government does not 
even realize what we are talking about’ (D.N., Kwala, 2013).  
This case is a clear example of a growing distrust of farmers towards the state, as a 
consequence of a disillusion for the failure of projects and a conviction that the state 
as such does not protect their interests. This distrust is often expressed by farmers 
choosing the ‘exit’ option, deciding not to participate in meetings and detaching 
themselves from the state apparatus. The detachment is the expression of farmers not 
trusting the ability of the autorities to improve their condition. For instance, F.J., an 
elder farmer in Kwala, says: ‘the state does not care about us old people, when you 
complain you get frustrated so it is better not to do anything and stay quiet’ (F.J., 
2012). Another farmer, A.M.T., a small scale farmer and village secretary in 
Mwenbengozi, explains his distrust and disillusionment towards the state using these 
words:  
‘Let me say this. If there are problems in our farms, for example to do 
with animals and insects, we meet and report to the village council. They 
send the report to the district, but most of the time this process is so long 
and ineffective that we, as farmers, prefer to deal with it by ourselves. It 
is much quicker to just go to the town and buy the medicine [pesticide] 
ourselves rather than wait for the state to help us. The state clearly has a 
top-down approach and our concerns are not taken into consideration’ 
(A.M.T., 2013).  
It is evident that there are policy implementation problems, symptoms of poorly 
thought-through policies that are not well adapted to the cultural and geographic 
realities of the country, and that these problems lead to farmers’ frustration towards 
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the state. At the same time, when asked their perspective on the irrigation scheme 
case, district officials defended themselves claiming that ‘the farmers involved were 
late to report the problems. Furthermore, there were several meetings and they were 
supposed to attend, but only 20 farmers were present to discuss the issues’ (Kibaha 
District officials, 2013). As will be explained in more detail in section 6.6, distrust is 
circular, as the ‘exit option’ used by farmers boycotting the meetings is seen by 
officials as a reason to blame farmers for the failure of the project.  
Along with the analysis of the Kilimo Kwanza policy and its practical 
implementation in Tanzania rural society, the gender approach of the policy deserves 
some attention since the presence of women in the agricultural sector is very strong, 
representing about the 54% of the workforce in agriculture (Mmasa, 2013). Despite 
the role of women being formally recognized in Kilimo Kwanza under Pillar 8.8 
which states the aim of ‘mainstreaming gender in Kilimo Kwanza and developing 
programs to strengthen the position of women in agriculture’, the policy stands 
accused of ignoring the realities faced by farming women, since women do not have 
equal access to inputs and to land throughut the different areas of the country 
(Harcourt, 2012, p.180). In Coast region it is clear from the declarations of many 
farmers, local politicians and women interviewed that the general attitude is that 
women can own land both by means of inheritance or by right of occupancy from the 
village council, and can freely participate to farming project (such as the irrigation 
scheme previously presented). However, for cultural reasons and despite the national 
land legislation on the matter, in Kilimanjaro it is more difficult for women to own 
land, as it is customarily passed by inheritance to the male children of the family. 
Hence, the commitments at national level assume little relevance in areas where 
traditional customs are stronger than national law. Moreover, in both regions the role 
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of women is still clearly differentiated from the role of men. Many programmes and 
organisations – for instance TAPP, IFAD and WFP - try to facilitate the inclusion of 
women in their projects, but cultural differences and a vision of women still 
anchored to tasks such as taking care of the household, children education, cooking 
and fetching water and so on.  
From the examples illustrated above, we can see that certain initiatives are 
disconnected from the reality of the countryside, revealing the state’s top-down 
approach. As a consequence, several problems have been experienced during project 
implementation. Moreover, there is an issue of disorganization and an un-traceability 
of responsibilities, which results in delays in sorting out the issues and in the 
reciprocal accusation of the parties involved. Furthermore, mismanagement of funds 
and clientelism create an environment of disillusion, distrust and a feeling of 
unfairness that contributes to the declining status of the state-farmers relationship.  
6.5.1. A disconnected society 
Besides the problems with the implementation of the policies, another aspect that 
emerges from the interviews is farmers’ scarce awareness of the agricultural policies 
promoted by the state officials. This information gap reveals a lack of effective 
communication between the level of the state and the farmers in rural areas and it is 
also responsible for the unsatisfactory outcome of policies, in the sense that if 
farmers are not informed of the broad objectives and of the benefits that they could 
receive through the implementation of a certain policy in the long term, they are less 
likely to welcome the policy and cooperate towards its success. As outlined by 
authors such as Azarya, Olorunsola, Ayoade (Rothchild and Chazan, 1988) Chazan 
(1994), and Migdal et al. (1994), a disconnected society is characterised by a lack of 
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confidence from its citizens in the effective implementation of policies by the state. 
Hence, this disconnect between the state and farmers causes the latter’s alienation 
from politics. This section will look at the level of involvement and participation of 
farming communities in national initiatives. Moreover, farmers’ 
discontent/disillusion will continue to emerge, following what has already been said 
in the previous section (Barker, 1989).  Another issue that will emerge in this section 
is the internal disconnect within the state structure. Faced with problems and 
complaints from society, local, district and central state officials blame each other, 
adding another dimension to the complex state-society relationship.  
According to the government ‘Kilimo Kwanza has a strong emphasis on pro-poor 
growth’ (JGDPG, 2009), yet Maschindano and Kaino underline the failure of this 
and previous policies to address rural poverty and improve agriculture (Mashindano 
and Kaino, 2009). According to these scholars, the failures were mainly attributable 
to ‘most of them being externally initiated and/or donor funded and lacking effective 
local participation for sustainability’ (ibid., 2009, p.18). Despite Kilimo Kwanza and 
programmes such as the ASDP and the ASDS aimed at improving farmers’ 
knowledge and their use of technologies and infrastructures by involving local 
communities and small scale farmers in the planning and in the coordination of 
agricultural support and investments (as indicated by the CAADP, no date, and 
TNBC, no date, and pillar 8 of Kilimo Kwanza), the reality is more complex. There 
are doubts about the level of farmers’ involvement, the extent to which small scale 
farmers can get access to financial help, and the benefits these policies have brought 
in rural isolated areas such as the ones where this research was based.  
Kilimo Kwanza is supposed to ensure adequate local participation in planning, 
funding and implementation (Mashindano and Kaino, 2009, p.19). Nonetheless, the 
 
 
232 
results of the fieldwork demonstrate that, in reality, farmers do not feel included in 
the policy process, and their awareness of state policy is limited or non-existent, with 
an extension service at times unreliable and ineffective.  Over 90% of the farmers 
interviewed did not even know what Kilimo Kwanza was, with the majority saying 
words to the effect of ‘we hear it in the radio, but nobody came to exactly explain to 
us what this entitles us to have’. The problems in communication reflect a problem 
in the organization of the state, as pointed out by Mr Sambuo, marketing officer at 
Rural Urban Development Initiative (RUDI), a local NGO:  
‘Farmers do not know about state policy because the state has a top-
down approach, at the root there is very little information. […] at district 
level they got the information, but from the district to the village level 
the information do not flow’ (Mr Sambuo, 2013).  
As expected, only the few ‘successful’ farmers (the farmers classified in group A in 
the previous chapter) know a little bit more about the policy, although even here one 
admits: ‘the government policy is a lot of blah blah and actually does not bring any 
changes to us. For example this region [Coast] is excluded from the subsidy 
programme’ (N.M., Mongomole, 2012). It is clear that, in the words of Mr 
Mashindano from the Economic and Social Research Foundation:  
‘very few farmers are aware of the policies and they tend to disengage 
with politics, […] people are not happy with the results, they think they 
are being deprived of their rights, sometimes they are right, other times 
they are manipulated by politicians against other politicians’ (Mr 
Mashindano, 2013).  
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Furthermore, farmers also believe that the recent agricultural policies in place do not 
benefit small scale farmers. For instance, a small scale farmer in Kwala, P.T.M., 
finds it really hard to support his family of seven children. In only two acres of land 
he cultivates rice that he sells to buy maize flour to feed his household. He has to 
deal with plant diseases, and claims to not have received any help from the extension 
officers to deal with the problems in his farm. Moreover he believes that the 
‘Tanzanian state is backwards in helping small scale farmers, but it helps large scale. 
My family never got any help from the state, and our life is getting more and more 
miserable’ (P.T.M., 2012). F.T.M., a small scale vegetables farmer who lives in the 
village of Mwembengozi, and farm two acres of land, expresses similar concerns:  
‘Kilimo Kwanza? In Tanzania almost three quarter of the population are 
farmers, but the government does not care about us small scale farmers, 
Kilimo Kwanza is directed to large scale farmers […] It should be 
directed also to small scale farmers with one or two acres of land’ 
(F.T.M., 2012).  
Farmers’ distrust towards, and disillusion in, the state apparatus is clear from the 
interviews with farmers. Yet, their concerns about the performance of the 
agricultural sector are not misplaced. According to Mr Rohrabach from the World 
Bank, the achievements of the last years in the agricultural sector and food security 
are not as good as they could have been. The sector has an annual value added rate of 
growth of 4.2%, while the World Bank believe a rate of 6-7% would be feasible if 
resources were used in a more efficient way. Furthermore, while production of the 
staple food the most consumed (rice and maize) have been on the rise, if analysed 
and corrected with data on population growth and import/export there is actually a 
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decline in the food supply quantity per capita per year, as demonstrated by the table 
below:  
Table 8: Food supply and production of the two major staple food in Tanzania 
(FAOSTAT, 2014).  
 
 This, added to data on poverty ratio and the indicators on food insecurity discussed 
in the previous chapter, indicates that an increase in food production does not 
automatically lead to an improvement in either food security or farmers’ conditions. 
Besides, the augmented production could be only benefiting large scale farmers or 
farmers that have been able to access the subsidy vouchers and/or live in proximity 
to a paved road that allows them to easily reach the towns’ markets and exchange 
their produce. In the areas where the interviews were conducted there was no data 
available related to production of the two major crops, but the personal perceptions 
of the farmers interviewed on the performance of the sector were not positive. 
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According to Mr Rohrabach the unsatisfactory results are due to a mix of 
mismanagement and bad implementation of projects and funds. For example, he 
believes that:  
‘while Tanzania is planning to develop 1million ha of irrigated land 
within the SAGCOT initiative that would only benefit around 3% of the 
farmers, it would be more efficient to improve the extension service so 
that water management and storage practices, in addition to soil 
conservation could be promoted on a larger scale. […] Not all farmers 
are poor, but the majority are still farming in the same way they farmed 
60 years ago and this shows a failure of state’s policies […] It is 
disappointing that we are not making more progress. […] Malnutrition is 
still incredibly high and production is low. The agricultural sector is so 
unproductive that most farmers are trying to escape to the cities, despite 
the fact that they may face lower nutritional values and calories intake in 
the cities’ (Rohrabach, 2013).  
In contrast, state officials believe that Kilimo Kwanza is helping the poorest farmers 
to gain access to resources and inputs, especially through the subsidies policies, 
which allows farmers to get seeds and other inputs at a cheaper price through 
specific selling points. For instance, through the National Agricultural Input Voucher 
Scheme, the government provides vouchers for a 50% subsidy on fertilizer and 
improved seeds to eligible farmers
38
 growing rice and maize in some specific high-
potential areas – in the Southern and Northern Highlands and Western region 
(United Republic of Tanzania, 2012; Hepelwa et al., 2013). However, despite the 
                                                          
38 Farmers eligible for the subsidy are the ones cultivating less than one hectare of maize and 
rice, with the highest priority being given to female headed household and resource-poor 
farmers who have not used fertilizer in the past five years (United Republic of Tanzania, 2012).  
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subsidised prices that should in theory help small scale farmers to gain access to the 
resources, many farmers seem to be unable to reach the selling points located in the 
bigger towns. This problem is compounded by the lack of proper information on the 
policy. Juma Mwatima, from the International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(IFAD) agency underlines that in reality things are different and the farmers are not 
benefiting from the subsidy policy because: 
‘The subsidy policy is not working right, and is not helping farmers. It is 
also not enough for the needs, for example, if there are about 300 farmers 
in one area, the vouchers for the subsidy are enough for only 90 farmers, 
therefore there is high corruption in the distribution of these vouchers. 
Often the farmers sell the voucher as they cannot even afford the 
discounted prices for the inputs. […] Despite the many policies on the 
agenda there are still so many issues on the ground’ (Mwatima, 2013).  
Furthermore, as mentioned before, the subsidy policy is not active in all areas of 
Tanzania, being implemented in only 57 out of 169 district. In fact, as explained in 
the policy, only the ‘high-potential areas’, meaning the regions where there is the 
greatest production of maize and rice, are chosen for the subsidy. For instance, in 
Coast region the policy is not active. Paradoxically, the areas in which productivity 
is lower and that would most need the input subsidy are left out of the policy. 
Curiously, when officials were asked why the policy of subsidy cut some areas off, 
the common idea seemed to be that areas in which the production is lower are areas 
in which farmers are less productive (or small scale), hence there is little point in 
helping them. For instance, Mr Mayabu, an agricultural input officer in the 
Agricultural Inputs division, under the Crop Development Department, said that:  
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‘there is a rationale behind the state’s decision not to extend the subsidy 
policy to Coast region, and that is because in Coast region there are no 
farmers, you cannot call the farmers in Coast region proper farmers!’ (Mr 
Mayabu, 2013).  
As we will see further on (section 6.6), comments like this one above reflect the 
attitude of the state officials towards small scale farmers and are part of the 
problematic relationship between farmers and state. Concerning farmers’ perception 
of the state’s presence, it is important to note that when asked about state help, the 
majority of farmers interviewed - over 70% - claim not to be receiving or never 
having received any kind of help, while about 25% of the farmers interviewed 
reported receiving some kind of help, such as support to elders, and/or school fees 
paid for their children. Help in agriculture is seldom reported, especially in Coast 
region – not least because the subsidy policy is not active there. Some farmers 
reported receiving some food during hard times, but this issue is highly controversial 
and farmers reported confusing and contrasting information. Several farmers blame 
the state for being late in their responses or bringing too little, and local officials are 
blamed for distributing the food so as to favour certain households over others, or 
even for keeping part of the food for themselves. This displays characteristics of 
weak state, unable to efficiently communicate with and penetrate society, as outlined 
by Migdal (1988).  
The problems in food relief operations are also linked to the way food insecurity is 
assessed. As explained by Mr Kidole, one of the facilitators of the Community 
Management Targeting Distribution, and by Mr Kalendo, from the Disaster 
Management Department, both interviewed in 2013, in cases of food emergencies 
the villages involved send the request to their relevant district. The district is 
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supposed to analyse the self-sufficiency relation by analysing agricultural production 
versus requirement in that specific area, and report to the central state that will then 
run some sample analysis to assess the real needs. As reported by the two state 
officials interviewed mentioned above, the food security assessment of the country is 
based on a sample analysis of six villages per district, and twelve households per 
village. The twelve households are selected in agreement with the village council 
according to their wealth, four households with a low income, four households with 
a middle income and another four with a high income. From this assessment the 
officials identify households who are in a condition of acute, mild and minor food 
insecurity. The food is distributed according to this assessment and should be shared 
according to the needs of the households: free food (usually maize to last for three 
months)
39
 to the households considered to be suffering from acute food insecurity, 
while the other households considered mildly food insecure or at risk of food 
insecurity could get maize or seeds at a cheaper price than the on the market.  
There are several problems with this assessment. It creates a distorted picture of the 
real needs of the households, and, as reported by several farmers both in Kilimanjaro 
and Coast regions, it is often manipulated by officials to favour some households to 
the detriment of others. Furthermore, by the time the village sends the request it may 
take up to five months to be processed and the food to be delivered. The response to 
seasonal food insecurity is slow and farmers know that they cannot rely on the help 
of the state. By the time the food is delivered to the villages the households that were 
experiencing acute food insecurity could have developed serious sickness due to 
undernourishment amongst their members, especially children, unless they had 
found another way to satisfy their food needs (Mr Mwimbe, the chairperson of 
                                                          
39 Calculated on 400g per person per day. 
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Mwembengozi, 2012). Furthermore, it is not rare to experience conflicts between 
villagers during the food distribution,
40
 as the procedures are not properly followed 
and forms of clientelism are vast (chairperson of Kigare, 2013).  
According to the state officials interviewed, while these long bureaucratic 
procedures are surely problematic, it is difficult to imagine a more efficient way to 
assess food insecurity (Mr Kidole, 2013). In particular, the national state officials 
have to deal with local forms of clientelism, in which ‘local politicians lie and ask 
for more food than is needed in order to present themselves as good politicians in 
their village’ (Mr Kidole, 2013).41 In such circumstances, and given the limited 
availability of food to distribute, ‘the state needs to make sure of the real needs of the 
villages to provide the food in the villages where it is mostly needed’ (ibid, 2013). 
As previously noted in the case of land conflicts, faced with complaints and 
problems in the food distribution process, local, district and national level officials 
blame each other, showing a lack of coordination and internal conflicts within the 
state structure. For instance, according to Mr Kalendo, an official in the Disaster 
Management Department under the Prime Minister’s Office, local officials are to 
blame for the poor implementation of the food aid policies. He accuses local 
politicians of using the food given for their own interests, and of not following the 
guidelines and giving it to random people. In contrast, from their point of view, the 
district and village officials interviewed blame the central state for giving too little or 
no help, and for it being ‘so late that at times what we get is not even good to be 
eaten’ (Mr Mwimbe, 2012; Mr Kadege, 2013; Mr Doyle, 2013).  
                                                          
40 As reported by several farmers interviewed, especially in Kilimanjaro region. 
41 Chabal (2009) well explains these practices of neo-patrimonialism, where some local and 
district politicians misuse public funds in order to gain consent, aiming to take personal merit 
for policies. 
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Reciprocal blame is also noticeable in local politicians’ assessment of the outcome of 
policies. While the chairperson of Dutumi, Mr Kanusu, simply claims that ‘Kilimo 
Kwanza has brought no changes’, and Mr Mwimbe, the chairperson of 
Mwembengozi, argues that the only implementation of Kilimo Kwanza seems to be 
the demonstration farms where farmers are showed modern methods of cultivation 
by the bibi shamba (extension officer), other local politicians are more critical both 
towards farmers (as we will see in the next section) and towards the central state. For 
instance, Ashura Hussein, a local politician in Mperamumbi, blamed national 
politicians for the failure of policies to improve the conditions of rural inhabitants: 
‘politics never help people to solve their problems, politicians do not care about 
agriculture, they only think about eating’ (Miss Hussein, 2012).  
In referring to these conflicts within the state apparatus, Mr Kinyondo, a senior 
researcher at the Research for Poverty Alleviation Institute (REPOA), admits that 
‘there is clearly a discrepancy between the central state stated intentions and what 
actually happens on the ground, there are lots of slogan, but on the ground they have 
very little relevance’ (Mr Kinyondo, 2013). There are several reasons why this is so. 
For instance, according to several state officials interviewed in the Department of 
Food Security the problem is with local and district administration, although they 
also admit that:  
‘there are lots of nice policies and programmes but implementation is 
problematic because of the delay in the funds, and extension services not 
covering all the country, beside the fact that it is difficult to get farmers 
on board and change their ways of farming’ (Mr Kidole, 2013, a similar 
opinion was also expressed by Mr Ngaiza, 2013).  
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At the same time, the district officers complain about being given contradictory 
tasks. For instance, one of the district officers in the district of Mwanga 
(Kilimanjaro) notes that: 
‘while on one side the central state asks us to promote the production of 
sorghum and talks a lot about food security and integration of other crops 
and fruit and vegetables in the diet, on the other side all the food aid they 
provide is maize, is that supposed to help people being food secure? How 
is that supposed to help us promote other crops if we continue to give 
only maize? We are contradicting ourselves, this is why farmers do not 
listen to us anymore!’ (Officer at the District of Mwanga, 2013). 
A divided internal state structure is therefore evident, as it was also noted and 
explained in chapter 4 when the different levels of state power were identified 
(central, district and local). In recalling what has been said in the chapters 3 and 4, in 
Tanzania this separation of power within the state structure translates into a clear 
hierarchy of power, with local level state officials being closer to villagers and often 
blaming higher level officials for their inadequacy of improving villages’ conditions. 
In this respect, the interview findings confirm the theoretical assumption presented in 
chapter 3, in which the relationship between the state and the society is also the 
result of how the national authorities presents the state to society. First, there is a 
tendency of high level officials to physically distinguish themselves from the rest of 
the society, by wearing expensive clothes and jewelleries and driving expensive cars. 
This is particularly noticeable during ceremonies and electoral campaigns, where 
officials’ visits to villages are considered and treated as extremely important events, 
and the official is accompanied by several policemen and treated with high regards. 
Outside these ceremonies the visits are rare, as affirmed by several villagers and the 
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chairpersons interviewed. This tendency of high level officials, reported by the 
farmers interviewed but also described by scholars such as Scott (1998), Ferguson 
and Gupta (2002), Daloz (2003), Lund (2006) and Becker (2009) demonstrates the 
top-down approach, which can be also observed in the character and implementation 
of policies. 
In addition, forms of clientelism and neo-patrimonialism can be traced, whereas 
local and district officials tend to take personal merit for successful 
occurrences/projects coming from the central government, as seen in the case of food 
distribution strategies. This attitude of local and district officials remarks, again, the 
incoherence within the state structure, and, as explained by scholars such as Chabal 
and Daloz (1999), and Hyden (1980 and 1983), adds to the complex state-society 
structure. In fact, it confirms the presence in Tanzania of a certain ‘economy of 
affection’ described by Hyden in the 1980s, useful to understand various aspects of 
Tanzanian society and its relationship with politics and the state (see chapter 3 and 
4).  
Hence, in summary, behind the problems of policy implementation due to 
mismanagement of funds, clientelism, a disconnected private sector, and an unclear 
legislation there is a conflictual relationship between the different levels of the state 
(local, district and national). Furthermore, central in understanding policy failure and 
farmers’ dissatisfaction is the character of policies, not being formulated around the 
needs of small scale farmers, and therefore of difficult implementation. What follow 
now are some considerations on the extension service, supposed to be the 
transmission belt between the central state and the farmers. Why is this system not 
working? 
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6.5.2. A complex and controversial relationship: the role of extension 
services in the state-farmer relationship  
Pillar 8 of Kilimo Kwanza deals with the role of extension officers, who are 
supposed to ‘establish demonstration farms and provide guidance on proper farming 
methods to farmers’ and to ‘be evaluated according to set performance targets’ 
(TNBC, no date, pillar 8.1). The figure of the extension officer has a central 
importance in the framework of the national agricultural policy and in the argument 
of this thesis, because it is the connecting point between the state and farmers, as 
affirmed by Miss Justa Katunzi, from the Extension Service Division (under the 
Department for Crop Development, interviewed in 2013).  Nevertheless, given the 
lack of information reported by the farmers interviewed, it is clear that this service is 
not helping much to achieve the expected results. The majority of the farmers 
interviewed showed complete dissatisfaction with the work of the extension officers, 
claiming, for example, never to have seen them, or to be afraid of calling them as 
they ask money for their services (a practice that is illegal). 
Other farmers assert that extension officers are not helpful and give misleading 
advice. For example S.S.M., from Mwembengozi, exclaims:  
‘Kilimo Kwanza is only a political slogan! We know how to plant and 
dig, we know all this. Sometimes we call the extension officer and ask 
him how to cultivate the cassava, and they can suggest us to cultivate it 
upside down he laughs. We need inputs, not lessons on how to farm!’ 
(S.S.M., Mwembenozi, 2012).  
This opinion is shared by other experts of the agricultural sector, for example Mr 
Lukas from Lonagro also mocks the extension officers claiming that:  
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‘extension officers know nothing! For example in Morogoro, they were 
telling people to burn the maize left as soon as the crops were harvested. 
This is an obsolete practice of 20 years ago! They give people the wrong 
information’ (Mr Lukas, 2013).  
According to Mr Rohrabach from the World Bank the farmers are right to think that 
extension officers are not well prepared, and this is because they do not receive the 
right training and neither do they share a passion for agriculture. In his words:  
‘extension officers are kids that make through secondary school, but did 
not do well enough to become secondary school teacher or go to business 
so they decided to follow a course to become extension officers. Many of 
them never farmed in their whole life, they do not know how to use the 
tools, how to deal with farmers’ problems and their recommendations are 
irrelevant to farmers in reality. They follow a manual on farming 
practices but are unable to adapt to different conditions. This is why 
farmers do not trust them’ (Mr Rohrabach, 2013).  
Moreover, often the extension officers live far from the village they are supposed to 
supervise. For example A.O.M., from Dutumi, reports that the extension officer of 
Dutumi lives in Dar es Salaam, 120 km away from the village of Dutumi, hence 
‘they are not close to farmers and do not provide any support’ (A.O.M., 2012). In the 
village of Msua the farmers share the same concerns, and lament that their extension 
officers lives in Kwala and never come to see their farms in Msua, and the same goes 
for the extension officer of Mwembengozi.  
Mr Sambuo, from the NGO the Rural Urban Development Initiative (RUDI, 
interviewed in 2013), provides other reasons on why the extension service fails to 
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help farmers. He explains that extension officers do not go around farms because 
they lack a means of transportation, nobody monitors extension officers to make sure 
that they are working properly, and farmers don’t trust them because they have no 
relationship with them, and they are not originally from the places they supervise. 
This is confirmed by the declarations of many farmers interviewed in both Coast and 
Kilimanjaro regions: most farmers meet their extension officer only once a year, 
while others do not even know who he or she is. Mr Kidole, from the Department of 
National Food Security, also mentions the ‘lack of incentives to work well because 
they lack transport, housing, and they often get appointed far from the cities’. 
Nevertheless, he also admits that ‘farmers do not trust extension officers because of 
corruption’ (Mr Kidole, 2013). Mr Mashindano, a senior researcher at ESRF and 
Lecturer of Economics at the University of Dar es Salaam also stresses the low 
salary and the lack of transport but adds that ‘some officers are expert in veterinary 
but not in agriculture, although they deal with both activities. Often they take part in 
other projects sponsored by external donors and neglect the rest of the farmers and 
their main job’ (Mr Mashindano, 2013).  
From their point of view, extension officers claim that farmers often do not ask for 
help, and they cannot go personally to all farmers’ fields if not requested specifically 
by farmers. For instance, Mr Kimicho, an extension officer in Kwala, claims that he 
lacks the inputs to establish a demo farm, and can only assist farmers theoretically 
(Mr Kimicho, 2012). Although according to Kilimo Kwanza each village is 
supposed to have a tractor and an agricultural officer, in practice there are not 
enough extension officers to cover all villages. As a matter of fact, the number of 
extension officers is limited, with only 7,974 officers present in the whole country, 
while there should be at least 15,000 as expected by the Ministry of Agriculture (Mr 
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Mashindano, 2013). Furthermore, the extension officers interviewed blame the 
farmers for not following their advice. For example, the Kigare ward councillor, Mr 
Abdul Selemani Kadege, stresses how farmers are often late to cultivate and do not 
follow the expert advice. He claims that:  
‘farmers blame the government but the truth is that they do not like to 
consult the extension officers, and they do not attend meetings! Often the 
council calls a meeting but the participation is so low that it is we have to 
postpone the meeting until more people participate. Extension officers 
are always present at meetings, if farmers say that they do not know their 
extension officer it means that they never attend any meeting! There is 
high participation only when the council is giving something away, for 
example in the case of food’ (Mr Kadege, 2013).  
The scarce participation in meetings (an aspect that will be more fully analysed in 
the next chapter) is also noted by the Chairperson of Kigare, Mr Doyle, and by local 
politicians in the villages in Coast region where the interviews were conducted. It 
was also mentioned in section 6.5 while talking about the irrigation scheme project 
problems in Kwala.  
In this section, two key features of the national agricultural extension service have 
been highlighted. The first is the opinion expressed by several extension officers and 
politicians who describe farmers as stubborn, and accuse them of not participating in 
local meetings, not cooperating with the state authorities and not following expert 
advice. The second is the tendency to abide to stereotypes such as those that define 
farmers as being lazy and ignorant in Coast region but hard working in the North of 
the country. These two tendencies are traceable in both the extension officers and 
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other officials at different state levels; as it will be illustrated in the following 
section. 
6.6. The state’s negative perception of farmers and its stereotypes 
There were several officials interviewed who, when asked about the problems of the 
agricultural sector or the relationship between the state and farmers, took the 
opportunity to describe farmers as stubborn, in particular concerning innovation in 
farming methods, adaptation to change and to new crops. For instance, the local 
chairperson of Mperamumbi, Mr Rashidi Vitusi, felt that:  
‘farmers don’t follow expertise advice, they don’t cultivate according to 
the requirements […]. Sometimes I have to force them to go to farm 
instead of staying in the local bars drinking the local alcohol. […]The 
officers should also check these pombe
42
 shops!’ (Mr Vitusi, 2012).  
There is also a general belief that it is difficult to change farmers’ eating habits, or 
their farming systems. In Mwanga region (Kilimanjaro) numerous farmers 
interviewed lamented the scarce harvest and the unreliable weather. According to a 
representative at the FAO, ‘70% of the maize grown in Mwanga dries before 
reaching the right development of the plant’ (Mr Laizer, 2013). Nevertheless, when 
both the FAO and the district officers suggested farmers switch to other crops -for 
example cassava or sorghum - they were met with reticence and a refusal to follow 
the advice (Mr Laizer, 2013).  
Moreover, several state officials describe farmers as being demanding and expecting 
everything for free. Using the words of Mr Kalendo, from the Disaster Management 
Department:  
                                                          
42 ‘Pombe’ is the name in Kiswahili for the variety of alcohol produced at home. 
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‘there is this attitude that the state should provide everything for free, if 
the state gives something for free than everybody is willing to share it, 
but if they have to pay for it that is when the cooperation spirit ends. 
Farmers are not willing to cooperate with the state, but they want 
everything provided for free. For instance, in Shinyanga we tried to push 
the cultivation of sorghum, but farmers were reticent, they were 
expecting the seeds for free and were not willing to swap from rice or 
maize to sorghum’. (Mr Kalendo, 2013). 
A similar opinion is shared by Juma Mwatima, country program officer for IFAD 
and chair at the Tanzania Organic Agricultural Movement, who believes that ‘in the 
past the state and external partners were too generous in giving help, making farmers 
think that it would be easier to tick a box and claim to be vulnerable rather than 
looking for alternatives’ (Miss Mwatima, 2013). Also according to Mr Laizer, from 
the FAO, ‘farmers have developed dependence’ (Mr Laizer, 2013). Mr Mashindano, 
senior researcher at ESRF, adds that people’s expectations from the apparatus were 
raised during the Nyerere era, which:  
‘by distributing resources and basic services promoted a mentality in 
which people expect everything to be for free […] the difference is that 
now the government does not have anything to distribute. In the past 
there were policies that incentivised waste. A big personalisation of 
politics led leaders to make promises and abuse of public funds. But it is 
also people’s attitude that has changed, Nyerere wanted to address 
inequality, that is why he was transferring resources, but nowadays there 
is no responsible use of resources, even from people. For example people 
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abuse public services, requiring more medicines than they need’ (Mr 
Mashindano, 2013).  
Another theme that constantly emerged during the fieldwork is the belief that there 
are cultural differences within the country and that some tribes are more productive 
than others. For instance, the stereotype of farmers in Coast region as being lazy and 
farmers in Northern regions as being hard-working is diffused in the society, and 
emerged in the fieldwork, especially when officials were asked about the problems 
of farming communities in Coast region.  
A representative from a Tanzanian think tank expressed this popular dichotomy 
between the supposedly laborious Northerners and laid-back inhabitants of the Coast 
region: 
‘People in Coast region are not used to farming, they fish and do small 
scale activities, petty business, they like to wake up in the morning, visit 
their cashew trees, see if there are any cashew nuts to pick up and sit 
under a tree to sell them up to 1pm. Then they buy maize flour from the 
nearby shop and go home to eat. They are not interested in more 
productive activities. They are more interested in ngoma
43
! People from 
the North are more entrepreneurial, and they have more opportunities as 
they border countries like Kenya’ (Mr Mashindano from ESRF, 2013).  
It becomes obvious that a clear cultural difference in the attitude towards work is said 
to exist in Tanzania, one that depicts the Coastal Region as a domain where leisure 
dominates over labour. At the same time, this affirmation comes with a normative 
undertone as the subsequent quote highlights: 
                                                          
43 This refers to traditional dances and ceremonies.  
 
 
250 
‘Farmers in Kibaha do not take agriculture seriously, while in 
Kilimanjaro they are very serious’ (Mr Laizer, representative at FAO, 
2013). 
It is telling that an employee of the FAO is as blunt in his comments and judgement. 
However, representatives of national political bodies come to very similar 
conclusions:  
‘Most of coastal communities are lazy, they wait for the government to 
act. They don’t even want to go to farm, they spend their time in the bar, 
even in the morning. When you go to Mbeya, Iringa, people are very 
serious, very very serious’ (Mr Clepin Revelia, Department of planning 
and public-private partnership, 2013). 
Other interviewees made references to historical and religious aspects to explain this 
perceived difference: 
‘Farmers in Kilimanjaro are more welcoming, maybe because of the 
influence of the missionaries. We [as the government] face problems, as 
farmers do not want to listen to us and do not want the state to control 
them. The problem is the level of illiteracy in many households. 
Moreover farmers are stubborn, we try to promote a certain crop but it is 
difficult to change their farming practices. Farmers want to see the results 
before starting acting! How is this possible?’ (Mr Kidole, from the 
Department of National Food Security, 2013).  
‘The Coast region had the impacts of Arabs, they behave like Arabs, they 
don’t do much agriculture, they are not used to that. People that work 
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here are not from the Coast, but from other areas. There is a lot of 
ignorance and illiteracy in people of this area. The missionaries went to 
areas with climate more similar to theirs, such as Kilimanjaro, Songea, 
Kagera, Mbeya, Arusha. Muslim people put a lower stress on education 
than Christians; this is why people in this area are poorer, because of 
ignorance’ (Mr Rwehambiza, WFP). 
It is quite surprising to hear these kind of declarations coming from representatives of 
international organisations such as the WFP. It indicates that these sort of stereotypes 
are collectively shared by a large part of the Tanzanian community. It is true that 
with diverse historical backgrounds come educational systems that prepare the 
population more or less well to a life as a farmer, and clearly there are cultural 
differences within tribes. In the previous chapter it was noted that the level of 
education was higher in Kilimanjaro region rather than in Coast region. Nevertheless, 
these judgements, by mixing education and the more fatalist view of inborn cultural 
differences, are manipulated to justify policy successes or failures in different parts of 
the country, as showed by these two following comments: 
‘Kilimo Kwanza is working well in some places such as Kilimanjaro 
because people are more educated and are taking advantage of the 
programme, including a different approach with extension officers, but in 
other areas such as Coast region people are lazy, maybe because of the 
different culture and tribe, and the programme is not working well’ (Mr 
Kimicho, extension officer in Kwala, 2012). 
‘In other regions people are much more hard working. Laziness is one of 
the problems that contribute to the lack of food in this area. There is the 
river there, but people still wait for the machines to irrigate. One day a 
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person -Mr Masaka, from Kwala- came here with his tractor and 
borrowed it to some farmers that should have paid back with produce, 
one bag per acre. But when the farmers harvested later on they did not 
pay back their debt, so nobody will trust these farmers again. Often they 
waste all the harvest income for local dance and celebration instead of 
saving it! There are some groups, but they are not active because people 
are lazy. It is not like other regions such as Msongea, Iringa, Morogoro. 
[…] People here complain a lot but do very little. Kilimo Kwanza is 
there, but people are not using it properly, although it is true that the 
government has not provided good information about this project’. (Mr 
Kakwete Chia Zulu, extension and veterinary officer in Dutumi, 2012). 
These quotes illustrate a certain degree of defeatism among officials and highly 
qualified people that have little hope for agricultural policies to function with a 
population that seems to behave in an irrational way. They thus also locate the main 
part of the responsibility with certain sections of the farmers themselves, and not with 
the practice of policy implementation. The common conception seems to be that if 
farmers are too stubborn, no one can help them. In other words, the disconnection 
between state and farmers is mutual, at least with some parts of the farming 
community. On the one hand, the farmers have grown tired of the state and see it as 
distant from their lives. On the other hand, state officials and those having the 
authority to influence policy-making seem to have given up on farmers that are seen 
to be either misinformed, or not interested, or simply resistant to advice.  
 ‘People in this area are different from people in the north of Tanzania, 
for example in Moshi, where they work very hard. People here are very 
lazy, there is a lot of land but people do not like to dig. There are some 
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reasons behind it, cultural reasons, they grew up like that. Most of them 
do not use modern methods of cultivation, therefore they harvest little. 
There is scarce knowledge on the good ways of farming, and farmers are 
very reluctant and stubborn to farm their own way and not follow the 
advice’ (Miss Pendi Ally Semoka, extension officer of Mwembengozi, 
2012). 
Surprisingly, these stereotypes are also common within farmers. In particular, the 
successful ones seem to believe that parts of the problems in the agricultural sector in 
the Coast region are due to farmers’ attitude. E.M., one of the most successful 
farmers interviewed, has been living in the village of Kwala for over 20 years, but he 
is originally from Kilimanjaro, Chagga tribe. He believes that: 
‘People in this area are lazy and don’t go to the farm every day. In Iringa 
they farm more. The government should promote the value of hard work 
and not depend on buying food and import food from abroad’ (E.M., 
2012).  
But also within the Zaramo tribe there are farmers that agree with this stereotype. For 
instance, a low income farmer in Kwala, who struggles to meet his household’s 
needs, blamed farmers of this area for not getting together and cooperating. In his 
opinion, ‘the Zaramo are not used to help each other and work together, while in 
Kilimanjaro it is different’ (2012). But is it really different? Does this widely shared 
stereotype reflect actual realities in the field?  
Firstly, it needs to be understood why this stereotype persists, perhaps by looking at 
the different historical pathways and development of the two areas. In the words of 
Mr Rohrabach of the World Bank:  
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‘There is this stereotype that farmers in the north of Tanzania are 
entrepreneurial while farmers in Coast region are lazy. However, it is 
important to understand why there may be some differences. There is a 
base of truth in saying that in the north they are more entrepreneurial, but 
this is because of the past history, there used to be a coffee growing 
culture up there, so they are historically more used to business and 
agriculture done with a business mind-set’ (Mr Rohrabach, 2013).  
Hence, the different agricultural history, more related to commercial crops in 
Kilimanjaro thanks to the exchanges with Kenya and thanks to the presence of cash 
crop cultivation (coffee and bananas) could explain a different attitude towards the 
agricultural sector, as mentioned above. Moreover, the villagization process has been 
administered in different ways in Coast and in Kilimanjaro region, (as explained in 
Chapter 4) and this could partly explain why there is a general belief that people in 
Kilimanjaro are more ‘welcoming’ than people in Coast region. In fact, while in 
Coast region people were forced to move to other areas, in Kilimanjaro the 
communities were already settled in villages, hence villagization did not assume the 
tones of dislocation it did in other areas. Therefore, people in Coast region may have 
developed a more sceptical attitude towards foreigners and state officials than people 
in Kilimanjaro.  
It is also important to stress that the areas where people are judged as ‘lazy’ are the 
ones that have mostly been ignored by government, as reflected in the exclusion of 
Coast region in the subsidy policy. But also international organizations and NGOs, 
as specified by Juma Mwatima from IFAD, tend to exclude certain areas. Most 
IFAD projects for example are based in the Northern areas of Tanzania (Miss 
Mwatima, 2013). Mr Sebastian Sambuo, from the Rural Urban Development 
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Initiative (RUDI, 2013), a local NGO, also confirms that some areas in Tanzania, 
including Coast region, have been more ignored than others, and also the NGO in 
which he works does not operate in Coast region (it operates in 63 villages in other 
10 regions of Tanzania). Also, international NGOs are usually based in the northern 
parts of the country, more easily accessible and with a more tolerable climate. Out of 
62 NGOs dealing with agriculture registered in the Tanzania National NGO 
Coordination government website only three are located in Coast region (of these 
two are in Bagamoyo, on the coast, and only one in the Kibaha district) while the 
majority are located in wealthier areas such as Arusha, Kilimanjaro, Morogoro, 
Ruvuma, Dar es Salaam (Tanzania NGOs National Coordination, 2013). 
Furthermore, the results of the empirical research gave an overview of two different 
realities, with different issues, cultures and farm systems but with lots of similarities, 
especially if the results of policies and the attitude of farmers towards the state are 
analysed. It is true that the attitude of state officials towards small scale farmers in 
Coast region is generally more negative (and this is at the root of the decision of 
excluding this region from the subsidy program, as explained by Mr Mayabu from 
the Department of Seeds and Inputs, 2013), but as noted previously, policy failure 
and food insecurity are also present in Kilimanjaro region, where despite a more 
positive attitude from state officials there is still a certain alienation of society from 
it. Despite the claim that in Coast region there are no farmers (Mr Mayubu, 2013) the 
villages interviewed in Kibaha district were inhabited by farmers, who spend their 
days on the farm or trying to find other sources of income. At time of harvest, most 
farmers interviewed admitted to having slept on their farms to keep wild animals at 
bay and protect their fields. Most farmers in this area have to walk several kilometres 
to reach their farms. This is because the farms, closer to the water sources, are often 
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far from the villages. As mentioned in chapter 4, as a consequence of the 
villagization policies, the villages have often been located in areas far from water 
sources, and this is one of the major problems of farmers in this region. 
Calling it laziness is clearly a way to exonerate the state’s past and present failure to 
improve the livelihoods of many farmers. It is also a way to justify farmers’ poor 
performances without having to look and address their issues in an effective way, 
externalising and dismissing the problem instead of thinking at possible solutions to 
solve it. Moreover, the idea that farmers in Kilimanjaro are more productive and 
more entrepreneurial is true only to a certain extent. In the Mwanga district, on the 
villages on the mountains, farmers are struggling with a unreliable weather, poor 
connections and the lack of market to sell their produce as a consequence of many 
cooperatives closing and international market price below the production costs. For 
these reasons, many farmers in this area have stopped cultivating cash crops – 
mainly coffee - and went back to cultivate food crops (on the decline of coffee 
production in this area see the study of Ikeno, 2007 and Craparo et al., 2015).
44
   
The stereotypes eradicated in the Tanzanian society are only but the expression of an 
official attitude towards farmers and the lack of consideration of the problems faced 
by rural communities; they also reveal a central negligence towards certain areas of 
the country, and add elements to understand the detrimental relationship between the 
state and the society. Furthermore, they conditioned the formulation of top-down and 
state-centric policies, which gives little consideration to the needs of small scale 
farmers and hence fail to improve their conditions. All these aspects of the 
                                                          
44 For instance, in Mwanga district the production of coffee has decreased dramatically from 
around 700 tons in 1985/86 to 100 tons in 2004/2005 (Ikeno, 2007). 
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Tanzanian state are in line with the analysis put forward by Ferguson and Gupta 
(2002) in describing the vertical structure of power.  
6.7. Conclusion  
This chapter provided an overview of the outcome of the agricultural policies that 
the successive governments of Tanzania has promoted in the last 15 years, and the 
way these policies were formulated and received by society. The relative 
success/failure of policies has been analysed by looking at the level of mechanization 
and modernisation (use of modern seeds and inputs), involvement of the private 
sector, infrastructures and access to the markets, farmers’ satisfaction and farmers’ 
awareness of policies.   
In short, from the results of the empirical research emerges a general discontent from 
the farmers and some local government officials towards these policies, which have 
failed in both achieving their stated objectives (modernisation and commercialization 
of the agricultural sector by a greater opening to private sector partnership and 
investments) and in improving the conditions/livelihoods of small scale farmers and 
consequently their level of food security. Furthermore, it was claimed that the failure 
of such policies to achieve modernisation was attributable to a series of reasons. 
There is a tension between the state and the private sector, with the latter blaming the 
state for still wanting to retain a high level of control over the agricultural sector. 
Foreign investments in the agricultural sector remain scarce, also due to the 
confusing and bureaucratically complex system of land transfers. Furthermore, a lack 
of coordination between the central government and the local government emerged 
from the interviews with both central state and local state representatives. This adds 
to forms of corruption and misplacement of funds during the implementation of 
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projects. On the farmers’ side, there is distrust towards the extension service, which 
limit the possible positive outcome of policies as it makes farmers sceptical of new 
initiatives.  
Moreover, and more importantly, the core of this thesis argues that these policies fail 
to improve the conditions of the greater majority of farmers in the country because 
they were not framed around the needs of such farmers, and were not in favour of 
small scale agriculture (on state’s distrust towards traditional methods and local 
farmers see for instance Scott, 1998). Alongside this, there is also a lack of effective 
information and knowledge dissemination on what these policies would entail for 
farmers: an example being the subsidies programme of Kilimo Kwanza. Behind the 
policies not being in favour of small scale agriculture, there is state’s officials’ idea 
that only a transformation of the agricultural system from small scale driven to large 
and medium scale can lead to the growth of agricultural production. This adds to 
generalised stereotipes and a negative opinion of small scale farmers often described 
as stubborn, ignorant, backwards and lazy (with Coast region farmers receiving the 
worst of it).  
Hence, it has been observed that the top-down approach of the state is also 
reinforced by the definition of the role of the extension officers, seen as the 
‘teachers’ of the ‘right farming methods’. This patronising approach reflects little 
trust in the ability of farmers to improve the agricultural sector. This top down 
approach does not facilitate the relationship between the state and rural society, 
creating a condition of reciprocal distrust, where farmers look at the state with 
scepticism and detachment. Political detachment is manifested in several ways, for 
instance by boycotting public meetings or the advice of extension officers, or by 
following tribal and cultural customs more than the national set of rules, as 
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demonstrated by the example on land regulation. As clearly explained by Azarya, 
Olorunsola, Ayoade and Chazan (all 1988), in rural Tanzania farmers’ 
disengagement, understood as a form of alienation from the state and expressed by a 
withdrawal from it, is related to a conviction in a lack of capabilities and willingness 
of the state to improving the conditions of the society (Olorunsola, 1988, pp. 189-
207).  
In particular, the results of the interviews collected in Kilimanjaro region - where 
villagization did not take place and memories of Nyerere are positive - provide 
interesting elements to believe that farmers’ disengagement from the state is more 
the consequence rather than the cause of the state’s attitude towards farmers, 
although it is true that the state became harsher and more extended as a result of a 
deluding participation of farmers towards the realization of Ujamaa’s objectives 
despite an agricultural sector highly subsidized.  
If farmers have chosen the ‘exit option’ as an expression of their discontent and 
disengagement towards the state, what are the coping strategies they choose against 
food insecurity? And, given their discontent towards the recent agricultural policies 
presented in this chapter, what are their forms of contestation? The next chapter will 
look at these issues in more detail. 
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Chapter 7 - Farmers’ political engagement and coping 
strategies for food security 
7.1. Introduction  
While the previous chapter analysed the complicated relationship between the state 
and farmers, underlining the feeling of alienation of this social group towards formal 
politics, this chapter will look at first, social hindrances to political action that 
impede farmers from forming a collective movement, and second, the coping 
strategies of rural communities and their attempts to improve their conditions, both 
at the individual and the collective level. As explained in the previous chapter, a 
disregard towards small scale farmers needs, and a negative attitude of state elites 
towards small scale agriculture, characterise recent and past agricultural policies. As 
a consequence, the policies do not seem to have achieved the desired increase in 
agricultural production, in rural development (improved conditions for farming 
communities) and in the general economic performance of the agricultural sector. 
Rural movements have not been able to address the state and bring substantial social 
change in rural areas, confirming what Dwyer and Zeilig (2012) and Bratton and De 
Walle (1992) had noted in analysing African movements in general (see chapter 2). 
The reasons behind weak collective movements in Tanzania are hence to be found in 
the political history of the country. In the specific, I argue that the negative attitude 
of state elites, which has been shown to be historically grounded, contributed to 
create a tense relationship between rural communities and the higher level of the 
state, which has compromised the success of several initiatives. 
In the light of this situation, this chapter will analyse farmers’ responses to policy 
failure and agricultural crisis and their attempt to ensure their own food security. 
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Farmers’ responses enact their discontent towards the state and manifest a form of 
political action, despite the fact that direct action is seldom reported. Seen through 
this lens, even intra-society clashes should be interpreted as a result of dissatisfaction 
of farmers with their livelihoods. Distrust within society is an important aspect of 
these conflicts and should be analysed in its political dimensions and beside farmers’ 
reaction to state policy and food insecurity. Hence, the first part of this chapter will 
explore the conflicts within society and in particular the clashes between farmers and 
pastoralist communities and how this is mediated by the Tanzanian state. 
This chapter will also look at how intra-national conflicts undermine the creation of 
a strong farmers’ movement and strong farmers unions that could negotiate with the 
state and/or organise protest against undesired policies. Many scholars have 
highlighted the lack of a proper farmers’ movement and the weak level of social 
cohesion in Tanzania (for example Hyden, 1980 and Kelsall, 2004). However, while 
it is true that direct forms of political engagement are rare, the reasons behind this 
need further assessment, and cannot only be attributed to an un-cohesive society as 
some scholars have tried to do in the past. Hyden (1980, 1983) for instance, blames 
the increasing individualist attitude of farmers, while other authors point to 
geographical issues that impede farmers’ more direct contestation, such as living in 
remote and sparsely populated communities. Furthermore, there are scholars such as 
Chabal (2009) who play on the role of cultural differences and interaction of 
different tribes in order to account for the passivity of Tanzanian social movements. 
There are no doubts that the historical background needs to be taken into 
consideration when analysing the ability and willingness to cooperate within farming 
communities. However, this chapter argues that the difficult relationship between the 
state and the farmers contributed to a feeling of political alienation of farmers 
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towards the state and a negative understanding of cooperative work within the 
farming communities themselves. In fact, the failure of past state-led initiatives such 
as the mismanagement of cooperatives in the 1970s (explained in Chapter 4) left a 
bitter memory in the minds of many rural farmers that directly experienced those 
years or simply heard about it. At the same time, the distrust towards state’s abilities 
adds to the scepticism of farmers in the effectiveness of direct action. Hence, the 
reasons behind the lack of a strong farmers’ movement that could address policy 
change and improve food security in the countryside by creating a direct link 
between farmers and state and improving democratic participation, are political and 
the reciprocal distrust between farmers and the state is connected to the struggles and 
conflicts within society. 
Yet, despite the scepticism about cooperation and the ineffectiveness of direct 
political action, the strong message of this chapter is that there are other ways 
farmers react to food insecurity and policy failure. The second part of this chapter 
will present some of the coping strategies in place, and will stress how a different 
political approach, one characterised by inclusion, could lead to cooperation between 
farmers and hence to a more successful outcome of projects. The success of 
politically inclusive projects confirms that the failure of governmental programs is 
mostly due to the top down approach adopted by the state, as exposed in the previous 
chapter. 
However, most of these projects - such as the Farming Field Schools implemented 
by the FAO - are managed and implemented by NGOs and international 
organisations, raising a whole set of different issues. The problem here is related to 
the influence of external agents on the national food system, and the growing 
dependence of the country on external aid. This dependence can again be read as a 
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form of dissatisfaction and distrust towards the state’s capacity to address basic 
public issues. In this sense, the growing dependence on external aid, whilst helping 
to address short-term basic needs, is also deepening the wedge between society and 
the state. 
7.2. Conflict as a form of discontent: clashes and mistrustfulness within society 
Questions on cooperation within society add to questions on society cohesion, which 
will be analysed in this chapter. Clashes between pastoralists and farmers and a 
reluctant attitude towards cooperation are used as examples to describe a general 
mistrustfulness found in the areas interviewed, in particular in Coast region. It will 
be explained why, in this study, these episodes of mistrust within society are seen as 
a manifestation of discontent. We will reflect on the relevance of these attitudes 
within the political sphere of state-society relations. Do these episodes of mistrust 
within society reveal an individualistic character of farming communities as stressed 
by authors such as Hyden (1980) and Kelsall (2004)? And is this character limiting 
the creation of a strong farmers’ movement and affecting the political relationship 
between state and rural society?  
As it was noted in chapter 3 and 4, some scholars have criticised Nyerere for 
misunderstanding its society. In fact, Nyerere believed that he could create a national 
identity through the implementation of socialism, which would have put aside the 
differences within the many different tribes present in the territory (more than 130) 
in name of a Tanzanian spirit of cooperation and self-reliance. For this reason he also 
pushed for the adoption of Swahili as a national language to be spoken in all spheres 
of society. According to Nyerere, traditional African society used to be based on the 
socialist principle of cooperation. However, he felt that that spirit was already 
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somehow ruined by the influence of colonialism and capitalism and needed to be 
‘reactivated’: 
‘We have to reactivate the philosophy of cooperation in production and 
sharing in distribution which was an essential part of traditional African 
Society’ (Nyerere, Mbioni, Vol. IV No. III, p.15, from Lundi, 2012). 
In Freedom and Unity he stated the importance of equality as a basic principle of his 
philosophy, also implying his desire to go beyond the distinctions between the tribes 
living in Tanzania (Nyerere, 1967). It is clear from the following statement that he 
aspired to social change driven by some form of nationalism:  
‘In Africa the social ethic is changing, and has to change, from one 
appropriate to a tribal society to one appropriate to a national society’ 
(Nyerere, 1967, p.20).  
Indeed, it can be said that Tanzania has been able to overcome tribal 
differences under a common spirit of national identity. Contrary to many other 
countries in the region, Tanzania has not experienced violent clashes between 
tribes, and this is perhaps one of the achievements of the moral drive and 
national vision Nyerere provided in the aftermath of independence (Kessler, 
2006). Nevertheless, tribal differences persist with many tribes retaining their 
cultural customs and traditions and observing traditional customs more than 
the national set of rules. For instance, the Maasai tribe communities generally 
prefer to live outside the villages and strongly defend their nomadic way of life 
against state control (Coast, 2002; Benjaminsen et al., 2013).  
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Episodes of antagonism within society are also present, even though they do 
not assume the appearance of violent conflicts at national level and are not 
directly driven by tribal differences. These conflicts are a result of a general 
dissatisfaction within society complicated even further by confusing or 
misleading policy legislation and its implementation, for example concerning 
land ownership. Such are the clashes between farmers and pastoralist 
communities that will be illustrated below. In this sense, these conflicts 
highlight the limited ability of the state to deal with land discrepancies in an 
effective way, confirming and reinforcing the idea of a distant and alienated 
state. Behind the clashes between these two parts of rural society, there is 
therefore a common and shared sense of discontent towards the high level of 
political power.  
7.2.1. Conflict between pastoralists and farmers 
Conflicts between farmers and pastoralists are certainly not new in Tanzania. As a 
matter of fact, the villagization process in the 1970s accelerated the creation of 
villages where people from different tribes had to live together and share resources. 
This increased intra-society conflicts, in spite of Nyerere’s vision of unity, peace and 
cooperation. In 1975, a land use division agreement was decided by the government 
whereby grazing and farming activities were assigned specific areas of land (Msuya, 
2009). The land division system is in place, at least in theory, still today, but it is 
scarcely applied, and often challenged by both pastoralists and farmers.  
Yet, increased violence has been registered over the last decades. In particular, 
conflicts increased as a larger number of pastoralists started to migrate from the 
northern part of the country towards the central, southern and eastern areas – for 
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examples in several districts in the regions of Morogoro, Manyara, Coast, Lindi, 
Mbeya, Tanga and Dodoma - as a result of climate change, population growth and 
the expansion of areas under cultivation and land delimitated for national parks, 
which have reduced access to pasture and water resources (Mwamfupe, 2015). 
Except from some districts in Mbeya, Manyara and Dodoma, the other regions have 
historically not been characterized as important areas for livestock keeping. Hence, 
in the words of Mwamfupe:  
‘these conflicts are now being witnessed in predominantly crop cultivating 
areas which had no prior experience of livestock keeping, let alone 
experiences of other resource use conflicts. Indeed, this partly explains 
why farming communities label the herders as “invaders”’ (Mwamfupe, 
2015, p.2).  
For these reasons, violent clashes were reported in several parts of the country over 
the last years, for instance in December 2000, 38 farmers were killed during clashes 
in Kilosa district, Morogoro Region, while more recently, in January 2014, 10 
farmers died during conflicts in Kiteto district, Manyara Region (Makoye, 2014). 
State intervention to resolve these controversies has proven ineffective. The policies 
on land management are often contradictory. For example, as noted by Lugoe 
(2011), the Livestock Policy of 2006 recognises nomadism as an important aspect of 
pastoralism and encourages the move from overgrazed areas to lower grazed areas. 
However, the National Land Policy (the Land Act and the Village Act of 1999) 
prohibits nomadism in all its forms and does not regulate land ownership to herders 
(Lugoe, 2011, Mwamfupe, 2015). Furthermore, the attempt to confine livestock 
keepers to certain areas and to limit nomadism has proven difficult, as pastoralists 
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lament that these areas lack sufficient pastures and water or these resources are too 
far, and therefore defend nomadism as a survival technique (Kaney, 2014, 
Mwamfupe, 2015). Pastoralists also claim that the government is not protecting them 
and in some cases is actually conspiring to evict them and sell their land to foreign 
investors; for example in Loliondo the government has been accused of trying to sell 
1,500sq km of land inhabited by Maasai to a company based in the United Arab 
Emirates to create a game hunting reserve (Smith, 2014).  
On the other side, farmers accuse local officials of collision with pastoralists in an 
attempt to make them leave certain areas. For instance, in the most recent conflict in 
Kiteto district, Kizito Makoye, writing for the International Press Service, collected 
declarations from several farmers of the area who accused local officials of taking 
bribes from pastoralists to evict farmers from economically strategic areas and to 
influence political decisions to their disadvantage. Job Ndugai, the Deputy Speaker 
of the National Assembly of Tanzania, referred to this situation by stating that: 
‘Land disputes are fuelled by officials… Who have been soliciting bribes 
in terms of money and livestock from pastoralists to evict farmers on the 
pretext that the land occupied by farmers is a reserved area’ (Makoye, 
2014). 
These rumours have been dismissed as false by local officials, but this attitude of 
officials has also been noted in other circumstances (Benjaminsen, Maganga and 
Abdallah, 2009). For instance, Yefred Myenzi, a researcher from the Land Rights 
Research and Resource Institute (HakiArdhi) also argues that most of the conflicts 
are the results of decisions and actions taken by the state. According to the 
researcher, besides confusing land policies at national level, violation of laws by 
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district officials, corruption and weak law enforcement are causes of the struggle for 
resources. These adds to a lack of proper awareness and knowledge of the land 
tenure system and inadequate participation of local people in policy and law 
formation (Makoye, 2014; on this also Mwamfupe, 2015).  
The results of my study are not dissimilar. The conflicts between pastoralists and 
farmers should be analysed in their political dimension, looking at the role that state 
officials play in it. Although the villages in Coast Region where the interviews were 
conducted are not in the proximity of a natural reserve, almost 50% of the farmers 
interviewed reported one of their major problems to be the disruptions caused by 
cattle trespassing their fields (for greater details see Chapter 5). In general, as we will 
see below, farmers accused policemen of favouring pastoralists during their clashes, 
while local politicians were accused of not taking a strict stand on the issue and to be 
keeping an ambiguous position. In other words, not only is the state regarded as 
being weak and distant by farmers, it is also accused of being partial. 
The nature of these clashes and the discrepancies around the land management issue 
are exemplified by some episodes witnessed during the fieldwork in Coast region. 
During the fieldwork in November 2012, I met the chairperson of Dutumi, Mr 
Kanusu, near the river of the village, busy handling some trespassing issues and 
debating with farmers. The latter were showing and lamenting the disruption of their 
fields caused by cattle trespassing. Later on, Mr Kanusu showed me a fenced area 
near the town hall where all the cows ‘caught’ in farmers’ fields are kept, waiting for 
the pastoralists to claim them back and pay the trespassing fine to the council, which 
will then pass the amount paid to the farmers involved. Mr Kanusu explained to me 
that, being the village chairperson, the only thing he could do is to catch the cows 
and wait for the pastoralists to reclaim them. He adds that writing to the district and 
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asking for the problem to be addressed has proven ineffective. Nearby, in the 
Secondary School of the village of Kwala, it was not unusual to find cows ‘trapped’ 
in one of the classrooms, caught by students that would wait and hope for the owner 
to come and pay a release fee. The headmaster of the school, Mr Mitimingi, 
explained that:  
‘the students are catching the cows that invade the school area and keep 
them until the owner comes and pays about 100,000 TZ Shillings per cow 
[around £30]; this is happening more frequently this year, because it is 
very dry and the rains have not yet started [usually they start at the end of 
October]. The problem is that after a few weeks that this has been going 
on, now the owners are not coming back to get their cows, because they 
believe that their cows will die anyway later on because of starvation. 
Even the school has difficulties to keep these animals alive until the owner 
reclaim them, often the cows die and end up in the school canteen [eaten 
by the students]’ (Michael Mitimingi, 2013). 
Besides the declarations of the headmaster of the school, it was clear that the 
students had found an innovative way to ‘entertain’ themselves and to get money - 
although the school would eventually keep the money paid by the pastoralists to 
have their cows back - and were starting to take advantage of it, deliberately 
attracting the cows to enter the school compound with the intention to catch them. Of 
course, this is an isolated example, as farmers would have little interest to 
deliberately attract the cows in their fields just for the monetary return. This is 
because the produce that they may loose as a consequence of the trespassing may 
have a higher value of the compensation that they may get from the pastoralists. 
Moreover, individual farmers are less powerful than an institution such as the school 
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hence the probability to actually obtain the compensation are lower and uncertain. 
Nevertheless, the attitude of the students shows a disrespectful attitude towards the 
Maasai and Daatoga pastoralist minorities.  
These episodes in general exemplify the problem of cows trespassing and the tension 
between farmers and pastoralists within the communities interviewed in Coast 
region. The chairperson of Dutumi explains that ‘Kwala and Mperamumbi have been 
allocated to farmers, while in Dutumi and Msua the district allocated about 3,000 
acres for pastoralists, without specifying a limit on the amount of cattle that can be 
present in this area’ (Mkali Saidi Kanusu, 2012). This represents a problem for 
farmers in Dutumi, who are more exposed to cattle invasion in their field, as the 
cows are growing in number and the acres allocated do not suffice. In the case of 
trespassing, the law requires the owner of the cattle to compensate the farmers for 
the loss in their fields. If an agreement cannot be found there should be a court trial. 
However, several farmers interviewed in Mwembengozi and Msua complain that 
pastoralists never pay them back, or that pastoralists bribe policemen not to bring 
them to court for illegal trespassing (S.S.M., Mwembengozi, 2012; the chairperson 
of Mwembengozi, Mwimbe, 2012; F. M., Msua, 2012). In addition, pastoralists will 
only pay if they get caught, but often the cows get into farmers’ fields during the 
night, when it is more difficult for farmers to catch the animal and identify the owner 
to ask for a refund. Moreover, as reported by Kwala’s extension officer, it could 
happen that even though the procedures are followed, and there is a trial in court, 
pastoralists can afford to go to the court (which is in Mlandizi, a town about 30km 
away from the villages of Kwala and Dutumi) while the farmers cannot, so the 
pastoralists have more chances to win the cases (Mr Kimicho, 2012; also Miss 
Pengo, area representative of Msua, 2012). Pastoralists are not generally wealthier 
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than farmers, and actually their living conditions are usually of a lower material 
standard than those of the farmers in the villages interviewed. Very rarely do they 
have access to electricity, and their houses are isolated from the villages and built 
with wood, stray and mud. However, they usually have more disposable cash when 
they sell some of their livestock. As referred by one of my former Tanzanian 
students belonging to the Sukuma tribe, which is now a pastoralist with over 100 
cows in Mwembengozi, an adult cow sold in the local market could fetch up to 
400,000 Shillings (around £120), which could satisfy the food needs of a medium 
household for about two months (Mahene, 2015).  
References to physical and direct confrontation between farmers and livestock 
holders can be traced in some declarations given by farmers. For instance, H.A.F. 
(2012), a farmer in Kwala, affirms that he ‘only got a bike as a repayment for his 
loss [of crops], but if farmers want to have a full refund from the pastoralists they 
need to be strong’.  According to A.M.F., if you are a woman or an elder person, it is 
even more difficult to face the cattle owners, as ‘they are strong’ and many farmers 
are afraid of being beaten up or ‘even killed’ (A.M.F., Mwembengozi, 2012).  
These examples hint at a precarious peace within different parts of the society. 
Furthermore, such social tensions impacts upon the the political behaviours of the 
individuals involved. Indeed, the conflicts with pastoralists offer farmers a further 
opportunity to criticise state officials, as the farmers interviewed claimed for 
example that ‘their voices are not heard, as policemen prefer to defend the interests 
of pastoralists rather than the interests of agriculturalists, because pastoralists bribe 
them’ (A.P.N., Mongomole, 2012). For many farmers in this area, cattle trespassing 
is a major problem that affects their lives and for which they have to act individually 
as they feel that the state does not help them. J.R.S., a farmer from Msua, claims that 
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‘farmers cannot improve their life because of pastoralists, as you have to guard your 
farm all day while you could spend your time doing other jobs’ (J.R.S., 2012). 
Moreover, farmers complain that ‘they cannot keep any goats or cows, because they 
will get stolen by pastoralists’ (F.M., Msua, 2012). Several farmers expressed the 
wish for pastoralists such as the Maasai and Daatoga -commonly referred to by the 
interviewees with the derogatory term ‘Mang’ati’- to be ‘chased away’ (R.T., 
Dutumi, 2012). 
Not only are pastoralists believed to affect farmers’ livelihoods, but there is a general 
concern that future agricultural projects, such as the irrigation scheme of 
Mongomole, Kwala (see chapter 6 for details about this project) would be disrupted 
too, if this problem is not politically addressed by state officials. The chairperson of 
this scheme is very clear in this, and affirms:  
‘if the issues of pastoralists will not be addressed the project will be 
destroyed. The farmers will guard their farms but it takes only one small 
distraction to lose the produce of half an acre. The group of farmers 
involved in the project has asked the village committee and the district to 
address the issue and make firm decisions, for example limit the amount of 
cattle that the pastoralists can own in a determinate amount of space, and 
make sure that the pastoralists respect the rules. Moreover, it is important 
that pastoralists are kept far from the area where the project will be 
implemented’ (Mr Zanda, 2012).  
According to local politicians, it is difficult to estimate how many pastoralists live in 
a specific area because they live in secluded areas far from the villages (‘they hide in 
the bushes’ in the words of one of the local officers in Msua, 2012), and often do not 
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register their new born children, as they try to ‘escape governmental control’ and do 
not want to be forced to send their children to school (Miss Pengo, 2012). Hence, 
beside the problem of trespassing, there is a clear problem of integration, which adds 
complexity to the conflicts between them and the villagers. 
Admittedly, local politicians find it difficult to settle this conflict, caught between a 
tendency to defend farmers, which have ‘been born here and have the right to stay’ 
(Miss Pengo, 2012), and the revenues provided by the presence of pastoralist 
communities to local businesses, mostly recreational places and small grocery shops. 
Moreover, the local politicians interviewed (the chairperson of Kwala and the one 
from Dutumi, for example) blame the unclear land legislation, and the directives 
coming from district and central state officials, for creating a situation in which they 
are powerless to address the conflict in any effective way. Again then, unclear 
policies at the national level are seemingly complicit in rendering processes of local 
governance more difficult. 
At the same time, the district officials believe that the problem is within local 
jurisdiction and local officials ‘should enforce the law’ and use the land use plans 
formulated by the district in order to prevent intra-society conflicts. According to 
Sibara Singa, the Agricultural, Livestock and Cooperatives officer of Kibaha district, 
pastoralists tend not to respect these agreements and this makes it difficult for local 
officials to prevent the conflicts (2013). As was noted in the previous chapter, the 
fact that the state actors at different levels blame each other and the negative attitude 
towards rural villagers (both pastoralists and farmers) makes the understanding and 
prevention of conflicts even more complex. Furthermore, it makes it harder for both 
pastoralists and farmers to address resource management issues and clearly 
understand both state’s responsibilities and the rules they should abide to.  
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7.2.2. Difficulties of cooperative association 
Intra-societal antagonisms do not seem to be confined to farmer-pastoralist conflicts. 
Several politicians, farmers, scholars and members of civil society also believe that 
there is a general distrust within society, which impedes them from cooperating 
successfully and working together towards a common objective. The clashes 
between farmers and pastoralists are one expression of this general distrust. Further 
manifestation of distrust can be found in the difficulties of cooperation and the lack 
of a strong farmers’ movement and unions, that seem to characterise the areas 
studied. These forms of distrust not only depict a fragmented society, but are also 
important factors impacting coping strategies against food insecurity and farmers’ 
political engagement with the state. But if the struggle caused by unclear land 
ownership legislation is at the basis of the conflict between farmers and pastoralists, 
what is behind the difficulties of farmers to aggregate and create a strong movement 
or work within a cooperative structure?  
As one of the country’s most historically important channels of aggregation of 
farmers (Lyimo, 2012, p.127), this study will look at the cooperative movements to 
understand whether a reluctance towards general cooperation is connected to the 
historical evolution of agricultural cooperatives. It is essential to have a look at 
historical events that have influenced the way cooperatives are seen by rural society. 
Following a period of negative performance of the cooperatives already present in 
the country before independence, the Tanzanian state decided to nationalise all 
cooperatives in 1976, effectively abolishing them as autonomous farmer-led 
institutions (Coulson, 1982, p.152; Bryceson, 1993, pp.53-62; Lyimo, 2012, pp. 115-
118). In response, farmers tried to escape state control by, among other things, 
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diverting produce to the black market to sell at a higher price than the state-run 
cooperatives would offer.  
Meanwhile, the villagization process and the forced cooperation in the common 
fields were also to leave bitter memories. Many scholars report that villagers 
preferred to work in their personal plot as they could not see any benefit in working 
in the communal plot (Coulson, 1982, p. 242; Scott, 1998, p. 240). As explained in 
Chapter 4, the difficulties and problems of the villagization programme in the 
countryside created a series of problems at the social, economic and political level, 
where growing tensions between the farmers and the state were beginning to be felt 
(Sijm, 1997, p. 210-223; Raikes, 1982; and Scott, 1998, p. 239).  
In 1982 the government decided to re-introduce the cooperatives under the 
Cooperative Societies Act, but the control of the state and of the major party, Chama 
Cha Mapinduzi, was to remain strong. In 1991, further reforms were implemented 
with the objective to make the cooperatives more independent and involve the 
members in a more extended way. However, according to Lyimo, in reality the 
structure, objectives and rules of cooperatives were still strictly regulated by the state 
(Lyimo, 2012, p.115-117). 
In fact, even though this represented an attempt to move away from a top-down 
approach, the Tanzanian scholar believes that: 
‘the bottom-up approach had become a difficult strategy to be 
implemented successfully as farmers had been living under the support of 
the government, and hence there was a sense of dependence which 
critically eroded peasants’ confidence. There was lack of appropriate 
knowledge and the peasants believed that it was the role of the government 
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to initiate the formation of the cooperatives and to provide them with 
necessary financial resources, to supervise and control them in achieving 
the goals set by policy makers’ (ibid., p.118). 
Essentially, farmers had developed an understanding of cooperatives as an extension 
of the state, and had difficulties re-embracing the cooperative structure in 
autonomous terms.  
Recently, there have been some positive changes, for example with the Cooperative 
Society Act of 2003 affirming that  
‘the Bill will enable members to determine their own cooperative structure 
and destiny, build their share capital through member contributions, use 
such capital to access bank loans, and in general operate under conditions 
and reduced dependence on government assistance’ (Tanzania Parliament 
online, no date).  
As a consequence of this act the number of cooperatives present in the countryside 
has actually increased. In June 2008 there was a total of 8,551 Cooperative Societies 
in the country, of which 2,614 were registered as ‘agricultural marketing cooperative 
societies’ (Lyimo, 2012, p. 122).  
Nevertheless, as noted by Maghimbi, less than 80% of registered cooperatives are 
active, and management problems persist, with most of the active cooperatives being 
largely indebted with banks (Maghimbi, 2010, p.30). Furthermore, a large number of 
cooperatives have a short lifespan, as highlighted by the Coast Regional 
Commissioner, Ms Mwantumu Mahiza (AllAfrica, 2014). Bringing the example of 
the failure of the Coast Region Cooperative Union (CORECU), Ms Mahiza accuses 
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the leaders of several cooperatives to having been using the cooperatives’ money for 
their own personal projects leading to a failure of cooperatives themselves (ibid., 
2014). The Cooperative Reform and Modernization Program of 2005-2015 tries to 
address cooperatives issues, recognising these being ‘poor management, 
inappropriate cooperative structures, a lack of working capital, a lack of cooperative 
democracy and education, weak supporting institutions, and some instances of 
corruption and embezzlement’ (MF Transparency, 2011, p.8). In order to do so, this 
program has promoted efforts within the cooperatives to adopt a stronger regulatory 
framework and increase supervision. The results of this program should be seen in 
the next few years.  
Yet, very few of the farmers interviewed in both Coast and Kilimanjaro Regions take 
part in a farmers’ union, movement, or cooperative, showing that the recent 
increased number of cooperatives are to be found mostly in the proximities of urban 
areas. Bibby (2006) noted that in 2006 there were nearly twice as many cooperatives 
societies in urban areas than rural, and this is probably still the case. In the 
meanwhile, many cooperatives seem to be suffering also from the changes in the 
international market. Indicative is the case of coffee cooperatives in Kilimanjaro 
region. The Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union, one of the oldest and largest 
cooperatives in Tanzania, has recently been hardly hit by falling coffee prices at the 
international level and a declining production in many districts caused by the 
inability of the cooperative to continue offering input support to its members 
(Temba, 2013 and 2014). Furthermore, the internal structure of the cooperative 
started trembling as several of its members decided to sell their produce to a 
competing group of primary cooperative societies, the so called ‘G32’ that would 
pay a better price (Simbeye, 2013). Smaller cooperatives also suffered from the 
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declining price of coffee on the global market. For instance, in Kilimanjaro region, 
Mwanga district, in the village of Usangi, there used to be several coffee 
cooperatives but most of them are now disbanded, following the international food 
prices crisis in 2008 (chairperson of Kigare, 2013). Of the farmers interviewed in 
this area, only one was still cultivating coffee, and selling it to a cooperative in a 
nearby village, but many other farmers reported to have stopped cultivating coffee 
and to have gone back to maize, bananas, potatoes and minor crops, moving from 
cash crops to subsistence crops. 
The farmers interviewed reported being sceptical about the effectiveness of 
cooperatives, for instance S.S. says ‘what is the point of having a cooperative? Even 
if we meet, we can talk about our problems all day, but then there will still be the 
problem of dryness, so what will we change? Unless you believe that dancing around 
a fire will call the rain…’ (S.S., Mwembengozi, 2012). Other farmers stress the 
‘exclusivity’ of cooperative groups. For example, A.M.F. (2012) is over 60 years old 
and lives in a thatched house with her two grandchildren in Mwembengozi; she 
claims that no group would want her because she is old and slow to dig. In other 
cases, farmers believe that ‘it is difficult to be part of a cooperative because once the 
group is formed it is not really open to new members’ (R.H., Kigare, 2013). This 
echoed what has been argued by a member of the WFO and the RUDI organization 
(Miss Negroponte, 2013 and Mr Sambuo, 2013). In general, and as exemplified by 
the failure of the cooperative water irrigation scheme project in Kwala, Kibaha 
district, missing self-regulation mechanisms, implementation problems, unclear 
responsibilities and misuse of funds seem to be at the heart of the failure, and hence 
disillusionment with cooperative efforts. 
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Besides the participation to cooperative societies, the vast majority of the farmers 
interviewed reported that they did not meet with other farmers to discuss problems in 
their fields. For example, Edrissa, a farmer in Mperamumbi, admits that ‘if farmers 
want to contest governmental policy or bring forward special requests or ask for 
assistance it is better to act as a group’. However, he also claims that he does not like 
to be employed or work with a group of people, but he ‘prefers to be free and work 
by himself, even if this means being poorer’ (E., Mperamumbi, 2012). E.’s desire to 
be autonomous is explained by his belief that it is better to be his own employer and 
that by himself he can better manage his farm and satisfy his households’ needs. 
Disillusionment and doubts over the effectiveness of joining a group are clearly the 
result of past negative experiences that farmers had in the past. Even small initiatives 
that were started autonomously did not succeed. For example, in Dutumi a group of 
farmers got together and were given some water pumps from the government in 
order to start producing vegetables in a field nearby the village (see Chapter 6), 
while in Mwembengozi, another group of farmers bought and shared several 
watering cans to irrigate their field not too far from the river. Both these group 
initiatives stopped after a few months, because of management related problems and 
mismanagement of inputs, which made farmers reluctant to take part in future 
similar initiatives (chairperson of Mwembengozi, 2012). 
The reasons behind the difficulties of cooperative associations and the reticence to 
cooperate expressed by several farmers have been explored by several studies. 
According to Kelsall, the heterogeneous nature of society in Tanzania is amongst the 
reasons that limit the ability of farmers to aggregate and act collectively (Kelsall, 
2002, p.64, 65 and 163). According to the scholar, time management, in a society 
where farmers have to find other sources of income other than agriculture in order to 
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satisfy households’ needs, is also an issue (ibid., 2002, pp.56-63). Several farmers 
and members of NGOs and international organizations interviewed, partly confirm 
this hypothesis, affirming that cooperatives ‘have a hard time if the members do not 
know each other well, while they may work better if the members are part of the 
same religious or tribe group’ (F.T.M., Mwembengozi, 2012, also Rohrabach, from 
World Bank, 2013). Essentially, it is important that the members of the group share 
common interests, beyond the economic sphere. Moreover, in order for group 
initiatives to succeed, ‘farmers need to see the results, they need to know what are 
the future perspectives in order to get interested and get involved in projects and 
initiatives coming from outside’, as explained by Mr Lukas, from Lonagro, a society 
that sells agricultural inputs in Dar es Salaam (2013). 
A further idea that could explain the difficulties of cooperatives to succeed and the 
lack of strong movements is expressed by Hyden (1980), and Spalding (1996a), who 
both believe that farmers in Tanzania are essentially (and have been, historically) 
individualistic and not used to obeying a central authority or cooperating with each 
other. The idea that ‘Nyerere got it wrong’, in the sense that he misunderstood the 
nature of Tanzanian rural society, comes forth strongly in work by Hyden (1980 and 
1983), and is also shared by later scholars. Shivji, for example, believes that certain 
values promoted by Nyerere’s Ujamaa, such as equality, are ‘alien and not organic’ 
to rural citizens’ perceptions (Shivji, 1995, pp.153, 158). Kelsall talks about a 
‘keenly individualistic streak’ he witnessed in analysing communities in Arumeru 
district (Kelsall, 2004, p.10). But, importantly, this assumption is even shared by 
some of the people interviewed. For instance, David Rohrabach (2013), from the 
World Bank, believes that:  
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‘farmers are in general individualist, they farm their own plot of land, 
operate their own machinery, sell their own crops, and like to operate 
individually, while they often do not do well in group. The level of 
participation to the various projects varies, it depends on the project and 
how it is implemented. Often you can see that an organization is formed 
for a particular project, but after the project terminates the organization 
collapse’ (Mr Rohrabach, 2013).  
Actually, individualistic attitudes, reciprocal jealousy and scarce community 
cooperation emerged in farmers’ accounts of certain episodes, such as the one 
reported by a farmer in Dutumi, A.H. According to his report, in 2011 a wealthy 
farmer of Kwala was able to get a lot of rice in his farm, and could not harvest all of 
it. Many villagers, from both Dutumi and Kwala, asked him to have the opportunity 
to harvest some of his rice and keep it for themselves, but he was very firm in not 
letting anyone touch his farm, even though that meant that most of the rice was 
wasted (A.H., Dutumi, 2012). In another occasion, a farmer in Mwembengozi 
reported that sometimes he hires a water pump from another farmer, but ‘when the 
owner of the water pump sees that [he is] doing well, he gets jealous and asks to 
have the water pump back’ (R.C.S., Mwembengozi, 2012). A.O., a farmer over 60 
years of age that lives in Msua with her four young grand-daughters, reports that ‘in 
old days, during Ujamaa, farmers were working in cooperatives, but now everybody 
is more individualistic, some people are lazy while others work hard so there are no 
cooperatives anymore. During Nyerere farmers were helping each other, but now all 
of that is dead, we only work for ourselves and do things for ourselves’ (A.O., Msua, 
2012).  
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Other farmers look at cultural reasons behind the lack of a strong farmers’ movement 
and the decline of cooperative work. For instance, H.A.F., a farmer from the Zaramo 
tribe who lives in Kwala, claims that ‘there are no cooperatives here; the Zaramo 
tribe do not know how to help each other and work together. In Kilimanjaro it is 
different…’ (H.A.F., Kwala, 2012). Some officials from Kibaha district share this 
thought, recalling some of the stereotypes about Coast region farmers reported in the 
previous chapter. However, the results from Kilimanjaro region were no different, 
and except for a greater number of independent microfinance groups led by women, 
cooperation between farmers was weak. Does this support the idea that all farmers in 
Tanzania are individualistic though? 
The argument of the individualistic character of Tanzanian farmers might offer some 
degree of insight into the situations observed, but it needs to be analysed in its 
specific context. Given the structure of the households visited during the fieldwork, 
in which mutual social assistance and family support were evident, it is difficult to 
believe that individualistic attitudes permeate all aspects of daily life. It is also more 
difficult to believe that individualism could be an inherent part or character of a 
whole community. It is more probable to think that some individualistic attitudes are 
the result of past experiences, disillusionment and distrust after the failure of past 
projects and loss of self-confidence, which led to a fear of failure in future group 
projects, or in the belief that group action is ineffective and/or pointless. Under this 
light, individualism is not an inner quality in the character of farmers, but is their 
response to a situation of discontent. In fact, cooperation and community sharing of 
wealth can be traced in other circumstances, for instance in the large family support 
within the households, in festivity events, and also in the sharing of food coming as 
food aid from the state and other organization during periods of food emergency.  
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Furthermore, farmers do cooperate and take part in projects if they feel directly 
involved and part of the decision process. If the failure and mismanagement of 
cooperatives in the past and the problems of working as a part of a group have put 
off farmers to cooperate, other circumstances have demonstrated that in certain 
conditions farmers are willing to cooperate. Empowerment is a determinant factor in 
affecting the level of involvement of farmers in different initiatives. In the following 
section, we will see how some of the results of the fieldwork have indicated that 
where a bottom up approach is implemented farmers are more willing to cooperate 
and the project is more likely to succeed.  
7.3. Different approach, different results? Cooperative attitudes between 
farmers under programmes following a bottom-up approach 
Initiatives such as the Farmer Field School (FFS), promoted by the FAO, and firstly 
introduced in Zanzibar by IFAD in 2007, and embraced by several NGOs that work 
in rural areas and deal with agriculture, seem to have success in the countryside and 
the number of farmers that participate in such projects is in continued growth, 
according to Mr Laizer (FAO coordinator of the FFS in Tanzania, interviewed in 
2013). The FFS are based on a principle of bottom up group-based learning and 
experimenting. Differently from the historical approach of the Tanzanian 
government (which sees the figure of the extension officer as central in providing the 
right farming mode to be reproduced by the rest of the farmers in the group), in the 
FFS all farmers have equal deciding power and take the decisions based on a 
democratic process. Initially, the FAO pays for the inputs and usually one of the 
farmers of the group donates the field. Part of the produce is shared, and the other is 
usually sold, in order to have a fund to sustain the costs of running the project in 
future years. According to a study conducted by Davis et al. (2010), in Tanzania the 
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FFS and their bottom up approach have improved income and increased agricultural 
income to the members. The FFS seem to also have a positive impact on food 
security (Larsen and Bie Lilleør, 2014).  The success of these projects compared to 
the ones promoted by the state confirms that the problem with state’s policy is 
mainly a problem of approach. A study conducted by Braun and Duveskog (2008) 
also underlines how the key of success of the FFS is to be found in the participatory 
approach used. Raphael Laizer, the FAO coordinator of the FFS in Tanzania agrees: 
‘The FFS approach develops knowledge, attitudes and practices, and 
promotes participation. Farmers prefer to get together through the FFS, 
because these use a participative approach, where farmers have full 
decisional power and learn even through making mistakes. Moreover, 
farmers are cooperating with each other because the group is self-selected 
and they decide the rules of the group themselves’ (Laizer, 2013).  
Similar initiatives are also run by local NGOs, such as the Rural Urban Development 
Initiative, which trains farmer groups and helps them improve their marketing skills. 
Sebastian Sambuo, representative of this NGO, on farmers’ attitude towards 
cooperatives and on the initiatives run by his organization, claims that:  
‘Cooperatives have a bad reputation because of political interference on 
them in the past. Autonomous groups, such as the ones supported by RUDI 
are outside the government, so farmers are more inclined to participate’ 
(Sambuo, 2013).  
But the bottom up approach and the level of autonomy in these projects are not the 
only factors accounting for success. In fact, in the previous section we saw that other 
projects, started autonomously by groups of farmers were not successful. Where is 
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the difference between the projects promoted by the FAO and RUDI and those 
initiated by smaller autonomous groups? It is clear that the presence, the follow up, 
the initial training and the expertise and the funding provided by the organizations 
that promote such initiatives to the group of farmers makes the difference in the 
projects outcome. Bahati Maregewe, from the Tanzania Agricultural Productivity 
Programme
45
 and Marina Negroponte, from the World Food Programme, underline 
that it is extremely important to empower farmers and create ownership of the 
project in order to promote efficiency and create the conditions in which farmers 
have an interest to maintain and continue the project as a group. Nevertheless, they 
admit that ‘initially lots of follow-up and close assistance are needed, but once the 
farmers see the benefits of working as a part of a group they have no problems in 
cooperate with each other’ (Negroponte, 2013). For the P4P programme,46 for 
example, Negroponte claims that  
‘it took about five years to run smoothly, and for the people to be 
convinced that they could benefit from this. Before being involved in the 
P4P, households were producing an average of 1.4 metric tonnes of maize 
per year, but now they are producing about 4.1 metric tonnes per year, and 
more people want to take part in this project’ (ibid, 2013).  
It is important to note that extension officers also participate in many of these 
programmes, but while they can provide advice and assistance, it is the farmers 
themselves that have full decision-making power. The extension officer, in projects 
such as the Farmer Field School, is more of a guide and behaves like a member of 
                                                          
45 The Tanzania Agricultural Productivity Programme (TAPP) is a USAID funded programme 
that support local NGOs to assist farmers with the use of technology in agriculture and creating 
connection with the market.  
46 The P4P programme is funded by the Gates Foundation, and aims at promoting and helping 
local farmers by buying the food aid needed and distributed in the country from local farmers in 
areas where there is a surplus of food production.  
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the group rather than an imposing teacher. According to Braun and Duveskog (2008) 
this approach makes a big difference to the harmony and the cooperative spirit of the 
group. This has also been claimed by several of the people interviewed (Negroponte, 
2013; Sambuo, 2013; Laizer, 2013; Mwatima Juma, 2013; Maregewe, 2013).   
Nevertheless, like many state initiatives, these projects also target some areas of the 
country (the North for example) and neglect others. For instance, in the areas 
interviewed in Kibaha district and in Mwanga district there were no programmes of 
this sort. With the support provided by initiatives such as the FFS (expertise, training 
and funding), cooperation between farmers in these areas could be successful and 
improve their lives. With the right premises and if they feel ownership over the 
project, farmers are willing to work together. This hypothesis is confirmed by a 
project that I personally started in the secondary school of Kwala in October 2011 
(still ongoing), and observed throughout the following years. This project, sponsored 
by the Rotary Club, had as a first objective the creation of a school garden to 
cultivate vegetables for the school canteen, and gave an interesting insight into the 
vision of agriculture by the younger generation of future farmers, as well as 
showcasing their ability to work as members of a group. Most children (between 12 
and 18 years of age) that volunteered to participate belonged to a farming  household 
and saw themselves as future full-time or part-time farmers (as a side activity to run 
while also doing another economic activity). The results were surprising. In 2011, 
the first group comprised 30 members, and the area cultivated was around one acre, 
while today the group is composed by around 120 students which cultivate an area 
bigger than three acres, and includes a poultry farm with over 40 chickens. With 
minimal supervision, the students were able to share the workload, create several 
groups to share activities, and write their own code of conduct, with penalties and 
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awards to the members according to their contribution to the project. They keep a 
daily journal and attend theoretical agricultural lessons at the school based on the 
national educational curricula on agriculture. 
The Rotary pays for the inputs, the seeds and the salary of the teacher that supervises 
the project. Initially I supervised the students; we had meetings where we discussed 
together an organizational structure and where I offered assistance and guidance. 
After this short period of training, the students were given full decision-making 
power; they followed a voting system to decide how to share the workload, what to 
plant and where, to take care of irrigation, manure and fertilizer, and to organize, 
share and cook the vegetables after harvesting. Most of the times the students prefer 
to cook the vegetables at the school and eat them together with the other members, 
rather than taking their share home. According to the vice master of the school, Mr 
Ngimba, the project: 
‘has proven successful in many ways, it has increased students’ 
confidence, their knowledge of different agricultural practices, their ability 
to use the little resources available, and it has demonstrated that agriculture 
can be successful if the resources are used in an efficient way’ (Ngimba, 
2013).  
Moreover, it has helped students develop a spirit of team work, and a passion for 
agricultural activities, while also improving their organizational skills, and their 
nutrition (Ngimba, 2013). One of the students participating, Hamisi Abdallah, 
reported that: ‘this project made me realise than being part of a group can be fun, 
especially if you can decide the next step. I feel like being an important part of the 
group, and I am proud of the results’ (Abdallah, 2013).  
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The assessment of this small project adds to the declarations of representatives of 
international organizations and NGOs interviewed (from FAO, IFAD, WB, RUDI, 
TAPP, etc.) and lends support to one of the thesis’ key claims that individualism, 
distrust and an unwillingness to cooperate are not an intrinsic part of rural society, 
but instead depend on the terms and conditions upon which projects are developed 
and implemented. Farmers need to see the benefits and to understand and share the 
values of the project, as well as feeling a part of the group and having decision-
making power. Initial guidance, founding and follow up are also very important for a 
project to be successful and to create a basis of sustainability.  
Therefore, the reasons behind the scarce participation of farmers in state-driven 
initiatives need to be found outside a supposed inner individualistic character that 
authors such as Hyden (1980) and Kelsall (2004) had identified. The reasons behind 
farmers’ distrust towards state officials both at local, district and national level and 
their reticence towards cooperation needs to be explored in their historical context. 
In the following sections the modalities in which discontent is expressed at a 
political level will be explained.  
7.4. Coping strategies towards food security and farmers’ engagement with the 
state 
The lack of a strong farmers’ movement has been interpreted as a form of political 
passivity by scholars such as Kelsall, who, writing about the lack of a strong 
movement in opposition to the ‘hegemonic ambitions’ of the state, argued that: 
‘What is most interesting about rural Tanzania in the independence period is not its 
degree of politicization; it is its passivity’, (Kelsall, 2004, p.8).  
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True, historically very little has been done to involve and promote rural citizens’ 
participation in political life. Following liberalisation, since the early 1990s, 
Tanzania witnessed a change in the structure of power dynamics, which became less 
state centric and more ‘multi-level’, with a ‘horizontal shift of responsibilities from 
government to NGOs and civil society actors’ (Havnevik et al., 2010, p.4). 
Moreover, since the 1990s there has been the introduction of a multi-party system 
and further devolution of power to the regional and district administrations. 
However, as noted in Chapter 4, these changes do not seem to have led to greater 
participation of rural areas citizens in political life. Actually, the decentralization 
process was a way to enforce the control of central state officials over local decisions 
(Hyden, 1980, pp.134-141; Coulson, 1982, p.254; Ninsin, 1988, pp.234-265; 
Olorunsola, 1988, pp.192-193). It is also debatable how much the introduction of the 
multi-party system has contributed to the process of democratization; despite the 
presence of about 18 parties, only five are represented in the Parliament, and the 
opposition lacks a realistic and comprehensive political programme, which makes 
the major party, CCM, a winner in all national elections (Shivji, 2005, Ewald, 2010, 
pp.223-253). According to Ewald, ‘one of the main constraints for the emergence of 
a more democratic society was and still is the lack of arenas for participation and 
voicing opinion’ (Ewald, 2010, p.236). The state tends to suppress criticism, for 
example by not renewing licenses for business people or by supressing 
demonstrations and public meetings. At the same time, the employees of the public 
sphere cannot stand in any election, but they have to resign first, and run the risk of 
not being employed again if they had campaigned for the opposition (ibid., p. 243).   
 The limited political engagement of farmers, as we have seen in the previous 
chapters, can be seen in the poor attendance at local meetings, in the lack of strong 
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political movements and direct contestations, in their scepticism of collaboration 
with state officials, and in the relatively poor electoral turnout. Citizens’ turnout to 
elections in Tanzania has been generally lower than 50%, and has declined over the 
years recording the lowest rate of 37.53% in the last parliamentary elections of 2010. 
The turnout for Presidential election was at 40.71% (International IDEA, 2015). This 
runs counter to the growing level of political participation in neighbouring Kenya for 
example, where electoral turnout has been on the rise from 40.9% in 1992 to 55.6% 
in the 2013 Parliamentary elections.
47
 Within this data, it is difficult to know the 
electoral turnout of farming communities compared to citizens employed in other 
sectors or living in the cities. Nonetheless, most of the chairpersons interviewed 
agreed that rural communities feel closer to local politicians, because they know 
them better and feel that they belong to their same social group. It is plausible to 
assume that local elections are more participated in than national ones. Therefore, in 
the words of Mr Msemakweli (chairperson of Kwala): 
‘The common people do not really understand much of politics, or of the 
power dynamics between different parties. The key for a political party to 
win the national elections [and gain the trust and the vote of rural citizens] 
is to have charming representatives and a good amount of funds to run the 
campaigns in the villages’ (Mr Msemakweli, 2013).  
                                                          
47 In other nearby countries such as in Zambia and Uganda the electoral turnout (considered as 
the percentage of the voting aged population that actually voted) is more variable over the 
years. In the last elections the electoral turnout for Zambia was at 42.25% for Parliamentary 
elections in 2011, while it recorded its historical lowest rate at 24.17% for Presidential 
elections in 2015 that follow the dead of the former President Michael Sata. In Uganda the 
electoral turnout for the last elections in 2011 was at 55.32% for both Parliamentary and 
Presidential elections. Rwanda is, differently from the other countries of the area, characterized 
by a very high percentage in electoral turnout, reaching 99.38% for the last Parliamentary 
elections in 2013 and 89.17% for the Presidential elections in 2010 (data retrieved from the 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, International IDEA, 2015).  
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This claim is important as it partially explain why the ruling party has been in power 
since independence, and confirms the concerns expressed by several scholars (such 
as Shivji, 2005; Pinkney, 2005; Edwal, 2010) about the difficulties of the opposition 
parties to run an effective electoral campaign, as they have less financial resources 
and a weaker political manifesto than CCM.  
The reasons behind the low participation of farmers in electoral politics are diverse. 
As argued in Chapter 4, it can be interpreted as the consequence of an effort of 
farming communities to escape state control over their way of life. While this may 
indicate a willingness of rural communities to preserve their tribal costumes and 
traditions, it also underlines how the tendency of the state to exercise control in rural 
areas in a top-down manner is at the basis of state-society alienation. In fact, the 
diffused presence of formal institutions and state control in the countryside was 
resented by the population and has certainly contributed at harshening the 
relationship between the state and farmers, creating an ‘alienated, demoralised, and 
uncooperative peasantry’ (Scott, 1998, p.237). At the same time, it can be argued 
that the central control and expanded bureaucracy that characterised Tanzanian 
politics at least until the mid-1980s was an answer to ‘peasant resistance’ and a way 
to force rural communities to accept the introduction of new methods and crops 
(Coulson, 1982, p.162).  
Hence, this thesis argues that farmers’ alienation towards the state does not translate 
into complete political apathy. As noted by Scott (1998) and Mamdani et al. (1988) 
there are several ways to show dissent, and the ‘exit option’, characterised by 
citizens deliberately choosing not to take part in direct contestation, could be one of 
these, and represents a reaction to policy discontent. Moreover, the previous chapters 
have described examples of farmers rejecting (or even deriding) policies and advice 
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from the district, local and extension officers - for instance the case of sorghum 
plantation in Mwanga district. Other episodes pointed at farmers boycotting formal 
meetings - see the example of the scarce participation to public meetings in Usangi, 
and the example in Kwala when farmers did not participate to meetings to discuss 
the problems of the irrigation project. 
This rejection, or ‘passive resistance’ in the words of Raikes (1982),48 is clearly a 
form of indirect political engagement and challenging of the state. Hence, in 
summary, and as it has been explained in the current and in the previous chapters, 
the communities interviewed mainly showed two forms of reaction to state policies: 
non-compliance and boycott or non-participation in political events (mostly 
meetings). Furthermore, the coping strategies adopted by farmers to improve their 
livelihoods and food security are also political. In fact, the choice of resorting to 
illegal practices (such as intensive charcoal production and game hunting) is a 
further proof of a society which does not recognise or respect state’s authority.  
7.4.1. Coping strategies for food security 
The cash needs arising from a liberalisation of services in the 1980s pushed farmers 
to search for other forms of income. Thus, the phenomenon of depeasantisation, as 
described by Bryceson (in Havnevik et al., 2010, pp.76-81), is common in rural 
Tanzania, where agriculture alone is not sufficient to cover household needs. There 
are different options that farmers pursue as alternatives or in addition to farming.  In 
the Coast region the main alternative in rural areas is charcoal production. For 
instance, in Kibaha region, one of the districts surveyed, the production of charcoal 
is very popular amongst farmers: more than 30% of the farmers interviewed admitted 
                                                          
48 Raikes (1982) talked about ‘passive resistance’ referring to the attitude of farmers to resist 
and escape modernisation, boycotting state’s initiatives and resisting change in the countryside.  
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to producing charcoal as a side activity, and in dry seasons they rely on charcoal 
production to satisfy their economic needs. Especially in more isolated areas, such as 
between Mperamumbi and Msua, farmers engage in this activity as they claim that 
‘agricultural productivity is extremely low because of weather condition and dry 
soil’ (L.V., Mperamumbi, 2012).  
As an example, in Dutumi, A.U.K., a farmer of over 70 years of age, told me that he 
wakes up every morning at 5.30 am, he takes care of his farm after an hour of 
walking and later on he goes to the bushes to cut trees to prepare charcoal. He does 
so by piling the wood collected and covering it with soil and mud, leaving some 
holes for the oxygen to go through. He puts fire on the wood through one of these 
holes. The wood will burn very slowly for several hours, usually one day, and when 
there is no more smoke coming out, indicating that the combustion is over, the 
charcoal is ready to be collected and separated from the soil. If he works hard, in two 
to three days A.U.K. can collect enough wood to burn and fill a bag of 20 kg of 
charcoal. He sells the charcoal collected to one of the middlemen of the area that will 
bring and sell it in Dar es Salaam. Mr Kirunga will get about 4,500 TZ Shillings 
(less than 2 £) for this bag of charcoal. The price for the same bag of charcoal in Dar 
es Salaam could be three times higher, up to 20,000 TZ Shillings (around 7£). Many 
other farmers in this region follow this routine (A.U.K., 2012). 
According to the chairperson of Dutumi, Mr Kanusu, preparing charcoal is the only 
alternative source of income for many farmers in this area, despite the fact that the 
Tanzanian government has declared this activity illegal in forest areas (Mr Kanusu, 
2012). It had also initiated a two-weeks ban and several dis-incentivising measures 
in 2006 to discourage this practice in the country, albeit with very little success 
(World Bank, 2010, pp.15-29). There are about 450 farmers in the village of Dutumi, 
 
 
294 
each household counts five to eight people, and almost half of these households are 
at risk of seasonal food insecurity, according to Mr Kanusu. He claims that farmers 
know that charcoal cutting is not a healthy option, but there are no alternatives, 
despite ‘the lack of rains being directly connected with people cutting trees’ (Mr 
Kanusu, 2012). A belief shared by many other farmers interviewed, for example 
S.S.K., who claims that ‘his future depends on charcoal, despite making charcoal 
brings less rain, but there is not much else to do’ (S.S.K., Msua, 2012). The 
connection between deforestation and change in rain patterns has been recently 
supported by some scientists when analysing deforestation in Brasil and Congo (for 
instance by Spraklen, 2012, and Aragao, 2012), but it is curious to note that in 
Tanzania it is a notion easily found in the school curricula, and widely known to 
children: sign of the government’s efforts to discourage the practice of cutting trees.  
Besides the production of charcoal, an activity generally run by men, there are 
several petty businesses initiatives in all the villages surveyed, usually run by 
women. In Kilimanjaro region, the situation is not much different, with the main 
coping strategies against food insecurity being represented by petty business, cutting 
and selling grass to feed animals in house captivity, and the sale or exchange of milk 
and/or vegetables to acquire basic produce such as maize flour, again at the expense 
of diversification and nutritional value. The so called mama-ntilie, are women that 
cook different kind of meals in the street, from breakfast - chapatti, sambusa, cake, 
bread, fried cassava or sweet potatoes and so on from a price range of 200-500 TZ 
shillings a piece - to lunch and dinner - rice or ugali with beans and mchicha or okra, 
often accompanied by a piece of stewed chicken, goat or cow meat, or the more 
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expensive chips-mayai
49
 for a price range of 1500-2500 TZ Shillings. A good 
percentage of women within the farming households interviewed in both Kibaha and 
Mwanga districts are involved in some sort of alternative activity, among which 
cooking in the street is the most common. This is especially true in bigger villages 
(such as those of Kwala and Kigare), where the presence of primary and secondary 
schools opens the doors to more market opportunities. It is ironic to find the same 
people who are at risk of being food insecure cooking food for other people, but the 
cash needed to pay for services such as education and health service push many 
women in the farming households to seek another source of income rather than 
agriculture. As explained by the chairperson of Kigare:  
‘Farmers want their children to get an education so they can get jobs in the 
cities and help them when they are older. This is why they look for other 
jobs: to pay for their children to go to school. Maybe they will mostly eat 
ugali and beans for several months, but providing an education for their 
children is their priority’ (Mr Doyle, 2013). 
Other strategies used in order to be able to satisfy the household exigencies over the 
years have a direct impact on the quantity and quality of food consumed in the 
household. Many farmers interviewed in Coast region revealed that they are selling 
all their rice at harvest time and then buying maize to satisfy their food needs during 
the year in the small shops in the villages. According to the results of the interviews, 
there are several reasons why they decide to sell all of their rice production during 
the harvest season: they do not have storage facilities to keep their rice, they need 
disposable income for other needs such as education and health services, and they 
                                                          
49 Chappati is a traditional type of round-shaped and flat bread, sambusa is a fried snack filled 
with potatoes or/and meat. Mchicha is a kind of spinach cultivated locally. Chips-mayai is a dish 
made of fries and eggs, a sort of omelette made with fried potatoes.  
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can feed the family for a longer period of time with maize because it is cheaper than 
rice at the market price.  
However, while it is true that maize is cheaper than rice in shops, a closer analysis 
demonstrates that farmers sell their harvest mainly because of a lack of storage 
facilities, and their decision is not driven by food preferences (in Chapter 4 it was 
mentioned that for many farmers rice is preferred to maize) or economic logic. In 
fact, during harvest time the selling price for rice is lower, because the offer is high, 
hence the amount that farmers get by selling rice almost equates the price that they 
pay later during the year to buy maize from middlemen sellers. As a consequence, by 
choosing maize instead of rice there is a loss in nutritional value and a relatively 
small gain in economic value for farmers. Moreover, not all of the income coming 
from the sale of rice is used to purchase food, but it is shared to satisfy the several 
needs of the household, such as education, health, clothes, housing maintenance and 
so on. As a result, if the income coming from the sales of rice is not enough to cover 
all these needs throughout the year, the household will be at risk of food insecurity in 
the months preceding the following harvest, when they lower the food intake or have 
to find other sources of income to satisfy their food needs.  
In addition to these risks, to rely on one crop is never a safe decision, as the 
experience of P., a young woman farming in the village of Kwala, demonstrates. In 
2012 she did not get any rice from her acre and a half because a rice disease had 
affected her plants. Because she had planted nothing but rice, she was facing a year 
of extreme food insecurity, without harvest and without any income, relying on the 
help of neighbours and family to support herself and her child. She blamed the 
extension officers for not helping her and providing her the ‘medicine’ to treat her 
crop. Because of these problems, many farmers in this region had started to keep 
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chickens or cultivate different crops in their field, beside rice. Amongst them, 
P.T.M., a farmer and father of seven young children in Kwala, decided to start 
keeping and selling chickens. His field was also affected by the rice disease, but 
thanks to his chickens he was able to get about 700,000 TZ Shillings, by selling 70 
chickens. He believes that ‘chickens make more money than agriculture, and they 
saved [his] household from starving’ while his one-acre farm was affected by the 
disease. He also said that thanks to the income raised from the sales of chickens he 
could increase the area under cultivation, up to two acres, and introduce other crops 
such as beans and cassava (P.T.M., 2012).  
During the fieldwork it has also emerged that there is a high level of illegal activities 
from the younger generations: at school level, the headmaster of Kwala Secondary 
School revealed that some students ‘engage in sexual activities in the village because 
their parents - who are farmers and live in villages nearby - are not able to provide 
for them, and this seems to them to be the only way to acquire enough cash to 
purchase food while they are in school’50 (Mitimingi, 2012).  
It is clear that different households pursue different coping strategies, or a mix of 
those presented above. Yet, if these activities are analysed with respect to food 
security at the household level, it becomes evident that they do not represent a 
plausible long-term solution to food insecurity. The choice of selling the rice 
                                                          
50 Despite the Tanzanian government wishes everybody to attend secondary schools, public 
schooling in the country is not free and can actually represent a high cost for poor families. 
Moreover, children that live in isolated villages, which are usually the poorest, have to live and 
study in bigger villages where the schools are located; hence they have to also sustain the cost 
of renting a room. Generally, the secondary schools have a canteen where the students can eat, 
but this has also a cost that many families cannot afford.  
Concerning the abuses and prostitution tendencies, many schools in rural areas have a problem 
of limited staff; therefore, in most occasions the students are not supervised or protected. 
Moreover, the students often do not trust the teachers themselves. For example, in 2011 the 
previous headmaster of Kwala Secondary School has been accused of abuses towards several 
students in the school, and has been transferred.  
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produced to buy maize to feed the family does not have much sense in economic 
terms, and it lowers the level of nutritional value assumed in the household, 
accompanied by a compromise on diversification. The charcoal production in 
particular is an uncertain activity with a variable economic return. While the state 
legislation on the matter has done little to limit and regulate this activity as it is 
disregarded by villagers and local officials, the indiscriminate cutting of trees for 
charcoal production has led to deforestation and degradation of large areas, 
especially in the proximity of the highway from Dar es Salaam to Morogoro, where 
more than 70% of farmers are considered to be relying on charcoal as a source of 
income (Malimbwi and Zahabu, 2005, p.230). Without wood regeneration 
initiatives, the potential for woodland to produce charcoal is declining over the years, 
increasing competition for resources between farmers and reducing their capacity to 
produce charcoal and gain an income alternative to agriculture (Ibid., 2005). 
At the political level, what can these coping strategies tell us about the relationship 
between the state and the farming communities of the areas interviewed? The 
disregard of national law that forbids the practice of cutting trees in some areas is a 
sign of rural communities not recognising the authority of the state, although there is 
little enforcement of national law from local officials, which tend to ‘close an eye’ 
and do not report illicit activities. Can we consider charcoal production and other 
coping strategies adopted to survive as political? I argue that these activities are 
political for different reasons. First, they express the discontent of farmers and their 
search for alternatives outside state’s control. Secondly, these choices manifest a 
lack of trust in the state’s ability to improve their conditions. The farmers do not 
count on the state to improve their conditions. In the words of farmers there is a 
sense of indifference, rather than a will to contest or dialogue with the state. We can 
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identify this spirit in the mocking words of many farmers towards state officials - 
‘that come with their big white cars, golden watch and expensive technology in a 
dusty village during elections and act as if they are the kings of the world’ (N.K.Z., 
Mperamumbi, 2012) -, in their indifference towards the advice that they get from the 
district officers - ‘they do not know what it means to be farmers, and they bring 
wrong advice, so their meetings are useless’ (A.M.T., Mwembengozi, 2012) -, and in 
their lack of interest and trust towards state’s agricultural policies - ‘Kilimo Kwanza? 
Lots of blah blah…’ (S.K., Dutumi, 2012). While a society that is included and 
encapsulated in the state would probably react with anger and direct confrontation to 
unwanted policies, a society that shows indirect reactions and indifference is rather a 
society that has developed a detached, cold cynicism and disinterest towards the 
state. Again, I argue that the relationship between the state and rural society in 
Tanzania is a relationship between two actors that have grown apart from each other, 
and that increasingly see each other as separate entities.  
The increasing influence from external actors does not seem to be helping in 
reconnecting these two entities, but, as will be explained in the next section, it may 
also be more detrimental to the relationship between the state and rural communities.  
7.4.2. The growing reliance on external help  
As foregrounded in the previous section, in the context of an already complex 
relationship between the state and the society, and perhaps in spite of this 
complexity, there are other actors that are shaping farmers’ livelihoods. The 
increasing presence of both smaller and larger NGOs, often sponsored by 
international organizations such as the Gates Foundation, USAID and FAO, are 
increasingly interested in helping and assisting farmers in different projects. But 
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what are the consequences for food security in the countryside, and how are these 
new actors changing the relationship between rural society and the state?  
There is reason to believe that the shifting of powers due to the increasing influence 
of external authority is complicating the already fragmented relationship between the 
state and rural society, making these two subjects grow further apart. In a situation 
where farmers are not confident in the ability of the state to improve their situation, 
the presence of these organizations works as a further incentive to divert requests 
and complaints from them rather than directly to the state. This is confirmed by the 
declarations of the project director of a foreign NGO that operates in Kwala:  
‘There is little cooperation between our organization and the state, 
especially at high level. With local level politicians it is different, and the 
chairperson of the village is always willing to listen to us and he is very 
thankful for what we do for this little community. We have always felt 
welcomed by the villagers, and we have been working with the secondary 
school for several years now. At times it feels like the state does not care 
about the problems facing the school, or the village in general, so our first 
reaction is to intervene directly. For instance, to respond to lack of teachers 
we welcome volunteers from Europe and the USA, or to sort out the 
problem of providing water for the students and the school canteen we 
built a water tank and a rain collection system. However, we believe that 
certain problems should be addressed by the state directly, and at times we 
wonder if the community is becoming too much dependent on us and 
forgetting about state’s responsibilities’ (Scarpa, 2013). 
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Of a similar opinion, Sebastian Sambuo, working for the Tanzanian NGO Rural 
Urban Development Initiative (RUDI) considers the investment of the government 
into agriculture as limited. He claims that: 
‘We [NGOs] are doing the work that is supposed to be done by the 
government, the money we have is peanuts compared to the money 
donors donate directly to the government! Nyerere built irrigation 
infrastructures, canals, warehouses, but most of them are now unused, 
unmaintained, there are bats in the warehouses, nobody is taking care of 
these structures. RUDI, and other NGOs are the only ones looking at 
funds to renovate these structures and help the farmers in a concrete way’ 
(Sambuo, 2013).  
The efforts of these organizations are welcomed positively by rural communities, as 
reflected by the declarations of the farmers interviewed. For instance, E.M. thinks 
that:  
‘It is thanks to small organizations such as NTC [Newton-Tanzania 
Collaborative] and CAMFED [Campaign for Female Education] that many 
households in the village of Kwala are able to send their children to 
school. Moreover, they have run HIV awareness campaign, literacy 
courses for adults, and started a sustainable agricultural garden in the 
secondary school, building an efficient water collection system. When 
someone have a problem or need help they are the first point of contact’ 
(E.M., Kwala, 2012).  
In the previous chapter we have seen how important it is for the Tanzanian state to 
keep a good relationship with donors, and to continue to attract foreign support. 
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Given that aid inflow finances a good amount of government operations - about 40% 
in 2007 (Nord et al., 2009) - and account for about 10% of GNI (OECD, 2014), it is 
not difficult to understand why this is the case. For local politicians the situation 
seems to be the same. For example, the chairperson of Mperamumbi underlines the 
positive impact of donor-led projects and believes that ‘things will change [in the 
agricultural sector] if donors and other experts will support the farmers’ (Mr Vitusi, 
2012).  
Yet, it is clear that the presence of external actors in the countryside is changing the 
terms of the relationship between state and society. Following Ferguson and Gupta’s 
analysis (2002, pp. 989-990), the vertical dimension of the hierarchy of power, 
where the state is above society, should be redefined by considering the external 
influences of organizations that act in a regime of transnational governmentality. 
This term, developed by Ferguson and Gupta (2002), describes the situation in which 
international organizations - which are external to single states and do not respond to 
a specific government’s legislation - have the power to interfere on the national 
policies of several states, changing the national dynamics of power. While these 
influences may carry a quick answer to society’s needs, they are also a threat to the 
state’s sovereignty, as they take over some of the functions that were once in the 
hands of the central state. Therefore: 
‘The social and regulatory operations of the state are increasingly “de-
statized”, and taken over by a proliferation of “quasi-autonomous non-
governmental organizations” (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002, p. 989).  
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Havnevik and Isinika also underlined how this shift of responsibilities from 
government to NGOs and civil society actors does not necessarily mean an 
empowerment or an increase of political power for society: 
‘Although a number of dynamic developments and transitions have been 
documented, structural changes that could promote broad based economic 
development and increased agency and participation among the population 
in governance and democratic processes in the country are lacking’ 
(Havnevik and Isinika, 2010, p.  274). 
Alongside a detached relationship between state and society, the loss of sovereignty 
of the state and the increasing influence of international actors on politics at both 
national and local level are contributing to developing dependency and depoliticizing 
social conflicts, impeding even more the creation of a strong civil society (Larmer, 
2010, p. 256; Dwyer and Zeilig, 2012).  
There certainly is a strong connection between the increasing presence of 
international organizations and the relationship between farming communities and 
the state. As mentioned in section 7.3 when talking about the Farmer Field Schools, 
the projects implemented and promoted by donors seem to be more successful than 
the initiatives promoted solely by the state, because they pursue a bottom up 
approach and have more funds. Hence, they are received and welcomed more 
positively by farmers. Nevertheless, it is clear that dependence on aid is not 
sustainable and will not lead to long-term food security, especially if some parts of 
the country are left behind and if the state is not able to embrace a bottom up 
perspective and democratically empower rural communities.  
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7.5. Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the reasons behind the lack of a stronger farmer’s movement 
in rural Tanzania. The apparent lack of cohesion amongst the members of society has 
been identified as one of the main cause of the difficulties of creating such a 
movement. At the same time, this lack of cohesion is the result of past events that 
hindered the confidence of farmers in the success of cooperative action and lead to a 
general distrust amongst various members of society and different levels of state 
power.  
The un-cooperative aspect of farmers, which is often mentioned by the state officials 
interviewed, is however not an intrinsic characteristic of farmers’ personalities. In 
fact, farmers are willing to cooperate with each other and work together towards a 
common objective if they feel included in the project and they have decision-making 
power, as affirmed by members of international organizations and civil society, and 
by a side project that tested the ability of younger generations of farmers to work 
together and manage a collective garden. This validates the thesis’ conviction that a 
bottom up approach is essential for projects to succeed, and that the failure of state 
agricultural policies is the result of a patronising and top-down approach.  
This chapter went on to argue that farmers chose to reject the policies coming from 
the state by not following the advice coming from district and local official, by 
deserting official meetings and by not cooperating in projects organised by state 
officials. Nonetheless, the indifference towards politics demonstrated by farmers is 
not to be considered a form of apathy, and is the result of a controversial relationship 
between farmers and the state, two subjects that over the years have grown further 
apart and are disconnected with each other.  
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This disconnection is more evident with the increasing influence and presence of 
NGOs and international organizations in the countryside, which promote a more 
participative and inclusive approach that has proven successful. This presence 
further complicates the relationship between the state and rural society, by creating 
dependence on external aid and further weakening the state. Moreover, while the 
influence of external actors in national policy making has shaken the power structure 
of the state, the democratic participation of society does not seem to be improving, 
leading to a depoliticisation of the relationship between the state and the society, 
where the state is looked at with indifference and its authority not recognised.  
This chapter also presented the coping strategies used by farmers to cover the 
households’ food needs. It is clear that the alternatives sources of income are in 
many circumstances uncertain and do not represent a long-term solution towards 
food security in the countryside. It is therefore implied that a political answer is 
needed, and that this answer cannot come from outside the country or from aid 
dependency, but needs to involve rural communities and create the conditions to 
promote a re-connection between society and the Tanzanian state in a sustainable 
way.  
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Chapter 8 - Conclusion 
8.1. Introduction 
This concluding chapter will sum up the main findings and position its contributions 
with regard to the existing literature on food security and farmers’ relationship with 
the state. This is done with reference to the original research question: How has the 
relationship between the state and farmers shaped food security in rural Tanzania 
since its independence? The chapter also reflects upon the limitations of this study, 
as well as the implications of the kinds of knowledge produced, both at the policy 
level and academic level. Finally, avenues for further research are explored that 
could enrich the knowledge of local Tanzanian agricultural systems and the role that 
different political actors and forms of political action have in the agricultural sector.  
8.2. Answer to research question 
In answering the research question, this thesis has showcased that the relationship 
between farmers and the state has been, and still is, determinant in shaping food 
security in rural areas of Tanzania, and in creating a situation of food insecurity. 
Hence, this research claims that the negative attitude that can be found at the national 
and the local levels of the state towards small scale farmers results in policies not 
being formulated according to the farmers’ needs and rural conditions, and hence 
contributes to policy failure. This negative attitude is evident in both state officials’ 
declarations and the objectives enunciated in the several agricultural policies 
implemented over the past years and analysed in chapter 6. 
Thus, farmers feel left out of the decision-making process and see the state as a 
distant entity. They are therefore reticent to comply and cooperate with initiatives 
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promoted by the state, judging them be to ineffective and inadequate to the real 
conditions of rural areas and their needs. Past policy failures have created a 
discontented and disillusioned community of farmers which tend to be sceptical also 
towards cooperative associations - especially after the failure of the cooperative 
associations in the 1970s - and reluctant to engage in direct political confrontation in 
the form of protest and rural movements. The limited trust in the state’s ability to 
improve conditions in rural areas, and farmers’ lack of self-confidence to address 
their issues at national state level, results in a weak contestation of policies and little 
community involvement in policy formulation. As in a circle, this erodes the 
relationship between the rural society and the state and worsens food security for 
farming households.  
The research question has been explored by using a qualitative approach, with the 
intent to give farmers a voice and let their stories be heard. 223 interviews were 
collected during two fieldwork trips conducted in 2012 and 2013 in two different 
parts of Tanzania: Coast and Kilimanjaro regions. Of these interviews, 125 were 
farmers, 55 teenagers aged 13-18 belonging to farming households, and 43 
politicians and state officials at local, district and national level, members of 
international organisations and representatives of agribusinesses and various 
organisations (local NGOs, research centres). What came to the fore were farmers’ 
difficulties, discontent and dissatisfaction towards political representatives, on the 
one hand, and their struggles towards reaching food security and providing a better 
livelihood for their households, on the other.  The term ‘food security’ is used in line 
with the definition given by the FAO in 2006
51
, which embraces a long-term 
                                                          
51 ‘Food security is a situation that exists when all people, at all time, have physical, social and 
economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food 
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condition that also takes into account diversification of food available and 
preferences. Nevertheless, as explained in chapter 2, in this study the subjective 
dimension of food security – the personal perceptions of the people that are food 
insecure - is also given great relevance. Food security is analysed not only with 
respect to these indicators but also according to what farmers think is ‘enough’ food 
and their satisfaction of the food they do consume, as explained in chapter 5. This is 
an important corrective to mainstream institutional studies, in which food security 
tends to be measured in numbers, calorie intake and quantity of meals consumed (for 
example in studies conducted by the FAO, WFO, IFAD, WB and so on).  
Chapter 1 introduced the study, and established that farmers, as both producers and 
consumers of food, would be at the centre of this study because they represent the 
largest majority of the rural population in Tanzania and are the most vulnerable to 
food insecurity. It then detailed the inspiration that drove this study, connected to my 
personal experience as a volunteer in a Tanzanian village in Coast region, were I 
witnessed the discontent and the problems of farmers and the impact of food 
insecurity on every-day life.   Chapter 1 also introduced the focus of this research, 
which is a study of food security in rural Tanzania through the lens of the 
relationship between the state and farmers. It is recognised that different levels of 
state power are present in Tanzania: local, district and national. The relationship 
between the farmers and national level of the state – represented by national level 
politicians and officials in the several ministries – is complex and characterised by 
reciprocal mistrust. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
preferences for an active and healthy life and are not at undue risk of losing such access.’ (FAO, 
2006).  
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The theoretical framework employed to answer the research question was provided 
in chapters 2 and 3. In particular, chapter 2 illustrated the evolution of the meaning 
of the term ‘food security’ from a term used to talk about fears of food scarcity to a 
more comprehensive term which takes into account social aspects such as 
vulnerability and sustainability, and which is employed in this study. Furthermore, 
chapter 2 illustrated the global food system as explained by McMichael and 
Friedmann (1989), locating this study in its global general context and setting the 
basis for an analysis of Tanzania in relation to the theoretical framework of the food 
security and food systems literature. Chapter 2 also introduced the political aspects 
of food security, highlighting the important role of the state in promoting food 
security at national level via agricultural policies. 
The other important figure of the thesis, the farmer, was also explored in this 
chapter. The different categories of farmers clearly defined by Barker (1989) are, as 
a consequence of the internationalisation of the agricultural sector and the effects of 
globalisation, of difficult application in a context such as Tanzania. Farmers tend to 
adapt to the various circumstances and rarely are pure substance farmers (producing 
only to satisfy their food needs). It was noted that a large majority of farmers in 
Tanzania rural areas are small scale - only cultivate a limited amount of land, usually 
less than two acres – and exchange or sell part of their produce in order to satisfy 
other cash or food needs. Often, besides being farmers, they also have another off-
farm job, as specified in chapter 7. Finally, this chapter underlined the importance of 
looking at the historical African context when analysing farmers’ coping strategies 
for food security and their political action against unwanted policies.  
 
 
310 
Chapter 3 provided the framework to analyse the interaction between farmers and the 
state, explaining how such interaction could impact the policy framing and farmers’ 
political engagement and reaction, and eventually the outcome of policies. State and 
society are seen as two separate entities, in line with the reading of Scott (1998). 
These two entities influence each other. Given the presence of different levels of 
power within the state, the relationship between state and society in the Tanzanian 
context varies, as explained in chapter 4. At the local level it is characterised by what 
Hyden (1980) defines as the ‘economy of affection’, where officials and local 
politicians use their power to gain personal consensus and clientelism is highly 
practiced (on this also Costello, 1996, Snyder, 2008 and Becker, 2009). At national 
and district level, state officials and politicians are instead looked at with suspicion 
and distrust. In this sense, rural society, and more specifically farmers, have 
developed a form of detachment towards politics and national state officials. The 
literature framework used to analyse farmers’ disengagement to politics is provided 
by Azarya (1988), Olorunsola (1988) and Ayoade (1988) among others.   
Chapter 4 introduced the case study of this thesis, setting the historical context of 
Tanzania since its independence, and underlining the importance of a cultural and 
historical contextualisation for studies that wish to offer an empirical contribution 
around the theme of food security. The successive state-sponsored projects of 
nationalisation, modernisation, villagization and liberalisation were highlighted as 
key formative experiences in beliefs and behaviours practiced by farmers today.  It 
was argued that the policies brought forward by Nyerere in the post-independence 
years, despite having unified the citizens under a common language and having 
increased the provision of social services such as health and education, have not been 
positive for the agricultural sector, and originated farmers’ feeling of 
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disillusionment, distrust and disengagement towards the state. In particular, this 
chapter explained how the villagization project damaged the relationship between the 
farmers and the state and within society itself. Many farmers were forced to leave 
behind their houses and start a new life in new villages, where they knew little about 
the conditions of the soil of a farming land that was often far from the village or 
from water sources. Moreover, they were also forced to work in a common plot, 
where the products would be sold directly to the state. Most farmers resented 
working in these fields, as selling to the state meant less income received, and they 
preferred working on their own personal plot, where lower controls enabled them to 
divert their produce to the black market.  
After the unifying spirit that characterised the independence of the country, and the 
years immediately after independence, the sense of alienation and disillusion towards 
the state started when the excitement of post-independence and the visions of great 
change morphed into bitter realisation of the reality and the limits of the state. These 
aspects have been analysed in depth by Hyden (1980 and 1983), Ayoade (1988) and 
Barker (1989), who identify the expectations raised and not met in the after-
independence years as the origin of the process of disillusion and detachment of 
society from politics. As a matter of fact, despite the uncontested advancement in 
social services provision, the situation had changed for the worse for many farmers 
in rural areas. Moreover, at the same time, the state, symbolised by the figure of 
Nyerere from independence in 1961 to 1985, manifested an increasing feeling of 
disillusionment towards farmers which, contrary to Nyerere’s initial thoughts, were 
not voluntarily embracing Ujamaa and were ‘resisting modernisation’ by 
disregarding state advice, and by not being open to the introduction of new crops and 
farming methods. This saw an intensification of state control in rural areas, with 
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villagization becoming compulsory in 1973. Nyerere approached the situation with a 
paternalistic and patronising attitude, convinced that farmers did not understand what 
was good for them and needed to be educated. This thesis argued that it is exactly 
this approach that signs a turning point in the state-farmer relationship in Tanzania. 
The state as an institution started to look at farmers as being a problem, since they 
were resisting change. This is an attitude that can be still retrieved in recent policies 
and in the words of several officials interviewed, as explained in chapter 6.  
The following chapters (5, 6 and 7) are the core of the thesis and presented the 
results of the empirical research conducted in Tanzania. Chapter 5 provided an 
insight into the conditions of the farming households interviewed. It analysed their 
dietary patterns, their perception of ‘good’ food consumption and availability and the 
problems that farmers face in everyday farming. This research was inspired and 
originated by the assumption that there was a food insecurity problem in the 
countryside in Tanzania. Hence, the first thing that has been assessed through 
interviews and participant observation was the level of food security, and the 
personal perceptions, of the households where the research was conducted. These 
results are presented in chapter 5. It is clear that there is both a problem of quantity, 
quality and variety of food consumed in rural areas of Tanzania. This is confirmed 
by statistical data, but, more importantly, it is felt as a genuine problem by the 
farmers interviewed. The majority of them perceive themselves as food insecure, 
claiming that the food they consume is either not sufficient to cover the household’s 
needs or inadequate to satisfy their personal preferences.  
Important findings were made about food consumption in the households 
interviewed. From the interviews it was established that maize flour, rice, beans and 
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bananas are the food crops most consumed in the households interviewed (with 
slight differences between the Kilimanjaro and the Coast regions). Diversification of 
food appears to be a problem in both regions, for almost all households interviewed. 
But quantity is also a problem for many households: 46% of the households 
interviewed consume less than three meals per day on a regular basis. Importantly, 
the majority of the interviewees are not satisfied with the quality, the quantity and 
the kind of food they eat regularly (although quantity appears to be a much greater 
concern than the quality or diversity of food for most farmers). These details about 
food consumption essentially confirm the statistical data on food security retrieved 
from FAOSTAT and the World Bank. 
However, a deeper analysis of the interviews reveals the personal dimension of food 
security that is often missed in national statistics. About 70% of the farmers 
interviewed describe themselves as not having enough food to satisfy households’ 
needs. Besides the quantity and the quality of the food consumed, perceptions of 
insecurity change according to the social context. In bigger villages, where economic 
differentiation is higher, there is a tendency for farmers to judge their own condition 
in more negative terms, as they compare their food habits and consumption patterns 
with wealthier farmers that live nearby. On the other hand, in more isolated villages, 
where the conditions of the households are very similar, farmers tend to describe 
themselves in less negative terms and feel less insecure. Food scarcity in these areas 
is considered and accepted as the normality, part of everyday life. This is interesting 
as it affects the households’ measures taken to prevent food scarcity or improve 
living standards. In fact, the farmers interviewed in these isolated areas are also the 
ones that have less contact with state officials and participate less in the political life 
of the villages nearby, and are also the ones that when asked about ‘future plans to 
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improve their living condition’ (one of the semi-structured questions asked to 
farmers) had difficultiy answering. These households were also within the poorest of 
the ones interviewed.  
The reasons behind food insecurity in rural Tanzania are manifold. Related to the 
ability to produce enough food for consumption or for sale, the farmers interviewed 
identified several problems, with little differences between the two regions. Weather 
patterns, lack of inputs, infrastructures, irrigation system, market, poor land 
regulation and knowledge, and trespassing of cattle and other wild animals are 
within the problems the most cited.  It is interesting to note that farmers do not 
directly accuse the policies of the state to be responsible for the problems that they 
face. Nevertheless, it is clear that some issues are the result of such policies, or 
would be resolved if policies were different. For instance, as was explained in 
chapter 6, a more coherent land policy and regulation of land titles could ease the 
clashes between farmers and pastoralists in some parts of the country, for instance in 
Coast region. The fact that farmers do not often connect their negative experiences to 
certain policies is the result of a scarce knowledge of the policies in place and the 
perception of the national state as a distant entity which can do little to affect their 
everyday life.  
Moving from there, chapter 6 looked at the more recent agricultural policies, and 
analysed their achievements and their effects on small scale farmers. By an analysis 
of international initiatives such as the SAGCOT and national ones such as Kilimo 
Kwanza, it was argued that the several policies put in place have done little to 
improve the conditions of small scale farmers and to generally improve food security 
in the countryside. The failure of these policies is attributable to policies not being in 
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line with the real needs of small scale farmers, a confusing and problematic 
implementation and a lack of coordination between the different levels of state 
power and between state officials and farmers.  
The lack of coordination between the state and farming communities is the result of a 
reciprocal mistrust that characterises the relationship between the two entities. In 
analysing this relationship, the interviews revealed a negative attitude of the state 
towards small scale farmers, which is also evident in the top down approach in 
policies implementation. This negative attitude is retrievable in some interviews with 
officials both at national level - mainly in the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security 
and Cooperatives - and in the two districts interviewed, where farmers are defined as 
stubborn, unproductive, inefficient, ignorant and backward, and envisions the future 
of agriculture in the country as mainly driven by medium and large scale farmers. 
The agricultural policies reflect this attitude, and are mostly directed to medium and 
large scale farmers, as explained in chapter 6. For example, the subsidy to get 
agricultural inputs at a cheaper price are not available in Coast region, because ‘there 
are no real farmers in this region, the production is too low, so there is no scope to 
activate this policy’ (Mr Mayabu, from the Department of Seeds and Inputs, 2013). 
At the same time, from farmers’ declarations emerged a general discontent and 
distrust towards national state officials and extension agents. Farmers see the state as 
a separate and distant entity in which they do not feel included. They have little trust 
in state’s ability to improve their condition and they tend to dismiss state’s advice – 
carried through extension officers – because they see the state being far from their 
problems and not able to understand agriculture and the problems of rural areas. It is 
in these circumstances that disengagement to politics is understood and expressed. 
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The two subjects have therefore grown disconnected to a degree where they are both 
alienated, separated from each other. Nevertheless, farmers’ discontent in relation to 
the state is not expressed through direct action or confrontation but rather through 
indifference, scarce participation to local political meetings, and boycotts of the 
state’s advice. The reasons behind the disengagement of state and society are two-
fold: one has to do with a historical evolution of the state and a series of agricultural 
policy failures, and the other one is connected with the approach that the state adopts 
and has adopted over time towards small scale farmers.  
As shown in chapter 4, a series of policy failures and the historical evolution of 
Tanzanian politics, including the effects of villagization implemented in the 1970s, 
have been decisive in shaping the relationship between the state and the farmers. In 
fact, this has contributed to develop distrust towards the state and a negative image 
of cooperative work within farming communities in rural Tanzania. In the 1980s, 
with the adoption of structural adjustment programmes and liberalisation policies, 
the state withdrew its attention from the agricultural sector and abolished the 
subsidies (until 2003), but reserved the right to still exercise a strict control over the 
agricultural market. The removal of subsidies however widely affected the 
performance of the agricultural sector and the livelihoods of farmers, bolstering even 
further the discontent in rural areas, and initiating the process of deagrarianisation 
and depeasantisation,
52
 as described by Bryceson (1993) and Ponte (1998, 2000). 
These two phenomena explain the increasing farmers’ desire to ‘escape agriculture’, 
an activity seen as unprofitable and from which it had become increasingly difficult 
to make a living. 
                                                          
52 Depeasantization, as defined by Deborah Bryceson, is the process for which farmers look for 
other forms of income other than agriculture, as the agricultural sector becomes less profitable.  
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The more recent policy, Kilimo Kwanza, has experienced inefficiencies and exposed 
the struggle of the state between pleasing the majority of the farmers versus opening 
the economy to foreign investments and creating the right conditions for a 
commercial agriculture. In this sense, despite the catchy slogan and the popular 
image, the objectives of the policy reveal a tendency towards increasing foreign 
investments and promoting large and medium scale agriculture in the country. This 
is a tendency that, after four years of Kilimo Kwanza and several other initiatives 
supported by the Tanzanian state such as the Southern Agriculture Growth Corridor 
of Tanzania (SAGCOT), the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development 
Programme (CAADP) and the Agricultural Sector Development Programme 
(ASDP), does not seem to have brought any major changes to rural areas for the 
majority of farmers. These policies are in general characterised by a stress on 
commercialisation of the agricultural sector, a top-down approach, and a focus on 
middle and large farmers.  
In chapter 6 it was also noted that there is a general lack of policy awareness in the 
countryside. This lack of awareness in turn further alienates farmers from the state, 
and increases the separation of the two subjects. Inefficiency, corruption and long 
bureaucratic processes also prevent the majority of farmers from taking advantage of 
the subsidies promoted by these policies to increase agricultural production, while a 
negative relationship between farmers and extension services works against a 
dissemination of information on state policies and actions towards improving food 
security in rural areas. State-farmers alienation precludes a fruitful cooperation 
between the two subjects (state and farmers) that could lead to more effective and 
fair agricultural policies, and thus prevents the achievement of food security in those 
parts of the country where a political response is most urgent.  
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Finally, chapter 7 looked at farmers’ coping strategies and their political response to 
a situation of discontent and political disappointment. It also explored the potential 
for farmers to act cooperatively, both among each other and within externally-
sponsored projects, where a bottom up approach is employed and farmers have more 
decision-making autonomy.  
Farmers’ attitude towards cooperation has been analysed by looking at one of the 
main institutionalised forms of cooperation in Tanzania, represented by the 
cooperative movements. It was argued that the villagization, and the abolition of 
cooperatives that were replaced by crop authorities in 1976, contributed to create a 
negative image of cooperatives in the eyes of the farmers, who saw cooperative 
association as an instrument used by the state to gain more control over their 
activities. As a matter of fact, only in 1991 was there a law to make cooperatives 
more independent from state control, the Cooperative Act of 1991. New attempts 
towards this direction were made in 2003 with the Cooperative Society Act. The 
number of cooperatives increased, but very few of them are active and management 
problems persist.  
This thesis argued that one of the reasons behind the scarce success of cooperative 
associations and the scarce participation of small scale farmers to cooperative 
movements and to collective groups in general is a lack of trust in the efficiency of 
cooperatives and disillusionment coming from past failures and mismanagement of 
group-led initiatives. In remarking on the unwillingness of farmers to cooperate 
(both with the state and with each other), several scholars have talked about a 
misunderstanding of Tanzanian society by Nyerere (Hyden, 1980, Bernstein, 1981, 
Coulson, 1982, Shivji, 1995, Spalding, 1996, Scott, 1998, Kelsall, 2004). According 
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to some of these scholars, contrary to the socialist nature depicted by Nyerere, it is 
widespread individualism that best characterises Tanzanian rural society, and which 
should be considered as an obstacle to the creation of a strong farmers’ movement.  
Nevertheless, the results of this research indicate that cooperation can exist under 
certain conditions, and the social structure of Tanzanian society clearly indicates that 
there is a tendency to support family members and neighbours in periods of 
difficulties. Hence this thesis argued that to talk about individualism as an inner 
characteristic of Tanzanian farmers is a mistake. Perhaps Nyerere’s assumption of a 
‘socialist by nature’ society was wrong, yet the will to cooperate spurs from a set of 
favourable conditions rather than from an inner tendency related to farmers’ 
personality. Furthermore, it was argued that in Tanzania, mistrustfulness, scarce 
cooperation with state’s initiatives and clashes over resources are the outcome of 
poverty, uncertainty, food insecurity and past policy and cooperatives’ failure. 
Unclear land policies, corruption and mismanagement also are responsible for 
internal social conflicts which limit opportunities for collaboration (for example in 
the case of farmers-pastoralists conflict illustrated in chapter 7).   
Chapter 7 also analysed coping strategies for food security. As emerged in chapter 7, 
farmers’ coping strategies are diverse as people perceive - and react to - their 
condition of food security according to the context in which they live. As explained 
in chapter 5, farmers in poorer and more isolated areas tend to see their condition of 
food insecurity as an inevitable destiny, to which they - or the state - can do little 
about, while farmers that live in villages where class differentiation is higher appear 
more critical both towards their condition and towards the state action.  
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In general, the phenomena of deagrarianisation and depeasantisation are still present 
in rural society, sign of a general discontent. Of the farmers interviewed, only 11 out 
of 125 are able to live out of farming alone, while the great majority of farmers need 
to find a side activity in order to survive. Side activities include making charcoal, 
petty business activities, cooking for other people, fetching grasses for animals, and 
in some cases prostitution and local alcohol brewing. Very few farmers have 
introduced changes in their ways of farming as a coping strategy to food insecurity. 
This happens for several reasons: lack of capital and inputs, but also resentment 
towards an activity – farming – perceived as unproductive and unsatisfactory. There 
were some exceptions. Most coffee farmers interviewed in Kilimanjaro have turned 
to food crop production, as a consequence of a declining price for coffee on the 
international market and the difficulties of dealing with increasing pests and plant 
diseases that caused a drop in production in recent years. 
At the same time, a sporadic number of farmers in the same region, the few that had 
the opportunity to follow training and had a mean of transport to reach nearby 
markets, have done exactly the opposite, switching production from food crops into 
cash crops (mushrooms or vegetables). This means that, contrary to what several 
politicians interviewed claimed - farmers being stubborn and anchored to the past - if 
farmers see the possibility of a profit they are willing to change their habits. Also 
remarkable was the presence, especially in Kilimanjaro region, of a few 
microfinance groups of women autonomously initiated, that would support each 
other by buying agricultural inputs or by other petty business activities. This is a 
further confirmation that cooperation is present in the society in specific 
circumstances, linked to the possibility for members to have decision-making power 
and feel an inclusive part of the group.  
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All in all, however, these coping strategies, even when illicit (such as charcoal 
production, prostitution and local alcohol brewing) get little political attention, and 
have no meaningful register upon agricultural policy. In short, they are not 
recognised as a signal of rural discontent. Less nuanced reactions and manifestations 
of discontent such as mocking and ignoring extension officers’ advices or boycotting 
or barely attending local meetings (that has been recorded in both regions 
interviewed) actually seem to be working against farmers. Instead of acknowledging 
that there is a problem in communication between state and rural areas, state officials 
find in these attitudes more reasons to stigmatize farmers as disinterested and 
stubborn, and to exclude them from the decision-making process. Consequently, 
farmers remain unaware of policy changes that could affect them both in positive 
and negative terms. 
Another issue explored in chapter 7 was the increasing dependence on external aid 
and its impact on the state-society relationship. It was noted that while in Latin 
America the weakness of the state has provided space for the creation of strong 
social movements, as highlighted by Wolford, in Tanzania the weakness of the state 
- seen as the inability of the state apparatus to improve living conditions in rural 
areas - has provided space for an increased presence of external NGOs, that act as 
the first support in providing some basic needs (Wolford, 2010, p.94). Hence, the 
dynamism that characterises the state-society relationship in Brazil as described by 
Wolford is not present in Tanzania, where the terms of this relationship are indirect 
and hidden by the presence of external intermediaries. Furthermore, the influence 
that external bodies have on the state and on policies which will affect the 
agricultural sector of the country and will define future agricultural policies (based 
on a promotion of commercial agriculture and large scale investments) raises doubts 
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on the democratic legitimacy of these decisions and points towards the possible loss 
of sovereignty by the state. In a country where land demarcation and ownership 
legislation is weak and undefined, a loss of sovereignty by the state could inhibit the 
ability to prevent future conflicts over land and resources.  
The inclusive approach adopted by many NGOs and international organisations 
seems more successful in gaining farmers’ trust and in improving their food security 
conditions. This research has shown that, where there is initial guidance and 
provision of inputs, the ownership of the project empowers farmers and enables them 
to more easily get a loan from the bank, buy agricultural inputs, connect with the 
market and improve their production, which in turn brings positive outcomes in 
terms of food security at the household level. Usually, projects promoted by such 
organisations succeed and are more welcomed both because they dispose of larger 
amount of funds and because they have a different approach to farmers.  
However, the increasing dependency on aid is not a sustainable option to improve 
food security in rural areas in the long term. In fact, if on the one side we have the 
state and its call for investments and involvement of international organisations in 
agricultural policies, on the other side we witness an increasing reliance on external 
aid in the countryside. International organisations and NGOs are substituting the 
state in some of its former duties regarding food aid and agricultural assistance. 
Another hypothesis highlighted in chapter 7 is the idea that in the absence of the 
state, or exactly because of the distrust that characterises the relationship between 
farmers and the state, farmers are increasingly referring to these organisations in 
seeking for help in the provision of various social services. This tendency is 
stretching the relationship between the farmers and the state to its limits, and 
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depoliticising the state-farmer relationship, since the state’s authority and 
competences are disregarded by rural communities. 
8.3. Main contributions 
This research has heavily been influenced by the literature on food security, 
especially by reflections on the current state of food and the future of agriculture (for 
instance by authors such as: Friedmann, 1993; Tansey, 1995; Lappé et al., 1998; 
Bernstein, 2000 and 2010; Petrini, 2005; Patel, 2007; Bryceson, 2009; Holt-
Gimenez, 2010; McMichael, 2010; Rosset, 2010; Schanbacher, 2010; Clapp, 2012; 
Holt-Gimenez and Patel, 2012). Starting from this, the major contribution made by 
this research is to offer an empirical study that contributes to an understanding of the 
diverse food systems that exist around the world. In particular, this thesis offers a 
contextualised approach to the global food system literature introduced by 
McMichael and Friedmann (1989, see chapter 2). The general idea expressed by this 
literature is that there has been a historic evolution of the food systems worldwide 
and this has affected farmers and food consumers in several ways. It describes a 
current food system which is increasingly shaped by the commoditisation of food 
and financial speculation on crops, and where multinational corporations are 
deciding over the future of food and agriculture worldwide.  
Nevertheless, I claim that in countries that are still in transition towards capitalism 
(such as Tanzania) there are communities of farmers which only have a marginal 
contact with the international market and hence their food security is mostly affected 
by a several amount of different factors at national level. In this respect, the role of 
multinational corporations in shaping food security in rural Tanzania needs to be 
downplayed, and actually some areas of the country are unattractive for foreign 
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investors because of low soil productivity and their unhospitable geographic 
location.  
Whereas some authors highlight the effects of the progress of liberalisation in 
agriculture (Ponte, 1998 and 2000; Meertens, 2000), this thesis, in the light of the 
results of the fieldwork, argued that in Tanzania the transition to capitalism is far 
from complete, and that political elites have always been reticent in reducing the 
control of the state over agricultural markets - especially for export crops - even 
despite the reforms put in place since the mid-1980s. Hence the country seems to fit 
the description provided by Thomson (2010), Lewontin (2000), Cooksey (2011), and 
Hyden (1980, 1983), concerning the limited penetration of modernisation and of 
capitalism in African states (see Chapter 3 and Hyden, 1980, pp. 9-11, 83, 212, 250). 
The capitalist mode of production has difficulties to fully penetrate the country, 
especially rural areas, where modernisation is far from being achieved, and where 
the economic interests of private companies and agribusinesses clash with a 
confusing system of regulation and a complex bureaucracy. Since most farmers in 
Tanzania do not formally own the land on which they farm - hence do not own the 
means of production - the reading provided by Bernstein (2004), who sees farmers as 
both capitalist and workers, is of difficult application in Tanzania.  
For similar reasons, this study questioned the use of food sovereignty as a lens 
through which to analyse the case of Tanzania. The means to achieve and define 
food security has been challenged by several scholars (Windfuhr and Jonsen, 2005; 
Schambacher, 2010; Patel, 2011; Holt-Gimenez and Patel, 2012) who prefer to talk 
about food sovereignty stressing the importance for communities to have ownership 
over resources and define their own agricultural, labour, fishing, food and land 
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policies. To me, this approach presents two major problems: first, it undermines the 
responsibilities of the state to implement policies and create the right circumstances 
for rural areas to develop and be food secure. Secondly, it assumes that farmers wish 
to choose one agricultural model over another, namely, the sustainable agriculture 
model over the industrial and commercial one. Nevertheless, in countries that have 
not yet fully witnessed the consequences of the industrial and commercial food 
model, it may be the case that farmers are the first ones to express the will to sell 
their land and escape the agricultural sector, or conversely wish their farming 
enterprise to be incorporated into the corporate food system. For instance, with 
reference to the specific case study analysed in this thesis, many farmers interviewed 
manifested these tendencies, and, in their circumstances, this is understandable. Who 
would not chose the security of a monthly fixed salary (although low) over an 
unpredictable future in farming? Tania Murray Li (2014), in her empirical studies of 
the food system in Indonesia, expressed similar concerns and underlined the 
importance of considering that farmers may not all share the same vision of 
agriculture and hence may not all abide to the kind of food system envisioned by the 
food sovereignty movement.  
Where depeasantization is an increasing phenomenon, and farming is resented by the 
rural population that see no advantage in it, the urge of having control over food 
resources and food system assumes a different tone. For instance, it may be the case 
that farmers have relative control over the land and their food system. In Tanzania, 
everybody I interviewed had a piece of land to cultivate, despite not always formally 
owning it. However, without resources, inputs and the political will to improve 
conditions in rural areas and address the challenges farmers face everyday, 
sovereignty and control of food and resources is only one of the aspects that 
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condition the food security condition of farmers. Essentially, this thesis embraced the 
idea supported by the food sovereignty movement of farmers’ empowerment and 
their importance in the food system; however, while the food sovereignty movement 
identifies capitalism as the main source of insecurity, this thesis argued that in the 
case of Tanzania food insecurity is the result of a series of causes from which a 
complex relationship between farmers and the state.  
Hence, besides contributing to the food security and food system literature, this 
thesis contributes to the literature on state-society relations. The novelty of this thesis 
is to look at the impact of state-society relations in relation to food security, joining 
two topics that are in general analysed in a separate manner. Surely, the political 
aspects of food security have been widely studied by the literature mentioned at the 
start of this section, and also there are several studies of economic nature about the 
effects of agricultural policies on food security (for instance Sijm, 1997; Devereux 
and Maxwell, 2001). This thesis tries to go beyond these analyses, and to understand 
how the historical evolution of the relationship between the state and rural 
communities in the Tanzanian context has affected the current food security 
condition. The implications of this approach to the study of food security are wide, 
and may help understand the mechanisms behind personal perceptions of food 
security in the farming communities and farmers’ political responses. In particular it 
may help understand why in different areas of the world farmers react to discontent 
in different ways.  
Regarding the contribution to the state-society literature, this research has defined 
the relationship between the state and the society - in particular rural society - as 
being best described as the relationship between two separate actors, in line with 
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analysis provided by several scholars including Scott (1998), Chabal and Daloz 
(1999), Ferguson and Gupta (2002), and supporters of the neo-patrimonial literature. 
Within this separation, the state is perceived and presented as above society, as 
power dynamics follow a vertical structure, with the central authorities of the state 
on the top. The state and the societies are seen as complex entities, which influence 
one another and are influenced in turn by external actors. The complexity of the two 
entities is identified in a variegated rural community, where different tribes live 
together and where social differentiation is increasing, and a state represented by 
mainly three levels of power at central, district and village level, often in contrast 
with each other. Economic disparities between the different levels of power are 
evident, with local level politicians sharing only a minimal part of the state wealth. 
This renders the separation between the central state and rural communities even 
more noticeable.  
Moreover, in light of theories of the African states, which tend to see the majority of 
African states as weak (Migdal, 1988), soft (Forrest, 1988), failed (Herbst, 2000), 
authoritarian (Fatton, 1992), incomplete (Bayart, 1993) or in general crisis 
(Rothchild and Chazan, 1988; Hyden and Bratton, 1992) this research has depicted 
an image of the Tanzanian state as one incapable of communicating successfully 
with its citizens and with great internal divisions that involve the different levels of 
the state at local, district and national level. The Tanzanian state is a state that has 
been unable to fully encompass and include certain areas of the country and its 
people - for instance farming communities in the most isolated areas - despite the 
fact that (or perhaps exactly because) central control and extensive bureaucracy has 
been a pervasive character of Tanzanian political history since independence. The 
particularity of Tanzania as an empirical contribution to the food security and state-
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society relations literature is given by its historical and political history, in which, 
agricultural development has always been on the top of the political agenda since 
independence and where different agricultural policies have followed, albeit without 
great achievements in terms of rural development and improved food security in 
rural areas.  
This thesis argued that rather than coercive control, state control in Tanzania 
assumed the tones of paternalism and persuasion. This understanding of the 
Tanzanian state is in line with readings provided by Hyden (1980), Bernstein (1981), 
Coulson (1982) and Scott (1998). In chapter 4 the dynamics of state control are 
explained and some examples provided, such as the one in the 1970s, when farmers 
were persuaded to settle in the new villages by promises of provision of social 
services, electricity and large mechanisation support, such as tractors (little mattered 
if the conditions of the soil were inadequate for the use of tractors or if farmers 
actually knew how to care about these machineries). This attitude is key to 
understanding the relationship between the state and rural communities. In fact, as a 
consequence of this attitude, it is argued that society has grown further apart from 
the state, and that the two entities regard each other with scepticism and mistrust. 
The relationship between the state and the farmers conditions both the outcome of 
policies and the ability of farmers to pursue efficient strategies towards improving 
their food security condition. Hence, the relationship between the state and the 
society in Tanzania needs to be considered as one of the reasons of policy failure.  
This research, therefore, adds to the literature on state-society disengagement and 
society’s distrust in the ability of the state to improve the conditions of rural areas. 
This literature has been brought forward by scholars such as Schwartz (1973), Hyden 
 
 
329 
(1980 and 1983), Rothchild and Chazan (1988), Barker (1989), Scott (1985), and 
Fatton (1992) among others. In particular, Ayoade’s interpretation of society 
disengagement is embraced, according to which the relationship between the state 
and rural society is characterized by a reciprocal disillusionment, and a reciprocal 
estrangement between the two bodies. The high expectations rose during Nyerere’s 
rule, and the consequent failure and high state control and bureaucracy have 
contributed to create a feeling of disillusionment in the society, while at the same 
time state’s disenchantment with society’s cooperation towards the realization of 
Ujamaa could be the cause of the state’s negative attitude towards rural society and 
the basis of the increased presence and patronising attitude of the state (Ayoade, 
1988, p.113).  
The practical consequence of this disillusionment is a detachment towards politics, 
where farmers are discontent but do not aim at changing or directly contesting the 
state, preferring instead to keep a distance and to withdraw from participating at 
meetings held in the councils, as showed in the examples reported from the villages 
of Kwala and Kigare, and as explained by Azarya (1988, pp.8-11). According to 
Hyden such a tendency to disengage by boycotting meetings and associations 
(despite the fact that in the past cooperatives and associations in Tanzania used to be 
numerous) is common in a communitarian state like Tanzania, where state’s control 
is challenged by the large varieties of tribes and cultures - more than 40 - (Hyden and 
Bratton, 1992, Hyden, 1992). However, while according to Hyden this attitude is 
attributable to a fear of citizens to contest state policies, this thesis argued than 
disillusion and distrust - more than fear - towards the state explain farmers’ political 
disengagement. 
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Given the particular history of the country, it is difficult to locate the reciprocal 
cynicism between the state and the farmers and to say whether the negative attitude 
of the state towards farmers is the cause or the consequence of a certain diffidence of 
farmers towards the state and their disengagement from politics. Yet, this thesis 
supported the idea that a paternalistic and top-down approach started emerging in the 
1970s, following rural communities’ resistance to some policies that were seen as an 
essential part of the socialism strongly promoted by Nyerere, for instance the 
villagization project. The conviction that farmers did not know what was good for 
them accompanied state officials’ attitude and conditioned the formulation of the 
successive policies, driving farmers’ detachment and discontent even further. The 
analysis of recent policies highlighted that the top-down approach of the state is still 
evident, while the analysis of farmers’ interviewed revealed that discontent, 
disillusionment and food insecurity are still present in some parts of the country.  
By providing an analysis of farmers’ coping strategies and their reaction to 
unsatisfactory policies in Tanzania, this study also contributes to the literature on 
farmers’ movement in a part of the world that is generally little researched. There are 
several analyses of movements in Latin America and in India (see for instance the 
work of Brass, 1995 and 2003; Holt-Gimenez, 2006; Wezel et al. 2009; Rosset et al., 
2011; Rosset and Martinez-Torres, 2012), but rural movements in Africa are 
generally given less attention (remarkable are the analyses provided by Moyo and 
Yeros, 2005; Holt-Gimenez and Amin, eds. 2011). Starting from the assumption that 
farmers’ movements are an important instrument that politically empower farmers 
and facilitate their communication with the state, the recognition of the lack of a 
strong farmers’ movement in Tanzania is important in the analysis of the state-
farmer relationship and farmers’ answers to inadequate policies in the countryside. 
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As mentioned, it is important to look at the reasons behind the weak political 
cohesion within farmers’ communities. This study demonstrated that the lack of a 
strong movement is the symptom of a disconnection between farmers and the state. 
In fact, within the difficulties of creating a strong movement in Tanzania there is the 
scarce trust in the ability of the state to improve the conditions in the countryside and 
a lack of farmers’ self-confidence in the effectiveness of active and direct protest to 
change policies.  
The lack of a strong farmers’ movement in a country like Tanzania does not mean 
that farmers do not react in other ways to unsatisfactory policies, but that the 
conditions - of political and social nature - for the creation of a strong movement are 
missing. Hence it is evident the importance of contextualising and studying forms of 
hidden communication between the state and communities, which do not feel 
included and part of the state. As noted by Scott (1990), there are forms of resistance 
that avoid open confrontation with the authority, and farmers are within those 
communities that usually and historically prefer to ‘disguise their resistance’.53 This 
research has explored these ‘hidden forms of contestation’ identifying them in 
farmers’ boycotting public meetings and disobeying extension officers’ advices. 
Furthermore, it has been argued that coping strategies, often illicit, adopted by 
farmers to overcome food insecurity are also a political expression of discontent. As 
defined by scholars such as Hirshman (1970), Raikes (1982), Mamdani et al. (1988), 
Scott (1990) and Fatton (1992), and explained in chapter 7, these hidden forms of 
contestation are political as they express farmers’ discontent and their detachment 
from the state. 
                                                          
53 Scott identifies some typical forms of resistance in peasants in: 
a) squatting to a defiant land invasion; 
b) evasion rather than tax riot, or fraudulent declarations on land farmed or animal possession; 
c) Poaching or pilfering rather than direct appropriation. (Scott, 1990, p.86) 
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8.4. Implications of the study 
Besides contributing to the theoretical literature, this study also offers some practical 
implications. First, it offers a valid perspective and useful analysis to Tanzanian 
policy makers by presenting some of the challenges farmers face and an assessment 
on the outcome of the recent agricultural policies and on food security issues in some 
rural areas of the country. Chief among its policy implications is the need for the 
Tanzanian state to pursue a more inclusive approach to policy making, by taking into 
consideration farmers’ opinions and the interest of small scale farmers who represent 
the largest majority of the population in the country. The importance of the 
agricultural sector is officially recognized by the government, but the challenges in 
policy implementation described in this study may offer some reflections and 
suggest some possible explanations on what is missing for policies to be successful 
and improve the conditions of the countryside.  
A more inclusive approach could be pursued by reforming the cooperatives system 
so that even small scale farmers in isolated areas of the countryside could benefit of 
such institutions. Moreover, cooperatives should be regarded as political institutions 
and not just as economic ones. A political collaboration between the high level of the 
state and the cooperatives could help the formulation of more effective policies, and 
at the same time help the state address the issues faced by small scale farmers. Even 
the World Bank (2004, 2) has admitted that ‘instead of sending sections of the state 
off to society, it is often even more fruitful to invite society into the inner chambers 
of the state’. In practical terms, an understanding of rural communities and their 
needs and the embrace of bottom-up agricultural policies to improve agriculture - 
and hence food security in rural areas - should be of special interest to the opposition 
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parties of the country, struggling to get a coherent and appealing manifesto to gain 
the support of rural communities and win elections. Opening the doors to political 
engagement and a re-connected rural society represents an opportunity for a political 
change in Tanzanian governance that has for long been missed. 
Moreover, the dense amount of information collected through the interviews offer an 
interesting and detailed portrait of the farming communities in Coast and 
Kilimanjaro regions, with details on their social and household structure, eating 
patterns, agricultural practices and political engagement (or disengagement), 
problematics related to farming.  Hence, this study may be of interest to the 
researcher interested in qualitative data on rural development, Tanzania, farming 
system in East Africa and rural movements.  
8.5. Limitations of the study and further research  
Besides the several contributions this research offers, it is fair to mention the 
limitations and difficulties encountered on the way, because of time or economic 
constraint reasons. First, it needs to be recognised that two areas of the country have 
been surveyed, hence the results of the study open the debate on the conditions of 
food security and farming in other areas of Tanzania, perhaps in those where food 
production per capita is higher, and different food habits and traditional customs may 
be present. The role of the state in agriculture, highlighted in this study, has general 
relevance, as policies and state’s attitude towards the agricultural sector has the same 
effects in all regions of Tanzania. However, it needs to be noted that the relationship 
between the state and the society in other parts of the country may have assumed 
different nuances, according to the presence of influential politicians in certain areas 
that were more represented than others at political level. This was the case of 
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Kilimanjaro region in the after-independence years, for example. Yet, this study 
explained that while Kilimanjaro had a ‘softer version’ of villagization compared to 
the one experienced in Coast region, this has not substantially influenced the current 
terms of relationship between the farmers and the state. Notwithstanding, this 
comparison has its limits because it is based on two regions and particular areas of 
these regions - rural villages in semi-isolated locations, far from the main roads and 
not easily accessible. If the terms of comparison were to be made in an analysis of 
bigger villages closer to the main roads of the country the results could be different.  
Moreover, because of time constraints and long bureaucracy to obtain permits from 
governmental agencies, the interviews to politicians are fewer than I had initially 
planned. In some cases the politicians interviewed agreed to talk to me but refused to 
have their declarations recorded or used in this research. In this sense, the connection 
between state and NGOs, and between the state and the private sector, in relation to 
promoting food security could also prove worthy of further research. Another topic 
that could benefit from further research is the impact and effectiveness of the several 
policies - both at national, regional and international level - that affect the 
agricultural sector and, as remarked in chapter 6, are often in contradiction with each 
other. For instance, contradicting policies emerged when analysing the land 
legislation, where on the one side the government and most of the agricultural 
policies implemented reflect a desire for the private sector and international investors 
to be greatly involved in shaping the future of agriculture in Tanzania, while on the 
other side politicians publicly claim to protect the rights and the needs of its citizens, 
making it harder for companies to acquire land. But here lies another contradiction: 
the land legislation of Tanzania does actually make it harder for investors to acquire 
land, but at the same time does not give any guarantee to the farmers that use their 
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land, as they do not detain any official ownership over it. On this topic, what is 
actually happening, and which deserves further investigation, is the involvement of 
state officials in the land speculation market, and their role in the several Joint 
Venture agreements signed with international companies, allowed by the land 
legislation.  
This study has also not been able to fully analyse the issue of gender in relation to 
the research question. In a society where gender roles are in general well defined, the 
role of women in the food system is of high importance. Women comprise more than 
half of farmers’ population, and within the household have an important role in 
distributing and utilizing the food. My intention was not to dismiss the issue. The 
initial intent of this study was to analyse farming households in the areas chosen and 
frame the research question according to what I would find as the main issue. 
Eventually, I found that the ‘main’ issues were many, all connected with each other. 
The role of women in the food system and their action as a separate group to contest 
policies would have been explored deeper if the areas surveyed had revealed a 
particular difference of women as a group towards these issues. But this was not the 
case, and what I actually witnessed was an almost equal presence (or absence) of 
women and men in meetings and a similar attitude towards politics and state 
officials.  
Along my experience in Tanzania I met many great and strong women and a 
variegated picture of social structure within the households interviewed. In some 
households the men go to the farm and the women have some petty businesses on the 
side, such as preparing and selling meals or selling items previously bought in closer 
towns. In other households the women are the ones employed in the farms and the 
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men would collect charcoal or be employed in the towns or cities. Nevertheless, 
while participation to the economic activity is shared, the same cannot be said of 
household chores, covered mostly by women: Taking care of the house, fetching 
water, cooking and the education of children are all activities in the hands of women. 
Gender differences in the ownership of land are also common in many regions. In 
Coast region women can own land, while in Kilimanjaro the land is inherited and 
passed to the males of the family. These differences were the result of tribal customs, 
more than national legislation.  
What emerged in this study is that all the organisations that I interviewed had 
projects with a focus on gender issues. The agricultural projects of organisations 
such as the FAO (for instance the Farmer Field School) aim at achieving an equal 
inclusion of women in their projects. This is positive, as it empowers women. On the 
other side, it would be interesting to explore how women in rural areas are involved 
in these projects, and what are the consequences of their involvement in their 
everyday life. Does empowerment in farming projects translate into a restructuring 
of gender roles within the household?  
Another understudied issue that has been raised in this thesis (chapter 6) is the role 
of children in agriculture. One of the persons interviewed raised the issue by saying:  
‘there is something nobody talks about, and is the consequence of cheap 
prices on child labour: cheap prices mean cheap labour, and there are lots 
of children working in the countryside in Tanzania instead of going to 
school, because farmers cannot stand the competition with the imported 
food and [so] employ them’ (Mr Legge, 2013).  
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This is an interesting claim, as it adds to the difficulties faced by farming households. 
Putting aside the unusual connection between cheap agricultural prices and child 
labour suggested by Mr Legge, the extent of child labour in Tanzania is reported in 
several studies. For example, Plan International (2011) reports that 20.7% of all 
children in Tanzania are involved in child labour, while the ILO and FAO estimate 
that about 80% of all the children undertaking economic activity are employed in 
agriculture (Plan International, 2011, ILO, 2013, FAO, 2013). The participation of 
children to the household farming activities emerges throughout an analysis of the 
households interviewed: in almost 20% of the households interviewed there is a 
presence of children below 14 years of age helping in the farm. This affects their 
ability to attend primary and secondary schools, as reported by the vice-master of the 
secondary school of Kwala, Mr Ngimba, and the headmaster of Mahundi Primary 
School, Mr Gunda (2012). The majority of farmers that reported having their children 
employed in the countryside justified it on the basis of a practical need, especially 
during the harvesting and planting seasons where the workload is higher.  
The issue of child labour in agriculture could be analysed under a food security 
perspective, by also analysing the reasons for this involvement and the effects it has 
on the children and on the future of agriculture.  Could this be at the base of the 
resentment towards farming manifested by many farmers interviewed? And how 
influential is the involvement of children in farming on their food security? 
Furthermore, how do state policies impact child labour in rural areas? For instance, 
Havnevik (1993, p.308) points to an increase of children labour during Mwinyi’s 
government: as a consequence of a reduction of state support to the education sector 
and a drop in primary school enrolment, children accounted for 35 to 44% of 
household members working in the family. Primary education is compulsory in 
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Tanzania, and many farmers interviewed wish for their children a ‘good education’ 
to escape agriculture and find an employment in the cities. Nevertheless, often they 
are not are not able to pay the school fees and/or they need the help of their children 
in their farm in order to have enough food or money to buy it. There is clearly a deep 
resentment towards the state that does not help their children to get the opportunity 
of a better future through education and that indirectly forces them to work in the 
farm. This resentment is passed to the children, who hope in the future to run away 
from the countryside and get an office job, as I could witness during my stay in 
Tanzania and my stay in the secondary school of Kwala. The farming project in the 
secondary school of Kwala originated by the will of the sponsor in cooperation with 
one of the teachers of the school can demonstrate that students could be successful 
with the right inputs and knowledge of agriculture, and does not need to be a burden. 
Initially met with scepticism by the students, it grew in popularity after the first 
vegetable harvest, proving that after seeing the first positive results, projects are 
welcomed and self-confidence increases. The students also had the opportunity to 
visit some small scale farms and meet farmers that have made of agriculture a 
successful activity and managed to increase productivity by using resources in 
innovative ways, for example by using drop irrigation and plant spacing techniques.  
Finally, another topic that deserves deeper analysis is the role of electoral 
participation as a tool to understand farmers’ engagement in politics. I was living in 
Coast region during the last elections in 2010, and witnessed the local atmosphere 
and the general discussions at local level. Electoral turnout was recorded at around 
39%, and saw the victory of the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party with more than 
60% of the vote and the absolute majority of the seats in the National Assembly (263 
out of 357). The CCM has been in power since independence as the opposition 
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parties do not have strong political programs and enough resources to raise consent 
during electoral campaigns. Nevertheless, the statistical data collected refer to the 
national level and it was difficult to find data on a specific section of the population, 
for example farmers or for the specific areas interviewed. The farmers interviewed 
did not seem comfortable in answering specific questions about their participation in 
elections, sometimes because they had little knowledge of the dynamic of politics 
and political parties and other times because they did not want to talk about who they 
had been voted for (if indeed they had). Hence the interviews concentrated more on 
attitudes towards direct confrontation and willingness to be part of a group. Clearly 
electoral turnout is an important indicator of political participation, but it also needs 
to be said that electoral participation, in a country where the democratic process is 
still ongoing, needs to be contextualised. In the elections of 2010, I witnessed the 
large number of ‘giveaways’ people received during electoral campaign and during 
the day of the vote itself, in the village of Kwala. Women were wearing kangas
54
 
with CCM prints, men were wearing hats with the same print. All you could see in 
the village were CCM leaflets and it was not hard to predict who the winner of the 
election would be. Nevertheless I couldn’t but ask myself, can a vote in these 
circumstances be interpreted as an indicator of political interest? This question 
remains open to further research, especially in view of the next elections planned in 
October 2015, the fifth elections to be held since the introduction of multi-party 
system in 1992. 
 
 
 
                                                          
54 A piece of clothing largely worn by women in Tanzania. 
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Appendix 2 
 
List of interviewees 1 
 
 
 
FARMERS INTERVIEWED 
NAME   SEX LOCATION GROUP DATE 
R.K. F Kwala  1 September-December 2012 
E. M. M Kwala  1 September-December 2012 
Mr I. M Kwala  2 September-December 2012 
Pi. F Kwala  2 September-December 2012 
P.M. M Kwala  2 September-December 2012 
R. J. M Kwala  2 September-December 2012 
C. M Kwala  2 September-December 2012 
unknown F Kwala  2 September-December 2012 
D. D. M Mongomole 1 September-December 2012 
N. M. M Mongomole 1 September-December 2012 
A. N. M Mongomole 1 September-December 2012 
P. F Mwembengozi 3 September-December 2012 
S. K. M Dutumi 1 September-December 2012 
A. Ki. F Dutumi 2 September-December 2012 
S. O. M Dutumi 2 September-December 2012 
A. K. M Kwala  2 September-December 2012 
S' aunt F Kwala  2 September-December 2012 
S’mum F Kwala  3 September-December 2012 
A. C. M Kwala  2 September-December 2012 
K. M Kwala  2 September-December 2012 
A. P. M Kwala  3 September-December 2012 
D. K. M Kwala  3 September-December 2012 
H. Z. M Kwala  1 September-December 2012 
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E. M. M Mperamumbi 2 September-December 2012 
S. S. F isolated area 
near 
Mperamumbi 
and Msua 
3 September-December 2012 
S. H. F isolated area 
near 
Mperamumbi 
and Msua 
3 September-December 2012 
T. M. M isolated area 
near 
Mperamumbi 
and Msua 
3 September-December 2012 
Z. L. M isolated area 
near 
Mperamumbi 
and Msua 
3 September-December 2012 
S. M. M isolated area 
near 
Mperamumbi 
and Msua 
3 September-December 2012 
K. M. M isolated area 
near 
Mperamumbi 
and Msua 
3 September-December 2012 
N. Z. M isolated area 
near 
Mperamumbi 
and Msua 
3 September-December 2012 
R. A. F isolated area 
near 
Mperamumbi 
and Msua 
3 September-December 2012 
P. Z. F isolated area 
near 
Mperamumbi 
and Msua 
3 September-December 2012 
L. V. M isolated area 
near 
Mperamumbi 
and Msua 
3 September-December 2012 
E. M isolated area 
near 
Mperamumbi 
and Msua 
3 September-December 2012 
S. M. M Dutumi 2 September-December 2012 
P. L. M  Dutumi 2 September-December 2012 
I. R. M Dutumi 3 September-December 2012 
H. B. F Dutumi 2 September-December 2012 
A. M. M Dutumi 2 September-December 2012 
M. Ko. M Dutumi 2 September-December 2012 
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R. T. M Dutumi 3 September-December 2012 
A. T. M Dutumi 2 September-December 2012 
R. H. M Dutumi 2 September-December 2012 
S. R. F Dutumi 2 September-December 2012 
A. H. M Dutumi 3 September-December 2012 
S. K. M Dutumi 2 September-December 2012 
A. M. F Dutumi 2 September-December 2012 
A. S. M Dutumi 3 September-December 2012 
A. K. M Dutumi 2 September-December 2012 
A. B. M Dutumi 3 September-December 2012 
S. L. M Dutumi 3 September-December 2012 
M. K. M Dutumi 2 September-December 2012 
T. B. M Dutumi 2 September-December 2012 
A. T. M Mwembengozi 2 September-December 2012 
F. M. M Mwembengozi 2 September-December 2012 
A. S. F Mwembengozi 3 September-December 2012 
S. S. M. M Mwembengozi 2 September-December 2012 
A. M. M Mwembengozi 2 September-December 2012 
R. S. M Mwembengozi 3 September-December 2012 
A. F. F Mwembengozi 3 September-December 2012 
S. S. M Mwembengozi 3 September-December 2012 
A. M. M Msua 2 September-December 2012 
S. R. F Msua 2 September-December 2012 
S. K. M Msua 3 September-December 2012 
F. M. M Msua 2 September-December 2012 
J. S. M Msua 3 September-December 2012 
S. F. F Msua 3 September-December 2012 
S. M. F Msua 2 September-December 2012 
M. R. F Msua 3 September-December 2012 
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P. M. F Msua 3 September-December 2012 
A. O. F Msua 3 September-December 2012 
J. C. M Msua 1 September-December 2012 
R. Z. M Kwala  2 September-December 2012 
R. T. M Kwala  2 September-December 2012 
H. F. M Kwala  3 September-December 2012 
K. J. F Kwala  3 September-December 2012 
O. A. M Kwala  2 September-December 2012 
F. J. F Kwala  3 September-December 2012 
J. M. F Kwala  2 September-December 2012 
A. M. F Kwala  2 September-December 2012 
Miss J. F Kwala  2 September-December 2012 
Mr M. M Kwala  2 September-December 2012 
Unknown M Kwala  2 September-December 2012 
Mr 
Kimicho 
M Kwala  1 September-December 2012 
A. H. F Kwala  2 September-December 2012 
Mr Z. M Dutumi 1 September-December 2012 
P. S. F Mwembengozi 1 September-December 2012 
A. M. F Kigare 2 July-September 2013 
K. H. M Kigare 3 July-September 2013 
Mw. F Kigare 2 July-September 2013 
M. R. F Kigare 2 July-September 2013 
R. H. F Kigare 3 July-September 2013 
R. A. Ms. M Kigare 2 July-September 2013 
M.A. Ms. M Kigare 2 July-September 2013 
H. R. M Kigare 2 July-September 2013 
M. R. F Kigare 3 July-September 2013 
N. K. M Kigare 3 July-September 2013 
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H. C. M Kigare 2 July-September 2013 
F. M. F Kigare 2 July-September 2013 
B. R. M Kigare 2 July-September 2013 
N. F Kigare 3 July-September 2013 
A.S. M. F Kigare 2 July-September 2013 
K. S. M Kigare 2 July-September 2013 
M.A.M. M Kigare 2 July-September 2013 
A.H. K. M Kigare 2 July-September 2013 
H. S. F Kigare 2 July-September 2013 
S. I. I. F Kigare 2 July-September 2013 
A. K. M Kigare 2 July-September 2013 
F. M. F Kigare 2 July-September 2013 
A.I. D. M Kigare 1 July-September 2013 
J.M. M Makandeni - 
Usangi 
2 July-September 2013 
A.I. F Makandeni - 
Usangi 
2 July-September 2013 
F.S. F Makandeni - 
Usangi 
2 July-September 2013 
A.H.S. M Makandeni - 
Usangi 
3 July-September 2013 
H.A.K. M Makandeni - 
Usangi 
3 July-September 2013 
H.A.M. M Makandeni - 
Usangi 
3 July-September 2013 
R.A. F Makandeni - 
Usangi 
3 July-September 2013 
O. M. M Makandeni - 
Usangi 
2 July-September 2013 
H. F Makandeni - 
Usangi 
2 July-September 2013 
M.A. F Makandeni - 
Usangi 
2 July-September 2013 
V. J. M Makandeni - 
Usangi 
2 July-September 2013 
I. K. M Makandeni - 
Usangi 
2 July-September 2013 
S. M. F Makandeni - 
Usangi 
1 July-September 2013 
A. S. F Makandeni - 
Usangi 
2 July-September 2013 
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Appendix 3 
 
List of interviewees 2 
 
 
POLITICIANS, AGRIBUSINESSES, NGOs AND INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION REPRESENTATIVES INTERVIEWED 
 
NAME ROLE/ORGANIZATION  DATE 
Ferdinand Rwehumbiza WFP International 
Organization 
July-
September 
2013 
Marina Negroponte WFP International 
Organization 
July-
September 
2013 
Sebastian Sambuo RUDI NGO July-
September 
2013 
David Rohraback World Bank International 
Organization 
July-
September 
2013 
Fanuel Kalendo Office of PM Disaster 
Management Department 
Government July-
September 
2013 
Valerian Kidole Ministry of Agriculture - 
Department of Food 
Security  
Government July-
September 
2013 
Ramashani S. Zanda Chairperson of irrigation 
Scheme project in 
Mongomole - Kwala 
local - kibaha Sept.-Dec. 
2012 
July-
September 
2013 
Oswald Mashindano Senior researcher at ESRF 
and Economic Lecturer at 
the University of Dar es 
Salaam 
Research 
institution 
July-
September 
2013 
Lukas Botha Lonagro Private 
company 
July-
September 
2013 
Luca Scarpa NTC  NGO Sept.-Dec. 
2012 
July-
September 
2013 
David Legge  Mining Agriculture 
Construction Limited 
Private 
Company 
July-
September 
2013 
Raphael Laizer FAO International 
Organization 
July-
September 
2013 
Abdul Kadege Kigare Ward Councellor local - Mwanga July-
September 
2013 
Reis A. Doyle Chairperson of Kigare local - Mwanga July-
September 
2013 
Rashidi Vitusi Chairperson of 
Mperamumbi 
local - kibaha Sept.-Dec. 
2012 
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Ashura Hussein Politicians of Mperamumbi 
- area representative 
local - kibaha Sept.-Dec. 
2012 
Mr Kimicho Extension officer of Kwala local - kibaha Sept.-Dec. 
2012 
Kassim Msemakweli Chairperson of Kwala local - kibaha Sept.-Dec. 
2012 
Kakweke C. Zulu Extension and veterinary 
officer of Dutumi 
local - kibaha Sept.-Dec. 
2012 
Mkali S. Kanusu Chairperson of Dutumi local - kibaha Sept.-Dec. 
2012 
Shabani A. Mwimbe Chairperson of 
Mwembengozi 
local - kibaha Sept.-Dec. 
2012 
Abdul M. Tengeneza Mwembengozi village 
secretary 
local - kibaha Sept.-Dec. 
2012 
Selena Pengo Msua Area representative local - kibaha Sept.-Dec. 
2012 
Pendi A. Semoka Extension officer of 
Mwembengozi 
local - kibaha Sept.-Dec. 
2012 
January Makamba Deputy Minister of 
Communication 
Government July-
September 
2013 
Mwatima Juma IFAD Tanzania Country 
Programme and 
chairperson at TZ Organic 
Movement 
International 
Organization 
July-
September 
2013 
Alex Mangowi DFID in Tanzania International 
Organization 
July-
September 
2013 
Bahati Maregeri TAPP - USAID - 
FINTRAC 
NGO July-
September 
2013 
Abel Kinyondo REPOA Government July-
September 
2013 
Mt Mtembo Director of Department of 
Food Security 
Government July-
September 
2013 
Malema Crop Production Services Government July-
September 
2013 
Ambaeli Lemweli Assistant director crop 
monitoring and early 
warning 
Government July-
September 
2013 
Justa Katunzi acting assistant director of 
Extension service 
Government July-
September 
2013 
Michael Mayabu seeds and subsidies 
agricultural inputs 
Government July-
September 
2013 
Clepin Josephat Food security Department Government July-
September 
2013 
Revelian Ngaiza Ministry of Agriculture 
Food Security and 
Cooperatives - Department 
f Policy and Planning  
Government July-
September 
2013 
Nancy Kihara District Livestock officer - 
Kibaha 
Kibaha District July-
September 
2013 
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Mr Kulos Vet officer - Kibaha 
District 
Kibaha District July-
September 
2013 
Mr Joseph Livestock and agricultural 
officer 
Kibaha District July-
September 
2013 
Gabriel Hango Accountant Kibaha District July-
September 
2013 
Michael Euzebio  Fisheries officer Kibaha District July-
September 
2013 
Mama Kuayu nutritional officer Kibaha District July-
September 
2013 
Mama Mganua Irrigation Officer Kibaha District July-
September 
2013 
Sihaba O. Singa District Agricultural 
Livestock development 
Officer 
Kibaha District July-
September 
2013 
Josephine Amollo Juma Principal Agricultural 
officer 
Government July-
September 
2013 
Mathew A. Ngwahi Feed the Children Tanzania  NGO July-
September 
2013 
Mr Singida officer Mwanga 
District 
July-
September 
2013 
Mr Michael Officer Mwanga 
District 
July-
September 
2013 
Andreas Joseph Officer Mwanga district July-
September 
2013 
Anthony Mbeela Officer Mwanga 
District 
July-
September 
2013 
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Appendix 4 
Examples of households’ classification 
Kilimanjaro region: 
Group 1 (wealthy households) 
A. I. D., (man, 77 years old) has eight children, but only one of them lives with him and his 
wife (he helps in the farm). He has one and a half acres of land where he cultivates bananas, 
and two acres where he cultivates maize. He never sells and he never buys food, he 
exchanges some of it for other crops such as sugar. They eat ugali,
55
 beans, bananas, and 
meat sometimes. He claims that the food is enough to satisfy the needs of the household, he 
harvests enough and he stores the harvest in order to use it during the whole year. He has 
two cows and several chickens; his house is made of bricks and has electricity, a water tap 
and a biogas system that he uses to cook. The manure of the cow is used in the biogas 
system. The ability of storage is particularly important, and not common to most farmers in 
rural Tanzania. This is one of the reasons why this household has been considered wealthy 
and less vulnerable than others to food insecurity.  
 
Group 2 (poor but resilient households) 
F. M., (woman, 53 years old). She has five children, but only one is still living with her and 
her husband, and helps her in the farm. They have two acres of land where they plant maize, 
bananas and yams (for own consumption and for sale). She claims that the food is not 
enough because of wild animals and pests, although they usually eat three times per day, 
mostly ugali. To be able to buy the food that they need they do some petty business, for 
example buying beans in the city and re-selling it in the village. She is also part of a 
microfinance group, so in case of emergencies she can borrow some money that she will 
                                                          
55 A dish made of white maize flour cooked with water to a dough-like consistency (no salt or 
spices added). 
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have to give it back with interest. They also have two cows for milk and manure, two ducks 
and several chickens. Sometimes they sell the animals. The house is made of mud, with 
laminated roof, a water tap outside the house but they have no electricity. Although 
diversification of food remains a problem and her declaration of food not being enough to 
satisfy the needs of the family, this household can be considered less vulnerable to food 
insecurity than others because of the amount of resources owned (such as animals) and the 
petty business and microfinance activities that provide the household with some extra 
income in periods of needs and bad harvest. 
 
Group 3 (poor and very poor households – highly vulnerable to food insecurity) 
J. M., (woman, 66 years old) lives alone, as her husband and children have died. She lives in 
a house made of bricks, with laminated roof, and a water tap in the proximity of the house, 
she has several chickens, which she mainly uses for the eggs. She has two acres of land, 
borrowed from a friend. She cultivates beans, yams, potatoes and bananas, but because of 
her old age, unreliable rain and bad quality seeds she claims that she does not harvest 
enough for herself to eat or to sell to buy other staples. She eats three times per day, mostly 
ugali and bananas, and she gets the money to purchase maize flour by her two brothers that 
work in Arusha. Despite the structure of the house, this household is considered vulnerable 
because of the old age of the woman (inability to provide for herself), and the lack of 
ownership on the land she cultivates, and the reliance on aid from family members to 
survive. 
 
Coast region: 
Group 1 (wealthy households) 
A. P. N. (man, mid 40s). His household is composed of five people (including three 
children). He has over 20 acres of land, but he doesn’t cultivate all of them. He cultivates 
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about 10 acres, with rice, maize, fruits and vegetables (water melons, pumpkin, okra, 
chillies, and spinaches). However, they mainly eat ugali and beans (that they buy from the 
village). They hunt meat in the bushes. There is enough food according to Alfred, as he sells 
most of what he produces (he does not have a storage facility to store it). He invests what he 
saves to improve his farm, for example he has been able to buy his own tractor, although he 
struggles to purchase the spare parts and the petrol. He has a motorbike so he can transport 
his crops to Dar es Salaam market, or can go to the near town to purchase the inputs he 
needs. His house is made of bricks, with laminated roof. There is no electricity and no water 
tap nearby (he irrigates by fetching the water in Mongomole, about three kilometres away). 
Despite food diversification remains a problem, and he is forced to sell part of his produce to 
buy it later at a higher price, he has a large amount of assets (motorbike and tractor) and land 
that allow him to produce a discrete amount of vegetables that he can sell, making him less 
vulnerable to food insecurity and better off than many other farmers in this area. 
 
Group 2 (poor but resilient households) 
A. C. (man, over 50). There are six people in the household, all farm, except three children 
that are too young and go to school. They have two acres where they only cultivate rice. The 
food is not enough, according to A.C. They sell the rice after the harvest because they lack a 
storage facility to store it, and they buy maize flour which is cheaper than rice on the local 
market. They mainly eat ugali and beans, three times per day. His wife also cooks in the 
village and sells meals. They have some chickens, and sometimes they sell them if they need 
more money. Their house has laminated roof, it is made of mud and it is plastered. No 
electricity and no water. The income gathered from catering for other people is a 
determinant in making this household less vulnerable to food insecurity than households 
classified as belonging to Group 3.  
 
 
 
390 
Group 3 (poor and very poor households) 
S. S. (woman, under 30 years old). She lives in a household with her husband, two children 
and her husband’s parents. Only her and her husband farm. They have three acres, cultivated 
with maize, vegetables and sorghum. They usually eat twice a day, ugali or rice, and beans. 
The harvest is scarce because of the weather, so she also makes charcoal in order to buy the 
food that her household needs. Sometimes they sell the vegetables in a nearby village. They 
live in a house made of mud that has thatched roof. Despite having three acres of land, this 
family is very vulnerable to food insecurity; the income from making charcoal is not reliable 
and does not seem to help cover even the basic needs of the household.   
 
